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     ABSTRACT 
 
 
 The primary focus of this study is the analysis of constitutional amendment-
making processes following transitions from authoritarian regimes. Based on an 
extended longitudinal comparative case study of Chile and Turkey, the body of the 
work focuses on the experience of constitution-making during military rule and 
amendment-making following the transition to elected civilian governments. While 
both countries suffered a breakdown of democracy and ensuing new military-imposed 
constitutions, their amendment-making processes after the restoration of democracy 
were quite different. Chile developed a largely consensual approach while Turkey 
moved increasingly toward dissonance and confrontation.  
 Extensive field research and personal interviews in both countries found that 
the procedural rigidity of amendment-making processes is insufficient to explain the 
extent and direction of constitutional change adopted under elected civilians after the 
	   	  	   	   	   	   	  vii 
transition from military rule (Chile in 2005, Turkey in 2010). Therefore a central 
feature of this study is the development of an analytical framework to explore both 
demand and supply side factors. This framework deconstructs the amendment making 
mechanism by examining such demand-side factors as shifts in the balance of power; 
societal forces and external actors; political, social and cultural context; 
characteristics of the constitution; and constitutional tradition. Supply-side factors 
addressed are the procedural and informal institutional elements, including the role of 
veto powers; informational constraints; and the content of the proposed amendments 
themselves. 
 This dissertation contributes to the expanding literature on authoritarian 
constitutions and amendment-making processes and breaks new ground by 
systematically comparing the experience of Chile and Turkey, as key actors attempted 
to gradually amend their military-imposed constitutions. The different outcomes in 
these two cases, this study argues, were shaped by variations in historical context, the 
balance of power, the number of veto players, and different incentives for reform, i.e., 
the reassertion of democratic practices in Chile and a reactive response to political 
and constitutional crises in Turkey. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 There is a growing interest on the impact of different design processes on 
constitutional outcomes. Every year, approximately ten countries are engaging in drafting 
a new constitution and many more are considering and enacting amendments (Elkins, 
Ginsburg, and Melton 2011). Following the Arab Spring, Egypt went through two 
processes of constitution-making. Tunisia’s new constitution is regarded as a progressive 
text, born out of a process characterized by dialogue but also tension. Japanese 
government is eager to amend the constitution that would potentially allow its military to 
engage in overseas combat. Bolivia’s Morales sought out to run for another term by 
amending the constitution, only to be defeated at the polls. Constitutional amendments 
are under way in France that would revoke the nationality of dual nationals that are 
convicted of terrorism and constitutionalize state of emergency- a reaction to November 
2015 attacks. Scholars of constitution-making are observing current drafting and 
amending processes, paying particular attention to which actors are involved, their 
motivations, and how they formulate, decide and approve a text.  
1.1 Research Question 
 This dissertation concerns the processes by which constitutions are made and 
changed. It examines the constitution-making and amending processes in Chile and 
Turkey. The primary research question that this study addresses is the following: How 
does a country reform an authoritarian constitution through democratic process? Both 
Chile and Turkey are intriguing cases of transitions from military rule to electoral 
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democracy. In both, the military left power after imposing new constitutions. The 
incoming civilian regimes faced the daunting task of operating under constitutions with 
authoritarian features, while keeping the military in the barracks and trying to move 
towards a consolidated democracy. In both countries, these inherited constitutions are 
still in force, although reformed exhaustively under civilian governments.  
 This study intends to identify the push and pull factors in constitutional reform, to 
explain the decisions to amend rather than to replace the constitutions, and to examine 
both the scope and the consequences of post-transition constitutional change. How can a 
constitution serve both democrats and authoritarians? The fact that “democrats” maintain 
an authoritarian constitution is indicative of the constitution’s capacity to accommodate 
democratic practices or the inclination of “democrats” to abide by an authoritarian 
framework? To what extent the content of the constitution and the context of transition 
from authoritarian rule play into the decision to replace or retain the constitutional 
framework? Is it possible to democratize an authoritarian constitution by piecemeal 
constitutional change rather than constitutional replacement? What factors affect the 
amendment-making process and the direction of constitutional change? 
 Rested on these questions is the empirical puzzle of constitutional change 
experienced in Chile and Turkey following the transition from military rule. The 
dissertation investigates the process by which the breakdown of democracy have led to 
military takeovers, the process by which the authoritarian constitutions were drafted and 
approved, the characteristics of the authoritarian constitutions inherited by the elected 
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civilians, the process by which civilian governments amended the authoritarian 
constitution. 
1.2 Case Selection: Comparing Chile and Turkey 
 The dissertation offers a comparative and longitudinal analysis of Chile and 
Turkey. Both cases have constitutions drafted under military regime, have emerged from 
periods of military rule in the 1980s and have maintained but amended the authoritarian 
constitutions, which were produced under military rule. The study is grounded on a 
within and across case study of constitutional change in Chile and Turkey. Although the 
pairing may seem rather strange, the parallels between the two cases have caught the 
attention of other scholars as well (see Arato 2014 and Ginsburg 2014). Hirschl (2014, 
226) drawing attentions to problems with inference-oriented case-selection in 
constitutional studies, offers certain principles with case selection and research design. 
As an example of a solid case selection based on “most different case” principle, Hirschl 
(2014, 254) suggests comparing Chile and Turkey on the account that these countries 
have “similar history of military authoritarianism and fragile transition to democracy” but 
differ in all other relevant aspects such as geography, social and cultural tendencies and 
political circumstances.1 Recent scholarships on constitutional change are based on either 
large-N studies (see Etkins et. al 2009 and Widner 2008) or single-case studies (see 
Oliver and Fusaro 2011 and Contiades 2013). Problem with having large number of cases 
when studying constitutional change is that it only allows the analysts to observe the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Hirschl (2014, 254) suggests using these two countries as leading cases for a study on the effects of 
history of authoritarianism on constitutional courts’ attitude toward “political question” doctrine. 
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effect of “procedural rules and the distribution of partisan power on amendments” 
(Negretto 2012, 58). Thus, in order to trace the impact of political, social and cultural 
context on constitutional change as well as the incentives and interests of relevant 
political actors, individual case studies offer a more comprehensive account. Such 
analysis, based on process-tracing methodology allows ivestigators to identify the 
sequence of events that effect whether constitutional changes takes place as a response to 
a crisis or a shift in the context (Negretto 2011, 1802).  
While countries such as Spain, Brazil, South Africa, and recently Egypt and 
Tunisia engaged in constitution-making as part of the general framework of transition to 
democracy, Turkey and Chile did not opt for constitutional replacement. The 1980 
Chilean Constitution required that in 1988 the military regime would appoint a 
presidential candidate for the next eight years who would be subject to approval by a 
plebiscite. The opposition-led a coalition of political parties called Concertación por el 
No, chose to accept the rules of the game set up by the military junta and campaigned in 
1988 against the election of the junta’s candidate, General Augusto Pinochet. The result 
was the defeat of Pinochet and thus of the armed forces.2 The victorious Concertación 
then called for reforms of the 1980 constitution, which the military allowed. The 
agreement between the military government, the right-wing parties and center-left 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Although the 1988 plebiscite did not result in Pinochet’s favor to extend his term for another eight years, 
the No vote was not overwhelming at 55.99%, suggesting that the military retained significant popular 
support. 
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coalition, paved the way for limited reform of the military imposed constitution in 19893 
but without changing its underlying constitutional character.4   
The Turkish military, although agreeing to voluntarily transfer power to civilians 
through elections, controlled the transition process as well. In 1982, the military-drafted 
Turkish Constitution was presented to a public referendum. By approving the text, the 
public also confirmed the presidency of Kenan Evren, the leader of the military regime, 
for a seven-year term.5  The president was endowed with vast powers, including a veto 
over constitutional amendments, which could only be overridden with a three-fourths 
majority of Parliament. Political bans on former leaders were not lifted until 
constitutional amendments in 1987. 
 In effect, even though civilians were back in power, in both Chile and Turkey, 
they were left with constitutions drafted under their military establishments, a major goal 
of which was to provide political and economic protection to the outgoing military and to 
maintain their influence over everyday politics. Even with the limited constitutional 
reforms of 1989, the Chilean constitution, like its Turkish counterpart, provided a 
significant ongoing role for the armed forces.6  In the immediate aftermath of the 
restoration of civilian rule, these new civilian governments chose not to pursue the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 One of these reforms was the easing of the amendment process. As it is, the 1980 Chilean constitution had 
more formal obstacles to revision than the 1982 Turkish constitution. 
4 In a way, the decision of the civilians to agree to an improved but nevertheless imposed Constitution 
inherited by the military regime simply “whitewashed” the constitution (Moulian 1997 as quoted in Uggla 
2002). 
5 The constitution passed with 91.37% of the votes. 
6 Montes and Via (2005) argue that the amendments brought by the 1989 constitutional reforms were not 
very significant and did not affect the course of transition to democracy. 
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replacement of existing military-imposed constitutions.  Unlike the Spanish case, where 
the constitution-making process that helped consolidate democracy took place under 
civilian leadership during the transition itself,7 in Chile and Turkey, the constitutions 
adopted during the military regimes were reformed rather than rewritten. 
Having established the transitional formula within the constitutional framework, 
upsetting the terms set by the military was not a risk that civilians were willing to take. 
As a result, Augusto Pinochet- the leader of the Chilean junta, would remain as 
commander-in-chief after the end of his presidency in 1990 until 1998. In similar fashion, 
in Turkey, Kenan Evren- the leader of the military regime there, would continue his 
presidential term until 1989. Under these constraints, reforming constitutions was going 
to be an arduous process. Yet over the years both constitutions went through lengthy and 
complex processes of reform. The most extensive reform, which eliminated almost all of 
the “authoritarian enclaves”, took place in 2005 for Chile. The constitutional changes of 
1995, 2001 and 2004 in Turkey reformed the “tutelary institutions” and expanded rights 
and liberties. These constitutional reform initiatives were not the products of a crisis or 
exceptional circumstances. Thus, I will address this lengthy amendment process that both 
Chilean and Turkish constitutions underwent by asking the following question: How can 
a democratic state overcome the authoritarian features of a constitution and the 
constitutional legacy of an authoritarian regime while avoiding constitutional 
breakdown?  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 For more on Spain’s constitution-making process, see Andrea Bonime Blanc. 1987. Spain’s Transition to 
Democracy: The Politics of Constitution-Making, Westview Press: Boulder and London. 
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This study intends to contribute to the literature by providing a better 
understanding of the causes, scope, and consequences of the constitution-making and 
reform process, more specifically in the aftermath of transition to democracy. Although 
there is a rich literature on the circumstances of transition and the aftermath of the 
transition in terms of civil-military relations, there is only a very limited literature on the 
constitution-making process and outcome in post-transition countries.8 Focusing on the 
aftermath of transition to democracy in countries that experienced interruption of 
democracy by military takeovers and examining the constitutional transformation that 
followed after the return to civilian rule, this study investigates the constitution-making 
and reform processes in Turkey and Chile. These case studies provide an analysis of the 
elements of constitution-making and amending process that come as a legal response to 
past regimes but also seek long-term transformative goals.  
Despite the similarities in terms of authoritarian constitution-making, pacted 
transition to democracy, inheriting constitution with authoritarian features that will 
ensure “protected democracy”, Chile and Turkey’s prolonged path of amending the 
constitution have differed in terms of the nature of amendment-making process and the 
extent of constitutional reform. Explaining the variation between these two cases as well 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Elster (2000, 346) argues that while comparative constitutional law, comparative study of ordinary 
lawmaking and comparative study of revolutions are very extensive fields, “comparative study of 
constitution-making is non-existent”. However, it is an expanding field and there are a number of recent 
works that deal with constitution-making process, See Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton (2009), Faffard and 
Reid (1991), Goldwin and Kaufman (1988) but these are not directly related to constitution-making in the 
aftermath of return to civilian rule. One such example of constitution-making as part of transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy is the work by Andrea Bonime-Blanc (1987) on Spanish constitution-
making experience. Gonenc’s book (2002) on the likelihood of constitutionalism in Eastern European 
countries also devotes much discussion on constitution-making process as part of the transition process in 
the former Soviet states.  
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as variation within cases, this dissertation attempts to identify the factors that contribute 
to constitutional change. Moreover, today as both countries are considering constitutional 
replacements, a study on constitutional change that will explore the causes, scope and 
consequences of amendments will help shed light on the current debate on constitutional 
replacement.  
1.3 Literature Review and Definitions 
A constitution is the highest level of lawmaking and intends to provide a long-
term guideline for the state. In its broadest sense, a constitution is the set of rules that 
determines the system of government within that particular state. It sets out how that state 
will be organized by deciding the powers and functions of government between different 
political units and by stating the basic law-making and structural principles of state and 
society.  
In one of the most cited definitions of constitutions, S.E. Finer (1979, 15) 
describes constitutions as “codes of rules, which aspire to regulate the allocation of 
functions, powers and duties among the various agencies and offices of government, and 
define the relationships between these and the public”. Constitutions serve a variety of 
purposes and therefore have a number of functions. Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton (2009, 
38-39) outline three functions of constitutions. First there is the constitutionalist function; 
constitutions restrict the behavior of governments through the set of inalienable principles 
and specific provisions they generate, which future laws and government activities must 
conform to. Constitutions also serve a symbolic function; a constitution defines the nation 
and its goal, enshrines common values for the political unit and establishes a raison d'état 
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for the country. In a way, the constitution also serves a state-building function since it 
outlines the legitimacy of the state and its aspirations, bringing together different 
fractions of the society. Lastly, constitutions have a functional role; they define systems 
of authority and sets of government institutions. A constitution is essentially the 
organizational map for the functioning of the state and its governmental units.9 
Constitutions generate incentives to comply with the rules (Alberts 2009). While 
theoretical works on constitutions suppose such noble functions, one fear is that 
constitutions might simply be tools to serve short-term political motives of actors 
involved, rather than the public interest. For example, Landau (2012) demonstrates that 
constitutional moments in Venezuela (1999) and Bolivia (2006-2009) were merely acts to 
carry out political goals. Thus, the discussion on whether any constitution lives up to 
expectations of being a higher form of lawmaking requires an analysis of how the 
constitution-making process takes place. 
1.3.1 Constitution-making process 
A constitution determines the principles upon which the state is based, establishes 
government institutions, guides the relationship between these institutions, sets up checks 
between them, standardizes the way laws are made, and lastly and arguably most 
importantly, defines the relationship between individuals and the state, especially with 
regard to citizens’ rights and freedoms. Historically, constitutions have served these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 There are a variety of attributes to the functions constitutions have. Rasch and Congleton (2006: 539) 
come up with a list of four objectives specific for democratic constitutions: establishing collective decision-
making routines, advancing majority interests, protecting minority rights and providing stability and 
flexibility to the constitutional system. Breslin (2009) focuses attention on seven functions: transforming 
existing orders, conveying collective aspirations, designing institutions, mediating conflict, recognizing 
claims of subnational communities, empowering social actors, and constraining governmental authority. 
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purposes albeit with differences in terms of how much attention is devoted to each. The 
literature on constitutional design focuses on the different systems of government and 
their impact on stability, endurance, and democratic performance.  Yet, the constitution-
making process is as important as constitutional design, meaning that the context in 
which the constitutional rules are made and the manner in which they are produced are as 
decisive as the choices made for the rules that regulate the institutions of the state and the 
relationship between state and citizens. The process by which a country adopts and/or 
reforms its constitution affects the underlying legitimacy of that constitution and 
therefore its endurance, enforceability and representativeness. 
While the roles and functions of the constitution and the substantive contents of 
each can be studied by examining the constitution itself,10 the process by which these 
roles and functions were set out requires in-depth analysis. But does the method of 
constitution making matter? Years after Jon Elster first drew attention to the field of 
constitutional design and constitution-making process, scholars in the field agree that the 
process of constitution-making, i.e., “the conditions and rules under which founders 
write, deliberate, and ratify” matter (Ginsburg, Elkins, Blount 2009). Yet, there is still no 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Here I am referring to written constitutions, also known as “codified”, “textual” and “formal” 
constitution, what Professor Anthony King calls ‘constitutions with a capital C’. The written text is not the 
same as broader constitutional order of a country, “constitution with a small c’. The latter refers to the 
totality of “super-statutes,” decisions of judges and agencies, and informal institutions (Elkins, Ginsburg, 
Melton 2011). The extra-textual constitutions are mostly outside the scope of this dissertation project. 
Another point to consider is the proposition that constitutions are of little value for the reason that there 
might be a gap between what it says in the written document and what really happens in practice. Although 
it is true that those who exercise power may not follow what the constitution dictates, the “constitution with 
a capital C” provides an understanding of what actually happens in that particular state. Lutz (1994) also 
notes that constitutions do not always reflect “the full reality of an operating political system” but he also 
acknowledges that “today any political system, dictatorial or democratic, fails to reflect political change in 
its constitution” and therefore maintains that constitutions are essentially “windows into that underlying 
reality” (355). 
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consensus on the link between process and outcome and no agreement on to what extent 
constitution-making matters. 
Bonime-Blanc (2010) postulates that since “constitution-making at its best is a 
comprehensive attempt at social and political solving and conflict resolution,” examining 
such an intense process reveals details about the future regime and the domestic political 
relations. In one study, Carey (2009) examines the link between what the constitution sets 
out to determine and the nature of the constitution-making process. Relying on the data 
from the Comparative Constitution Project, Carey finds that democracy is identified as 
one of the constitutional ideals in 76% of all constitutions since 1789. His findings 
demonstrate that the inclusiveness of constitution-making process is conducive to higher 
levels of democracy. From a normative perspective Arato (1995, 191) argues that it is 
crucial that the process of creating the rules of the game be democratic, considering that 
most of the constitutions set out the rules of the democratic politics.  
But what happens when the existing system is constrained with authoritarian rules 
and procedures? Can we expect such a system to produce a democratic process? Elster 
(1997) argues that to achieve a constitution with democratic substance, the process by 
which it is adopted must also be democratic. He concedes that it is possible to find 
democratic constitutions established in a non-democratic manner but he does not believe 
that a democratic constitution-making process could result in a non-democratic text.11  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Arato (1995) cites the example of French Fourth Republic’s foundational process that saw the 
establishment of Constituent Assembly, which prepared a constitution that was approved through 
referendum, after the first one was rejected. According to him, the process was procedurally democratic but 
nevertheless the rules that created the process were not arrived at democratically. The electoral law that led 
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Democracy is not necessarily the only ideal or goal toward which constitutions 
aim to contribute. Carey (2009) identifies two other ideals: temperance and durability. 
According to him, constitutions, by creating a division of power, aim to impose self-
restraint on office holders, limiting power to ensure that unilateral decisions will not take 
over politics, and promoting deliberation and moderation. He defines such an ideal as 
temperance and argues that increasing the number of actors involved in constitution 
drafting and enacting increases the likelihood that the outcome will generate more formal 
constraints on governments. Investigating sixty-seven constitution-making moments 
between 1990 and 2005, Carey demonstrates that when actors participating in the 
constitution-making are freely elected, the result is effective constraints on executives. In 
regards to durability, again Carey’s findings indicate that inclusive constitutional 
moments lead to stability. He suggests that this might be explained by the citizens’ 
espousal of the text and consequently their commitment to it. Another alternative 
explanation he proposes is that in constitutional moments where the number and variety 
of actors that participate is high, amendment-making rules might be rigid.  
Moreover there is growing interest in the constitution-making process as it serves 
the purpose of promoting consolidation of peace after conflict, whether this involves civil 
war or outside occupation.  Constitution-making and reform is central to “rebuilding or 
strengthening state and political systems” in war-torn countries and helps in “securing a 
durable peace—particularly if it entails an inclusive process that leads to the creation of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
to the creation of assembly government was prepared by the provisional government instituted after the 
liberation of France and provided for proportional vote, which was the first time for France. 
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consensus-based road map for a more just economic, political, and social order” (Brandt 
et. al 2011). Research conducted by Ingeborg Friedl (2010) aims to answer why some 
constitution making processes lead to durable peace while others do not. The research 
demonstrates that a representative and participatory constitution making process is 
extremely helpful at recognizing the roots of the conflict and building peace but the 
author does not address whether the process leads to democratization, arguing that peace 
and democracy may not always be compatible. Samuels (2006) holds that a constitution-
making process that is representative and/or participatory is essentially a forum that 
provides for a negotiated transition where issues that led to violence can be addressed. 
Such inclusive processes also contribute to reconciliation by offering a chance of 
dialogue that plays a healing role. The study verifies that inclusive constitution-making 
processes lead to constitutions with democratic content that provide for rights of those 
disenfranchised under the previous regime and remedy injustices committed. Samuels 
adds that representative and participatory constitution-making processes result in 
constitutions that are perceived legitimate by citizens and therefore achieve greater 
popular support; however, she does not address whether this leads to constitutional 
stability and durability.  
An important shortcoming of the literature on constitution-making process is the 
absence of concrete results across individual cases, despite the abundance of hypotheses 
that delineate how the process of constitution making leads to certain outcomes 
(Ginsburg Elkins and Blount 2009). As a result of lack of data and disagreement over 
concepts, scholars have not been able to generate large-n studies. Thus, the literature is 
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very much limited to individual case studies. The Constitution Writing and Conflict 
Resolution Project12 and the Comparative Constitution Project13 are two ongoing studies 
that promise to generate additional large-n studies. 
1.3.2 Why Amend Constitutions? 
Written constitutions often outline the means for their own amendment (Dixon 
2011, Lutz 1995, Rasch and Congleton 2006)14. There are a number of mechanisms to 
utilize in the amendment process depending on the effort to make it more or less rigid.15 
Amendment may seem necessary if changes such as new information or a different 
political understanding or experience emerge from society, which require constitutional 
adjustments. Constitutional change becomes necessary in order to reflect political, social, 
and economic transformation and to refine democratic practices. Essentially, 
constitutional amendment is an attempt to correct or improve the existing constitutional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The Constitution Writing and Conflict Resolution Project is directed by Jennifer Widner of Princeton 
University and seeks to provide comprehensive information on constitution writing process. The project 
aims to explain how constitution making impacts certain outcomes, especially conflict resolution. The 
researchers have reviewed 194 cases of constitution drafting between 1975 and July 2003. The project 
contributes to the literature by providing frameworks to study the drafting process based on the data 
gathered. 
13 Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP) is directed by Zackary Elkins (University of Texas, 
Department of Government) and Tom Ginsburg (University of Chicago Law School) and is supported by 
National Science Foundation. Its main goal is to investigate the sources and consequences of constitutional 
change. In order to study constitutional change in an empirical manner, CCP collects data on current and 
historical written constitutions from around the world starting from 1789. This cross-national dataset of 
written constitutions is a great asset for any scholar interested in constitutional law and constitutional 
design.   
14 In 1978 Maarseveen and Van der Tang calculated that less than 4% of all constitutions lacked a provision 
outlining the formal amendment process.  
15  In their effort to provide a comparison of amendment procedures, several authors have categorized 
different mechanisms. See Lane (1996), Lijphart (1999) and Rasch and Congleton (2006). 
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design (Dixon 2011 and Ginsburg and Melton 2015, 687).16 It is one of the means to 
ensure that the constitution remains relevant to the present.17  
Yet, updating the constitution in order to keep it in tune with the spirit of times 
may not be the only purpose of constitutional amendment. Rasch and Congleton (2006) 
maintain that demand for constitutional change may appear in cases when a temporary 
majority is convinced that it would be able to advance its own interests through 
constitutional reform. Therefore, a constitution much amended may suggest an 
instrument that is not much respected. Nevertheless, the decision to pursue a formal 
amendment process rather than extra-constitutional means indicates that the constitution 
is at least respected enough to follow its own provisions. According to Lutz  (1994), for 
constitutions that last for many years under popular sovereignty, the number of 
amendments will be high.18 Therefore he acknowledges the growing need for 
modification as time passes and distinguishes between the total number of amendments 
and the rate of amendments. His definition of a successful constitution includes “a 
constitution of considerable age that has a total number of amendments which, when 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Lutz (1994) citing the development of amendment process in 1770s America argues that the American 
premise that human nature is imperfect but yet educable meant that there had to be mechanisms to alter 
institutions and practices after experience demonstrates their flaws and deficiencies. Accordingly, the 
amendment process was deemed necessary not simply to adapt to changing circumstances but also “to 
compensate for the limits of human understanding and virtue” (356). 
17 Another common method is to rely on constitutional review by courts that interpret the constitution and 
therefore allow the anachronistic aspects of the constitution to be scrapped. In total Lutz (1994) notes four 
means to modify a constitution: 1) a formal amendment process, 2) periodic replacement of the entire 
document, 3) judicial interpretation, and 4) legislative revision. For the purpose of this dissertation I am 
only interested in constitutional amendment understood as formal changes to the text of a written 
constitution. For a discussion of other understandings of constitutional amendment see Dixon 2011. 
18 The Norwegian constitution, second-oldest after that of the United States, has been amended more than 
200 times. 
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divided by the constitution's age in years, represents a moderate amendment rate- one that 
is to be expected in the face of inevitable change” (Lutz 1994, 357). Yet, even in cases in 
which extensive constitutional amendment has resulted in significant changes in rules and 
procedures of governance, the modified constitution is still regarded as a continuation as 
long as the established amendment procedure has been followed.19 
1.3.3 The Thin Line Between Rigidity and Flexibility 
The constitution is the supreme law of the state, what Rasch (2008, 2) describes as 
a “law for making laws” and is, therefore, unlikely to be amended in the same fashion as 
other laws.20 Amending the constitution requires special procedures, and so cannot be 
done arbitrarily without vast support or deliberation. Dixon (2011) provides two main 
reasons for why constitutional stability is important. First, it promotes the process of 
democratic self-government, since a constitution serves the task of providing the rules of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19  Bjørn Erik Rasch and Roger D. Congleton (2006) cite the examples of U.S. and Norwegian constitutions. 
These two are regarded as the two oldest constitutions in the world but through amendments (U.S. 27 times 
and Norwegian more than 200) the content of the constitutions and accordingly core features of political 
order have been altered. Despite the fact that these have involved substantial reforms, including the end of 
union between Norway and Sweden and granting universal suffrage in the case of Norwegian constitutions 
and the selection of vice president and the term of president in the case of U.S. constitution; the dates of the 
constitutions are noted as 1814 and 1780, respectively.  Therefore for the authors, it is not the core features 
of political procedures, rules and constrains that determine the durability of the constitutions but rather it is 
the existence of stable amendment procedure. As a result, Rasch and Congleton differentiate “between a 
constitution’s durability and the stability of its associated pattern of governance” (537). 
20 Considering the American approach to constitution, Lutz (1994) notes the significance of deliberative 
process. According to him, constitution is not simply a means to reach collective decision in an efficient 
manner, “but to make the best possible decisions in pursuit of the common good under a condition of 
popular sovereignty” (356). The pursuit of “common good” is a difficult one that requires a highly 
deliberative process. Constitutional matters are distinguished from normal legislation since it is the 
constitution that is the higher law that provides the blueprint for the limitations and content of normal 
legislation. Because of this distinction between normal legislation and constitutional matters, the 
amendment process for constitutional matters needs to be more difficult and scrutinized than that which is 
used for normal legislation. 
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the polity. Second, constitutional stability fosters elements of “pre-commitment” that help 
ensure minority rights and maintain inclusionary policies.  
The first danger of excessive constitutional amending flexibility is that the polity 
may become susceptible to be subject of endless debates about its basic functions and 
institutions. Such prolonged debates will only amount to the undermining of democratic 
action.  In that sense, Stephen Holmes (1995) compares constitutional amendment rules 
to grammar rules: “Linguistic rules allow interlocutors to do many things they would not 
have been able to do or even thought of doing” and constitutions perform a similar 
function (Holmes 1995). Just as having open rules of grammar would undermine 
communication, having an open constitution would also undermine democracy’s ability 
to formulate policy.21 Therefore a stringent amendment procedure ensures that 
constitutional commitments remain stable and credible. 
The second danger of excessive constitutional amending flexibility is that it might 
erode the constitution’s capacity to protect established rights and protections. Such 
danger can be found when a temporary majority grasps power and makes significant 
constitutional change to stay in control. By setting the structural framework for 
governance, the constitution assures that “momentary majorities attempting to lock 
themselves in power” do not succeed (Issacharoff 2003). Elster (2000) maintains that if 
the amending procedure is difficult, people tend to view the constitution “as a given 
framework for policy rather than as a tool for policy” (353). However he contends that it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 From a normative perspective Lutz (1994) adds that an easy amendment procedure that cannot be 
differentiated from normal legislation devalues the principle of popular sovereignty and does not provide 
for the high level of deliberation that is expected of constitutional procedures. 
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must not be too rigid either, because otherwise people may find it like an “intolerable 
prison” (353).22 A highly difficult amendment procedure fails to take into account that 
human beings are prone to make mistakes (Lutz 1994). The possibility of correcting the 
ill-conceived commitments of their predecessors provides a way out for future 
generations.23 Overall, Elster (2000) agrees with the view voiced in the French 
Constitutional Assembly (Assemblée Constituante 1789-1791) that “it must be neither 
easy nor impossible to change it”.24 Aside from such normative statements, it is not 
possible to identify the exact balance between rigidity and flexibility as Dixon (2011) 
cautions; the comparative constitutional study is still a developing field and therefore any 
issue regarding this is “ultimately judged optimal in a particular constitutional context” 
(104). While the literature on constitutional amendments deals with the definitions of 
rigidity and flexibility, the jury is still out on the influence of constitutional amendment 
procedures on the rate or difficulty of amendment25. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Rasch and Congleton  (2006) warn that sometimes with ultra-rigid constitutions the only possible method 
of “amendment” may be a civil or revolutionary war. 
23 Tocqueville urges caution against rigid amendment procedure proposed for the French 1848 
Constitution: “I have long thought that, instead of trying to make our forms of government eternal, we 
should pay attention to making methodical change an easy matter. All things considered, I find that less 
dangerous than the opposite alternative. I thought one should treat the French people like those lunatics 
whom one is careful not to bind lest they become infuriated by the constraint.”  
24 Elster (2000) quoting Lally-Tolendal from 8 Archives Parlementaires, supra note 2, at 517. 
25 A study by Rasch and Congleton (2006) found that the difficulty of amendment procedure increases as 
the number of actors that need to consent increases. The authors, employing Tsebelli’s (2002) concept of 
“veto players,” argue that with each actor whose consent is necessary for amending the constitution and 
with each veto point, the document becomes more difficult to amend.  Looking at the OECD countries, the 
authors find that as the numbers of veto players and veto points increase, the amendment rate falls, 
concluding, “as the costs of passing an amendment increase, fewer amendments are adopted” (536). In the 
first such empirical study of constitutional amendments, Lutz (1994) looked at US state constitutions and 
demonstrated that there was a negative correlation between the difficulty of the amendment process (such 
as the requirement of super-majority, ratification in a federal system or popular approval requirement) and 
the rate of amendment.25 Dixon and Holden (2011), working on a dataset of state-level constitutional 
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1.4 Arguments and Dissertation Outline 
 This study is organized around four axes. The first part (Chapter 2) provides a 
comparative constitutional history of the two cases- Chile and Turkey, analyzing the 
degree to which constitutions have been employed to solve a crisis and the degree to 
which frameworks have prompted crises. Commonalities such as the reactive relation 
between constitutional texts, lack of experience with a representative constituent 
assembly and precedents for military involvement demonstrate some early parallels 
between the two cases, albeit with a stronger constitutional tradition in Chile. The second 
part (Chapter 3) examines the breakdown of democracy in both countries, a product of 
political party system polarization, social unrest, economic crisis and the institutional 
deadlock rooted in constitutional crises. The third part (Chapter 4) examines the 1980 
Constitution of Chile and the 1982 Constitution of Turkey as a distinct subcategory of 
authoritarian constitutions, namely “antidotal authoritarian constitutions,” which are 
informed by past crises, attempt permanent change and include mechanisms to maintain 
the constitutional structure even as they envision a return to democratic rule. The fourth 
and final core component of this dissertation (Chapter 5, 6, and 7) sets up an overarching 
framework, which deconstructs the amendment making mechanism by examining 1) the 
shifts in the balance of power, societal forces and external actors; political, social and 
cultural context; characteristics of the constitution and constitutional tradition- factors 
affecting the demand side of constitutional change and 2) the procedural and institutional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
amendments in the United States, found that a super-majority requirement reduces the rate of constitutional 
amendments but that either a double-passage requirement or a single subject rule for proposed amendments 
does not have a statistically significant effect on the overall constitutional amendment rate (106).  
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constraints, the role of veto powers, and the content of the proposed amendments are 
taken into consideration as part of the supply side of constitutional change. Using this 
framework, the study offers a detailed analysis of constitutional amendments adopted in 
the post-transition period of Chile and Turkey and demonstrate that interlocking of 
number of factors that take into consideration both the demand and supply side of 
constitutional change play a simultaneous role that make or break the amendment-making 
process and determine the direction of the amendments. 
1.5 Data and Methodology 
 In order to uncover the process through which constitution and amendment-
making took place in Chile and Turkey, an extensive process tracing exercise is 
undertaken for each moment of constitutional change. This study predominantly relies on 
primary sources such as the official constitutions, transcripts from the drafting 
committees, constitutional amendment bills and hearings from the parliament/congress. 
To contextualize the process in which constitutional change took place, the study utilizes 
secondary sources on constitutional history of Chile and Turkey. While there is 
substantial literature on constitution-making, historical and recent, literature on 
amendment-making is rather limited. Thus, other secondary resources such as reports and 
analyses from civil society organizations and policy makers, as well as news articles will 
be utilized. These are substantiated with personal interviews with political leaders from 
Chile and Turkey, including a former president, member of the high court and a number 
of deputies, bureaucrats as well as semi-structured interviews with academicians and 
policy makers, which provide an additional depth to this study’s goal of uncovering the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	   	  
amendment process to explain paths to democratic constitutional change. The main 
methodological approach of this dissertation is comparative historical analysis. More 
specifically, it relies on process-tracing to carry out within case and across case analysis. 
It offers careful description of the process of constitutional change but also gives 
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Chapter 2: History of Constitutional Change in Chile and Turkey 
 Before moving on to the authoritarian constitutions in Chile and Turkey, it is 
important to examine the countries’ prior experience with constitution-making and 
amendment-making. The exercise will help provide background information on both 
countries with regards to the tradition of constitution-making process and features of past 
constitutions. It will contextualize the historical setting in which the authoritarian 
constitutions were promulgated and offer a comparative overview of Chile and Turkey’s 
experience with constitution-making and breaking. 
 The reason why such an exercise is worthwhile calls for some elaboration. 
Beyond the benefits derived from gathering an account of individual country’s 
constitutional history, we also observe whether a pattern exists or there has been a break 
in constitutional tradition. Ginsburg and Simpser (2014, 15) in their book on authoritarian 
constitutions draw our attention to need to work on “longitudinal analysis of 
constitutional sequences in individual countries”. According to authors, constitutions do 
not cease to exist once they are abrogated; they have an “afterlife”. 
 “As the highest normative act of the state, constitutions mark an exercise of power 
and create a historical legacy. We observe that constitutions in dictatorships are often 
replaced or amended by new leaders who come to power. To understand these documents, 
one needs to read them in light of the predecessor documents, as the sequence of 
documents will provide clues over the particular leaders’ political rulers and of 
authoritarian constitutions on democratic ones- may shape behavior and idiom long after 
those who promulgate formal documents are gone”. 
 In short, countries’ constitutional histories matter. Once a provision or a trait is 
entrenched, it tends to resume in the subsequent constitution, revealing a path dependent 
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relation between the country’s historical constitutions (Elkins et. al 2014, 154).26 Early 
constitutions have a historical weight; “the path of constitutional history constrains future 
constitutional paths in specific and systemic ways” (Varol 2016 forthcoming, 4).27 
Studying the past constitutions provides us an opportunity to assess whether a provision 
in the authoritarian constitution is a new trait that first emerged with the new 
authoritarian constitution or whether it had been introduced under the previous 
constitutional arrangements. Similarly, getting a picture of the country’s tradition of 
constitution-making makes it possible to observe whether there is an established pattern 
in terms of the process of promulgating a new constitution. Stilt (2014) with regards to 
authoritarian constitutions underline three very important points: 1) The content of the 
constitution must be taken into account separately from the process of constitution-
making, 2) The constitution needs to be analyzed in its entirety but also with specific 
attention to each distinct article, 3) The constitution must be viewed in light of the 
previous constitutional arrangements. The substance of the constitution might be 
democratic while the process of drafting and adopting the constitution might be top-down 
authoritarian. One particular provision in the constitution might genuinely represent the 
intentions of the authoritarian rulers adopting the document, for instance with regards to 
power sharing in the government, while another provision dealing with rights and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Authors define this as “serial dependence in constitutional texts” (Elkins et. al 2014, 162). According to 
Elkins et. al (2014) the region and the period of constitutional texts are more important predictors along 
with the country’s past constitutions rather than whether the formal constitution is a product of democratic 
or authoritarian regime. 
27 Varol (2016 forthcoming) calls this phenomena “constitutional stickiness” according to which “the 
existing constitutional configurations […] depend, quite arbitrarily, on the historical starting point, rather 
than a rational assessment of all alternatives”. 
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freedoms might simply be added on for “window-dressing”. The constitutions do not 
exist in a political vacuum. In order to evaluate a constitution (true also for amendments) 
and categorize it as authoritarian, we need to situate it in relation to past experiences with 
constitutions.  
 This chapter provides an individual country profile for Chile and Turkey in terms 
of their constitutional history and a comparison of constitution-making in these two 
countries. The rest of the chapter chronicles the constitutions of Chile and Turkey; 
starting off with early precedents, providing the political, social and economic context in 
which new constitutional arrangements were pursued and offering an analysis of the 
major documents. The chapter is organized as follows. Starting with Chile’s early 
experience with constitution-making, I will be examining the two constitutions that 
governed Chile before the 1980 Constitution; namely the 1833 and 1925 Constitutions. 
For both of these documents, besides a brief discussion of the political, economical and 
social context that gave rise to their promulgation, I will be analyzing the constitution-
making process, the content of the constitution, its interpretation and major amendments 
introduced during its lifespan. A similar format will be followed for Turkey’s history 
with constitution-making. I will first examine the early experience with constitution-
making under the Ottoman Empire and during the independence war years and then 
devote more in-depth analysis to two constitutions that governed Turkey before the 1982 
Constitution; namely the 1924 and the 1961 Constitution. Again, part of the discussion 
will focus on the context in which the constitutional development took place. I will also 
provide an account of the constitution-making process, examine the content of the 
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constitution and the relevant amendments that were introduced to the text. The chapter 
will conclude with a comparative analysis of the process of constitution-making in Chile 
and Turkey. 
2.1 Chile’s History of Constitution-Making 
2.1.1 Early Constitutional Experiments 
 Before the conservative 1833 Constitution was drafted, Chile went through four 
formal constitutions (1818, 1822, 1823 and 1828), one drafting process that did not lead 
to promulgation (1826) and three provisional constitutions (1811, 1812, 1814).28  The 
politicians of 1820s were guided by the belief that “legislation on its own way was 
effective: good laws, above all a good constitution, would automatically work wonders” 
(Collier and Sater 1996, 41).29 These texts were early examples of constitutionalism in 
Chile. While Loveman (1993, 318) maintains the three provisional constitutions (1811, 
1812, 1814) should be regarded as “historical curiosities rather than significant juridical 
antecedents of Chilean constitutionalism”, the ensuing constitutions set precedents in 
regards to executive and legislative powers.  
 The years following the junta’s declaration of independence on September 18, 
1810 witnessed a civil war (1810-1814), the restoration of Spanish rule (1814-1817) and 
Bernardo O’Higgins declaration of independence in 1818. During the period known as 
patria vieja (1810-1814), Chile adopted three provisional constitutions. These texts were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Loveman (1993, 314) calls these “proto-constitutions”. 
29 This view is concurred by (Moreno 1969, 88): “Legislation and constitutional devices were used as 
quasi-magical formulas, which enactment, it was hoped, would end specific evils”.  
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attempts to regulate public order during junta’s provisional authority. The 1811 
Reglamaento Para El Arreglo de la Autoridad Ejecutiva Provisorio de Chile established 
a three-member executive and a unicameral Congress. According to Ruiz-Tagle (2006, 
85) the Congress was “organically independent” from Spain and it was “the first 
republican body constituted in Chile that expressed the concept of citizenship”. However 
both the Congress and the text were short lived. Patriots that enlisted the help of the 
military ousted the moderate royalist creoles from power. Shortly after, on November 15, 
1811, José Miguel Carrera, a successful young military officer, orchestrated a coup d’état 
and established himself as the ruler of Chile. A new provisional text, Reglamento 
Constitucional Provisorio of 1812 was proclaimed on October 26, 1812. Navia (1999, 5) 
argues that the 1812 Constitution followed the American model. The U.S. delegate to 
Chile, Joel Robert Poinsett encouraged Chilean political leaders to adopt a constitution 
similar to American model and with that objective he had drafted a constitution and 
presented to Carrera (Kinsbruner 1968, 62). Although this draft was not accepted, the 
idea of adopting a constitution remained. The American influence is evidenced by the 
fact that the document was drafted at Poinsett’s house (Navia 1999, 5).30 The charter 
established a three-member executive and seven-member Senate.31 Important matters 
such as declaring war, establishing alliances, making treaties, naming envoys, changing 
the location and number of troops and changing the constitution required approval by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Navia (1999, 5) traces the American influence to before the 1812 constitution. Martínez de Rozas, one of 
Chile’s independence leaders was a friend of an American physicist Procopio Pollock. Pollock encouraged 
the adoption of a text similar to American Convention. In order to disseminate his ideas, he provided a 
manuscript on constitutionalism.  
31 Concepción and Coquimba were to have two representatives and Santiago were to have three. 
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Senate (Kinsbruner 1968, 62). Nevertheless the text maintained loyalty to Spanish 
Crown.32  
 Amidst the wars of independence, instigated by the military expeditions ordered 
by the Peruvian viceroy who wanted to reestablish Spanish control over Chile, a new 
provisional constitution was established in mid-1814. The text departed from the previous 
one as it was primarily designed to give full powers to the Supreme Director. 33 As such, 
there was no mention of civil rights and liberties.   
 The split between the two rival independence movements, one under the 
leadership of José Miguel Carrera and the other under the leadership of Bernardo 
O’Higgins gave way to defeat to the Spanish royal forces and ended the period patria 
vieja. For three years, while the patriotic rebels recuperated from the 1814 defeat, the 
Spanish “reconquest” overturned the patriot reforms.34 The pro-independence forces 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Besides the regulatory function, it established civil rights and liberties, such as rights to security of 
persons, homes, possessions and documents (Article 16) and considered situations when their suspension 
could be required by “threats to public welfare” (Article 26) (Loveman 1993, 316). The constitution 
provided for freedom of press, but in order to ensure that freedom does not translate into license to harm 
the religion, customs and honors of the citizens; its rules of conduct were to be established by the junta and 
the senate (Article 23). 
33 The junta had installed Francisco de la Lastra as the Supreme Director and unseated José Miguel Carrera. 
Therefore the title was to assumed by Lasta provided him with broad powers. However after the British 
naval officer Captain James Hillyar’s mediation Lastra agreed to a truce with the royalist forces and his 
representatives signed the Treaty of Lircay on May 3, 1814. The treaty reaffirmed loyalty to Spanish crown 
and the royalists agreed to Chilean provisional government in exchange for Chile’s reaffirmation to 
financially contribute to crown’s treasury and abandon the new national flag. For Carrera and other patriots, 
the treaty was an act of betrayal. Imprisoned by royalists, once the news arrived he escaped from prison and 
returned back to Santiago to overthrow Lastra from power and establish himself as once again the Supreme 
Director (Collier and Sater 1996, 36). 
34 During Carrera’s rule moderate reforms such as the opening of first public school Instituto Nacional and 
first library Biblioteca Nacional had taken place. He had also adopted other progressive measures such as 
adopting a law of free birth and promoting the establishment of printing press. The press (first newspaper 
was Aurora de Chile) was helpful in disseminating revolutionary ideas. 
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achieved a decisive victory with the help of the Army of the Andes. 35 O’Higgins, titled 
the Supreme Director, was a “reluctant dictator” (Collier and Sater 1996, 46) 36. A seven-
member commission (Navia 1999, 6) selected by O’Higgins wrote the 1818 Constitution 
(Loveman 1993, 319) and O’Higgins asked all Chilean men who were “fathers, had some 
capital or an occupation” to sign their names in favor or against the document  (quoted in 
Valenzuela 2012, 26).37 There was no vote that was cast against the document 
(Kinsbruner 1968, 112). Thus, the constitution was ratified with some type of plebiscite 
on October 23, 1818. 
 On the one hand, O’Higgins equipped himself with a range of powers but he also 
perceived himself as a liberal and as such initiated moderate reforms and promulgated a 
constitution to legitimize his rule. He believed that “it was necessary with a people like 
the Chileans to confer good upon them by force" (quoted in Loveman 2001, 106). The 
1818 constitution (August 8, 1818) gave him sweeping powers, including the 
appointment of all civil servants, commanding over the armed forces and militia and 
election of the five-member Senate. Ruiz-Tagle (2006, 86) explains this ambiguity as an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 The Army of the Andes was organized under the Argentine General José de San Martín and was 
supported by a guerrilla campaign under Manuel Rodríguez. Martin favored O’Higgins over Carrera and 
helped organize an army to liberate Chile. In the meantime, excluded Carrera sought other means and 
obtained warships from the United States. However, seen as a threat after he returned back to Mendoza he 
was imprisoned by San Martin’s forces. Although he later escaped, and became part of the Argentine 
Federalist war, he was evidently captured and executed in 1821. 
36 After a set back at the Second Battle of Cancha Rayada (March 19, 1818), the patriot forces achieved a 
decisive victory at the Battle of Maipú (April 5, 1818) that “assured Chile’s recently proclaimed 
independence” (Collier and Sater 1996, 38). However San Martin realized that Chile’s independence would 
not be secured until Peru was freed of Spanish control and set out for his next expedition in Peru. Although 
San Martin was offered the title Supreme Director, he declined and supported the candidacy of O’Higgins 
who formally proclaimed independence on February 12, 1818) (Loveman 1993, 318) 
37 This was also the method Carrera had used (Valenzuela 2012, 25). 
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attempt “to utilize the republican discourse just to validate the military dictatorship of 
O’Higgins”. However, Kinsbruner (1968, 113) argues that even though the intention of 
O’Higgins might have been to create “a specious legislature to lend respectability to his 
regime” and despite the fact that senators were appointed by the Supreme Director and 
not elected, the Senate “proved to be a viable, energetic legislature”.  
 The 1818 Constitution lists a number of natural and inalienable rights of man; 
personal safety, honor, finance, freedom and civil equality and states that “every man is 
deemed innocent until legally be declared guilty” (Title 1, Chapter 1). However, these 
and other rights (freedom of press and privacy of correspondence) are accompanied by 
provisions that set the conditions under which they can be suspended. For example, 
according to Art. 11 “every man is free to publish his ideas” but goes on to limit it by 
declaring that the right exists to the extent that “it does not offend the public tranquility 
and the Constitution of the State, and conservation of the Christian religion”. As such, the 
constitution also established Catholicism as the state religion.38  
 Loveman (1993, 319) argues that O’Higgins “intended to institute a strong, 
centralized government but not a tyrannical dictatorship”. His authority was not unlimited. 
For example, according to the 1818 constitution the supreme director could not intervene 
in the judicial process.39 Senate approval was required on important matters such as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 According to Title 2, Capital Unico Catholic religion is the only and exclusive state religion and “its 
protection, preservation, purity and sanctity, will be one of the first duties of the leaders of the society, who 
shall never permit public worship of another religion contrary to of Jesus Christ”. 
39 The limits of the executive dictated that the supreme director “may not intervene in any criminal, civil 
matter before the courts, nor alter the system of administration of justice, nor the appeal process in the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts Appeal” (Title 4, Chapter 2, Article 1). 
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“imposing taxes, soliciting loans, declaring war, making peace, forming treaties of 
alliance, commerce, neutrality; sending ambassadors, consuls, deputies or envoys to 
foreign powers; raising new troops or sending them outside the State; undertaking public 
works and creating new authorities or employs” (Title 3, Capital III, Art. 4). The Senate 
also had the power to amend the constitution (Title 3, Capital III, Art. 5). Mainly because 
the Supreme Director appointed the senators, the constitution is perceived as providing 
vast powers to the director. 
 Despite the fact that O’Higgins enjoyed vast powers as the Supreme Director, his 
ability to maintain his rule was still conditional on the approval of different political 
groupings.40 He was blamed for the deaths of a number of his adversaries41 and financial 
problems.42 Additionally, there was a growing pressure to have an elected legislative and 
constituent assembly. Demands for a new and permanent constitution escalated43 and 
O’Higgins in response called for the formation of a legislative assembly in May 1822. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 During the war effort, he enjoyed support from the upper classes. However he began to alienate the 
landed aristocracy by attempting to prohibit entailed estates (mayorazgos) and hereditary titles and 
antagonized the Church by measures such allowing for a foreign Protestant cemetery, twice expelling the 
bishop of Santiago Rodríguez Zorrilla and prohibiting burials in churches. Critics saw his membership to 
Logia Lautaro a secret revolutionary lodge that had its main subsidiary branch in Buenos Aires and 
promoted Spanish America’s independence as evidence to his foreign connections. It is important to note 
that the 1818 constitution  (Title 4, Chapter 1, Article 8) dictated the function of maintaining close alliance 
with United Provinces of Rio de la Plata as one of the powers of the executive. 
41 It was believed that he had ordered the killings of Carrera brothers and the leader of guerrilla raids, 
Manuel Rodríguez- important figures of the independence effort, which alienated his few allies. 
42 In 1822 he acquired Chile’s first debt from London. The economy was already experiencing downturn 
because of decline in trade when a massive earthquake in Valparaiso in November 1822 added more 
hardship. 
43 Valenzuela (2012) argues that the press reflected the opinions of those who called on to the adherence to 
“the spirit of the century and the order of nature, which call us to have a liberal and just government” (an 
1820 column quoted in Valenzuela 2012, 27). 
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However, he made sure that his preferred deputies would be “elected”. For that matter, he 
specified that the composition would be decided by the municipal councilors and sent out 
secret letters to his trusted men in the municipal councils with the names of the people he 
wanted to see elected. If necessary, the councils were instructed to distort the makeup of 
the meeting that would choose the deputies (Valenzuela 2012, 27). Once the new 
congress was convened, O’Higgins offered his resignation with the expectation that it 
would be rejected (Kinsbruner 1968, 143). As planned, the Congress rejected it and 
approved the constitutional text, which was written by O’Higgins’ minister - an ex-
royalist José Antonio Rodríguez Aldea (Collier and Sater 1996, 47). Thus, O’Higgins 
who wanted to appease the opposition by charging a constituent assembly with drafting 
the constitution was able to manipulate the process (Bethell 1985, 132).  
 The 1822 Constitution was perceived as his attempt to prolong his rule. 
According to the charter, the Supreme Director was to be elected by a two-thirds majority 
in both the senate and the chamber of deputies for six years with the possibility of 
reelection for four years. However, according to Art. 84, the first election would 
automatically confirm the director of the current term- O’Higgins.  
 The blatant manner that O’Higgins manipulated the election of the legislative 
council and the way that the charter was approved- with no deliberation and the 
legislators voting on entire sections in a quick fashion led to growing frustration. A 
scandal over speculation of tobacco prices and growing frustration over the extent of 
manipulation of electoral process stirred additional discontent. Opposition figure, the 
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Intendant of Concepción Ramón Freire denounced the “monstrous foetus” of the 1822 
Constitution (Collier and Sater 1996, 48).44 Opposition grew in the form of provisional 
uprising and O’Higgins was forced abdicate. As Loveman (1993, 322) observes, the 1822 
constitution “had precipitated the provisional revolts that ended O’Higgins’s rule”. 
 Despite the short span and the role that it played in bringing about the end of 
O’Higgins period, the 1822 constitution is praised for providing “a reaffirmation of the 
principles of republican constitutionalism” (Ruiz-Tagle 2006, 86). The preamble 
explained that the charter embraced “the fundamental and invariable principles 
proclaimed since the birth of the revolution, that is: division and independence of the 
branches of the government, the representative system, the election of the chief executive, 
accountability of government officials and individual rights”. Ruiz-Tagle (2006, 86) 
argues that it was very much influenced by the Spanish liberal Constitution of Cádiz 
(1812) while the preamble dictates that the drafters had studied the “the best models, 
especially the classic country of liberty, the United States”.  Even though, the constitution 
failed to declare the Chilean state a republic and maintained Catholicism as state religion 
(Art. 10), it provided that sovereignty is vested in the nation and established three 
independent powers; executive, legislative and judicial.45 Although the constitution 
established separation of powers, it did not institute checks and balances (Navia 1999, 7). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Freia was already upset that his province’s situation had not improved even slightly since independence 
(Collier and Sater 1996, 47) when he uncovered the manipulation of electoral process (Valenzuela 2012, 
27). 
45 The constitution created a bicameral congress. The chamber of deputies were to be selected in elections 
at municipalities and the senate to be composed of non-elected members including state ministers, generals, 
priests, university representatives and traders. 
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A controversial aspect of the constitution was that it aimed to centralize the 
administration by dividing the county into three provinces, as before; Santiago, 
Concepción and Coquimba but with governors-intendants appointed by the Supreme 
Director. According to Kinsbruner (1968, 154) this provision, more than any other aspect 
of the constitution was responsible for bringing down the end of O’Higgins regime. 
 The 1822 constitution was elaborative- it included 248 articles. It did not extend 
the powers of the executive. Although the Supreme Director still maintained control of 
the armed forces and had the authority to appoint civil and religious bureaucrats; he was 
also limited in some aspects. For example, although the Supreme Director had the 
authority to appoint general officers and departmental administrators, the legislative also 
had to approve the decision. Legislative approval was also needed if new posts that 
required public expenditures were to be created. The Supreme Director was prohibited 
from interfering in the deliberations of the legislature or its suspension during scheduled 
sessions.46 Although the Supreme Director was charged with the protection of public 
order and security of the state, the emergency powers had to be granted by the legislature 
in the “case of imminent danger of State .., for the duration of the necessity” and not for 
any period longer than that (Art.121). Thus, growing opposition to O’Higgins in response 
to the new constitution was not necessarily because the 1822 constitution expanded his 
powers, but because of the fraudulent manner that the constitution was proclaimed and 
because it provided the possibility of O’Higgins rule for ten more years. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Art.118 further stated that in the event this prohibition was violated by anyone, he would be prosecuted 
for treason against the Fatherland. 
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 After O’Higgins resignation, Chile went through three ensayos, constitutional 
essays as they are called because they were not necessarily implemented. The 
Constitution of 1823 was found impossible to carry out so it was never put into actual 
force. The Constitutional Convention discussed in extent the Law (constitution project) of 
1826, which envisioned a federal system but before it was able to draft a complete 
constitution, the convention was dissolved. The 1828 Constitution became invalid when 
liberals were defeated in 1830. Each had its peculiarities and therefore each require 
further attention. 
 The Intendant of Concepción Ramón Freire replaced O’Higgins and brought forth 
the Constitution of 1823. The constitution was essentially the work of conservative Juan 
Egaña. As Loveman (1993, 324) explains it was “unusual, lengthy and complex”. It 
provided for three branches of government. The legislature was to be composed of two 
houses, a nine-member permanent aristocratic senate (in the sense that property 
requirements were high) and popularly elected national chamber that functioned only 
when summoned. Thus, the National Chamber was conceived as a “momentary assembly” 
(Art. 60) that would convene only when there is disagreement between the Senate and the 
executive (Art. 65). The Supreme Director had the power to suggest legislation that the 
Senate could either approve or summon a meeting of the National Chamber, which could 
only approve or reject the legislative and not deliberate on it. Heiss (2012, 158) maintains 
that the 1823 Constitution was “designed to limit popular power”.  Juan Egaña, the 
drafter of the 1823 Constitution supported a “conservative senate” because according to 
him, there would “never be stable and self-sustaining government if the Republic is left 
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to a popular administration without a permanent and conservative body of notables 
dedicated to the protection of the Constitution, and to the control of the errors and abuses 
of vicious democracy” (quoted in Jaksic and Marcelo 1998, 14-15). 
 The 1823 Constitution is marked for officially establishing the form of 
government as a republic (Art. 1). However, it is peculiar because it produced a republic 
without elected representatives (Loveman 1993, 324). But on the other hand, the 
constitution also granted people the power to review and verify (censura) the officials 
every two years in convened caucuses (asambleas electorales) (Art. 97).  
 The most distinguishing aspect of the constitution was that it charged the 
government with the duty to promote and protect the civic merit of citizens. Under title 
27 on “National Morality”, the constitution stipulated a strict moral code and assigned the 
Senate with the function of maintaining the national character and the citizen merit (Art. 
250). For that reason, the charter came to be known as the “moralist constitution”. In 
essence, the constitution was impractical; it was “an aberration, devoid of consistent 
principles and impossible to implement” (Loveman 1993, 325). Regardless, the 
constitution was never implemented. Freire went on a military expedition, the day after 
the constitution was promulgated, in order to unite the island of Chiloé 47 with the 
Chilean state. He returned back in June 1824 only to declare to the Senate next month of 
his intention to resign because he was not able to implement the constitution. The Senate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 The island of Chiloé was the only remaining territory under the Spanish control and was only able to 
become part of the Chilean state in 1826. 
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agreed to suspend the implementation of the constitution and provided Freire with broad 
powers. In November 1824, the Senate repealed the constitution. 
 A new political current among a faction of Liberal politicians in late 1820s was 
federalism. It emerged as a reaction to conservative and oligarchic that had was 
advocated by the 1823 Constitution. Its proponents wanted to decentralize the political 
power and argued that the central authority that a unitary system created simply 
perpetuated the centralized monarchical rule inherited from colonial times (Heiss 2012, 
160).  
 Freie faced opposition both from the provinces and from the Congress.48 After he 
returned back from his second military expedition in March 1826, he resigned from his 
post of Supreme Director. Manuel Blanco Encalada was elected to the newly created 
position of president. The congress began pushing for institutionalizing the federal 
system. The prominent champion of federalism was José Miguel Infante who had become 
Provisional Supreme Director during Freie absence and initiated measures to implement 
decentralization. He was an admirer of American federalist model while other proponents 
of federalism were driven by their desire to gain autonomy from the capital. Asserting 
that the regions were much effective in administering their authority, the proponents of 
federalism wanted to introduce a new constitution with a federal emphasis. A new 
Constitutional Convention with representatives from the provinces was called and began 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 In 1825, he dissolved the Congress and during his second mission to Chiloé, Directorial Council that was 
led by José Miguel Infante, the president of the Senate, temporarily assumed power. In Freie’s absence, the 
council created eight provinces and introduced Provincial Assemblies with the goal of establishing a 
federal system. 
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drafting a federalist constitution (Navia 1999, 8). A military revolt led by Enrique 
Campino who literally entered the room on his horse when Congress was in session, led 
the country into a political crisis. It created a backlash from those that championed a 
unitary system and put an end to flirtation with federalism. General Freie was called back 
to power in order to resolve the crisis and after doing so, he resigned once again.49 
Although the federalist constitutional draft was never approved, decentralization of 
power continued to be advocated by a segment of liberals as a vehicle for establishing 
greater representation.  
 A new constituent congress was established and mostly written under the 
guidance of José Joaquín de Mora; President Pinto (1827-1929) promulgated the 1828 
Constitution. The constitution produced a liberal framework, retained the provincial 
assemblies (but nevertheless maintained the unitary system), limited executive authority, 
established religious tolerance, formed a much broader electoral system50 and 
strengthened individual rights.51 In essence, the 1828 Constitution “symbolized the 
temporary victory of the liberal factions over the patrician, merchant, and colonial 
oligarchy” (Loveman 1993, 326). It created checks and balances between the executive 
and legislative. The Congress was stipulated to have control over budgets, taxes, the size 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 His Vice President Francisco Antonio succeeded him in May 1827. 
50 In order to vote, citizens had to be either 21 years old or if younger they either had to be married or 
serving in a militia. Although literacy requirements was not sought, the constitution established that 
citizens had to profess some “science, art or industry” or have a job, productive capital or property from 
which to derive a living, or 4 years of service as an officer in the army (Article 7). 
51 However, it is also important to note that certain rights were curtailed under some conditions. For 
example Article 16 declares, “no house may be searched” except “in cases of resistance to the legitimate 
government”.  
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of the armed forces, the creation of new government posts and appointment of members 
of the Supreme Court.52  
 This charter also did not last long. In some ways, it was ahead of the Chilean 
society as “it attempted to mold people to the Constitution, rather than to adapt the 
Constitution to the possibilities of the existing society” (Gil 1966, 86). It further polarized 
the different factions in the society. On the one hand, there were the liberals (pipioles) 
who were divided among themselves into federalists, centralists, anticlericals and 
moderate Catholics and supporters of universal suffrage and supporters of restricted 
suffrage (Loveman 1993, 326). On the other hand, there were a number of political 
groupings that were in opposition to the liberal project. The Conservatives (pelucones) 
included the traditional landowners, the followers of exiled O’Higgins that favored the 
authoritarian restoration, the clericals and the estanqueros 53 (merchants and politicians 
that were supporters of Diego Portales). Although, the constitution maintained 
Catholicism as the state religion, it also provided that “no one shall be persecuted or 
molested by their private opinions” (Art. 4). The constitution also de facto abolished the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Despite these several progressive attributes of the 1828 Constitution, it entrusted the executive with 
powers to act “in the cases of grave and unexpected external attack or internal commotion take whatever 
security measures deemed expedient, immediately advising the congress, or if recess, the Permanent 
Commission, of the measures taken and his motives (Article 83.12). Because it does not stipulate whether 
the Congress can do any action to challenge the executive’s decision, it does give the President leeway to 
“take whatever security measures deemed expedient”. Regardless, Gargarella (2010, 208) describes it as 
“the only good example of a liberal constitution during the entire nineteenth century in Chile”. 
53 The name comes from the word estanco, tobacco monopoly. Diego Portales, together with José Manuel 
Cea. opened a trading house, called Portales, Cea and Co..When the Chilean state found itself unable to 
service the debt that it acquired from London, in 1824 it gave the tobacco monopoly to Portales’ trading 
house provided that he would be responsible for paying off the foreign debt. However, the government was 
unable to enforce the monopoly and without the capability to regulate the sales of tobacco and liquor, 
Portales, Cea and Co. was not able to make the repayments and eventually went bankrupt. This event led 
resentful Portales and his associated to enter to Chilean political life and pursue an ideology that promoted 
centralized strong government that would bring order to country. 
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mayorazgos- entailed estates and declared, “there is no privileged class” (Art. 126).54 
Therefore, the Conservatives did not welcome the presumed anticlerical and anti-
aristocratic provisions of the constitution. 
 After the Constitution of 1828 was promulgated, the constituent assembly was 
dissolved and new elections were called.55 The incumbent President Pinto was elected but 
the election of the vice-president triggered a crisis that became the pretext for the ensuing 
civil war. According to the constitution (Art. 71 to 75), the top vote getter would become 
the president and his runner-up would be the vice-president. However, in the event that 
the runner-up did not get absolute majority from the electoral college, the Congress were 
to choose the vice-president from the two top runner-ups. Both the first (Francisco Ruiz-
Tagle) and the second (José Joaquín Prieto) were conservatives and therefore the liberal 
majority in the Congress did not want to confirm either of these two top runner-ups.56 
Complicating the events was the fact that the constitution’s language was very ambiguous. 
Article 72 dictated that the Congress would elect it from “those with immediate 
majorities” (los de la mayoría inmediata). Therefore, the liberals interpreted this 
provision indicating that the Congress could vote for other candidates. The disagreement 
over the interpretation of the constitution and ensuing Liberal Congress’s election of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 This was a form of inheritance that allowed large landowners to maintain their assets by prevented the 
division of property and assets among several heirs. The fortunes would usually pass to the eldest son that 
ensured the concentration of wealth in a few hands. 
55 1829 election was marked by the fact that voters were going to elect both the president and the vice-
president. 
56 It was speculated that President Pinto was going to resign and as such the election of his successor was 
crucial (Valenzuela 2011, 51). President Pinto resigned, as rumored leaving the position to the leader of 
Senate a liberal, Francisco Ramón Vicuña. 
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third runner-up Liberal Joaquín Vicuña, the brother of Senate leader precipitated the 
Conservatives to rebel. The 1829 civil war witnessed the defeat of Liberal forces under 
the command of General Ramón Freire by the Conservative forces united under the 
command of José Joaquín Prieto (the second runner-up). In essence, “both conservatives 
and liberals had feigned defense of the 1828 Constitution as the rationale for the 1829-
1930 civil war” (Loveman 1993, 329) but the result of the civil war resulted in the demise 
of the liberal constitution and brought over thirty years of conservative government, 
known as Conservative Republic (1831-1861). The pelucon victory at the Battle of 
Lircay (1830) confirmed the triumph of strong, centralized, authoritative system that 
would soon be institutionalized with the 1833 constitution.  
 Throughout the successive interim governments during the civil war (1829-1830), 
Diego Portales came to play a significant role.57 Preferring to play his part behind the 
public scene, Portales retired to Valparaiso but even so he was still the most powerful 
figure (Collier and Sater 1996, 53). The election of General José Joaquín Prieto set off 
three 10-year consecutive conservative governments. The institutional legacy of this 
period, namely the 1833 Constitution ended the period known as “constitutional drafts”.  
2.1.2 The Constitution of 1833 and Its Making 
 The Constitution had prohibited its reform until 1836 (Art. 133). Despite that, the 
Congress passed a law demanding the reform of the constitution. A “great constituent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 During provisional presidency of José Tomás Ovalle (April 1830-March 1831), Portales occupied two of 
the three ministries: Interior and Foreign Affairs, and War and Navy. After Ovalle fell ill, he ruled Chile in 
consort with General Prieto, Colonel Manuel Bulnes (nephew of Prieto), Manuel Rengifo (minister of 
finance) and after Ovalle died, Portales orchestrated the election of General Prieto as president in April 
1831 (Loveman 1993, 329). 
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convention” began first revising the 1828 constitution but ended up drafting a new 
constitution in October 1831. The Great Convention (Gran Convención) was composed 
of sixteen elected deputies and twenty citizens of “acknowledged probity and 
enlightenment,” appointed by the Congress (Heiss 2012, 175). Heiss, quoting liberal 
thinker of the period José Victorino Lastarria argues that the Great Convention shared 
homogeneous interests and had convergent ideas (2012, 176-177). 
 A seven-member commitee began to analyze drafts. It mainly took two drafts into 
consideration. One was written by Manuel Gandarillas and the other one by Mariano 
Egaña. Manuel Gandarillas was formerly a minister under Freire government and a fierce 
opponent of federalism (Valenzuela 2012, 54). According to Navia (1999, 9) Gandarillas 
promoted the American model that established an independent and popularly elected 
senate. Mariano Egaña was the drafter of electoral laws in 1822 when he was the Minister 
of Interior and he was also the son of Juan Egaña, the drafter of the 1823 Constitution. 
Egaña promoted the establishment of a Senate composed of 14 elected members that had 
indefinite re-eligibility and non-elected members such as former Presidents, Bishops and 
Archbishops (Heiss 2012,176).58 In addition, his draft included a President that could also 
be indefinitely reelected and was bestowed with extraordinary powers. Although these 
extreme provisions were rejected, the “spirit” of this draft was maintained (Heiss 
2012,176). Andrés Bello, a prominent Venezuelan jurist in international public law who 
had the support of Diego Portales among other public officials also played a role in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Heiss rightly points out that this proposal likens to institutional and appointed senators provisions of the 
1980 Constitution (2012, 176). 
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final stages of revising and editing the draft (Jaksik 2001, 103). Diego Portales was not 
interested in constitutional theory or writing the document himself (Valenzuela, 2023: 68 
and Jaksik 2001, 103).59 However, the 1833 Constitution and the conservative system it 
established came to be seen as representative of Diego Portales’ political thought, 
reflected it in the manner the regime is characterized: “Portalian state”. 60 
 President José Joquín Prieto promulgated the new constitution in May 1833. Both 
Gandarillas and Egaña drafts influenced the final text (Gil 1966, 86 and Navia 1999, 9). 
The final document established a strongly presidentialist and centralist system. The 
president was to be elected indirectly and was eligible for two consecutive five-year 
terms. The president was granted broad executive power that enabled him to maintain 
control over the cabinet, judiciary, armed forces and public administration (Collier and 
Sater 1996, 55 and Gargarella 2010, 210). Despite the fact that the charter established a 
strong executive, its power was not absolute. The bicameral Congress still maintained 
important powers.61 However, it is important to recognize that the powers of the 
legislative branch were mostly in theory. The president had ways to render these 
restraining mechanisms void. Despite the fact that, the constitution designed a system 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Portales was skeptical towards the constitution, which he expressed by stating: “As you know, no work 
of this kind is absolutely good or absolutely evil; neither the best nor any [constitution] will be of any use if 
the main spring of the machine is faulty” (quoted in Faúndez 2007, 27). 
60 Portales firmly believed that political order should always triumph over respect for constitution and 
ordinary laws (Faúndez 2007, 27) 
61 The deputies were to be chosen directly while the senators indirectly. The Congress had the right to 
initiate legislation; the Chamber of Deputies could initiate tax law while the Senate could initiate 
constitutional amendments (Article 40). The Congress also was charged with the approving the yearly 
budget (Article 105.4), establishing the mobilization of armed forces (Article 37.3). The Chamber of 
Deputies was granted the power to impeach the cabinet ministers “for the crimes of treason, extortion, 
embezzlement of public funds, bribery, violation of the Constitution, trampling the laws” (Article 92). The 
president was required to get congressional approval in order to declare state of siege (Article 82.20). 
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where the Congress was entrusted with executive control, such that presidential veto 
could be overridden by a two thirds majority in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies 
(Art. 47) the executive did not face an adverse Congress until 1870s; making these 
powers inconsequential.62 The president made judicial appointments once the State 
Council provided its recommendations. Similarly, considering that the president 
essentially controlled the State Council, judicial independence was absent under the 
framework of the 1833 Constitution (Faúndez 2007, 20). Thus, for the next three decades, 
the powers of the executive did not have a solid counterweight. 
 The constitution established Catholicism as the official religion. Most of the rights 
instituted in the previous charter were kept in the 1833 conservative constitution, albeit 
with certain limitations in application (Ruiz-Tagle 2006, 91). However, two aspects of 
the 1828 Constitution, namely the office of the vice president and the provincial 
assemblies were eliminated. The office of provincial intendant was to be appointed by the 
President and it was conceived as the “natural and immediate agent” of the President (Art. 
116).63 The constitution set up a very centralized and hierarchical system.64  
 A major component of the presidential republic designed by the 1833 Constitution 
was the states of exception it devised for the empowered executive. The constitution 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 However, after the 1891 crisis these provisions of the 1833 Constitution would give rise to a 
reinterpretation of the constitution that would create a pseudo parliamentary system  
63 Collier and Sater (1996, 55) point out that the same phrase was used in the 1925 and 1980 Constitutions. 
64 At the top were the provinces governed by an intendant; followed by the department headed by a 
governor; the subdelegation by a subdelegado and finally the district by an inspector (Gil 1966, 87). Each 
official was removable by the next higher-ranking official and possessed veto powers over the elected 
municipal councils. 
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enabled two types of states of exception. One was the extraordinary powers (facultades 
extraordinarias) granted by Art. 36.6 and the other one was the power to declare a state 
of siege (estado de sitio) allowed by Art. 82.20. Until the 1874 reforms, the Constitution 
did not define the grounds for extraordinary powers. An internal upheaval or external 
attack was defined as the trigger of state of siege. Declaration of state of siege meant the 
suspension of all constitutional guarantees.   
 In the case of external threat, the President could decree state of siege with the 
agreement of the State Council.65 In the case of internal upheaval, the state of siege was 
to be declared by the Congress, unless it was in recess. In the case that the Congress was 
not in session, the President could declare state of siege with the agreement of the State 
Council, subject to later congressional approval. Considering that the Congress held 
ordinary sessions only between June 1st and September 1st, the authority most of the time 
rested solely on the President and the State Council (Heiss 2012, 182 and Collier and 
Sater 1996, 55). 66 Moreover, given that the State Council was a body composed of 
cabinet ministers, two members of the judiciary, an army or navy general and other high-
ranking officials and ex-officials all appointed by the President; the likelihood that there 
would not be consensus was unlikely. Essentially, the State Council was “designed as a 
support for the President” (Gil 1966, 88). As such, emergency powers were exercised 
extensively throughout the Conservative Republic period (Collier and Sater 1993 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Among the Latin American countries, Chile was the first to create a constitutional provision for state of 
siege and other countries such as Argentina, Bolivia and Ecuador followed (Gargarella 2010, 210)  
66 The Congress even if it was in session usually held “short and sometimes inquorate sessions” such that 
for example, in the year 1838, it did not meet at all (Collier and Sater 1996, 55). 
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estimates, one third of the period between 1833 and 1861) 67. Thus, Chile that is praised 
for its legal tradition and considered as an “exceptional” case 68 among other Latin 
American countries that were plagued by constitutional instability and political disorder, 
actually lived through years of states of constitutional exception. The Chilean 
exceptionalism was constructed by forgetting that the “1833 constitution was the first 
among the independent Spanish American republics to provide for state of siege and 
constitutional dictatorship” (Loveman 2001, 3). In essence, the abandonment of the 
constitutional order through states of exception was a result of precisely the constitutional 
system that was set up. 
 The main goal of the drafters of the 1833 Constitution was to maintain order by 
providing for “the legal dictatorship of the president” (Moreno 1969, 104).  In the words 
of Diego Portales, it created governments able “to set the citizens on the straight path of 
order and virtue” (quoted in Hickman 1998, 22). General Prieto described the constitution 
as “a means of putting an end to the revolutions and disturbances which arose from the 
confusion in which the triumph of independence left us. For this reasons the system of 
government to which the republic was subjected… may be called autocratic in view of 
the great authority of power… concentrated in the hands of the citizen elected as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Article 82.20 established time and geographical limitations for the declaration of state of siege but left 
them ambiguous. While it did not set a fixed time, the constitution stipulated that it would be for a 
“determined period of time. Similarly, the language suggested that state of siege would not apply to the 
whole country but to “one or several points of the republic”. However, because it did not explain whether 
“points” corresponded to provinces or municipalities, this restriction also remained vague (Heiss 2012, 
183). 
68 For instance, Constable and Valenzuela (1991:20) explain, “while neighboring countries were regularly 
rocked by coups and revolutions, Chile’s presidents dutifully gave way to their elected successors, and the 
army was kept in check”.  
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president” (quoted in Loveman 2001, 110). However, the constitution only set up the 
institutional aspect of this “conservative settlement”69. The cherished political stability 
also depended, 1) suppression of dissidence, 2) electoral intervention (Collier and Sater 
1993, 56).  
 During the Conservative Republic period, the state resorted to repression 
regularly. The standard type of repression was imprisonment and exile for dissidents and 
only in cases when the opposition turned violent, death penalty was exercised. Therefore, 
by today’s standards it was not necessarily brutal but kept the opposition undermined 
(Collier and Sater 1993, 56).  
 The other instrument of political stability was “electoral intervention”. The 
President, eloquently described as the “Great Elector” was able to manipulate the 
elections to the extent that from 1830s onwards for sixty years, the election of the 
Congress was determined by the executive.70 This was thanks to three mechanisms that 
the “conservative settlement” allowed; 1) the 1833 electoral law, 2) civic (national) guard, 
3) weakness of the municipal authorities as intended by the constitution. Valenzuela 
(2012 55) calls this arrangement “the victor’s system of electoral management”. The 
constitution raised the voting age to 25 years old, if single, and 21, if married and set that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Conservative historian Alberto Edwards in his prominent work La Fronda Aristocrática en Chile (1928) 
interprets the 1833 constitution as playing an insignificant role in the formation of strong state. However 
his work is highly criticized for being selectively interpretative. 
70 Faúndez cites that between 1833 and 1864, 7 out of 11 congressional elections were uncontested (2007, 
19). 
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they must have certain income or property- the amount to be determined by future laws71. 
It reestablished the literacy requirement but it was suspended until 1840.72 Land-owners 
signed up their tenants and commanders of the militia enrolled their troops as voters. As a 
result of lax enforcement, those already registered continued to vote even after 1840. 
These two groups provided the incumbent government with a base that they could control 
to ensure their preferred choices were elected. 
 The centralized system set up by the constitution enabled the executive to dictate 
its electoral choices. Since the president had the power to name the mayors and select the 
members of the municipal councils, governors and intendants, through the extension of 
local control, the executive was able to control the ballot box. Municipal authorities were 
charged with overseeing the election process. “Delivering the vote was a vital aspect of 
the Intendant’s work” (Collier and Sater 1996, 58). They were responsible for 
establishing panels of citizens that would certify voters’ qualification, executing the 
elections and examining complaints. Typically, the executive would make up a list for 
both houses and send it off to the authorities in departments, requesting these to be 
chosen. The certificates of registration, commonly known as calificaciones “remained the 
key gateway to electoral victory” (Valenzuela 2012 56). In order to outnumber the 
opposition, the incumbent supporters would try to gather as many calificaciones as 
possible to the point that these certificates would be bought and sold (Collier and Sater 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 The first such law was stipulated in 1834 and set low levels of income and property qualification, that it 
“could be met by virtually anyone who had a fixed domicile” (Valenzuela 2012 55). 
72 Artisans and craftsmen were included in the electorate, in that sense the 1833 electoral law expanded the 
electorate. 
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1996, 56). The civic guard commander would oversee that their troops vote cast their 
ballot in line with the official list of candidates created by the government. Every 
government official was also expected to vote the official list. The actual poll would take 
over two days in which other methods such as personation, intimidation, temporary arrest 
and bribery would be instrumental in preventing the opposition voters from casting their 
votes (Collier and Sater 1993, 58). The whole system provided “a varnish of legitimacy” 
to “those who were already in power or those who were selected by those in power to 
replace them” (Valenzuela 2012 57). It enabled the executive to further exercise its 
powers by guaranteeing an acquiescent Congress. However, it is important to note that 
the system was not exclusive to the conservatives (Collier and Sater 1996, 56-67). The 
liberals when they reached power in 1861 also exercised “electoral intervention” in order 
to maintain a mild Congress.73 
 The 1833 constitution that made the backbone of the autocratic republic survived 
until 1925, albeit with some important reforms in 1870s and 1880s. After a period of 
constitutional instability, constitutional order was consolidated with the 1833 
Constitution. It became the framework that provided Chile with a sense of pride that the 
country was able to escape the political chaos witnessed by its sister republics in South 
America. Regardless of the electoral manipulation from 1831 to 1890, the 
constitutionally mandated electoral calendar was strictly followed and after the 
government of Manuel Bulnes (1841-1891) Chile was led by civilians. However, this 
myth of Chilean early political stability is at odds with the number of schemes the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Nevertheless, the Congress was composed of able members (Collier and Sater 1996, 58). 
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constitution provided for restricting the exercise of guarantees and years of rule under 
states of exception. Nevertheless, the constitution proved itself flexible enough to 
accommodate major amendments starting in 1870s and interpretation after 1891.  
2.1.3 Amendments to 1833 Constitution  
 The major amendments to the 1833 constitution came along with several political 
and economic developments that led to the breakdown of the conservative consensus and 
led to a more active Congress. The period between 1861 and 1891 witnessed the gradual 
liberalization of political order that allowed progressive allocation of power to the 
Congress. A number of factors help explain the sea change in the political dynamics and 
hence, constitutional change: 1) the role of political leadership74, 2) liberal impulse for 
change75, 3) international events such as revolutions of 1848 in Europe76, 4) internal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Political leadership was instrumental in opening up political space by moderates and creating further 
agitation by exercising suppression in the hands of hard-liners. Manuel Bulnes’ conciliatory approach 
(Collier and Sater 1996, 104), José Joaquín Pérez’s initiation of moderate transformation and Antonio 
Varas’s acquiescence to pressure to forgo presidential candidacy exemplify the first type of political 
leadership while Manuel Montt’s extensive use of states of exception to undermine opposition falls under 
the second type of political leadership. 
75 The gradual change of the 1833 Constitution from a staunchly conservative one to a more liberal one can 
also be partly attributed to the role that intellectuals of the liberal camp played (Garreton 2013). University 
of Chile and the Literary Society, both founded in 1842 and the National Institute allowed for “a climate of 
acceptance of dissent” (Heiss 2012, 191). Constitutional reforms were pushed with the help of the advocacy 
efforts of liberals such as José Victorino Lastarria, Carrasco Albano, Melchor de Santiago Concha who 
contributed to the debate with their scholarly works on the political system and the constitution75. Club de 
la Reforma, founded in 1849 provided the liberal activists with the organizational setting to promote 
constitutional change. 
76 The 1848 revolutionary events in France and elsewhere Europe also had an impact on Chilean liberal 
impetus and the mobilization of elite opinion. President Bulnes opened the Congress with a speech 
recognizing the significance of French Revolution and characterized France as bastion of “civilization and 
freedom” (quoted in Collier 2003, 79). Intellectuals began using the vocabulary of revolution; republic, 
people, citizen etc. A new organization Sociedad de la Igualdad (Society for Equality) was founded in 
1850 with the intention of disseminating new ideas and educating the proletariat. Its founders were devoted 
followers of the French Revolution. Francisco Bilbao was a first-hand witness to events in Paris in 1848 
and Santiago. Arcos was raised in Paris, France until he moved back in 1848. This idealistic enterprise 
recruited artisans and organized lessons on history, mathematics, political economy, English and music 
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division among conservative ranks77, 5) formation of political parties78 and 6) ultimate 
convergence of interests between factions of liberals and conservatives79. Although the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(Collier 2003, 85). Its moto was “liberty, equality, fraternity” and its members, igualitarios addressed one 
another as “citizen” (Collier and Sater 1993, 107). The Sociedad, repeatedly harassed by the authorities 
attracted the support of prominent Liberal leaders and continued with propaganda activities. A provincial 
uprising in San Felipe gave the government the pretext to declare a state of siege on November 7, 1850, ban 
Sociedad and arrest igualitarios. However, the ideas were planted. Thomson (2002) provides a full account 
of the impact of European Revolutions of 1848 on Americas. Also see Gargarella 2010, 17-29. 
77 Internal division among conservative ranks (pelucones) upset their control over political power. While 
the division is to be expected, as a new generation of conservatives that lived through conservative rule 
began to espouse new ideas, 1849 congressional elections set the stage for growing agitation (Collier and 
Sater 1996, 105-106). A split between rival pelucones became the precursor for the emergence of political 
party system. Upcoming presidential elections also generated political turmoil. Bulnes’s designated 
successor was Manuel Monnt whose reputation as a hard-liner was not favored by the liberals that had 
come to identify him as the principal figure of repression and “as their most formidable adversary” (Collier 
and Sater 1996, 105). President Bulnes’s cousin, intendant of Concepción and a hero of the War of 
Confederation General José María de la Cruz Prieto had presidential ambitions, supported by the leading 
citizens of Concepción. Despite the fact that he was a conservative, Liberals championed his candidacy.  
He encouraged resistance to the imposition of Montt, which led insurrection in capital and later uprisings in 
La Serena and Concepción in 1851. Montt was inaugurated amidst Liberal revolts that were soon 
suppressed under the leadership of outgoing President Bulnes. Here, it is important to note that the 
revolutionaries in La Serena and Concepción offered only one solution; creation of a provisional 
government while readying up for a constituent assembly. Pelucones officially split during the Montt 
presidency. Not all conservatives welcomed Manuel Montt. He was from a poor origin and was an outsider 
to the close-knit Chilean nobility. His preference for merit, rather than allegiance to upper class family 
relations annoyed aristocratic pelucones (Collier and Sater 1996, 111). During Montt’s second term (1856-
1861) the unity among conservatives began to further disintegrate. The controversy over the dismissal of a 
lay sacristan forced President Montt to take sides between the authority of the Supreme Court and the 
church and maintained a regalist attitude. For more on what is known as Sacristan affair, see Scully 1992, 
p.36-38 and Paxson 1990. 
78 The clerical-anticlerical dispute mobilized different sectors of the society and clerical pelucones began to 
distance themselves from Montt. The event, albeit seemingly trivial, “left an indelible mark on the 
emerging party system” (Scully 1992, 38). Archbishop Valdivieso rallied clerical conservatives. This 
faction later united for the defense of the church and formed the Conservative Party, in 1857. In response, 
Montt-supporter pelucones formed the secular, pro-government National Party in 1857 (also known as 
Montt-Varistas, after Montt’s interior minister Antonio Varas). Conservative consensus was shattered and 
the seeds of the emerging political party system were planted.  
79  Although the Conservative party mainly sought protecting the privileged status of the Church, its other 
ideological positions paralleled the Liberal party’s aspirations. While maintaining “absolute allegiance to 
the cause of Catholicism”, Conservative Party also espoused “liberal economic philosophy with an 
antiauthoritarian bent” (Scully 1992, 39-40). Like the liberals they championed political reforms that would 
curb the powers of the government (Garreton 2013, 39). Liberals and Conservatives began to join forces in 
Congress and passed an amnesty bill for those participants of 1851 revolt and when Montt refused to sign 
the legislation, the Conservative-Liberal alliance stalled the congressional approval of next year’s budget. 
What united these two parties was their “common detestation of Montt”  (Collier and Sater 1996, 112). 
Moreover, both parties advocated for economic liberalism, amnesty for participants of 1851 Civil War and 
wanted the official candidate-Montt’s minister of the interior, Antonio Varas (1861-1856 and 1860-1861) 
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increased state repression was the underlying reason for growing political dissidence, the 
above-mentioned factors further explain how dissidence came to realization.  
 The internal division of pelucones regarding their support for President Montt and 
their attitude towards clerical issue initiated the formation of political parties. Liberals, 
influenced by the ideas of the period and sharing a common cause against the government 
have become willing to exploit the internal division of pelucones to their own advantage 
and enter into a formal alliance with conservatives in what came to be known as Liberal-
Conservative Fusion, Fusión Liberal-Conservadora.80 What differentiated the reformist 
segments of the liberal party was that it chose to formulate its political demands within 
the framework of a new constitution and began to call for a constitutional assembly. They 
demanded the political rights to be expanded, presidential reelection to be banned and the 
press to acquire freedom (Garreton 2013, 39). In 1858 liberals Isidoro Errázuriz and 
Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna founded the newspaper La Asamblea Constitucional, which 
helped disseminate the reformist liberals’ demands.81 In December 1858, Vicuña 
Mackenna and Errázuriz, along with other liberals Manuel Antonio Matta, Guillermo 
Matta and Angel Custodio Gallo (the future founders of Radical Party) organized a 
“constituent assembly” in Santiago. Soldiers dispersed the event and the government 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
not to run in the upcoming elections (Garrenton 2013, 39). In January 1858, liberals and conservatives 
formalized their alliance of convenience in what came to be known as Liberal-Conservative Fusion, Fusión 
Liberal-Conservadora. The fact that the demands of the conservative and liberal party have now come to 
overlap meant that they could provide a stronger opposition against the authoritarianism of the Montt 
administration. The 1858 congressional elections witnessed the burgeoning of an organized political 
opposition. 
80 As such, Liberals chose to hold off demands religious reforms for the time being (Scully 1992, 40). 
81  This radical newspaper was “the official organ of reformist and youth elements among the Liberals who 
would later join to form the Radical party” (Scully 1992, 41). 
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declared a state of siege (Collier and Sater 1996, 112). It precipitated the armed 
resurrection in the south and north of the country.82 Ultimately crushed by the 
government forces, Pedro León Gallo’s “Constituent Army” posed the greatest challenge 
to Montt’s forces during the 1859 civil war. The members of radical faction of liberals 
were sent off to exile. Antonio Varas, the official candidate of National Party, the pro-
government and secular party that emerged after the split among conservative ranks, 
yielded to sea change and renounced his candidacy83. Thus one of the demands of the 
Fusion was fulfilled and the alliance for the first time became part of the ruling 
coalition.84 
 These young and reformist liberals now back from exile represented the radical 
wing of the Liberal party that found the interparty alliance between liberals and 
conservatives as ideologically offensive. They had agreed with the Fusion that Manuel 
Montt needed to be deposed, however “they refused to dirty themselves in a political pact 
with the party of the ‘retrograde’ Catholic church” (Scully 1992, 41). From this liberal 
split, the Radical Party was officially formed. In December 1863, in the province of 
Atacama radicals organized Asamblea Radica and united as a new force.85 The evolution 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 The rebels were led by an affluent mine owner Pedro León Gallo y Goyenechea of Copiapó, who would 
later be a Radical deputy and senator. 
83 Instead, Jose Joaquin Pérez was designated as the official candidate who was perceived as “a candidate 
of conciliation; he inspired neither great enthusiasm nor opposition” (Loveman 1993, 344). Here again we 
see the role of political leadership. Both conservative leaders Varas and Pérez’s decision to adapt to 
political dynamics were instrumental in bringing about a “silent revolution” that would soon materialize 
with a more active Congress. 
84 Indicating his desire for national reconciliation, Pérez granted amnesty for exiled reformist liberals 
85 Although they would not officially become an official political party until 1888, they represented 
coherent sets of ideas based on liberal-democratic aspiration of anticlericalism. 
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of political party system in Chile marked a significant development. Although electoral 
intervention was still practiced, the political system became much more inclusive 
representing different shades of political currents. The bourgeoning political party system 
allowed for the internalization of conflicts and identified the Congress as the venue for 
opposition. Scully (1992, 42) provides a concise summary of the changing political 
landscape and the emergence of political party system: 
 Chilean political elites were basically divided into two camps: those who wished 
to secure for Chile a strong, centralized, authoritative presidency, and others who 
supported a more decentralized, parliamentary form of government. After the pelucon 
victory at the battle of Lircay in 1830 the former group consolidated their control over the 
young republic and institutionalized the new regime in the constitution of 1833. Though 
political opposition to the pelucones became scattered and disorganized during what is 
generally called the “authoritarian republic (1833-1861), political conflict between “ins” 
and “outs” constituted a strong undercurrent during the late 1840s and the 1850s. Though 
this struggle left no institutionalized party legacy, it did precipitate the formation of a 
loosely organized group of opposition Liberals. 
 It was the ongoing struggle between church and state leaders over the place of the 
Catholic church in society that eventually triggered the crystallization of the party 
system… The Conservative party formed to defend the interests of the church and to 
protect it from state interference. The Liberals, seeking to take advantage of the presence 
of the powerful Catholic Conservative elite among the ranks of the opposition, formed a 
political coalition to offer a more coherent political opposition to the Montt government. 
The formation of a third party, the Radicals, was precipitated by the alliance of Liberals 
and Conservatives, which doctrinaire liberals felt was a betrayal of their principles. 
 The opening up of political space in the 1860s allowed for the discussion of 
constitutional reform, the “old dream of the Liberals, finally rose to the top of the 
political agenda” (Collier and Sater 1996, 119). The religious tone of the 1833 
constitution became more moderate in time as a result of the 1865 interpretative law that 
weakened its assertive features. According to Art. 5, Catholicism was the official religion 
and public worship of other churches was prohibited. In 1865, the Chilean Congress 
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debated the scope of the Catholic Church’s power but the Fusion-majority Congress was 
not able to produce a constitutional amendment. Instead, the Congress passed an 
“interpretative law”86 that made it possible for non-Catholics to privately practice and 
teach their religion. Discussions on amending Art. 5 produced, as Collier (2003, 121) 
states, “possibly the highest-quality debates the Chilean Congress had yet seen”. The 
Nationals, with the support of the Radicals began to push for constitutional reforms that 
would reduce the power of the president- “partially out of political rancor and rivalry, and 
partially out of ideological conviction, they now joined the liberal cry for reform” 
(Moreno 1969, 128). The convergence of interests among the members of Fusion, 
National and Radical Party helped push the demand for further constitutional reforms. 
Nationals and Radicals, now in opposition had an interest in instituting genuine 
competitive elections. Together with independent liberals, they organized Reform Clubs 
and in September 1869 national convention set the agenda of their demands: electoral 
freedom, expanded franchise and curtailment of presidential powers. Despite the fact that 
debates over Art. 5 prepared the ground for further amendments and the Congress of 
1870-1873 was made up credible congressmen, only one amendment, albeit an important 
one passed towards the very end of Pérez’s term (1861-1871). The amendment of 1871 
ended the immediate reelection of presidents. 
 Under the term of the next president, Federico Errázuriz Zañartu (1871-1876), the 
1833 Constitution was further amended. He was a staunch liberal, a founding member of 
Reforma, who was sent off to Peru for participating in the 1851 uprising. Despite the fact 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Ley interpretativa de libertad de cultos (1865). 
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that in 1860- then as a liberal politician Errázuriz had criticized the constitution for 
producing a regime of tyranny that “falsified all principles of democratic government”, 
he chose to amend it rather than replace it (quoted in Loveman 2001, 5). An amendment 
in 1871 reduced the necessary quorum for the sessions of Senate and Chamber of 
Deputies.87  
 The Liberal-conservative alliance formally broke up in 1873 and Errázuriz 
assembled a cabinet with solely liberal members. Further reforms that expanded 
constitutional guarantees and limited the executive power followed in 1874. The 
amendments added; association and peaceful assembly in a public place without 
permission, and freedom of education as fundamental rights. Also an amendment 
shortened the residency requirements for foreigners to acquire citizenship from 10 years 
to one year. Moreover, senators (one for each province) would now be directly elected, 
rather than electoral college. The 1874 amendments limited restrictions to freedoms and 
liberties under a state of siege88 to a period not longer than a year.89  Moreover, the 1874 
amendment provided for an expedited process of prosecution of the ministers90 and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 For the Senate, it was reduced from an absolute majority to a third of its members and for the Chamber of 
Deputies, it was reduced absolute majority to a quarter of its members (BCN- Biblioteca del Congreso, La 
Constitución: Historia constitucional de Chile) 
88 State of siege was declared for long periods under hardliner Manuel Montt to create the pretext to arrest 
Liberals (Collier and Sater 1996, 105). 
89 A state of siege could be declared as a result of external or internal threat. In the event of an external 
threat, the President could declare a state of siege with the agreement of State Council- a consultative body 
composed of the president, ministers and other high officers. In the event of an internal threat, the state of 
siege was to be declared by the Congress but if the Congress was in recess, then again it had to be declared 
by the President with an agreement of the State Council (Heiss, 2012, 182). 
90 The restructured provisions provided for impeachment of cabinet members for the crime of treason, 
extortion, bribery, breach of the constitution, disregard of the laws and for compromising the honor and 
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restructured the State Council-the body responsible for judicial appointments91. Another 
amendment in 1882 changed the process of constitutional reform. Same year, the right to 
vote was expanded to all male Chileans who can read and write, and the property 
requirement was abolished.92 
 In sum, after 1850s, the 1833 Constitution began to lose its conservative 
characteristics gradually (Gargarella 2013, 38). This was the result of a number of factors 
that included the breakdown of oligarchic consensus as a result of clerical-anticlerical 
split; the liberal impulse that was sustained as a consequence of elite persuasion that 
mobilized public opinion through outlets such as newspapers like La Asamblea 
Constitucional and organizations like Sociedad de la Igualdad and Club de la Reforma 
and infusion of ideas from Europe; the convergence of interests between factions of 
liberals and conservatives that materialized with the alliance of Fusión Liberal-
Conservadora; the emergence of vigorous political party system that helped identify the 
Congress as the venue for change and strengthened the inclusivity of the political system. 
Additionally, political leadership played a significant role, whether this was in the form 
of creating greater opposition as a result of repressive rule (Montt)93 or acquiescence to 
changing political dynamics (Varas and Pérez). These factors helped the Congress to 
progressively achieve more power and the 1833 constitution to shed some of its most 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
security of the state. Accordingly, if a member of the cabinet was impeached, he was also subject to trial by 
ordinary courts (Faúndez 2007, 41). 
91 The membership of State Council was expanded to include appointments by the congress, rather than 
solely by the president.  
92 The 1874 electoral reform eliminated property requirements and the 1888 reform reduced the age to 21. 
93 In total, during the Montt presidency (1851-1861), Chile was under states of exception for five years and 
one month (Heiss 2012, 194). 
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conservative provisions. What was remarkable was that these reforms took place despite 
a number of constraints, namely the electoral intervention that produced a compliant 
Congress, the high acclaim shown to the constitution for producing “political stability” 
and the difficulty of amendment-making process94. 
2.1.4 Interpretation of the 1833 Constitution 
 The series of constitutional amendment in 1870s and 1880s had already reduced 
the executive’ excessive power and paved the ground for shifting the balance towards the 
legislative branch. However, the final straw came when President José Manuel 
Balmaceda (1886-1891) attempted to reverse the predominance of the executive. The 
Congress did not agree with the government’s nitrate policies, cabinet appointments and 
the presidence’s preference for his successor- a wealthy landowner who was his personal 
friend (Loveman 2993, 348). Balmaceda’s main grievance with the Congress was its 
power to interpellate ministers and censure cabinets. He described the political system in 
June 1890 as the “dictatorship of congress” (quoted in Loveman 1993, 348). The 
Congress censured the cabinet and declared that until a suited cabinet was formed, it 
would not pass the budget and authorize a bill on tax collection. In return, on January 1, 
1891 the president declared that he was going to adopt last year’s budget. Clearly 
unconstitutional, in January 1891 the Congress voted to depose him, which he responded 
by assuming dictatorial powers. A seven-month long civil war erupted in which both 
Balmaceda forces and his opponents maintained that they were defending the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Provisions for the amendment process are listed under chapter 12 and require 2/3 majority and other 
hurdles. 
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constitutional order (Loveman 1993, 349).95 Balmaceda in an attempt to salvage his legal 
position, called for a constitutional convention, but despite the election it never met 
(Moreno 1969, 140).96 When the war ended, the congressionalist forces had triumphed, 
10,000 were killed and Balmaceda rather than accept defeat and surrender to the new 
government killed himself in the Argentine embassy where he had taken asylum.97 The 
crisis altered the political system, for the next three decades the balance of power would 
be shifted towards Congress in the so-called “parliamentary republic”. The system 
change took place without a corresponding amendment “but it was understood by 
everybody that hereafter a president should not be able to govern without submitting to 
the public will as expressed by parliament” (Reinsch 1909, 514).  
 The supremacy of Congress that emerged following the 1891 civil war can be 
explained by analyzing 1) the contrasting provisions of the 1833 constitution and 2) the 
Congress’ gradual allocation of power. As explained in the previous part, the 1833 
constitution even before the amendments of 1870s had devised a system where the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 The president was supported by the army and the Congress by the navy. General Emil Körner, a German 
army officer who was asked to modernize the Chilean army sided with the Congressional forces, which 
proved to be crucial to their success. 
96 In June 1891, Interior Minister Julio Bañados presented a draft constitution to the constituent congress 
and expressed the government’s desire to reform the constitution in order to “place the independence of 
State Powers on a foundation of granitte” (quoted in Zeitlin 1984, 214). However, the proposal’s intent to 
provide for a centralized state apparatus created opposition even among supporters of Balmaceda. For more 
on the content of this proposal see Zeitlin 1984. 
97 The 1891 crisis was not just about the rift between the Congress and the President, it also had an 
economic aspect: “Balmaceda’s attempts to implement measures designed to put an end to currency 
depreciation, to parcel out land to small holders, and to curtail the growing influence of foreign investments 
encountered the violent opposition of the landowners and big exporters on one hand, and on the other, the 
hostility of the influential foreign nitrate interests” (Gil 1966, 47). His nationalistic aspirations and suicide 
have later led to comparisons with the fate of Salvador Allende. Blakemore (1986, 521) disputes the role of 
foreign nitrate interests.  
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Congress could play an active role. However, other aspects of the “conservative 
settlement”, namely the electoral intervention had produced acquiescent chambers, which 
yielded to the far-reaching powers of the executives. Besides the authority to pass budget, 
taxes and deployment of the army; the Congress had the power of interpellation 
(interpelación) and vote of no confidence (censura). After 1861, the Congress began to 
resort to these powers more frequently (Scully 1992, 46).  
 The constitution-making process of 1833 can shed light on how the system 
characterized by omnipotent executive also allowed for the emergence of a vibrant 
Congress. The two main drafts prepared by Manuel Gandarillas and Mariano Egaña for 
the Constitutional Convention adhered to different political systems. While Egaña’s draft 
leaned towards an English parliamentary system,98 Gandarillas’s draft had a penchant for 
the American model (Navia 1999, 9). The main ideologues’ divergent proposals 
ultimately produced a “mixed system” where instead of “establishing a system of checks 
and balances” between the executive and legislative branches, “several provisions for 
interference by one body on the other body’s constitutional power were set in place” 
(Navia 1999, 9-10). Also it is important to recognize that Art. 164 of the 1833 
constitution identified the Congress as the only body that “can settle any doubts that may 
arise in regard to the interpretation of any of the articles pertaining to it”. In sum, these 
constitutional dispositions gave rise to parliamentary republic. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Egaña had spent time in Europe. 
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 After 1861, Chilean political system began to resemble “a quasi-parliamentary 
system of government” (Scully 1992, 45). This, as explained, happened as a result of the 
breakdown of conservative consensus and the emergence of a political party system. 
Thus, the constitutional transformation took place gradually as the oligarchic power 
structure began to dissolve as a result of “the growing ideological, political and regional 
fragmentation of the Chilean elite” that initially led to armed insurrections in 1851 and 
1859 but later in 1870s lent itself “to a gradual, but fundamental, transformation of the 
autocratic republic and its authoritarian underpinnings” (Loveman 2001, 122). Therefore, 
parliamentary practices that were consolidated with the 1891 crisis were introduced 
gradually before then (Scully 1992, 46, concurred by Loveman 2001, Couso et. al 2011). 
Starting with 1861, Chilean presidents had governed by forming coalition cabinets. As 
Heise (quoted in Scully 1992, 46) explains, 
 “It is simply not possible to affirm-as all our historians have until now-that 
parliamentarism was born as a consequence of the revolution of 1891. By the time the 
1891 constitution was produced, government by cabinet ministry was an indisputable 
reality in Chile. The Balmaceda dictatorship represented a simple historical accident in 
the history of liberal parliamentarism: a vain attempt to disturb an inexorable historical 
development. While the president continued to be the “Great Elector,” the birth of an 
organized and active political opposition required that he govern with the support of one, 
or a combination of, existing political groups. The existence of opposition political 
parties would produce profound transformations in the structure of political relations in 
the decade from 1857 to 1867”. 
 Following the 1891 Civil War, three sets of amendments passed that modified the 
ways to convene special sessions of the Congress (1891), provided for new 
disqualifications to be elected as a deputy (1892) and modified the forms of the 
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presidential veto (1893).99 While 1891 and 1893 amendments did increase congressional 
control, parliamentary practices in effect resulted from a new interpretation of the 
constitution.  
2.1.5 Analysis of 1833 Constitution  
 The 1833 Constitution remained in effect for almost a century. Chile, despite brief 
armed conflicts maintained regular elections, followed the electoral calendar precisely 
and respected the term limits, without interruption until 1925 (Valenzuela 2012)100 with 
the exception of the fall of Balmaceda. The transformation of the strongly presidentialist 
and centralized system began after the end of the Conservative Republic in 1861, 
followed by formal amendments to the constitution in 1870s and consolidated after the 
1891 civil war. Both sides in the 1891 war claimed to be fighting for the restoration of 
legitimate government, however the victory of Congressionalists confirmed the 
continuation of the congressional dominance that precluded strong presidency and came 
to be known as Parliamentary Republic (1891-1924). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Beside constitutional reforms, other institutional changes also marked the changing political system. The 
most important was the December 1891 law comuna autónoma (autonomous municipality) decentralized 
the system and gave more autonomy to approximately 200 municipal units (comunas) (Collier and Sater 
1996, 188). 
100 Valenzulea (2012) offers an in-depth account of the instituting the electoral process in Chile and 
describes it as one of the most modern of its time. The electoral laws provided for a secret ballot, instituted 
one vote to every qualified citizen, excluding women as it was the case in everywhere else, specified 
district sizes with respect to its population, set up an electoral registry as a mechanism to check voters’ 
name at the ballot and mandated electoral renewal for governmental and legislative authorities. Although 
irregularities took place, the system had long-term impacts. It helped promote party formation. It engrained 
an appreciation for the electoral process as the only mechanism to ensure political legitimacy. Therefore, 
despite the fact that, in the short term “winner-take-all nature of the contests stimulated a sharp process of 
political polarization”, respect for the electoral system had a “precedent-forming impact” that in the long-
term established the electoral process as the legitimate mechanism to set up governments. 
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 Although Chile’s political stability, which was attributed to the political system 
set up by the 1833 constitution, was a matter of envy of neighboring countries, this was 
achieved on account of the constitutional restrictions and other mechanisms like outright 
repression and electoral intervention, resulting in what Loveman (1993, 315) describes as 
“constitutional dictatorship”. While the constitutional amendments and electoral reforms 
made the Chilean political system more inclusive, the oligarchic republic instituted by the 
1833 constitution endured and the Chilean politics remained exclusive to prominent 
pedigrees. Writing in 1909, Reinsch (510) explains that the same names one sees in 
“contemporary social and political affairs, we find affixed to the constitutions of Chile”. 
After the unrestrained use of states of exception during Montt’s presidency, until the 
1891 civil war, neither the Congress nor the president employed this authority, including 
the periods of labor conflicts in 1880s and the War of Pacific (1879-1884) (Loveman 
1993, 347).  During the “parliamentary republic”, states of exceptions were resorted to 
three times; during Jorge Montt’s presidency (1891-1896) state of siege was declared in 
1893 and 1894 and once in 1919 under President Luis Sanfuentes (1915-1920) until the 
crisis of 1924.101  
2.1.6 The Parliamentary Republic and its Fall 
 While it won’t be accurate to treat the terms of six presidents of Parliamentary 
Republic and the number of congressional blocks that dominated the Chilean politics 
between 1891 to 1920 as uniform, it is possible to draw several characteristics of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 With the 1924 coup, the military declared a state of siege in Santiago, Valparaíso and Aconagua; closed 
down the Congress and indicated that it would soon summon for a constitutional assembly that ultimately 
resulted in the promulgation of the 1925 constitution, which will be addressed below. 
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system established after the 1891 war and assess the factors that contribute to its 
breakdown in order to contextualize the political, social and economic conditions that 
ultimately led to the 1924 crisis and the 1925 constitution. 
 The Parliamentary Republic was marked by a number of attributes. First and 
foremost, the congressional supremacy consolidated in this period and as such the 
political parties whose numbers multiplied began to play fundamental roles. In order to 
achieve majorities and therefore govern, parties needed to form political blocs. 
Previously the strong executive and especially its manipulation of elections had avoided 
factionalism but now the heterogeneous victors of the 1891 civil war competed for 
control over the Congress. They came to hold significant influence over appointments to 
cabinets. The congressional dominance proved to be a volatile one. Political pacts were 
pursued in order to achieve electoral advantage and have access to government resources 
(Valenzuela 1977, 201). However, these alliances tend to be short-lived. The ministerial 
instability is illustrated by the fact that during the 33 years of parliamentary republic, 
there were a total of 121 cabinets with 530 ministers (Gil 1966, 49). During this period 
average cabinet lasted for only 133 days (Valenzuela 1977, 201).102  
 Although the period between 1891 and 1920 is known as the parliamentary 
republic, the political system was not really parliamentarian. The executive lacked the 
power to dissolve the Congress and/or request new elections.  Unlike parliamentary 
systems, there was no prime minister. The minister of interior while played a significant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 For close analysis of the 1920-1924 period, see (Yeager 1977). 
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role, lacked the authority of prime minister (Collier and Sater 1996, 193).  The so-called 
parliamentary system was not the result of constitutional change. Here again it is 
important to recognize the role of the political leadership. The tone set by Jorge Montt- 
the first president in the aftermath of the 1891 crisis established a subordinate role for the 
presidency. Therefore, “modifications in practice became far more significant than 
changes in form” (Blakemore 1986, 522)  
 Although bribery and vote-buying (cohecho) were common practices during this 
period (Gil 1966, 50)103, the Parliamentary Republic witnessed the emergence of political 
parties across the political spectrum.104 The Parliamentary Republic, despite its many 
defects had allowed for the emergence of opposition parties (Loveman 2001, 163). 
Although party competition was strong, there was no significant ideological difference 
between parties with the exception of the role of the religion.105 In order to form 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 As the public administration expanded, the congressmen used their political position to place their 
choices in important bureaucratic posts. While the electoral intervention of the past era where the executive 
was able to manipulate the results was no longer possible in the Parliamentary Republic, the political 
parties took on the role of meddling in the electoral process. The 1891 autonomous municipality law had 
provided municipal authorities with more power, including over the election process. It prompted 
politicians to utilize local bosses to fix the elections, to deploy the manpower of the landowners to deliver 
the votes of inquilinos (tenant farmers) and if all fail, simply bribe their way through  (Collier and Sater 
1996, 191-192). A second law, called the “parliamentary incompatibilities” was designed against the 
excessive power of the executive and the potential it held to intervene in electoral affairs. According to this 
law, issued under Balmaceda but adapted only after 1891 crisis, a member of the public service appointed 
by the President could not run for a seat in the Congress. As a result, persons from affluent backgrounds 
who wanted to stamp their political prestige simply bought seats in the Congress (Gil 1966, 50). The 
political corruption was so widespread that it led to the emergence of Liga de Acción Cívica (Civic Action 
League), which pushed for electoral reforms. Eventually the 1914-1915 reforms cut the interference of 
municipalities in elections (Collier and Sater 1993, 198). 
104 To the list of political parties that included Conservative Party, National Party, Liberal Party and Radical 
Party; first the Democrat Party joined in 1887 and after the 1891 civil war Liberal Democratic Party 
brought together supporters of former President Balmaceda and hence they were known as balmacedistas. 
105 The difference was most obvious between Radicals and Conservatives over the issue of the role of 
religion in education (Gil 1966, p. 49 and Collier and Sater 1993, 191). While the Radicals maintained that 
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congressional majorities, parties chose to make temporary alliances. As a result, there 
were two main groupings; Alliance (including the Radicals) and Coalition (including the 
Conservatives). Despite the shifting allegiances, these two political combinations 
dominated the congressional politics throughout the parliamentary period. However, 
these political parties did not necessarily represent the changing social dynamics. The 
Chilean Congress remained under the control of traditional oligarchy. A small group of 
“political families with strong backbone in the Chilean countryside” continued to 
dominate the government (Loveman 2001, 165). While the Radical Party had a broader 
base and contained the potential to be the voice of social demands, the affinity of some of 
its members to Chilean aristocracy restrained the progressive elements of the party (Gil 
1966, 56). Although the Democratic Party favored social and economic reforms, 106 it did 
not align itself with the growing labor movement and like the other political parties vied 
for seats by engaging in parliamentary politicking.107 Thereby political channels were 
closed for increasing new demands.  
 Chile’s first socialist party came about as a result of a split from the Democratic 
Party in 1912 by Luis Emilio Recabarren who recognized the need for a party that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the state should be the primary agent of education; the idea of estado docente; the Conservatives argued 
that education should free from state interference.   
106 Among others, Democratic Party had the strongest ties to working-class associations and its leaders 
“proclaimed their party to be founded on a-Marxist platform that sought improvements in the social, 
economic and economic conditions of the Chilean people through nonviolent, gradual reform” (Scully 1992, 
73).  
107 Loveman (2001, 164) describes PD as “Chile’s first populist political party” because of the number of 
reforms that it proposed and the social base it aimed to appeal to, namely Chile’s lower middle class. 
However, the party also fell to the common traits of parliamentary system like corruption and increased 
repression by the state apparatus led to the loss of appeal of gradual reform (Scully 1992, 73).  
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represented the interests of the growing working class. Thus, Partido Obrero Socialista 
(POS-Socialist Workers Party) while lacking congressional strength, had strong affinity 
with labor organizations. The most obvious example of Parliamentary Republic’s 
tolerance but not outright acceptance of Chile’s working class is the Congress’ refusal to 
seat Recabarren because he refused to swear to Bible after his election in 1906 (Loveman 
2001, 164). 
 The worker class unrepresented in the Congress began to organize from bottom-
up108; strikes became common109 and so did government repression110. Newspapers 
offered an outlet for the labor movement and gradually other segments of the society, 
namely students began to support the demands of the working class (Collier and Sater 
1993, 200)111. Although the development of labor movement during the parliamentary 
republic era coincides with the plight of the nitrate workers, it was one of the many 
catalysts. The conditions of the urban poor and the inquilinos in the countryside also 
sharply contrasted with the standards enjoyed by the upper class. As Collier and Sater 
(1993, 195) recognize what is commonly known as the “social question” that refers to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 The Chilean worker class first began to organize in mutual benefit societies (mutualidades) in order to 
attend to their basic concerns that might arise in cases of occupational illnesses and accidents and provide 
for a venue to hold meetings and lectures and to offer educational opportunities (Gil 1966, 54). The 
Federación Obreros de Chile, FOCH was initially founded as such an organization, however the influence 
of Recabarren and POS led to growing adaptation of socialist aspirations. Later resistance groups that were 
under the influence of anarcho-syndicalism and sought to improve labor conditions emerged. The 
conditions of the workers of the nitrate industry in the north exacerbated in time and gave way to a strong 
labor movement. Government forces repeatedly repressed the industrial workers seeking better working 
conditions, which ultimately strengthened their appeal and increased the number of strikes 
109 Gil (1966, 54) estimates that in Chile between 1911 and 1920, 293 strikes took place. 
110 Some of those acts of repression that went down in history include strikes in Valparaiso in 1903, 
Antofagasta in 1906, Iquieque in 1907, Puerto Natales in 1919 and Magallanes in 1920.  
111 The students were organized under FECH (Federación de Estudiantes de Chile) founded in 1906 
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growing social discontent and unrest in Chilean society, did not just emerge during the 
parliamentary republic. Chile’s urban and industrial proletariat has been growing since 
1890s but the Congress had remained indifferent to their problems.112 Therefore, while 
“the gap between the rich and the poor had always been there”, what changed was the 
realization that the congressional oligarchy detached from the conditions of the lower 
classes was unwilling to offer remedies to their problems.113   
 What also lent substantial support to growing demands of the labor movement 
was the success of the Russian Revolution in 1917 (Collier and Sater 1993, 200)114 and 
the Mexican Revolution that produced the constitution of 1917, which for the first time in 
the world stipulated social rights. While the outbreak of the World War I initially led to 
recession but ultimately to a temporary boom, it was the end of the European war that 
brought adverse economic results in Chile. On the one hand, Chile’s trade relations with 
Europe were interrupted115 and on the other hand, Germany’s discovery of artificial 
nitrate, out of wartime necessity, ultimately led to Chile’s nitrate industry to fall into 
depression (Hickman 1998, 41). Such economic repercussions of World War I spurred a 
stronger wave of protests that added fuel to the strength of organized labor (Collier and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Except a 1906 legislation that authorized housing for workers and the non-mandatory six-day week law 
in 1907, the Congress did not pass any social legislation that would protect the urban working class. 
113 Besides, Chile attracted relatively few migrants. In 1907, less than 4% of industrial workers were 
foreign born and labor movement was essentially home-grown (Loveman 2001, 167). 
114 In response to protests over high food prices, the government enacted a Residence Law, with the 
presumption that foreigners were responsible for labor agitation. The law passed in 1918, came after the 
Russian Revolution and enabled the authorities to deport “foreigners who preached violent change in the 
social or political order” (Loveman 2001, 167). 
115 Gradually United States came to replace Britain and Germany as Chile’s major trading partner. 
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Sater 1993, 200). Therefore, social discontent positively and negatively affected by the 
international developments, sharpened the edge of the working-class demands.  
 Changes brought about by Chile’s modernization also had an impact on the 
country’s political, social and economical transformation. Chile at the turn of the century 
was becoming increasingly literate, experiencing dissemination of education beyond 
upper-class and enjoying the availability of press (Collier and Sater, 1993 180-181, 
Loveman 2001, 163). As Gil (1966, 51) recognizes, throughout the parliamentary period 
respect for civil liberties facilitated an atmosphere where new ideas could be freely 
debated. In many respects, the parliamentary decades laid the ground in preparation for 
the next period. One such example of socio-economic transformation is that of railways. 
A milestone in nation-building, Chile’s construction of railroads not only provided for 
employment opportunities but it also linked the country’s working force from north to 
south (Hickman 1998, 52). The industrial worker, urban poor and inquilino separated by 
distance became closer thanks to developments in transportation and communication.  
 While it is important to recognize that the sustained industrial and commercial 
growth altered Chile’s social diversification, the significance of the role played by the 
expanding middle-class should not be over-emphasized (Collier and Sater 1993, 172). 
Although during the parliamentary period, small middle-class expanded as steady 
economic growth, albeit with growing budget deficits led to the emergence of new types 
of jobs in private sector and expansion of public administration, the Chilean middle class 
could not enjoy upward social mobility as much because of the aristocracy’s strong hold 
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of power, especially with respect to land holdings (Gil 1966, 52).116 While the working-
class had the vigor to mobilize, the middle-class still small and heterogeneous lacked 
such potential (Collier and Sater 1993, 199). Some migrants, although most became 
industrial workers in the north or agricultural laborer in the south, joined Chile’s 
bourgeoning middle-class but mostly remained unstirred. The main contribution of the 
middle-class came with intellectual guidance (Gil 1966, 53). Therefore, the Parliamentary 
Republic, despite its vices witnessed economic growth accompanied by social changes 
especially with respect to small but emerging middle class, a new type of social force- the 
“intellectual” and strong in numbers and conviction working class that petition the 
Congress to no avail. Added the international developments, flourishing press and 
repression unleashed by strikes, Chile as it neared 1920 had become a vibrant society. 
However, the unresponsiveness of the congressional oligarchy and the mismatch between 
the political demands and political parties led to a crisis of representation that 
increasingly became unable to contain the changing social dynamics. The growing social 
forces would only have an electoral impact with the election of Arturo Alessandri in 1920 
in what is dubbed as “revolt of the electorate”. 
2.1.7. The 1925 Crisis and the Making of the 1925 Constitution 
 Arturo Alessandri, a congressman who had aroused much passion when he was 
elected senator of Tarapacá in 1915, indicated his desire to run for the presidential seat. 
Despite being part of the old political establishment, he was able to garner the support of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Collier and Sater (1993) report that in 1924 Chile “one-tenth of all properties covered more than nine-
tenths of the land”. 
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both working and middle class. Nevertheless Alessandri relied on “all traditional methods 
of Parliamentary campaigning” (Collier and Sater 1993, 206) and achieved marginal 
victory in 1920.117 Alessandri who had campaigned on the promises of social legislation 
(including social security and a Labor Code), constitutional reform (including matters 
such as direct vote in presidential elections, separation of church and state, and 
decentralization) and appealed to the demands of the working class faced an 
uncompromising Congress (Gil 1966, 58).118 The 1920 elections had witnessed the 
realignment of political parties and shifting of coalitions, Alessandri supported by the 
Liberal Alliance (including a faction of Liberals, Radicals and Democrats) faced the 
bitter opposition of National Union (including Conservatives, Nationals, Liberal 
Democrats and segments of Liberals) and found his hands tied with congressional 
politicking- proving that “the Parliamentary Republic had not, after all, been broken” 
(Collier and Sater 1993, 207).  Congress, in order to curb the executive power continued 
to utilize its prerogative, namely its veto power over ministers and its delaying tactic, that 
is its authority to approve “periodic” laws of budget, tax collection and military 
deployment. Between December 1920 and September 1924, there were sixteen cabinet 
changes (Stanton 1997, 4). 
 Although Alessandri was convinced that “only constitutional change would 
enable Chile to tackle its real social problems” (Hickman 1998, 55) and although a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 A Tribunal of Honor ratified his close victory. 
118 During his campaign, Alessandri had expressed his position by stating, “I want to be a threat to 
reactionary spirits, a threat to those who resist all just and necessary reforms” (quoted in Loveman 2001, 
179). 
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growing momentum for constitutional reform enabled the Union and Alliance to produce 
a preliminary draft on February 1, 1924 involving number of changes 119 related to 
parliamentary procedures, the party pact was soon abandoned.120 
 Congress’ refusal to adopt social laws that would help ameliorate the conditions 
faced by the laborers as well as the general frustration with political stalemate, even after 
the congressional elections of 1924 that produced a Liberal majority, demonstrated the 
constraints faced by the existing system. With many pressing issues, including the long 
neglected social legislation, Congress supported by the president moved forward with a 
bill that introduced salaries (dieta) for its members. The decision prompted military 
protests where junior officers flocked Senate sessions for two days in September 1924 
and demonstrated their disdain by rattling their swords.121 The junior officers were 
supported by their seniors, who gave Alesssandri a list of their petitions. It included veto 
over dieta and measures addressing income tax law, social laws (including Alessandri’s 
Labor Code), payment of back salaries to civil servants and military personnel, 
improvement to conditions of military and removal of three ministers (Collier and Sater 
1993, 210). Military was able to force the Congress into action but announced that it 
would not disband it. Yet the military officially assumed power on September 11.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 For example, the 1924 political pact would have formalized the Congress’s power to censure ministers 
(a practice not constitutional authority), put a time limit for periodic budget and tax collection law 
consideration (Stanton 1997, 20). 
120 The alternative project that was proposed by the political parties as an alternative to what ultimately 
became the 1925 Constitution (the subcommittee prepared text) was partly based on this set of provisions 
that aimed to formalize the parliamentary system. However the agreed 1924 reform also aimed to change 
what was commonly perceived as the elements of the system that led to stalemate, for example with the 
Congress’s exclusive authority with regard to budget legislation. 
121 The incident is known as saber-rattling. 
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 Chilean armed forces until the September mutiny had not exerted an overt 
military intervention. However, over the Parliamentary Republic period, there have been 
other plots to topple the government.122 A number of factors help explain the underlying 
reasons for the Chilean armed forces’ growing frustration with politics. Chilean military 
officers during the parliamentary period had acquired a strong disdain for politicians, and 
especially for parliamentary type of politics that led to political inaction. The armed 
forces had professionalized under Prussian leadership, starting with Emil Körner in 
1885.123 Their equipment and instruction modernized; the military had come to acquire a 
strong sense of nationalism and belief in the urgency of “national regeneration”. A 1900 
conscription law has led to recruitment to army mostly from low and middle-income 
families that brought about growing concern among its members for the social 
conditions. Additionally, the government’s reliance on the army to suppress strikes and 
public demonstrations while failing to address their urgent needs that have gave rise to 
agitation over the long term had led the armed forces see politicians as incompetent. 
More direct concerns over the Congress’ intervention in military promotions and 
assignments (especially their favoritism towards the navy) have led the armed forces to 
react against what they perceived to be political meddling in their internal affairs. The 
armed forces utilized as instruments of repression of the labor movement, frustrated over 
parliamentary stalemate and intervention in military matters, responded with a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 A secret “Military League” had planned a coup in 1910, but fell apart when the intended replacement for 
the president chose not to go with the plan. Another attempt in 1919 was thwarted and conspirators were 
punished (Collier and Sater 1993, 210). 
123 Collier and Sater (1993) describe the German impact on the Chilean Army as a process of 
“Prussanization”.  
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conspicuous act of protest over the Congress’ blatant decision to pay salaries to its 
members.124  
 In January 1925, a “reformist” faction within the military headed by Marmaduque 
Grove and Carlos Ibáñez, in order to thwart off what they perceived to be a conservative 
restoration125, reached out to Alessandri. The former president who was granted by the 
Congress constitutional leave of absence, agreed to assume power on the condition that 
military would go back to its barracks and a constituent assembly would be organized to 
reform the constitution (Loveman 2001, 181). In his initial months in office, Alessandri 
prioritized constitutional reform. The September 11, 1924 manifesto drafted by the junta 
had also placed constitutional reform through an elected constituent assembly as one of 
its goals (Nunn 1970, 92). With that mandate and urgency of matters to resolve, 
especially with Alessandri’s term scheduled to end in December 1925; on April 7, 
Alessandri named a Consultative Commission (Comisión Consultativa) in order to decide 
on the procedure to select delegates to the constituent assembly (Nunn 1970, 92).126  
 According to the 1833 constitution, the Congress had the authority to amend the 
constitution.  However, an attempt to revise the charter in February 1924 had failed 
because of the laborious amendment process dictated by the 1833 constitution and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Loveman (2001, 169) explains the armed forces main task became an internal one: “If border disputes 
with Argentina or threats of renewed conflicts with Peru and Bolivia were the main stimulus for 
modernizing the armed forces in practice the Chilean labor movement became the principal target of 
military operations”. 
125 They feared that a conservative, namely Ladislao Errazuriz would be nominated presidential candidate, 
who was soon announced as the junta’s candidate. 
126 This was ordered by an executive decree (Decree no 1,422). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	   	  
failure of party accords. Thus, by 1925, “the 1833 document seemed worthless even for 
the purpose of its own renovation” (Nunn 1970, 92). The commission, appointed by the 
President included members from each party, including the newly created Chilean 
Communist Party: 26 Radicals, 16 Liberals, 14 Conservatives, 14 Democrats, 10 Liberal 
Democrats, 6 Communists, and 2 Nationals and independents127 (Collier 2003, 213, note 
6).128 Nevertheless, its critics found it to be dominated by Alessandri-supporters. 
However Stanton (1997, 15) argues that, the accusation against Alessandri for stacking 
the commission is based on the claim that he gradually increased the number of members 
and adds that the President’s decision to do so was based on the need to establish 
credibility for the commission in public opinion.129  
 The commission created two subcommittees. The one working on the guideline 
for drafting the new constitution met three times and did not produce one that every party 
could agree on. The second subcommittee of fifteen members were chosen “across the 
political spectrum and were to serve in their individual capacity” in order to carry out the 
drafting of the constitution (Stanton 1997, 6).130 Most of its members were part of the 
Liberal Alliance coalition during the 1920 elections but on the issue of executive 
dominance, most tinted towards maintaining the parliamentary system. Overall, it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Complete information on independents is not available but Stanton (1997, 15) had gathered that these 
include union leaders, journalists and more significantly five current or former members of the military. 
128 Initially, the commission was composed of 53 members when it was first convened on April 4 however 
over time new members were added, totaling 122 (Stanton 1997, 6). 
129 Additional members were introduced on April 22 (3 members), on July 17 (51 members) and July 23 
(15 members) (Stanton 1997, 6). 
130 Nunn (1970, 93) contradicts this statement and claims that most were members of Alliance coalition and 
left parties. 
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witnessed passionate debates. The roundtable style of deliberations allowed for divergent 
opinions to be shared. While the President’s influence was not severe, he did introduce 
his agenda of reforms. For instance, Alessandri proposed a senate that would act as 
consultative body and executive power to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, both of 
which were not accepted in the final text (Stanton 1997, 22). 
 The issues were not necessarily decided by vote, instead when possible 
compromise was sought.131 By working in smaller groups of two or three members, 
opposing candidates were encouraged to formulate compromise language and build 
consensus (Stanton 1997, 17). The subcommittee held thirty-three sessions starting its 
work on April 18 (Gil 1966, 89). “The small size of the group and the number and 
frequency of the sessions may have facilitated a greater willingness to compromise than 
was evidenced in larger public fora” (Stanton 1997, 17). Additionally, during the initial 
months of deliberations, the understanding was that a constituent assembly would be 
established and therefore participants of the subcommission that opposed the President’s 
reforms expected to see continued deliberation (Stanton 1997, 17). However, later in the 
process, the idea of forming a constituent assembly was discarded.132 It was decided that 
the subcommittee’s draft would be presented to the Commission, and if accepted, it 
would be ratified by a plebiscite. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 An example of compromise is the wording of Article 10 that deals with property. The first paragraph 
repeats the 1833 constitution and maintains that property is inviolable right, which is the position that the 
Conservative Party held. The second paragraph adds that the exercise of that right is subject to the 
limitations of maintaining public order, and hence law may impose obligations for the sake of public utility. 
“Thus, in conscious self-conflict, the provision maintains two disparate concepts of property in the same 
text. Conservatives got their language; Radicals got theirs” (Mirow 2011, 1205). 
132 Gil (1966, 88) argues that the absence of electoral registries made election of delegates difficult. 
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 Not every political group was in favor of constitutional reform and polarization 
was high (Stanton 1997, 21). The Radical Party did not wish to see the political system to 
change, therefore did not initially support the project for a new constitution. As part of 
the Commission, the Radicals, like the Communists and some of the Liberal members, 
objected to the final draft. Their opposition was not only against the reforms that the 1925 
constitution proposed to bring but also against the process of making the constitution; 
they would have preferred to see it take place through a constituent assembly (Nunn 
1970, 94).133 Alessandri’s alliance with the military invited suspicion and although each 
political party recognized the need for reform, there was also a deep distrust toward 
possible executive abuse of power (Stanton 1997, 8). The division between the political 
actors was also reflected in the attitude of the press. 
 It is important to recognize the initiative organized by Comité Obrero Nacional 
(National Labor Committee) 134 for constitutional reform. A month before Alesanddri 
organized the Consultative Commission, the Committee called for a Congreso 
Constituyente de Asalariados e Intelectuales (Constituent Congress of Employees and 
Intellectuals). In early March, the congress met at the Teatro Municipal and brought 
together approximately 1250 delegates.135 After three days of deliberation, the congress 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 On the day of the final draft’s submission to the subcommittee, July 23 1925, Radical Party member 
Julio Bustos made reference to September 11 manifesto and the military movements’ call for a constituent 
assembly (Stanton 1997, 13). 
134 It was composed of Federación Obrera de Chile (Foch), Trabajadores Industriales del Mundo (IWW), 
independent unions and la Federación de Estudiantes de Chile (Fech).  
135 Of the 1250 delegates, 45% were proletarians, 20% employees, 20% teachers, 7% students, and 8% 
professionals and intellectuals. 
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issued a list of principles, rather than a draft constitution.136 However the left leaning 
demands of political and economic transformation was not welcomed by the military and 
ignored by Alessandri. Nevertheless, the gathering marks an important civilian initiative. 
 The military, as mentioned above, was also in favor of holding a constituent 
assembly but had come to accept this compromise that Alessandri put forward, because 
ultimately they wanted “to see the constitution written and promulgated with despatch” 
(Nunn 1970, 93).137 Conservatives that had initially supported the draft because it was not 
introducing as many radical changes as they feared eventually came to oppose it.  
Ultimately it was the position of the military and not that of political parties that came to 
be the determining factor.  
 The draft was completed on July 13 and debated throughout July. The decisive 
moment came when the military held a meeting on July 20, 1925 the army delegate to the 
Commission General Mariano Navarrete Ciris had gathered high-ranking officers whom 
expressed to him that the high command supported the subcommittee’s draft, wished to 
see it passed by the Commission and in the case that the Commission was not willing to 
do, it would invite military pressure (Nunn 1970, 94). On July 23, the day of the 
Consultative Commission’s meeting, Alessandri made calls to the opposition to approve 
the draft but his message did not convey through. He evoked the public support for 
September 5 and January 23 military movements as indication o f the people’s disdain for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 For the list of principles, see Salazar (2009), chapter 6. 
137 Stanton (1997) argues that the principles put forward by the Constituent Congress of Employees and 
Intellectuals concerned the military and partly changed their attitude toward a constituent assembly. 
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the parliamentary system. The previous day, the leader of Radical Party and director of 
Conservative Party wanted to introduce amendments to the final draft, although as 
members of the subcommission they had previously approved the final text 138. 
Opposition to the final draft both on substantive and procedural grounds was bypassed 
when Inspector General of the Army Mariano Navarrete Ciris let them know that “the 
country is tired of the petty politicking” (quoted in Stanton 1997, 13).139 After other 
members of the subcommittee made declarations in favor and against the final draft and 
the president Alessandri made a stint of walking out of the session, most members voted 
in favor of the draft. Although the armed forces did not intervene in the drafting of the 
constitution, “the threat of renewed military intervention that was implicit in Navarrete's 
commentary” was the catalysts for the approval of the resolution (Stanton 1997, 15). 
 On July 31, Alessandri called for a constitutional plebiscite to be held on August 
30. 140 The plebiscite did not allow for article-by-article vote. The voters received three 
choices: 1) subcommittee’s constitution project (red ballot), indicating that this was the 
vote requested by the President of the Republic, 2) alternative constitution project 
suggested by the representatives of political parties (blue ballot)141, 3) reject both 
proposals and find another other procedures to re-establish institutional normalcy (white 
ballot), interpreted as a military solution. The different ballots used in the plebiscite 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 The alternative project that aimed to constitutionalize parliamentary practices was based on these 
amendments offered by the Radicals and Conservatives. In terms of substance, it was weak; it did not 
elaborate a full constitutional text. 
139 Although Navarrete said that he was not speaking as a representative of the armed forces, his words 
indicated otherwise. 
140 Alessandri had put forward the idea of holding a plebiscite on May 28 (Stanton 1997, 10) 
141 Mostly shaped by the amendments offered by the Radical and Conservative Party in the July 22 session. 
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evoked criticism for lack of secrecy (Stanton 1997, 20). Both the Radical and 
Conservative Party issued statements asking their constituency to abstain from plebiscite 
(Stanton 1997, 18). It was only the Communist Party that supported the alternative 
project, which championed a parliamentary system (Gil 1966, 89). 
 The plebiscite witnessed a low turnout at 45%. Of those who casted their vote, 
93% did for the subcommittee’s draft, i.e. the President’s request.142 After a participatory 
but not a democratic process of drafting the constitution amidst a genuine fear of further 
military intervention and a not so secret voting scheme for the plebiscite, the new 
constitution was officially promulgated on 18 September 1925 and went into force on 
October 18, 1925. However, the 1925 Constitution began to function only after 1932 -
once Alessandri was reelected to presidency. In between, a series of events including the 
resignation of Alessandri and that of his successor143, rise of Carlos Ibáñez, his elected 
but authoritarian rule between 1927-1931, and following his forced resignation a series of 
civilian and military governments144 including that of the very short Socialist Republic 
marks a prolonged period of political instability.145 Constitutional stability was restored 
once Alessandri was reelected to office in December 1932. In the period between 1925 
and 1932, although the constitution was officially in force, it was not observed. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 According to Gil (1966, 89), the official numbers are: “127,483 votes for Alessandri’s project (red 
ballots); 5,448 for the parliamentary regime (blue ballots); and 1,490 against reforms (white ballots), 
making a total of 132, 421”. 
143 Alessandri’s elected successor Emiliano Fugueroa resigned amidst political pressure, including the 
growing influence of his Minister of War of Ibáñez. 
144 Eleven administrations followed Ibáñez’s resignation that included four military juntas and one 
democratically elected president Juan Esteban Montero Rodríguez. 
145 The short-lived (twelve days) Socialist Republic was proclaimed after a coup by Air Force General 
Marmaduke Grove on June 4, 1932. 
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2.1.8 Analysis of the 1925 Constitution 
 The 1925 Constitution reestablished the dominance of executive and ended the 
parliamentary style of politics. In many respects, the document was a reaction to the 
perceived excesses of the legislative power as it was practiced under the Parliamentary 
Republic (Siavelis 2000, 6).146 Certain provisions of the 1833 charter- a strong 
presidentialist constitution in its initial form remained unchanged such as the structure of 
the government. However, it was not simply a return back to the strong presidential 
system as designed by the 1833 constitution.  The constitution maintained the bicameral 
congress. The size of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate was to be decided by 
law.147 Terms of deputies extended from 3 to 4, and senators from 6 to 8. The charter 
prohibited the members of the cabinet to also serve as congressmen. Proportional 
representation replaced cumulative voting system, in order to provide representation for 
different political views and political parties (Art. 25).148 One significant result of 
proportional representation was the proliferation of political parties. Multi-party 
representation came to be one of the defining characteristics of the Chilean democracy. 
The regular sessions of the Congress were to last from May 21 to September 18 (Art. 56). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 The executive-legislative conflict was one issue that the 1925 Constitution attempted to address, the 
other two were clerical question; the state’s relation with religion and social question; the changing social 
dynamics and growing labor agitation.  
147 The Chamber of Deputies initially composed of 147 members, later expanded to 150. The Senate was 
initially made up of 45 members and was later expanded to 50. 
148 Article 25 called for an electoral system that would provide for a proportional representation of all 
political parties. The Congress adopted the D’Hont system. See Gamboa and Morales 2015 that offers an 
alternative explanation for the adoption of the PR. 
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 A major prerogative of the Congress, namely the authority to approve the periodic 
laws was removed in the new constitution. In the case of the budget law, if the Congress 
could not agree to approve it, the President could override the delay by approving the 
budget of the previous year. Another authority, albeit not constitutional that had led to 
parliamentary stalemate- congressional votes of censure that was effectively used by the 
Congress to depose the cabinets, ended with the new constitution.  Despite the fact that 
the congressional politics had left a bitter taste because of perpetual instability, the central 
role acquired by the Congress for decades had also deepened its institutionalization 
(Siavelis 2000, 6). Thus, under the new framework the Congress was not stripped of all 
its powers. The lower chamber was granted the power to bring impeachment charges 
against members of the cabinet and the President (Art. 39) and if found credible, the 
Senate was authorized to act on them.  
 Presidential terms extended to six years to be determined by direct vote149. But 
immediate reelection of the incumbent was prohibited. If any candidate failed to receive a 
majority in the presidential elections, the Congress had the power to select the winning 
candidate between the two candidates that received the highest votes. The dates of the 
presidential and congressional elections were to be non-concurrent, which in practice 
ensured that the president no longer would come to power controlling the legislative.150 
Instead, presidents unable to achieve legislative majorities were forced to negotiate with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Property requirement was not sought but “universal” suffrage was limited to literate males. The literacy 
requirement was removed in 1970 
150 Presidential elections were to take place every six years and congressional elections every four years- in 
which the Chamber of Deputies and half of the Senate would be replaced.  
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the Congress. The president’s ability to intervene in the electoral process was curbed with 
the introduction of an independent electoral tribunal (Tribunal Califacafor de 
Eleccisiones) to impartially supervise the elections.151  
 Yet, the president still maintained a central role, he was designated as the chief 
administrative authority and the supreme head of the state (Art. 60). The president was 
granted an important role in legislation, besides the power of veto – that could be 
overridden (Article 52 -55)152, he was also given the authority to declare certain 
legislation as urgent and force immediate debate and even call for extraordinary sessions 
of the Congress. Moreover, he also had the exclusive right to create administrative posts 
and alter government salaries. 
 The legislative process revealed a complex system of interaction among the 
different branches of the government. The usual process was to follow several steps 
(trámites), which included the discussion of the bill first as a whole and then in detail by 
each chamber and then consideration in detail where one house could propose to modify 
or reject the bill. In case where the other chamber sought to modify or reject a bill, the 
initiating chamber could insist on its version by a two-thirds majority, granted that the 
second chamber could also insist on its modifications or rejection by a two-thirds 
majority. This would prove the formation of mixed committee where the deputies and 
senators could work out their divergent proposals. After both houses approved the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 It would be composed of 5 members, elected for four-year terms. 
152 The President could also ask for amendments over legislation. The Congress could override the veto 
and/or the amendments by a two-thirds majority. 
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legislation, it would be directed to the president who by proposing its own modifications 
could also delay its adoption (Sigmund 1977, 15-16). 
Under the new charter, the governmental control of judicial nominations ended. 
The President no longer had the power to remove judges for bad behavior, only for gross 
malfeasance (Sigmund 1977, 16). Although the presidency maintained the authority to 
appoint judges, he was limited to the list of candidates prepared by the judiciary. Under 
the previous document, the Council of State153 was responsible for pre-selecting 
candidates for the judiciary and since that body was under the control of the president- 
the judicial independence was compromised (Couso et al. 2011, 29). One main concern 
of the drafters of the 1925 Constitution was the balance of power between the president 
and the congress. Their focus on separation of powers, indirectly strengthened the powers 
and autonomy of the judiciary (Faúndez 2007, 66). Another important institutional 
change was the introduction of a mechanism for judicial review. Under Art. 86, the 
Supreme Court was granted the power to interpret the constitution and declare new laws 
unconstitutional. Recurso de Inaplicabilidad (writ of inapplicability) was limited for a 
specific case and thus its effect did not alter the entire statue in question. The mechanism 
could only be used against laws and could not be applied against administrative acts, 
including executive decrees (Couso et al. 2011, 30.)154  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 The Council of State that existed under the previous constitution was abolished with the 1925 
Constitution. Another such institution that seized to exist was the Comisión Conservadora, the organ that 
functioned when the Congress was in recess. 
154 According to Article 86, any party could petition the Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of 
legislation and the Supreme Court on its own initiative could also make such decisions. However, 
throughout the lifespan of the 1925 Constitution, the Supreme Court “consistently failed to exercise its 
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 Under the new charter, the unitary form of the state remained intact but it also 
reintroduced provincial assemblies and envisioned a gradual decentralization of state and 
introduction of a system of administrative tribunals (Gil 1966, 89-91).155 However, these 
ideas were not implemented and Chile maintained its strong central state under the 1925 
Constitution. The President was granted the authority to appoint the governors of 
departments, intendentes of provinces and mayors of municipalities with population of 
above ten thousand (Sigmund 1977, 16).156 
 In terms of progressive rights, the 1925 Constitution recognized the freedom of 
worship and conscience and established separation of church and state157 (Art. 10-2). In 
that sense, the new charter resolved cuestión clerical (clerical question), an issue that had 
caused conflict among political groups throughout the 19th century. Another issue, which 
the 1925 Constitution aimed to respond was cuestión social (social question). The 
growing demands of the labor movement, unanswered during the Parliamentary Republic 
were partly addressed under the new charter. It characterized the right to one’s property 
as inviolable except for the goal of “the maintenance and progress of the social order”. In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
power to review the constitutionality of legislation, even in case of legislation evidently compromising the 
constitutional rights of large groups of Chileans” (Couso et al. 2011, 31). The court’s passivity is 
exemplified by its dismissal to review the 1948 Law of Permanent Defense of Democracy that outlawed the 
Chilean Communist Party. 
155 The reason that decentralization was not concretely engrained in the constitution was because of the 
participation of President Alessandri in the process and the experience of “partisan infighting” that took 
place at the municipal level during the Parliamentary Republic (Eaton 2004, 96-97). 
156 Local municipalities had the authority to elect municipal councils. 
157 In return, the state was ordered to pay the Church a subsidy of 2.5 million pesos annually for the next 
five years (Collier and Sater 1996, 213). As specified by the Transitional Provisions of the Constitution, the 
amount was for the “religious needs of the Catholic Church”. 
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essence, it implied that individual rights related to private property could be limited when 
social need demanded” (Gil 1966, 90). Its application would evolve over the next decades.  
 Another feature of the social dimension of the new constitution, was the 
recognition of state’s role in education and health and protection of labor and industry 
with the guarantee that “each inhabitant shall enjoy a minimum standard of living, 
adequate to the satisfaction of his personal needs and those of his family” (Art. 14). The 
social aspect of the 1925 Constitution was on the one hand, a response to the “social 
question” and on the other hand, inspired by the emerging ideas, namely “the social 
constitutionalism of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 and that of the Weimar Charter of 
1919” (Couso et al. 2011 29-30).158 However, it is important to recognize that in term of 
social rights, the new charter was nothing revolutionary, it “was only moderately ‘social’ 
(it fundamentally included one article- Art.10- that was clearly dedicated to the ‘social 
question,’ making vague references to ‘work,’ ‘property,’ and ‘public health’)” 
(Gargararella 2013, 114). However it proved to be an amendable document in the sense 
that it  “was functional to the organization of workers and the development of a mixed 
economy characterized by state interventionism, import substitution, and welfare 
measures” (Gargararella 2013,114) and helped apply welfare oriented policies under the 
Cerda, Frei and Allende administrations.159  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 Mirow (2011) argues that it was not the Mexican Constitution of 1917 that inspired the definition of 
“property in terms of a social function” but it was the transmission of ideas from Europe, mainly that of 
Léon Duguit, a French constitutional law professor from the University of Bordeaux. 
159 Welfare policies were not accompanied with a reduction of the executive authority (Gargararella 
(2013,114). 
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 The new charter differed from the 1833 one in terms of the flexibility of the 
amendment process. The process required an absolute majority from each legislative 
chamber to be followed by a joint legislative session after 60 days where deputies and 
senators vote without a debate. If majority of the legislators are not present during the 
public joint session, then a vote if taken the next day where a minimum quorum is not 
sought. In order to approve the amendment a simple majority is required. Once it is 
approved, the amendment is passed to the President who may suggest modifications. In 
order to override them each house must insist with a two-thirds vote.  If the changes that 
the President proposed are rejected by both houses, the President has the option to either 
promulgate the amendment as it stands or submit the points of disagreement to a 
plebiscite within 30 days (Art. 109).160 The amendment-making process was therefore 
simplified (Gil 1966, 91) which ultimately contributed to the number of amendments that 
took place during the lifespan of the 1925 Constitution. 
2.1.9 Amendments to 1925 Constitution 
 The 1925 Constitution was utilized to solve Chile’s pressing problems, namely 
the social question and the clerical question. It also helped settle down military’s 
demands but also made a precedent for the armed force’s involvement in political affairs. 
From the time of its promulgation, which soon followed Alessandri’s second resignation 
until his reelection in 1932, the constitution was not implemented. During the rule of 
military strongman Ibáñez, he chose to implement only its provisions on executive power. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 The President’s power to call for a plebiscite in cases of disagreement with the Congress over a 
constitutional amendment was broadened with the 1970 amendment. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	   	  
However once Alessandri came back to power, the constitutional order was restored and 
the political parties found the 1925 Constitution “a perfectly congenial framework with 
which to operate” (Collier and Sater 1993, 214). Yet over the years, it was amended on 
ten different occasions, and modified on a number of provisions. The following section 
will examine the amendments introduced to the constitution and the relation between 
constitutional change and crisis. 
 Chile’s dynamic and modern political party system by 1930s yielded to a multi-
party environment. Enhanced by proportional representation, “(p)arty spirit had come to 
seem inseparable from the Chilean way of life, and competition between parties as 
natural as the air Chileans breathed” (Collier and Sater 1996, 213).  Although six main 
parties161 from all parts of political spectrum made up the Chilean party system, in terms 
of ideological disposition Chilean electorate was divided almost equally between the 
center, left and right.162 Tripartite distribution of votes had consequences. First, 
throughout the period between 1932-1973 Chile elected governments from all ideological 
tendencies. Second, the period following the Carlos Ibáñez’s rule (1932-1964) came to be 
known as the “State of Compromise” (Estado de Compromiso), referring to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 Although there were other smaller parties, by 1960s the six main political parties received 80% of the 
votes in total (Valenzuela 1999, 202). 
162 On the left were the working-class parties Socialist party and Communist party, on right were Liberals 
and Conservatives (who by 1966 merged to form National Party) and the Radical party represented the 
center. The Christian Democratic Party in 1957 joined the competition on the left of center. With no party 
apparently dominant and a system spanning across the ideological spectrum, the multi-party system was 
competitive. Parties appeared and disappeared, merged with each other, split from one another and pursued 
shifting congressional alliances, but nevertheless the “tripartite” composition ensued.  
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atmosphere of accommodation and negotiation.163 From 1939 to 1952, the centrist and 
pragmatic Radicals held the presidency as a result of their willingness to negotiate with 
other parties (Constable and Valenzuela 1991, 22).  However the cross-party compromise 
was not simply the result of understanding among different political contenders but “the 
result of polarization and the inability of any one political sector to impose its will on the 
rest” (Silva 2008, 18).164 Despite the fact that the regime set out by the 1925 Constitution 
was presidential, the prominent role played by political parties in the making and 
unmaking of the cabinets, in practice created a hybrid regime where the old style 
parliamentary politics ensued (Faúndez 2007, 104 and Siavelis 2000, 7). Ministerial 
instability, although not as frequent, indicated the continued tension among political 
parties and within governing coalitions.165 Third, because of tripolar voting, governments 
were only able to get elected through electoral pacts and coalitions, formed prior to 
election to be disintegrated soon afterwards. This meant that presidents would then have 
to form separate governing pacts.166 The constitutional framework had provided for a 
complex legislative process, in which both the executive and legislative could intervene 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 Couso et. al. (2011, 32) defines it as “an implicit agreement between the center-left coalition which 
controlled the executive, and the conservative right, which controlled the decisive rural vote. Estado de 
Compromiso consisted of an acceptance by right wing parties of the growing role of the State in the 
economy in exchanged for a commitment by the center-left coalition to postpone land reform indefinitely”. 
Scully (1995:112 and 496) defines it as “a set of institutions that had allowed all significant social and 
political forces to obtain at least a partially favorable resolution to their demands through negotiations”. 
164 Borzutsky (1998, 93-96) disputes that a “state of compromise” existed in Chile. She argues that the 
functions of the state expanded throughout the years as the Chilean state tried to incorporate all the new 
political groups without a consensus on what is the national interest. 
165 The Aguirre administration (1938-1941) had 44 ministers, the Ríos administration (1942-1946) had 84, 
the González administration (1946-1952) had 73, and Ibáñez had 75 (Faúndez 2007, 105). 
166 For a complete list of the electoral and governing pacts different presidents had to depend between 1932 
and 1952, see Table 3.5 on Scully 1997, 99. 
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in the process. This allowed accommodation and compromise among competing actors 
on the one hand, but on the other hand it led to “large amounts often incoherent and 
particularistic legislation” (Borzutsky 1998, 90).   
 The 1925 Constitution had created a framework where both the executive and 
legislative branch had important powers. Although compared to previous pseudo-
parliamentary regime the congress was weakened, it was still able to exert strong 
legislative opposition.  The 1925 Constitution had eliminated the major congressional 
prerogatives; members of the Congress were no longer able to be members of the cabinet, 
the legislature’s power over budget was moderated and the president was granted 
legislative powers, which could enable him to expedite legislation. Yet, the Congress had 
the authority to make accusation against ministers for violating the laws or the 
constitution, which would initiate the process of impeachment.  The presidents’s ability 
to govern depended on unstable coalitions. “In order to secure passage of their legislation, 
presidents were forced to cobble together working alliances. Thus, presidents negotiated 
with parties, which in turn had to make programmatic peace with each other in order to 
coexist within the same working coalition” (Siavelis 2000, 7). Such arrangement 
increased congressional influence and led to growing tension between the two branches 
of the government. Thus, during this period executive/legislative conflict marked the 
Chilean political life where only incremental change could take place. Besides the effect 
of proportional representation and non-concurrent elections, proscription of immediate 
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reelection of the president tied the hands of the incoming president with regards to what it 
can accomplish working with a fragmented Congress (Sigmund 1977, 16-17).167  
 The growing number of political contenders helped promote cross-party 
bargaining, accommodation and compromise but also at times led to a slow law-making. 
Thus, the thriving political party system came to explain both the durability of the regime 
and its ultimate deadlock. After mid 1950s, politics became more ideological, reducing 
the chances of alliance making across parties. However, this was not the only factor that 
sharpened the fragmented political party system and led to growing polarization. Political 
polarization of 1950s and 1960s was for the most part a result of the urgency of issues 
that the previous governments had failed to address such as high inflation, foreign 
ownership of copper industry and agricultural sector falling short in the face of rapid 
urbanization (Faundez 1997, 311). Moreover, despite their ideological differences, 
clientalistic politics provided for cross-party cooperation. Concerned over their electoral 
success -Chile’s presidential, congressional and municipal elections meant continuous 
election season- political parties tended to leave aside their ideological concerns to work 
on needs of their common constituency and personal favors (Valenzuela 1999, 204).  
Large expansion of the electorate, especially with the extension of right to vote to 
women, ensured that political parties become more liable to the demands of their 
constituency and the promises made during campaign.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 The 1925 Constitution had prescribed separate presidential and congressional electoral dates, which 
practically meant that presidents might find a hostile Congress. 
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 The 1925 Constitution remained unaltered until 1943. Compared to the previous 
1833 charter, the new framework’s provisions for amendment was less strict. It basically 
required the same procedures of an ordinary law, albeit with a higher quorum and an 
additional joint legislative session after 60 day of approval. It was only under the Ríos 
administration (1942-1946), the second president form the Radical Party coalition period 
(1941-1952) that the first amendment passed in 1943.  
 The 1943 amendment (Law 7727 on November 23, 1943) made modifications on 
three areas. First, the new provisions provided the president with the exclusive authority 
to initiate legislation on (three) areas: altering the political and administrative divisions of 
the country, the creation of new public services and remunerative offices, and salary 
increases for government employees.  Accordingly, the congress’s powers were restricted 
on these types of legislations; it was only empowered to accept, reject or reduce the 
expenditure. The complex legislative process and the multi-party system had led to the 
president’s giving in to congress’s practice of producing particularistic and personalistic 
legislation in order to have their own initiatives approved (Siavelis 2000, 8).168 Therefore, 
one reasoning behind this amendment was reduce the president’s dependence on the 
congress to pass legislation.169 The 1925 Constitution had remedied the Congress’ ability 
to block the government’s annual budget bill. According to the new charter, if the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 It was not until the 1970 constitutional amendment that the president was granted the full and exclusive 
legislative initiative on matters concerning public expenditure (Faúndez 2007, 107). 
169 However, it failed to clearly define the distribution of responsibilities between the president and the 
congress. The Congress still maintained the right to initiate legislation in areas of social policy, tax 
exemption, setting salary in private sector, pensions and retirement benefits-other areas where the members 
of the Congress could pursue personalistic legislation in order to extract clientalistic relations (Siavelis 
2000, 8). 
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approval of the budget were delayed, the current one would automatically enter into force 
for one more year. However, the constitution had not defined the authority responsible to 
initiate legislation on public expenditure. Thus, the members of the congress were in the 
habit of introducing bills to raise public expenditure (Faúndez 2007, 107). Therefore, the 
1943 amendment’s this modification attempted to take greater executive control over 
public expenditure. 
 The second area that the 1943 amendment addressed was the status and functions 
of the Contraloría. The Contraloría was created in 1927 by law under the guidance of a 
Professor of Economics at Princeton, Edward Kemmerer. It was aimed to enforce 
legislation on public finance, to rule on the constitutionality of government expenditures 
and in essence “to curtail the discretionary spending power of the president” (Navia, 1999 
15). The new organ was authorized to judge the constitutionality of all laws requiring 
fiscal expenditures and therefore evolved to serve the purpose of constitutional 
adjudication (Navia 1999, 17). With the 1943 amendment, the Contraloría was elevated 
to the status of a constitutional organ and the Comptroller General was provided with 
security of tenure, like the members of the Supreme Court. As such, the amendment did 
not expand the powers of the Contraloría, but it provided him more independence with 
regards to checks on executive power (Faundez 1997, 308). Although its rulings 
continued to be non-binding, the 1943 amendment reinforced its independence and it 
resumed to act as a substitute for judicial review and its rulings were complied (Faúndez 
2007, 121-125).   
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 The third modification introduced by the 1943 amendment was in order to restrict 
disregard for the annual budget to prevent the executive from overriding the 
Contraloría’s objections on public expenditure. The governments tended to exceed the 
expenditure set by the annual budget by relying on special presidential decrees (decretos 
de insistencia) (Faúndez 2007, 119). Such abuse of special presidential decrees brought 
the executive in conflict with the Contraloría. As a response, the 1943 amendment 
provided that the president could issue decrees of economic emergency (decretos de 
emergencia económica) and may order expenditures not authorized by law in cases of 
national emergencies provided that the president substantiates and justifies the facts that 
make it necessary and expenditures authorized by decree does not exceed 2% of the 
annual amount of expenses authorized by the annual budget.170 
 Throughout 1950s and 1960s other amendments were introduced to the 
constitution but it was not until the 1970 such a major reform revised the structural and 
institutional framework. The 1957 amendment (Law 12548) created the possibility of 
dual citizenship with Spain on the condition of reciprocity. The 1959 amendment (Law 
13296) made changes to municipal elections, increased the municipal councilmen’s (los 
regidores) term from 3 to 4 years and provided for a two-year gap between municipal and 
congressional elections. The 1963 (Law 15295) amendment, under the government of 
Jorge Alessandri, the son of Arturo Alessandri, established regulations concerning 
expropriation including the conditions and the compensation due. Within the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 National emergencies were defined as “(1) public calamities, (2) external aggression, (3) internal 
disturbance and (4) exhaustion of funds to maintain services that can not be realized without serious 
damage to the country” (Law 7727). 
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international context of President Kennedy’s Allience for Progress initiative and Chile’s 
immensely high concentration of land171, Alessandri had introduced the 1962 agrarian 
land reform172, which allowed for the distribution of state owned land to small farmers.173  
Therefore the 1963 amendments effecting Art. 10, which defines the provisions on 
property was carried out in order to provide a favorable system of compensation that 
would help carry out the agrarian land reform (Mirow 2011, 1209). If a constitutional 
amendment did not follow the land reform law, Alessandri’s reform “would have been 
useless, since the cash resources necessary for expropriation did not exist” (Lapp 2004, 
67). The amendment allowed the state to pay the compensation for expropriated poorly 
farmed or abandoned property with bonds (10 percent cash and bonds up to 15 years, as 
opposed to simply cash as provided in the original text of the 1925 constitution). 
 Alessandri, right before the 1964 elections presented a draft for constitutional 
reform to respond to what he considered to be Chile’s political systems’ shortcomings 
(Huneeus 2007 173, note 100).174 The draft proposed to establish a mixed senate with 17 
nonelected membesr that would be representing the interests of businesses, unions, 
universities and the Supreme Court. The goal was “to reduce the influence of universal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 It was estimated that 375 families owned half of Chile’s private land (Mirow 2011, 1209). 
172 The reform became possible because the right wing had lost their veto power in Congress (Loveman 
2001, 228). Therefore, a center-right president ironically laid the foundations of transforming Chile’s 
agricultural policy. 
173 Law 15020 also created three government agencies; the Agrarian Reform Corporation (CORA) “to 
administer land acquisition and distribution”, the Institute for Agrarian and Livestock Development 
(INDAP)  “to administer credit and technical support to small farmers” and the Superior Council of 
Agricultural Production (CONSFA)- “to coordinate regional and national agricultural planning” (Lapp 
2004, 66 and Tinsman 2002, 90). 
174 The draft was prepared by Enrique Ortúzar, the future president of the commission (Comision de 
Estudios de la Nueva Constitutcion Politica del Estado) that worked on the 1980 Constitution. The 
proposal was announced to public in July 1964. 
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suffrage and the weight of elected senators and, at the same time, to minimize the role of 
parties and elections” (Huneeus 2007, 156).175 The proposal was sidelined, however the 
idea of nonelected senators would later be applied by the 1980 Constitution.176 
 The agrarian reform continued under the President Eduardo Frei of Christian 
Democratic Party (PDC).177 While the previous land reform allowed the expropriation of 
land according to its usage, the 1967 land reform (Law 16640) set the standard according 
to size – estates larger 80 “basic” hectares were to be eligible to expropriated and 
redistributed to peasants (Lapp 2004, 71). The Frei government’s new land reform 
brought with the requirement to amend the constitution. Frei, months after coming to 
office had proposed a major constitutional reform. Like Alessandri before him, he 
submitted proposals that aimed to strengthen the powers of the president (Faúndez 2007, 
105-106). These included proposals for the use of plebiscites and administrative 
decentralization (Lapp 2004, 69). A point of difference between Alessandri and Frei’s 
proposals was that Frei’s planned reforms also addressed issues related to lower class; 
such as the right to work, the right to education, the right to living wage and the right to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 The nonelected senators would be either former presidents or they would be appointed by Chile’s 
institutions. The exact formula for the 17 senators was as such: “two former presidents of the Senate and 
two from the Chamber of Deputies, elected by their respective bodies; two former presidents of the 
Supreme Court, appointed by the court; a former comptroller-general, appointed by the president; two 
former presidents of the University of Chile or others recognized by the state, appointed by the university 
system’s Council of Presidents; four representatives of the private business sector, appointed by the Senate, 
plus two representatives of the employee sector (white-collar workers) and two of the worker sector 
(manual workers).” (Huneeus 2007, 173 note 100) 
176 The next chapter will provide more information on the issue of nonelected senators. It is important to 
note that the 1980 Constitution included former members of the armed forces as nonelected senators. 
177 Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano) officially entered to Chilean political scene 
in 1957. The Christian Democrats were formed from the ranks of Falange Nacional, the anti-communist 
and progressive Catholic youth movement that had split from the Conservative Party in the 1930s 
(Oppenheim 2007, 15).  
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organize and strike and revisions to property rights that would “extend the right to 
property” (Lapp 2004, 69). Also, PDC proposed extension of suffrage to illiterates and 
reduce the age of vote to 18. However, these proposals set off intense political debate. 
While most of these proposals were able to get approved by the Chamber of Deputies 
where the Christian Democrats had a majority, they were blocked in the Senate, where 
the PDC lacked a majority (Lapp 2004, 70). The passage of the 1967 land reform meant 
the urgency of revising the property rights and hence Frei found the solution in separating 
the proposal on property right from the rest (Mirow 2011, 1211 and Lapp 2004, 70).178 
Accordingly, Art. 10 was amended once again “to allow the law to establish the limits 
and obligations that permitted to secure the social function of property, and to make it 
accessible to everyone” (quoted in González 2008). In line with the land reform, the 
amendments introduced new regulations on expropriating farm holdings and small rural 
properties. As part of the irrigation concerns of Frei’s attempt to modernize the 
agricultural production, the amendments also established all of the national waters to be 
“national property of public use”, in order to facilitate the redistribution of water.179  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178  Some of the other reforms that were put aside for the time being were proposed once again in 1969, and 
approved in 1970 (Lapp 2004, 70). 
179 Frei was asked by U.S. President Johnson to travel to United States but the Congress refused to grant his 
the permission to travel, as required by the constitution. In response, Frei submitted a constitutional 
amendment to the Congress that would give the president the power to dissolve the legislature once during 
his term. The political parties, across the spectrum refused to approve the amendment: “The Socialists said 
they would only adopt the amendment if the president would himself resign and hold new elections; the 
Radicals called for greater guarantees of government impartiality in the electoral process; the Communists 
were compelled to support the proposal because they had made similar proposals earlier; and the National 
Party called for postponement of a decision until after the municipal elections schedules for April 2” 
(Sigmund 1977, 58). In the end, the proposal could not get the absolute majority required for a 
constitutional amendment. In October 1967, another amendment (Law 16672) passed that made changes to 
provincial groupings. 
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 The 1970 amendments, like the 1943 amendments helped increase the president’s 
legislative powers. The proposals approved by parties of center and right, included the 
proposals that Frei government abandoned in 1967 in order to see pass the urgent reforms 
of property rights such as the reduction of right to vote to 18, removal of literacy 
requirement for voting and guarantees for labor protection.  Additionally, it brought more 
requirements to become a parliamentarian and introduced changes to the procedure for 
the members of the cabinet and the president to leave the territory of the state. More 
significant changes that came with the 1970 amendment relate to modifications to 
legislative power of the president and the congress. The President’s sole legislative 
powers were expanded and the Congress was prohibited from matters dealing with salary 
adjustments in private sector, social security and pensions, thus expanding on the 1943 
amendments. The modified provisions introduced different timeframes dealing with the 
president’s authority to push for urgent legislation, put limitations on presidential 
observations/remarks during the processing of a bill180, provided regulations for mixed 
commissions, set deadlines for the promulgation of laws and incorporated to the 
constitution the practice of “decrees with the force of law” (DFL: Decreto con Fuerza de 
Ley).  For Frei government, the decision to constitutionally recognize the authority of the 
congress to delegate legislative powers to the president was not simply an initiative to 
increase the executive powers. DFLs were already an established practice, what the 1970 
amendment did was to constitutionally recognize it and more importantly to restrict it in 
areas of budget and national defense. Hence by “placing limits on an already widespread 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 The president was prohibited from incorporating amendments that depart from the basic purpose of the 
bill. For more on this change, see Vöhringer and García 2009. 
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practice of delegating legislative powers to presidents”, the amendment actually restricted 
possible executive abuse of DFLs (Faúndez 1997, 316).  The two modifications related to 
legislative power of the president; the exclusive legislative initiative and restrictions and 
the prohibition against amendments that deviate from the essential ideas of a bill, remain 
intact in the subsequent constitution of 1980 (Vöhringer and García 2009).181  
 The 1970 revisions also altered the mechanism for constitutional amendment-
making. Accordingly, presidents were no longer authorized to completely reject a 
proposal, a majority requirement was established for the president’s observations to be 
approved by both of the chambers182 and plebiscite became the recourse in cases of 
disagreement between the president and the congress. Yet, the single most important 
institutional change that the 1970 amendments brought on was the establishment of a 
constitutional court (Tribunal Constitucional- Constitutional Tribunal).183 According to 
the 1925 constitution, the Supreme Court was granted the authority to decide on the 
constitutionality of laws based on concrete and a posterior review. The addition of a 
constitutional court was to complement it with an abstract and a priori mechanism.  It 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 For this reason, Vöhringer and García (2009) argue that the assertion that the presidential system of 
Chile is not rooted in the 1980 Chilean constitution but its seeds were planted in the 1970 amendment. 
182 The amendment failed to specify the exact majority requirement to override a presidential veto of 
constitutional amendment, this would later cause a conflict in the Congress during the UP government. 
183 According to Couso (2011, 1528) the Constitutional Court was modeled after Charles de Gaulle’s 
Constitutional Council of 1958 and intended “to enhance the powers of the executive branch against the 
legislative branch by providing a neutral arbiter. As a result, the court could ensure that the legislature 
respected the regulatory powers of the president” (Couso 2011, 1530). 
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would serve the purpose of solving conflicts between the executive and legislative 
(Couso et al. 2011,122).184   
 The 1970 amendments were approved by a coalition of right and center parties 
(Valenzuela 1999, 216-217). Chile’s multi-party electoral system compelled the political 
parties to compromise in order for constitutional amendments to be adopted in the 
Congress. The different sets of provisions approved in 1970 reflected the different 
considerations held by the approving coalition. Expanded constitutional guarantees were 
part of the Christian Democrat’s party program (Falcoff 1991, 6). The provisions that 
expanded the powers of the executive at the expense of the legislative branch were partly 
to thwart politics of patronage and “to strengthen executive efficiencies” (Valenzuela 
1999, 217). But more importantly these reforms were sought because the approving 
coalition assumed that the upcoming 1970 elections would be won by a center-right 
candidate and therefore did not want to deal with a left party dominated hostile congress 
(Valenzuela 1999, 217, Oppenheim 2007, 55-56).  The calculations proved wrong when 
Salvador Allende, the candidate of coalition of left wing political parties, Unidad Popular 
(UP) won the presidency and the right and center parties found themselves in opposition 
with reduced congressional authority. However, the Constitutional Tribunal, an 
institution that was favored by conservative parties was seen as a mechanism to prevent 
the approval of bills deemed against the constitution (Navia 1999, 18).  
 The inability of the center and the right to agree on one candidate185 (and the 
constitutional ban on immediate reelection for the incumbent, Frei) once again resulted in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 The Tribunal Constitucional’s actions during the intense months of 1973 contributed to political 
polarization building up before the coup. 
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tripartite distribution of votes in the 1970 elections.186 Since no candidate received a 
majority, the Congress, which according to the constitution had the power to select the 
winning candidate between those two that received the highest votes, confirmed the 
presidency of Salvador Allende- the candidate with the plurality.187 However, before the 
Christian Democrats agreed to cast their votes for Allende, they demanded a set of 
constitutional guarantees that would ensure that the incoming Marxist candidate would 
not embark on drastic changes and would respect the constitutional order (Oppenheim 
2007, 34). Allende conceded to the clauses to the agreement that came to be known as 
“Statute of Constitutional Guarantees”.188 Upon The Christian Democrat parliamentarians 
initiative, a commission began to draft constitutional assurances based on the agreement 
and submitted it to the Chamber of Deputies on October 8, 1970 as a constitutional 
reform. In the opening segment of the amendment, the commission explained the 
reasoning behind pursuing these reforms: “The constitutional status established in 1925, 
even with the reforms undertaken to date, is presented as insufficient, in light of recent 
electoral events, and political events that have taken place in this country” (Proyecto de 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 Frei’s agricultural reform program prompted the political right to refrain from a coalition with the 
Christian Democrats and put forward its own candidate (Oppenheim 2007, 31). 
186 Salvador Allende, supported by a coalition of Marxist and non-Marxist parties (Socialist Party (PS), 
Communist Party (PC), Radical Party (PR), Popular Unitary Action Movement (MAPU), Social 
Democratic Party (PSD) and the Independent Popular Action Party (API)) received 36.2 percent of the vote. 
Jorge Alessandri the candidate supported by a coalition of the right; National Party (PN) and Democratic 
Radical Party (PDR), obtained 34.9 percent of the vote. Radomiro Tomic, the candidate of Christian 
Democrats representing the center, received 27.8 percent of the vote (Oppenheim 2007, 32-34). 
187 This mechanism was frequently resorted because of the three -way division of the votes. Between 1938 
and 1970, out of the six presidential elections, in three of them the winning candidate had been confirmed 
by the congress. 
188 During the negotiations between UP and PDC, the political atmosphere got more intense when General 
René Schneider, Commander in Chief of the Chilean Army- a constitutionalist general was assassinated. 
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Reforma Constitucional "Estatuto de Garantías Democráticas", October 7, 1970). They 
also added that during the presidential campaign, the public opinion expressed the need to 
clarify and develop the constitutional guarantees of social and individual rights. The 
proposal included ideas and initiatives that were considered before, some even put 
forward during the constitutional project of 1965, promulgated in 1967. After the 
constitutional amendment passed the Congress, the Congress confirmed Allende’s 
presidency on November 3. As promised, the new president signed the constitutional 
amendments without his corrections or modifications on January 9, 1971 (Law 17398). 
These reforms, albeit being impositions for Allende, included a number of progressive 
clauses. Civil and political rights were greatly expanded. It guaranteed the independence 
of political parties (until the 1971 reforms, the constitution did not mention political 
parties) and provided regulations on their organization, participation in the electoral 
process and guaranteed political pluralism. Accordingly, the parties were granted legal 
personality, with freedom to define and modify their mission statement, programs and 
agreements, and guaranteed free access to media. Similarly, social organizations such as 
neighborhood associations, unions and cooperatives where people participate to solve 
their problems and assist in the management of the services of the state is recognized as 
legal persons. Reforms stipulated a guarantee to organize and create democratic 
institutions and representations for social organization, provided that they do not attempt 
to exercise the powers of the state. Also, the reforms provided for constitutional 
guarantee for freedom of expression and press, freedom of movement, right of assembly, 
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right to education,189 right to work, right to social security, right to organize and strike 
and in general obliged the state to remove obstacles that limit the freedom and equality of 
individuals and groups and to ensure their participation in social, cultural, civic, political 
and economic life. The amendment to Art. 22 recognized the Armed Forces and 
Carabineros as the exclusive body of public security forces, provided that they will be 
organized according to principles of professionalism, hierarchy and discipline, and only 
upon the recommendation of their own specialized institutional schools, new staff could 
be allocated. The rationale for this provision was to protect the armed forces against 
political purges and prevent the creation of militia (Loveman 2001, 248). By demanding 
these guarantees, “the Christian Democrats sought to buttress with constitutional 
amendments Chile’s existing political system against the in-coming Allende 
administration’s plans for a new institutional order” (Loveman 2001, 248).190 
 Allende had run a campaign based on Unidad Popular’s program of setting off on 
a path to socialism. It called for greater implementation of the agrarian reform191, 
formation of a socialized sector of the economy, various social welfare initiatives, 
establishment of a single house legislature and a national unified educational system, 
which became the major issues of contention during Allende years (Oppenheim 2007, 37-
38). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 Amendments related to education were extensive and included reforms on a system of national 
education, academic freedom in higher education and established a superintendent of public education. 
190 Another constitutional reform promulgated in March 1971 (Law 17420), amended the system for 
electing the municipal councilmen (los regidores). 
191 During Frei’s term, about 15 percent of the eligible land was expropriated with approximately 20,000 
peasants benefiting from the reform (Oppenheim 2007, 49). 
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 In the first year of his presidency and taking advantage of UP’s popular 
momentum192, Allende moved on with plans to initiate major structural reforms- starting 
with the nationalization of copper mines. There was “a virtual national consensus that 
copper should belong to Chile” (Oppenheim 2007, 48).193 The Chileanization of copper 
program, started off with Frei government was now deemed inadequate. The left, center 
and right all agreed on the next step: nationalization.194 That is why, when the 
constitutional amendment bill was submitted to the Congress, it was unanimously 
approved on July 11, 1971.195 The government’s decision to pursue the route of a lengthy 
process of constitutional amendment helped avoid a confrontation with the United States 
temporarily (Sigmund, 1977, 141). The constitutional amendment established a 
nationalization process (Law 17450) and “turned out to be one of the few UP measures to 
sail through the legislature” (Oppenheim 2007, 48). Art. 10 was amended once again, but 
this time it was revised “to broaden the scope of social function of property and introduce 
the concept of ‘nationalization’ to trespass great transnational copper industry to the 
public domain” (quoted in González 2008. Chapter 1). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 UP received nearly 49 percent of the votes in the municipal elections of April 1971 (Oppenheim 2007, 
48). 
193 The great copper mines known as Gran Minería del Cobre were practically owned by three American 
corporations Anaconda, Kennecott and Cerro, albeit in joint venture association with Chilean corporation 
CODELCO. The Chilean government acquired share ownership thanks to Frei government’s individual 
negotiations with these three companies, known as “nacionalización pactada”. Chilean government 
became part owner, which provided it with the right to participate in decision-making; in exchange the 
American companies maintained the control over the management of companies and received lower tax 
rates than before. 
194 The right agreed to nationalization as well, partly because the public opinion was unanimous on the 
issue and rejecting it would be politically costly and partly because they maintained resentment to the 
United States for their support for the agrarian program of 1960s (Collier and Sater 1993, 334). 
195 The date was declared as “Day of National Dignity for Chile” (Día de la Dignidad Nacional). 
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 Initial draft of the constitutional amendment provided a different scheme for 
compensation than the one later approved by the Congress. According to the original text, 
the compensation was to be based o the original cost of the investment minus deductions 
for amortization, depreciation, installations in bad conditions and for “excess profits” 
since the 1955 agreement of Nuevo Trato (New Deal).196 It provided that the amount of 
compensation was to determined by the comptroller general, to be paid over thirty years 
and a special Copper Tribunal was to act as an appeal court (Sigmund 1977, 141).197 
However, the Congress modified the government proposal. According to the version that 
was approved, the compensation was to be based on the book value of the companies’ 
financial interest, rather than the original cost of investment. More controversial was the 
modification to charge the president, rather than the comptroller general with the 
authority to determine the “excess profits” and to make that presidential decision not 
subject to review (Sigmund 1977, 141). This provision gave President Allende a great 
leeway in calculating the compensation due and in practice, nationalized the three largest 
US-owned copper companies. President Allende declared his calculations of “excess 
profits”, which was above the value of the mines. Once the comptroller general also 
announced his calculations of the book value minus the deductions, it became clear that 
Chilean state would only pay compensation to Cerro, and not to Anaconda and Kennecott 
(Sigmund 1977, 154). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 The deal (Law 11.828) provided a simplified tax structure, accordingly the large copper companies 
would pay the Chilean state 50 percent of their profits, and 25 percent adjustable tax based on investment 
and production (Collier and Sater 1993, 277). Starting with Nuevo Trato, Chilean state began to keep 
accurate profits of copper companies. 
197 The interest rate was agreed to be 3 percent. 
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 The amendment that provided for the nationalization of copper industry was the 
final constitutional reform introduced to the 1925 constitution. However, the UP program 
that gave Allende the ticket to presidency called for major structural reforms some of 
which required constitutional change. Allende’s resort to constitutionally authorized but 
nevertheless controversial “decree of insistence” evoked opposition from the Christian 
Democrats and National Party for evading the Congress, where UP lacked a majority.198 
Moreover, unlike the agrarian reform program there was no established program that the 
UP agreement could resort back to implement its plans to take control of privately owned 
industries (Oppenheim 2007, 44). Thus, in order to create a socialized sector of the 
economy, which was an integral part of the UP’s program for transition to socialism, 
President Allende was forced to pursue the legislative route.199 The ensuing attempt to 
introduce a bill that would reorganize the economy into three sectors- state, private and 
mixed, led to a constitutional crisis that unlike the other issues that faced the Allende 
government, polarized the political atmosphere. Polarization at the institutional level, in 
which Allende faced opposition not only from the Congress where the PDC introduced a 
counterproposal but also from the Constitutional Tribunal contributed to polarization at 
the mass level. The constitutional crisis over the issue of expanding the role of the state 
by taking control of the major domestic industries created the underlying political tension 
that ultimately culminated in the 1973 coup. The next chapter will explore more in de-
depth the constitutional crisis of 1971-1973 and the making of the 1980 Constitution. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 The congressional elections were scheduled for March 1973. 
199 Besides the legislative route and executive decrees, President Allende could also buy the private 
industries directly from their owners or buy the majority of the stock of public corporations (Oppenheim 
2007, 44). 
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2.1.10 Discussion 
 A historical review of Chile’s constitution-making and amending saga reveal that 
Chile boasted an “exceptional constitutional stability” (Barros 2002, 40). The initial 
instability marked by constitutional experimentation in which Chile went through three 
provisional constitutions (1811, 1812, 1814), one drafting process that did not lead to 
promulgation (1826) and four formal constitutions (1818, 1822, 1823 and 1828) came to 
an end with the 1833 Constitution. Setting aside this early instability, Chile was governed 
by only two constitutions before the 1980 Constitution, which will be discussed in the 
next chapter, entered into force (Table 2.1).  
 The way that the constitutional change occurs in Chile demonstrates a two-way 
interaction between political, economic and social developments and constitutional 
reform in the form of a new constitution or amendment. Constitution-making is utilized 
to solve problems, just as constitutional crisis is responsible for escalating political 
problems. An example of this relationship is the 1829 civil war, which was brought partly 
over the interpretation of the constitution and was also waged on both sides on behalf on 
protecting the constitution.  
 The Chilean case also shows that constitution-making is seen as an exercise in 
remedying political crisis. A constitutional convention was called by Balmaceda in order 
to settle down the 1891 crisis and the ensuing civil war which were precipitated over 
Balmaceda’s violation over the constitution. Similarly the 1925 Constitution, as well as 
the attempt to revise the constitution in 1924 were initiatives to respond to pressing 
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problems, most important of them all were the clerical and social questions.  Chile’s 
history of constitution-making also reveals that, “the winning side of a violent conflict 
has always imposed a new constitution,” whether this is a civil war (the 1833 
Constitution) or a military coup (the constitution of 1925) (Couso 2011, 400).  
Table 2.1: Constitutions of the Republic of Chile 1833-2010 
Constitution Endurance Number of 
Amendments 
1833 91 years 12 
1925 48 years 10 
1980 Current 27 
 
 Although Chilean political and constitutional stability is remarked as 
“exceptional” within the Latin American context, the country did nevertheless experience 
two brief interruptions in 1924 and 1932. In these instances the military did avoid any 
outright intervention and did not directly administer the country, however the 1924 
military involvement is significant for being a precedent of military playing a role in 
constitution-making. Not only did the armed forces early on during the crisis issued a 
manifesto that called for a constitutional reform, but also the threat of a new military 
intervention hastened the drafting process. An earlier yet less blatant example was 
Infante’s attempt to produce a federalist constitution, which was interrupted by a military 
revolt.  
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 The constitutions of 1833 and 1925 were both amended extensively, rather than 
being replaced. At times the amendments were pursued to catch up with changing 
circumstances such as expanding suffrage in 1882; to institutionalize an already existing 
condition; such as the role of Contraloría with the 1943 amendment or to provide 
constitutional buttress for a new legislation such as the 1963 amendment that 
accompanied the land reform initiative. The 1833 text is an example of incremental 
constitutional change in which an overtly conservative constitution amended over the 
years gradually came to accommodate a parliamentary style government ultimately by 
interpretation. What strikes out with the amendment making process of the 1833 
Constitution is that it took place despite a number of constraints; namely the electoral 
intervention, respect for the constitution for providing political stability and the rigidity 
of the constitution. The convergence of interests among political parties allowed for 
overcoming these limitations. Similarly, the 1970 amendments in which a number of 
different constitutional changes were achieved was the result of agreement between the 
center and right political parties. Chile’s multi-party electoral system compelled cross-
party bargaining in such instances. However, compromise could not always be achieved. 
The fact that Frei had to abandon parts of his constitutional proposal during the 1963 
amendment-making process is a testament to difficulty of constraints over the necessary 
quorum. 
2.2 Turkey’s History of Constitution-Making 
 It is not possible to address Turkey’s history of constitution-making without first 
looking at the experience under the Ottoman Empire. Turkey as the inheritor of the 
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Ottoman legacy traces its experience of constitution-making to early attempts of 
constraining sovereign power of the Ottoman sultan.200 Before the constitutional 
experiment of 1876, which sought to create a monarchial order in which the sultan would 
govern alongside an appointed upper house and an elected lower house; the Turkish 
politics was not entirely devoid of attempts to govern the relationship between the ruler 
and the ruled. The emancipation attempts of a new state from the remnants of the 
Ottoman Empire gave rise to modern Turkey’s first experience with constitution-making. 
The two primary constitutions of Turkish Republic, the 1924 and the 1961 constitutions 
followed the short-lived 1921 Constitution.  
 The chapter will begin by analyzing the constitutional precedents under the 
Ottoman Empire and mainly focus on the first constitution of 1876. Taking into 
consideration the relationship between political crisis and constitutional change, I will be 
looking at the amendments introduced to the 1876 Constitution. Before moving on to the 
Turkish Republic’s two primary constitutional texts, I will examine the war-time 
constitution of 1921. Next, I will focus on the 1924 Constitution and the 1961 
Constitution and the ensuing amendments. This section will conclude with an assessment 
of Turkey’s experience with constitution-making. 
2.2.1 Constitutional Precedents from the Ottoman Empire 
 Early steps towards establishing constitutional government began with the 1808 
agreement known as Sened-i Ittifak (Deed of Alliance), which established the relationship 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 For a reliable source for Ottoman constitutional history, see Tanör 1991. 
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between the notables (âyan) and the central government (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 
7).201 The initiative was largely a response to weakened central authority in the aftermath 
of revolt against Selim III. During the chaos years of 1807 and 1808, these feudal lords in 
the provinces had gained much autonomy in the countryside and had come to refuse the 
authority of the central government. A meeting (meşveret-i amme) convened by the 
Grand Vizier of the time, brought together representatives of the government with the 
notables202 and produced a document in which the notables pledged their loyalty to 
central government that in exchange recognized their privileges in the countryside 
(Gözler 2000, 10).203 Despite the fact that it failed to be implemented, its value rests on 
being a precursor to establishing limited rule of law.204 Although, it would be farfetched 
to consider the text as a constitution, it is recognized as the first attempt to introduce 
limitations on the central government. In the following Reform period, two edicts namely 
Tanzimat Fermanı of 1839 and Islahat Fermanı of 1856, recognized basic rights and 
freedoms of the Ottoman subjects and on principle established limitations to the 
autocratic rule of the Sultan (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 7). Both texts are essentially 
concessions by the Sultan and do not establish a working mechanism to oversee the 
implementation of these bestowed rights and depend on the goodwill of the Sultans. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 The agreement included an introduction, seven articles and a supplementary (Hekimoglu 2010). 
202 The meeting was held on September 29,1808 in Istanbul and was presided by the Grand Vizier Alemdar 
Mustafa Paşa. The document laying down the agreed points was signed and sealed by each side on October 
7 and promulgated by the new Sultan, Mahmut II (Gözler 2000, 10). 
203 The notables’ authority in their administrative areas was acknowledged but they were also confined to 
affairs strictly in their own areas (Hekimoglu 2010). 
204 According to the document, each succeeding grand vizier had to sign it to oversee its implementation. 
There were no other institutions or mechanisms to oversee the implementation of these commitments. 
Shortly after its promulgation, the Grand Vizier was killed in another uprising and Sultan Mahmut II 
introduced modernizing reforms, leaving aside any notion of limited government (Gözler 2000, 10).  
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Tanzimat Fermanı (Imperial Edict of Reorganization) was conferred by Sultan 
Abdülmecid I following the initiative of his reformist Grand Vizier, Mustafa Reşid Pasha 
and recognized rights to security of life, property and honor; guarantees for fair and 
public trials and principles for equitable taxing and conscription, and rule of law205. 
However, it remained short of a comprehensive declaration of rights and freedoms. 
Islahat Fermanı (the Imperial Reform Edict) followed the reformist agenda of the era, 
however its promulgation was precipitated by outside pressure, namely British and 
French in exchange for their military support for the Ottoman Empire during the Crimean 
War with Russia (Gözler 2000, 13).206 Different than the 1839 edict, Islahat Fermanı 
provided comprehensive rights for both the Muslim and non-Muslim subjects, removing 
special treatments and exemptions in matters of taxation, army service, public service, 
based on religion and recognized the right to convert to other religions and get 
representation in the provincial assembly and the Council of Justice (Meclis-i Vala-yı 
Ahkam-ı Adliye) (Gözler 2000, 14 and Hekimoglu 2010).207  
 These two edicts and the 1808 contract were essentially unilateral concessions 
that do not amount to a comprehensive legal framework.208 However, in terms of the 
rights conferred by especially the latter two texts have been significant in laying down the 
notions of rights and freedoms and the limitations of absolute authority of the central 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 See Gözler 2000, 11- 12 for a more comprehensive discussion of its clauses. 
206 Its fundamental points were agreed upon in a discussion participated by the British and French 
ambassadors to the Sublime Porte and the edict was declared right before the Peace Treaty of 1856 was 
signed. 
207 Additional to these rights, it provided for the abolition of torture and arbitrary punishment. 
208 Hekimoglu (2010) defines it as a constitutional document, falling short of a constitution. 
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government and prepared the ground for the first constitution of Turkish politics.  
2.2.2 The 1876 Constitution 
The 1876 constitution, Kanûn-u Esâsî (the Basic Law) promulgated by Sultan 
Abdulhamid II, despite its short life span is important for a number of reasons. Within the 
Ottoman framework, for the first time constitutional mechanisms were set in place to 
check the sovereign power of the sultan. It was also one of the early instances that a non-
Western state had embraced constitutionalism.209 Several arguments have been put 
forward to explain the motivations behind introducing a higher law, akin to the Western 
trend at the time.  
 Public discussion on the merits of constitutional government had been going on 
for nearly a decade and Abdulhamid II had acceded to the throne only after agreeing to 
the promulgation of a constitution.210 Several events such as the uprising in Bosnia and 
Herzegoniva, war with Serbia and Montenegro, brutal suppression of the rebellion in 
Bulgaria and an impending war with Russia were taken as signs of imminent threat for 
the disintegrating multi-ethnic empire.211 Rearranging the central authority, such that a 
true equality among all subjects, Muslim and Christian alike and a parliament which can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209 Tunisian constitution of 1861 was the first constitution of the Muslim world. As Brown (2002, 26) 
explains the Ottoman constitution “provided a starting point for most of the attempt to draft constitutions in 
the former Ottoman provinces”. See Brown (2002) for more on early constitutions in the Arab world, 
including the Ottoman constitution of 1876. 
210 The autocratic rule of Sultan Abdülaziz and the economic hardship experienced by the Ottoman 
population prompted a group of Ottoman politicians including Midhat Pasha, who was the strongest 
champion of constitutionalism to lead a coup against the sultan and depose him in May 1876. The 
following events, including Murad V’s short stint on the throne revolved around the domestic pressure 
from prominent Ottoman figures on the need to enact a constitution. 
211 This section is based on Davidson 1963, Chapter 10 unless otherwise noted. 
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function as a limitation on the powers of the sultan began to be seen as the only solution 
to salvage the situation. A constitution could help curb the fever of nationalism in the 
Balkans and revive the declining empire. In its dire situation, the Ottoman Empire was 
also being pressured by the great powers of Europe to enact substantive reforms. 
However, it was not simply the case that the idea of enacting a constitution was a tool to 
set aside calls for further reforms by the great powers and avoid their interference 
(Davidson 1963, 363).212 The approaching Constantinople Conference where the main 
discussion was planned to be political reforms in the Balkans helped speed the process of 
drafting the constitution, however the idea had been in development long before the 
necessity to act forced the Sultan’s hand. Besides the objective of establishing equality 
among subjects regardless of creed, domestic pressures for reform aimed at restraining 
the arbitrary government, especially with regard to spending (Davidson 1963, 362). The 
chief proponent of constitutionalism was Midhat Pasha who among other concerns shared 
the belief that “the mysterious secret of the political success and economic prosperity of 
western nations” lied with a parliamentary regime (Davidson 1963, 363).  
 A month less than the accession of Abdulhamid II, on September 26, 1876 
seventy notables agreed on the idea of establishing a constitution and four days later the 
sultan ordered the formation of a commission composed of ulema (legal scholars of 
Islam) and civil officials that would oversee the drafting process. Thus Kanun-i Esasi, the 
first Turkish constitution was not a product of a representative constituent assembly 
(Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 9).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 The great powers refer to the six European states that had the furthermost influence on Ottoman affairs: 
Britain, Russia, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy.  
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 The appointed commission began its sessions on October 4 and brought together 
sixteen civil officials, ten members of the ulema and two generals, among whom six 
belonged to the Christian faith.213 The commission worked in smaller committees, 
chaired by Midhat Pasha and witnessed vigorous debates. Even before they began to 
work, there were already about twenty or so drafts circulating but the commission did not 
restrict itself to any single source. However, the final draft shared many similarities with 
Midhat Pasha’s draft.214  
 The constitutional project was not without any opposition. The high-ranking 
ulema were hostile to the idea that the constitution would allow a parliament where 
Christians could serve. Reformist or not, the constitutionalists in order to save their 
project acted arbitrarily and suppressed the opposing figures. By the end of November, 
the 140 article-constitutional draft was complete and included the introduction of the 
office of a prime ministry and thus giving an end to grand vezirete. Abdulhamid, albeit 
reluctant about the prospect of diminishing his authority requested the opinions of 
ministers and officials, most probably with the intention of prolonging and complicating 
the process. He modified the draft by eliminating the prime ministry, restoring the office 
of grant vizier and the power of appointing the ministers. The modified draft was then 
sent off to the council of ministers, who provided their own alterations, ended up 
reducing the number of articles and officially submitted it to the sultan on December 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213 Initially, the commission had 24 members, four others were added on November 2. 
214 Outside influence for constitutional project included the Belgian constitution of 1831 and the Prussian 
constitution of 1850. 
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6.215The great power conference was scheduled for December 11, meaning that if the 
constitution project was going to help thwart off foreign reform suggestions, time was 
running out. However, one of the provisions of the modified draft caused a rift between 
Midhat Pasha and the Sultan, delaying its promulgation. Abdulhamid insisted on the 
clause (Art. 113 on state of siege) on the power of the sultan to send people to exile if 
deemed dangerous to the state. However, its opponents led by Midhat Pasha maintained 
that the clause violated the spirit of the constitution and rendered all other provisions to 
mere aspirations.216 Midhat Pasa and his reformist agreed to a compromise with the 
conservatives to see the approval of the constitution, thinking that minor defects could 
later be remedied. 
 At the time when the great powers had gathered their first plenary session, on 
December 23 the constitution was finally promulgated. To the gathered public, it was 
presented as a continuation of reforms initiated by Abdülmecid. For the European powers, 
it did not lead to an altogether abandonment of reform plans for the Balkans but it did 
help to persuade them to scale down their demands. Its promulgation was celebrated as a 
joyous event, a daily newspaper (Vakit) reported that “Yesterday was for all Osmanlis, 
the beginning of happiness”, with “Osmanlis” denoting the idea of unity and equality 
among all subjects.  
 Indeed, the most revered aspect of the constitution was its section on basic rights 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215 The final text included 119 articles and was composed of 12 sections. 
216 The provision was later used to exile Midhat Pasha on Feb 5, 1877. 
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and freedoms that built up on the previous constitutional texts.217 However, despite the 
freedom of religion and right to citizenship to all, the constitution maintained the unity of 
the empire, with one state religion, Islam and one official language, Turkish (Art. 11). In 
line with the goals of trimming the powers of the sultan, it provided for a legislative 
assembly (Meclis-i Umumî) with two chambers; an appointed senate (Heyet-i Âyân) and 
an elected chamber of deputies (Meclis-i Mebusan)218 that would function along with an 
executive composed of the sultan and a council of ministers, again appointed by the 
sultan- thus responsible to him and not to the parliament. Taking into consideration the 
number of prerogatives that the sultan was able to maintain under this framework219, it 
would be not be accurate to describe it as a constitutional monarchy or a parliamentarian 
monarchy (Gözler 2013, 19).220 Although the members of the Chamber of Deputies had a 
right to freely express themselves, the senate had wide-ranging veto powers and the law-
making process contained a number of limitations, including the requirement that the 
proposals initiated by the chamber had to pass through the non-elected offices of grand 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217 These include freedom of religion, freedom of press, freedom from arbitrary punishment, right to 
security of property, inviolability of the domicile, right to taxation according to individual mean, right to 
free education. The bill of rights of the 1876 constitution was defined from Article 8 to Article 26. 
218 The members were to be elected indirectly with the administrative councils at the local level acting as 
electoral college. The constitution provided for a secret ballot and excluded suffrage to males. Although it 
did not include age and property restrictions, a supplementary degree determined the eligibility of vote 
property owners over twenty-five years of age (Weiner and Özbudun 1987, 332). Constitutionalists were 
eager to see the convocation of a parliament as soon as possible, thus a provision electoral regulation came 
into force before the constitution did. For more on the electoral process see Kayali (1995). 
219 These powers include the power to appoint and dismiss ministers, to convene and dissolve the 
parliament, the power to exile persons, to declare war and peace and to conclude treaties. The sultan also 
served as the caliphate and thus considered “sacred” and not accountable (Article 5). As Davidson (1963, 
387) explains “Sovereignty, in short, still resided in the sultan and not in the nation”. 
220 Davidson (1963, 387) calls it a “limited autocracy”. 
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vezirate, the Council of State (Şura-yı Devlet)221 and the sultan before being presented as 
a bill or otherwise it had to introduced by the ministers. Although the constitution 
provided for parliamentary oversight over budget, a goal that the constitutionalist group 
hoped to realize, the constitution stipulated that the ministry could decide on the budget 
in the case that the parliament was not in session- regularly held between November 13 
and March 13. Despite its shortcomings, the constitution’s provisions on judiciary were 
quiet advanced for the time period. It provided for independence of courts from 
administrative interference (Art. 86), appointment of judges for life (Art. 81) and public 
trials (Art. 82). Moreover, it established a high court (Divan-i Ali) that would hear cases 
against the members of the government (Gözler 2013, 19). However, two systems of 
courts, religious and civil were kept, including denominational courts for non-Muslims. 
 The first constitution of Turkish politics, despite not being the product of a 
representative constituent assembly, was nevertheless the outcome of a long process of 
reformist initiatives and pressures from reformist politicians called Young Ottomans.222 
Abdulhamid II who had only reluctantly agreed to promulgate the constitution after 
trimming down provisions that would have reduced prerogatives, did not enjoy the free 
debates witnessed in the parliament.223  For him and other conservatives, the constitution 
was a Western import that had been taken in without any regard for the particularities of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 This organ corresponds to a supreme court of appeals. 
222 This reformist group of Ottoman politicians established as a secret society in 1856 and was influenced 
by the constitutional developments in the West. Another reformist group, called Young Turks will be 
similarly influential in ending the arbitrary rule of Abdulhamid and ushering in the Second Constitutional 
Era. 
223 “The New Constitution in Turkey and International Law” (1908) explains that during the war with 
Russia, “The independence manifested was so distasteful to the new convert to constitutional government 
that the Parliament was suspended in February 1878”. 
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the society and thus proved to be ill fitted. He also considered “force” to be the only 
mechanism to advance his people; “I made a mistake when I wished to imitate my father 
Abdülmecid, who sought reforms by permission and by liberal institutions. I shall follow 
in the footstep of my grandfather, Sultan Mahmud. Like him I now understand that it is 
only by force that one can move the people with whose protection God has entrusted me” 
(quoted in Davidson 1963, 403). 
 Thus, it is no surprise that the constitutional rule did not last long. After the exile 
of Midhat Pasha, the sultan strengthened his hold on the government and existing merely 
for two sessions, the parliament was prorogued by Abdulhamid II.224 Although officially 
the constitution remained in force, because the Chamber of Deputies did not convene 
until 1908 when the constitutional rule was restored with the Young Turk revolution, the 
first constitutional experiment was short-lived.225 For the next thirty years, the sultan 
established his personal rule.  
2.2.3 The 1909 Amendments 
 The absolutist rule of Abdulhamid II came to an end when the Young Turks, a 
growing oppositional group that brought together students, intellectuals, bureaucrats and 
army officers, demanded radical change (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 9). A revolt in 
Macedonia against the sultan’s autocratic rule, prompted Abdulhamid to reach a 
compromise with the revolutionaries in exchange for keeping his throne, he agreed to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 The first session lasted from March 19 to June 28, 1877 and the second session from December 13, 1877 
to February 14, 1878.  
225 In technical sense, because the sultan constitutionally was granted the power to convene and dissolve the 
parliament, this move did not violate the constitution and the constitution was never formally revoked. 
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restore the constitution on July 24, 1908.226 For the Young Turks, the first and foremost 
goal was the restoration of the constitution but their overall aim was “the transformation 
of the decrepit Empire into a modern state based upon a common sense of allegiance 
among its citizenry and with sufficient military and political strength to halt the 
encroachments of European power” (Rustow 1959, 516). The Young Turks-dominated 
legislature227, initially organized as a revolutionary organization under the Committee of 
Union and Progress (ITC) İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti now serving as a political party 
overcame a countercoup attempt by reactionaries in 1909 that led them to conclude that it 
was necessary to dethrone Abdulhamid II and amend the constitution in order to restrict 
the prerogatives of the sultan (Örücü 1999, 32). 228 The ITC ruled the empire until its 
collapse after World War I, 1918.229  
 The sultan was demoted to a constitutional monarch. According to Art. 3, he had 
to pledge before the Parliament that he would respect the constitution. In its original 
framework, the constitution had provided the sultan with extensive power and none had 
been specifically denied to him. The August 1909 amendments reduced his appointment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 The event known as the “Young Turk Revolution” was the first example of military coup in Middle 
Eastern countries (Rustow 1959). 
227 In the 1908 elections for the first time organized political parties competed. 
228 The event known as 31 Mart Vakası (31 March Incident) because it took place on date in the Islamic 
calendar, corresponding to 13 Nisan 1909 was suppressed with the mobilization of Army of Action 
(Hareket Ordusu) that marched from Thessaloniki to Istanbul. The intervention of Hareket Ordusu to 
suppress the countercoup became a precedent for military interference in the political process (Gözler 2013, 
19). Abdulhamid II was deposed on April 27, 1909 and Mehmet V, a much weaker figured acceded. In 
total, 21 articles were altered, one removed and three were added (Gözler 2013, 20). For more on the 
history of Second Constitutional Era, see Zürcher 2004, 96- 99. 
229 In the aftermath of the revolution, the ITC took measures to expand the autonomy of the armed forces 
and increase its powers vis-à-vis the parliament. For more on civil-military relations before and after the 
Young Turk Revolution, see Hanioğlu 2011.  
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powers from all ministers to şeyhülislam and grand vezir and the approval of ministers 
nominated by the grand vezir (Findley 1980, 295).230 The sultan’s veto power over 
legislatures was reduced from absolute to one that can be overridden by the parliament 
with a two-thirds majority (Art. 54) (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 9). The controversial 
article on the sultan’s authority to exile persons was eliminated from the provisions and 
his power to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies was made on the conditionality of 
senate’s approval. Overall, the proposals weakened the absolute power of the sultan. 
Additional changes introduced new rights and freedoms including the freedom of 
assembly and association (Art.120), freedom from arbitrary arrest (Art. 10) and 
established secrecy of communication (Art. 119) and banned censorship (Art. 12). Most 
importantly, the amendments strengthened the power of the legislature branch. Deputies 
and senators were given the right (previously held only by ministers) to initiate bills (Art. 
53) and their power vis-à-vis the ministers were enhanced. The ministers, under the 1876 
text were not directly responsible to the parliament, but to the sultan. The 1909 
amendments strengthened the deputies’ right to initiate motions of censure and confirmed 
ministers’ accountability to the parliament, making steps to establish checks and balances 
between branches.  
 The amendments were based on the fifteen-point program outlined in imperial 
restrict in the summer of 1908. The rescript was drafted by the grand vezir of the time, 
Küçük Said Paşa and covered many wide range of topics, most of which were 
implemented as constitutional amendments. However, not all of the proposed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
230 Şeyhülislam is the highest authority of Islam that was responsible for religious affairs of the state. 
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amendments were able to pass, the initiative that would have made reading and writing in 
Turkish a requirement for vote failed to pass the chamber (Kayali 1995, 268).  
 The second experience with constitutionalism, this time with a much-strengthened 
parliament was able to establish, although for a short period of time, a parliamentary 
monarchy.231 However, the inevitable decline of the empire brought internal turmoil and 
foreign policy failures, ITC’s goal of preserving the unity of empire got replaced with a 
full-fledged nationalist ideology.232 After the coup of 30 January 1913 (The Bab-ı Ali 
coup), ITC established concentration of power, turning the regime into a party 
dictatorship (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 9).233 Amendments that were proposed in 
1912, passed in 1914 on the eve of the war restored some of the powers of the sultan. The 
March 1918 amendment provided for the extension of a parliamentary term in the case of 
an ongoing war, and allowed extraordinary session with further extensions, if required. 
Following the Unionists consolidation of power, the period of 1913-1918 witnessed the 
parliament becoming a compliant mechanism for ITC, rendering the constitutional 
protections insignificant. Thus, Young Turks who had embarked on their political career 
as “champions of constitutional and parliamentary government”, ended up concentrating 
power in their own hands and strengthening the role of the military during the process 
(Rustow 1959, 544). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 See Earle 1925, 79-80 for why the experience with the reinstituted constitution failed to achieve 
observation to the constitutional guarantees. 
232 Anderson (2008) argues that ITC’s main aim was the preservation of the empire and “Constitutional or 
other niceties were functional or futile to it, as the occasion might be – means, not ends in themselves”. 
233 Despite the fact, the second constitutionalist period (1908-1918) is usually remembered for failing to 
generate a stable constitutional order and ultimately culminating into an “outright party dictatorship”, it 
also witnessed “the first extended Turkish experiment with competitive elections, organized political 
parties and, and the parliamentary process” (Özbudun 1990, 181). 
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2.2.4 The 1921 Constitution 
 Ottoman Empire’s partition following its defeat in the World War I and the 
conclusion of the Moudros Armistice on October 31, 1918, prompted a resistance 
movement throughout the remains of the empire. Despite Sultan Mehmet VI Vahdettin’s 
policy of appeasement with the Entente powers (British, French and Russian), the peace 
treaty, Sèvres (August 10, 1920) proved to be very harsh. While the parliament remained 
open, held its last session March 18, 1920, resistance movement under the leadership of 
Mustafa Kemal Pasha began to demonstrate both political opposition to the palace and 
military resistance to occupying powers and organized meetings around Anatolia to 
initiate the struggle for independence.234 In order to give a legitimate voice for the 
national liberation movement, Mustafa Kemal called for the establishment of a 
constituent assembly and thus formation of a new Turkish parliament, to be based in 
Ankara.235 It was this self-appointed assembly, which held both executive and legislative 
powers, unlike the Ottoman parliament, that adopted the Constitution of 1921 (Teşkilât-ı 
Esasiye Kanunu), which for the next three years became the fundamental law of Turkey. 
The constitution entered into force on January 20, 1921 and based its sovereignty on the 
nation, rather than the divine sultan (Gözler 2013, 24).236 Thus, even before incorporating 
the provision that the nation was a republic, with the amendment of 1923, the 
Constitution in practice established its notion. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234 See Zürcher 204, 142 for a comprehensive analysis of the resistance movement and Mustafa Kemal’s 
role. Mustafa Kemal first issued the Amasya Circular on June 22, 1919, and organized a conference in 
Erzurum in July-August 1919, another one in Sivas in September 1919.   
235 With the sultan still based in Istanbul, the country practically had two contesting authorities.  
236 The 1921 Constitution did not repeal the 1876 Ottoman Constitution; it would formally be replaced with 
the 1924 Constitution (Gözler 2013, 24). 
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 In an atmosphere of urgency of independence struggle, the constitution was 
prepared in a short time (the process begun in November 1920) and laid down the basic 
of parliamentary authority in 23 articles.237 Its most significant provision was on the 
principle of national sovereignty, a first in the Turkish constitutional history. In order to 
maintain unity during the national struggle between supporters of monarchy and 
supporters of republicanism, the Constitution did not establish an office of presidency 
(Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 10), the functions and powers of the president was taken 
on by the president of Grand National Assembly. Yet it did establish a very powerful 
assembly, which was vested with the power to execute state functions through ministers, 
appointed and instructed by the GNA (Article 8), who in return did not have the power to 
dissolve the assembly.238 The constitution did not establish a bill of right and did not 
create a separate judicial branch. Independent courts, known as Istiklal Mahkemeleri was 
not an institution established by the constitution but by ordinary law on September 18, 
1920. However, the members of the court selected from the GNA by the GNA, were 
responsible to handle wartime crimes, such as treason, espionage, defection from the 
army and looting. Thus, it is not possible to talk about a system of checks and balances 
under this framework. The 1921 Constitution also did not stipulate on the amending 
process, thus prompting observers (Gözler 2013, 24) to conclude that it could be 
amended with a simple majority, like ordinary legislations.239 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 Because the 1876 Constitution was not abrogated, in technical terms both texts existed during this 
transitional period. 
238 Hence, the constitution established an assembly government system (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 10 
and (Gözler 2013, 25). 
239 Thus, the 1921 Constitution can be described as a flexible constitution. 
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 With the successful outcome of the Independence War, the Grand National 
Assembly abolished the sultanate (October 30, 1922)240 and with a constitutional 
amendment241 the Republic was officially declared (October 29, 1923).242  
2.2.5 The 1924 Constitution 
 The 1921 Constitution was drafted hastily for wartime conditions, and once the 
issue of national liberation was secured, the necessity to draft a more extensive one 
emerged. The constitution was drafted by an ordinary legislature (the Second GNA, 
elected in 1923) and not by a constituent assembly and it was not ratified by a constituent 
referendum. The legislature that was elected in the 1923 elections was not necessarily 
representative of the nation. The Republican People’s Party (known as People’s Party 
(Halk Fırkası) until November 10, 1924) that united Mustafa Kemal supporters 
(Kemalists) had been successful in controlling the elections and hence was able to 
dominate the new legislature (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 10).  
 Gözler (2013, 28) argues that there was a legal gap regarding the mechanism to 
write a new constitution. The 1921 Constitution lacked a provision regarding the 
amendment process. While the 1876 Constitution did have a provision, the other 
institutions of the Ottoman text, starting with the Sultan were no longer operational. Thus, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240 For the meantime, the caliphate was maintained. Eventually that was abolished as well on March 3, 
1924. 
241 The October 29 amendments made changes to Article 1, 2, 4, 10, 11 and 12. Parla (2007, 18) considers 
the declaration of republic as a formal step since the Constitution in its original form rested its sovereignty 
on the nation. 
242 In the meantime a peace treaty, Treaty of Lausanne, signed by Turkey and Entente powers officially 
ended the state of war and provided international recognition of sovereignty to nascent state. The 1923 
amendments established the system of appointment for president, the prime minister and the ministers. 
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the ordinary legislature of 1924 after a debate on the required quorum (two thirds of the 
absolute majority) adopted a new constitution, rather than expand on the previous one.243 
The debates during the drafting process reflect the confidence of deputies arising from 
the success of the war of independence and zeal for modernization reforms (Kili 1971, 8). 
The Constitution was prepared by the Constitutional Commission, which was grouped 
from the members (twelve members) of the second GNA. The Constitutional 
Commission presented its draft, provided the Assembly with a report on why it should be 
accepted, and proceeded to debate it first as a whole and then consider each article one by 
one. This process lasted from March 9 to April 20, 1924 and finalized with a vote on the 
Constitution as a whole (Kili 1971, 30-31).  
 The drafting process and the ensuing debate on the draft reflected the ideals of 
republicanism, especially the principle that “sovereignty resides with the nation”. There 
was not so much emphasis on the concept of “democracy” but rather the debates focused 
on the ideals of “national sovereignty” and “supremacy of parliament” (Özbudun 2012, 
79)244. The drafters had examined the constitutions of other countries and although they 
had not directly copied any of their articles, the Polish and French constitutions have 
been source of inspiration for some of the provisions (Kili 1971, 33).245 However, the 
main emphasis had been on the earlier Turkish constitutional experiences and the Turkish 
national revolution (Kili 1971, 33). Despite the fact that the GNA was composed almost 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243 The rule of procedure, the quorum of two-thirds of the vote of the absolute majority of the Assembly 
members was accepted on March 11, 1924, 
244 For parliamentary debates on the 1924 Constitution, see Şeref Gözübüyük and Zekai Sezgin, 1924 
Anayasası Hakkındaki Meclis Görüşmeleri 1957 Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler. 
245 Swiss, German and Italian constitutions have also influenced the 1924 Constitution. 
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entirely of members of People’s Party, founded by Mustafa Kemal the president and 
national hero, it witnessed genuine debate (Özbudun 2012). Because the other 
constitutional experiences had been cut short as a result of absolute rulers’ disregard for 
national sovereignty, there was great concern for a strong executive. Kili (1971, 62) 
observes that, “the majority of the deputies understood by limited government a 
limitation of the executive and not of the legislature”. Thus, it is no surprise that the 
original draft had provided for greater executive power than it was amended after the 
debate in the Assembly. In the Commission draft, a presidential decree taken with the 
consultation of the Council of Ministers (in addition to Assembly’s own decision) were to 
dissolve the Assembly; the President were to serve for a seven-year term, act as the 
commander-in-chief of the armed forces, his veto could be overridden by two-thirds vote 
of the Assembly. These provisions led to most heated discussions and resulted with 
strengthening of the Assembly at the expense of the executive (Kili 1971, 62 and Mead 
1925, 87). Thus, despite the fact that the Turkish Assembly was dominated by deputies 
that belonged to the party, which was founded by the President, proposals that would 
empower the office of Presidency was vehemently discussed and ultimately rejected 
(Özbudun 2012). 
 There were two primary reasons why the constitutional drafters insisted on a 
powerful Assembly based on the principle of concentration of powers. First, the 
experience of national independence struggle had awakened a “nationalistic and 
republican spirit”, with a strong emphasis on nation’s general will that could only be 
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represented by a legislature (Kili 1971, 30).246 Second, the experience of failure to uphold 
constitutional guarantees first under the despotic rule of Sultan Abdulhamid II and then 
under the de-facto dictatorship of Union and Progress government led constitutionalists 
to regard the abuse of power by one-man or majority party as the utmost danger to 
constitutional stability (Kili 1971,8 and Giritli 1962, 9). Thus, the discussions on 
unicameral vs. bicameral assembly and the extent of executive power, especially with 
regard to the President’s power led to much discussion with those favoring the supremacy 
of the legislature over the executive able to amend the draft to produce a strong 
unicameral assembly.247  
 The emergent document founded on the principle of unity of power failed to 
provide effective checks on the legislative branch.248 The concept of “national 
sovereignty” that first entered to the Turkish constitutional jargon with the 1921 
Constitution was maintained and the GNA was vested with the power to exercise the 
rights of sovereignty on behalf of the nation (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 11). 
According to Art. 5, the parliament possessed both the legislative and executive power. 
The President of the Republic, elected by the GNA and the Council of Ministers 
appointed by the President shared the executive power (Art. 7) while legislative power 
was entrusted to the GNA, “the sole representative of the nation” (Art. 5 and 6)249. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
246 Both Kili (1971, 35) and Özbudun and Gençkaya (2009, 12) consider the emphasis on general will, as 
indication of Rousseauian concept of democracy. 
247 Topics such as the definition of citizenship, conditions to declare martial law, the administration of the 
provinces etc. were also discussed during the debate however did not lead to as much controversy Kili 1971, 
30-63). 
248 However, the Constitution did, at least in principle provided for a separate judicial power. 
249 English translations of the 1924 Constitution are based on the translation provided by Earle 1925. 
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GNA maintained the prerogative to supervise and dismiss the government at all times 
(Art. 7)250, while the Council of Ministers lacked the authority to dissolve the assembly 
and call for new elections.251 In essence, the 1924 Constitution maintained “supremacy of 
parliament” (Hekimoglu 2010) and created an “assembly government” where both 
executive and legislative powers were concentrated in GNA, rather than separated, as it 
would be in a parliamentary government (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 11). At the time 
of drafting of the constitution, the Turkish state was on verge of consolidating one-party 
regime.252 However the prepared document did not have any provisions that would 
prepare the legal basis for an authoritarian one-party regime (Özbudun 2012). It 
embraced an understanding of majoritarian democracy and its characteristic of union of 
the executive and legislative branch in the Assembly was instrumental in the realization 
of modernization reforms that the new republic embarked upon in its early years. 
 The process of law-making also rested on the GNA, along with the authority to 
interpret the law (Art. 26). The initiative for legislation could come either from the 
Assembly or from the Council of Ministers. The President did not have the right to vote 
on the decisions in the Assembly or participate in the discussions. While the constitution 
established that the President could veto a legislation passed by the Assembly within 10 
days, the simple majority requirement to override the presidential veto made the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
250 Additionally, the Council of Ministers were individually and collectively responsible to the Assembly. 
251 Only the Assembly, with a majority decision could authorize new elections (Article 25).  
252 The first opposition party, the Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası) 
established upon the request of Mustafa Kemal in 1924 was led by war heroes that clashed with Mustafa 
Kemal on reform related matters. The party was later banned in 1925 on the charge that it was involved in a 
Kurdish/Islamist rebellion that had broken out in southeast region earlier that year. 
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influence of the President quite limited.253 
 Compared to the provisional 1921 Constitution, the new text authorized 
independent courts with judicial power (Art. 8) and outlined the principles of 
independence of judges and court decisions (Art. 53 through 60) but failed to provide 
mechanisms that would ensure its implementation. The High Tribunal (Yüce Divan), 
convened upon the decision of the Assembly was charged to try the members of the 
Council of Ministers, the Council of State254 and the Court of Cassations and the 
President for all matters that result from the performance of their duties (Art. 61 through 
67). 
 In terms of political rights and liberties, the fifth section of the Constitution 
framed the principles in the context of natural rights doctrine (Gözler 2013, 33).  Article 
68 defined liberty as the right to live and enjoy life without offence or injury to others; 
established that all Turkish citizens are born free and the only limitation that could be 
placed on this liberty would be to protect the interests and liberties of others and such 
limitations could only be imposed by strict adherence to law. In the following articles 
(Art. 68 through 88), the 1924 Constitution embraced equality before law; inviolability of 
person, property, home and honor; freedom of conscience, of thought; freedom of press; 
freedom of travel and of contact; freedom of labor, freedom of private property, of 
assembly, of association, freedom of incorporation and prohibited torture, persecution, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253 Gözler (2013, 30) describes the President’s veto power as simply a “delaying” authority. 
254 The Council of State would be composed of members elected by the Assembly, and were “to decide 
administrative controversies and to give its advice on contracts, concessions and proposed laws drafted and 
presented by the Government, and to perform specific duties which may be determined by law” (Art. 51) 
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confiscation and forced labor (without pay).255 Additional to these individual rights and 
liberties, the Constitution provided for certain political rights; including the right to elect 
and get elected, right to citizenship, right to make a complaint or petition competent 
authorities and the GNA and the right to be eligible to be an employee of the government. 
However, the constitution did not include any social or economic rights (Gözler 2013, 
33).256 
 The provisions for constitutional amendment established a two-thirds majority 
requirement and excluded the system of government, i.e. republicanism from proposals 
for constitutional change (Art. 102).257 Although Art. 103 established the supremacy of 
the constitution over any ordinary legislation, there was no mechanism to check the 
constitutionality of bills (i.e. a constitutional court). 
 Overall, it was a concise document (with 105 article and 6 chapters).  
Despite the fact that in theory, the 1924 Constitution established “supremacy of 
parliament”, in practice Turkish political life under the document witnessed “domination 
of the executive body” because both during the single-party years, dominated by 
Republican People’s Party (CHP) and multi-party years dominated by Democratic Party 
(DP), the assembly confronted an executive controlled by the party (or faction) leaders 
while itself was composed of “numerically larger, but politically much weaker, group of 
backbenchers” (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 11).  Thus, the political contingencies of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255 Limitations included suspensions of these rights and freedoms under martial law and during war (Article 
86). 
256 Primary education was made compulsory, however right to education was not stipulated. 
257 The President has no authority with respect to modification or veto of the proposals. In order to propose 
a constitutional amendment, one-third of the GNA must sign off on the initiative. 
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effective one party rule until 1950258 and the majoritarian rule resulting from distortions 
that partly arose from the electoral law after 1950259; created a political system where the 
government was able to exert domination over the Assembly.  
2.2.6 Amendments to the 1924 Constitution 
 The 1924 Constitution remained in effect for 36 years but amended over its 
lifespan to reflect the changing dynamics, especially with respect to modernization 
reforms (Table 2.2). 260 In its original form, the Constitution had established Islam as the 
state religion (Art. 2). However, after the abolishment of the caliphate and other reforms 
that strengthened the secularization process, this statement was removed with the 1928 
amendment, which further removed the “executes holy law” among the functions of the 
Grand National Assembly that was stated in Art. 26. Similarly, provisions regarding the 
wording of taking oath for deputies and the President were secularized with the 1928 
amendments introduced to Art. 16 and 38. Art. 7, which stipulated, “no one may be 
molested on account of his religion, his sect, his ritual, or his philosophic convictions” 
was amended to remove the word “sect”. This amendment was approved in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 I use the word effective one-party rule, because in the Constitution there was no restriction against other 
parties. However, the initiatives of Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası) and 
the Free Republican Party (Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası) were closed down.  
259 The first elections in which the opposition party Democratic Party ran was the 1946 elections. Thus 
CHP’s victory in the first competitive elections had been tainted with corruption. However, new electoral 
law of 1950 provided for judicial supervision, secret ballot and open count. During the next 10 years, the 
electoral system used was the first-past-the-post system (simple plurality or winner-takes-all) which 
produced unfair parliamentary representation. For example, in the 1950 elections DP had 83% 
representation in the Assembly despite the fact that it received 53.3% of the votes (Gözler 2013, 34).  
260 It was amended seven times, five of which were amendments related to substance. Two of these 
amendments were to modernize the language (Law no 4695 on January 10, 1945 and Law no5997 
December 24, 1952). The five amendments took place in 1928, 1931, 1934 and 1937 (Law no 1222 on 
April 14, 1928, Law no 1893 on December 19, 1931, Law no 2599 on December 5, 1934, Law no 3115 on 
February 5, 1934 and Law no 3272 on November 29, 1937) (Özbudun 2012, 5). 
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parliament with no debate because by then the conservative camp was subdued (Özbudun 
2012, 8).261 
 Originally, the constitution (Art. 10 and 11) had recognized suffrage for men 
above the age of 18 and eligibility to be elected as a deputy for men over the age of 30. 
After the gradual extension of vote to women, the 1934 constitutional amendments made 
the necessary changes to remove the gender restrictions. The minimum voting age was 
set at 22 for both men and women.  
 Art. 2 was amended once again in 1937 to incorporate the basic characteristics of 
the state, which also happened to be the official ideology of the CHP:  republican, 
nationalist, populist, etaist, secular and reformist.262  The constitutional change essentially 
equated state with the CHP (Parla 2007, 25).263 Further amendments in 1937 (Art. 44 and 
47) added “parliamentary secretaries” that would serve under the ministries to be chosen 
among the members of the Assembly by the prime minister and approved by the 
President. Such a problematic revision that further blurred the lines between the 
executive and legislative remained in effect for ten months and with another 
constitutional amendment, these provisions were restored to its original.264  
 What has been interesting with respect to 1924 Constitution is the lack of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261 The word “secular” was not incorporated in the text of the constitution but it was used in the amendment 
proposal (Özbudun 2012, 8). 
262 These are also known as Six Principles (Arrows) of Kemalism. 
263 See Özbudun (2012, 9-12) for remarks during the debate on this amendment. 
264 Another revision that was restored after a short period of time was the language of the 1924 Constitution. 
In 1945, the whole text of the Constitution was purified from foreign words without altering the meaning of 
the provisions. However, the “pure” Turkish version was repeal under the DP rule in 1952 and the original 
1924 version was restored (Gözler 2013, 34). 
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constitutional amendment that would facilitate the transition to a multi-party system after 
1946. Just as there was no formal constitutional change when the Turkish state was 
consolidated as a one-party regime, again there was no resort to constitutional revision 
when Turkey made the transition multi-party system265. The 1924 Constitution was able 
to serve as the fundamental law both during the authoritarian single-party rule and the 
multi-party regime. Transition to democracy after 1946, albeit with its own deficiencies 
did not prompt constitutional change, which is significant if one considers the lack of 
constitutional change following the end of military regime in 1983, which will be 
discussed in the following chapter. 
 The landslide victory of Democratic Party in 1950 was a turning point in Turkish 
politics. The election was not simply perceived as a competition between the Republicans 
and Democrats, but it was regarded as a struggle between the masses and the elite. Not 
only did it mean the end of CHP’s dominance over political life, it also meant that its 
allies in state bureaucracy including the armed forces found themselves in a weakened 
position.266 A new social group, formerly marginalized and feeling resentful found the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265 The transition to multi-party system came as a result of several factors. Main reason was that the 
government led by CHP, the party of one-party regime was not popular among large segments of the 
society. The government was perceived to be inefficient with providing services, not respectful of 
expressions of faith and unable to respond to socio-economic discontent of working class. It had alienated 
its most important ally, namely the bourgeoisie. Its economic policies to combat inflation during the World 
War II period has also led growing opposition among large landowners. Additionally, changing 
international tide in the post-war period with growing emphasis on political and economic liberalization 
created the right atmosphere for Turkey to move in that direction as well. Soviet Union’s activism in 
Eastern Europe put Turkey in an important position vis-à-vis the United States. The American political, 
economic and military support also provided the necessary conditions for Turkey to align itself with 
American values, democratization and economic liberalism (see Zürcher 2004, 206-210) 
266 As Zürcher (2004, 221) explains, “The most striking difference from the CHP was the virtual absence of 
representatives with a bureaucratic and/or military background. It was clear that a significantly different 
section of Turkey’s elite had come to power”. 
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Democrat’s message of political and economic freedom, especially with respect to 
freedom of faith resonates with their demands. Joined by small business owners, 
countryside entrepreneurs, landless peasants and lower-class urban groups, the 
Democrats achieved overwhelming support. As the constitution did not provide for any 
formal restraint on the legislature and judicial review of legislative acts, the “all-powerful 
Assembly” controlled by a majority party witnessed domination of the government over 
the opposition (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 13).  The most important flaw of the 
constitution, the absence of checks and balances mechanisms against majoritarian 
domination became apparent during the Democrat Party government (Özbudun 2012, 
81).  The electoral law that gave advantage to the majority party distorted the 
representation in the Assembly and aided the unrest. Democrats believed that they 
represented the popular will (millî irade) and their understanding of democracy equating 
majority with absolute power gave them the legitimacy to ignore the opposition (Zürcher 
2004, 222). The promises of political liberalism were sidelined, after the 1954 electoral 
victory and authoritarian tendencies of the DP government became much more overt.267 
The governing Democrats’ tolerance for reactionary groups, seen as evidence of 
departure from Kemalist reforms, as well as its willingness to use its vast powers at the 
expense of the minority party, Republicans, heightened the political conflict.268 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267 Examples include pressure over the bureaucracy, especially judges and academicians, suppression of 
press, using the police to suppress popular protest and lack of tolerance for any criticism. 
268 Tanör (1986, 6-10) argues that while social and economic factors did play a role, it was a regime crisis 
that was rooted in the inefficiencies of the 1924 Constitution in terms of institutions and mechanisms that 
brought about the coup. Examples of actions by the government, Democrat Party that had threatened the 
fragile democratic system include introducing control over the bureaucracy (especially over judges and 
academics) by forcing retirement; tightening the press law to exert government control, prohibiting political 
meetings and marches except during election time and banning the opposition parties to use combined lists 
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Polarization at the political level could not be salvaged as a result of  “the weakness of 
the political culture of compromise” (Hekimoglu 2010).269 In that sense, the absence of 
checks and balances and formulization of majoritarian democracy heightened the 
polarization and in essence, paved the way for a military takeover (Özbudun 2012, 82). 
Amidst economic difficulties270, a group of military officers carried out the first direct 
military intervention in Turkish Republic 271 and overthrew the Democrat Party 
government on May 27, 1960.272  
 Before moving on to the discussion of the making of the 1961 Constitution, it is 
worthwhile to review the role of military in Turkish politics and analyze the conditions, 
which led to its overthrow of the government. During the late Ottoman Empire, known as 
the period of Young Turks rule, the members of the armed forces had assumed leadership 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
in the elections (Zürcher 2004, 230-232). The final draw was the establishment of a parliamentary 
commission with judicial powers to investigate the certain activities of CHP, which resulted in massive 
protests. DP’s declaration of martial law to suppress the protests invited the military into political conflict. 
Also see Özbudun (1990, 186-189) and Varol (2012, 323-325). 
269 The polarization at the political level did also translate into polarization in the streets. The most horrific 
example was the September 1955 pogrom against the Greek population in which the government failed to 
respond to and even encouraged street demonstrations which got out of hand when news broke out that the 
Turkish consulate in Salonika, Greece was bombed. Later it was reveled that the bomb was planted a 
Turkish agent and the press provided false information to incite the events. The event, known as Istanbul 
pogrom took place in the context of growing nationalism with respect to Cyprus issue. 
270 See Zürcher 2004, 224-229. 
271 Varol (2012, 328) describes the coup as a “democratic coup” because it was staged “against the 
authoritarian DP regime in response to popular opposition against that regime. Upon assuming control, it 
set a timetable for democratic elections and relinquished its power to democratically elected leaders within 
two years”. 
272 The officers (37 officers in total) that conducted the coup were mostly junior officers acting outside the 
chain of command. In order to give legitimacy to the take over, the retired General Cemal Gürsel at the last 
minute was asked to be the leader of the coup, a figurehead. For more on the background of the coup-
makers, see Karpat 1970. 
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role in modernization efforts.273 The armed forces under the ITC rule had expanded their 
autonomy and became a “major power-broker” in politics (Hanioğlu 2011, 178).274 Series 
of wars during the last years of Ottoman rule starting with Tripoli, the Balkans and finally 
the World War I, “brought the Ottoman Empire closer to being a garrison state than it had 
perhaps been at any time since its infancy” (Rustow 1959, 518). The independence wars 
fought and won by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his fellow former members of the 
Ottoman officer corps provided high esteem for the armed forces.275 Although the officer 
corps played a decisive role during the formation of Turkish Republic, early on in 1924 it 
was decided that if the officers wanted to participate in politics they had to resign from 
active duty276 (Karpat 1970, 1658). Based on the long held notion that “the military 
represented the highest virtues of the state” respect for the institution may have been 
genuine but it was also promoted by the state as part of its values during the nation-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
273 The modern Ottoman army was organized towards the end of the 18th century and is regarded as the 
“oldest social institution in Turkey” (Karpat 1970, 1656).  Rustow (1964, 352) explains the modernizer role 
of the military: “The political modernization of Turkey occurred for the most part under military aegis. The 
"New Order" proclaimed by Sultan Selim III (1789-1807) when he first undertook a program of 
Westernization consisted in the creation of a new army. The final victory of constitutional and 
representative principles came in 1908, as a result of a threatened military rebellion. A decade later, 
Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) and other generals transformed the Ottoman Empire into a modern nation-state. 
Thus, for nearly two hundred years, the soldier has been Turkey's foremost modernizer”. For more on the 
organization, historical development and ideological indoctrination of the Ottoman military, see Karpat 
1970, Varol 2013b. 
274 A main turning point for the role of the military was the abolishment of Janissary corps and 
establishment of a European-style army during the Sultan Mahmud II’s rule. For more, see Hanioğlu 2011. 
275 See Rustow 1959. 
276 Only for a short period the chief of staff was a member of the cabinet. However the chief of staff did 
continue to informally attend cabinet meetings. Additionally, army commanders serving at the frontiers 
also took on governorship roles. Extended periods of states of sieges during the early years of the Republic, 
especially in Kurdish town in times of uprisings and during the World War II enabled the army officers to 
take on civil administration roles (Rustow 1959, 550). Many retired officers were elected to parliament and 
appointed important civilian offices. 
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building process. 277 The Turkish military had long identified its values and goals with 
that of the Turkish state.278 Although the military formally acknowledged democracy as 
the form of the government279 and young officers were educated not to engage in politics 
but they also came to believe that it was legitimate to intervene if they believed that the 
Kemalist principles or the state’s unity was in danger of collapse (Birand 1991).280 The 
young officer corps regarded “themselves as continuing the revolutionary vanguard role, 
which they inherited from the late Ottoman period,”  (Hale 1990, 57).281   
 Thus, when the CHP’s rule, which lasted from 1923 to 1950 came to an end when 
the Democratic Party won the elections, it was not certain how the armed forces would 
perceive the new government. While segments of the army, mostly younger officers were 
hopeful that the new government could respond to their demands regarding better salary, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277 According to Jenkins (2007, 340), Atatürk was influenced by the contemporary German ideas on civil-
military relations. Like its Chilean counterparts, the Turkish officer corps were educated by a German 
general, General Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz (1843–1916) in order to “to restructure and revitalize the 
Ottoman officer corps in the nineteenth century” and his book that described the military as the core of the 
nation was a recommended reading for the Ottoman cadets. The Article 34 of the military internal 
organizational code that charged the armed forces with the mission to defend the state was borrowed from 
the Prussian military code when German officers were sent over to Ottoman Empire at the end of the 19th 
century to train the Turkish army (Karpat 1970, 1669).  
278 For instance, prior to 1950 elections a group of officers joined together to prevent a possible election 
fraud by the Republicans while higher ranking officers approached the President Inonu to let him know that 
if the Republicans wanted stay in power, it could be arranged (Karpat 1970, 1661). In December 1957, a 
group of army officers were arrested for coup-plotting. 
279 Varol (2013b, 48) argues that the military was a major agent of modernization at the time of the 1960 
coup and  believed that “democratization—i.e., the creation of a pluralistic political order representative of 
all major social groups—was integral to becoming a modern society”. 
280 From the perspective of the military, this had a legal basis. According to Article 34 of the military code, 
the military had the duty to protect the state. 
281 This view is revealing in one of Atatürk’s speeches in Konya on February 22, 1931:"Whenever the 
Turkish nation has wanted to take a step up, it has always looked to the army . . . as the leader of 
movements to achieve lofty national ideals. . . . When speaking of the army, I am speaking of the 
intelligentsia of the Turkish nation who are the true owners of this country. . . . The Turkish nation . . . 
considers its army the guardian of its ideals." (Quoted in Harris 1965, note 4 from Turk Inkilap Tarihi 
Enstitüsiü (ed.) Atatürk'’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, vol. 2 (Ankara, 1952)). For more on the military’s role on 
as the guardian of Republican reforms, see Harris 1965. 
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infrastructure, equipment and promotion; the high-ranking officers were cautious about 
the DP (Karpat 1970, 1661).282 The new Prime Minister Adnan Menderes did not have 
any personal affiliation with the military and his party lacked organic ties to the military, 
as they did not participate in the War of Independence or in the formation of the Republic. 
The DP also distrusted the military since they feared that the armed forces’ allegiance 
lied with the Republicans and especially İsmet İnönü- the revered war hero, the former 
president and party leader of the CHP.283 The distrust over the years became mutual.284 
 Thanks to growing relationship with the United States and the West in general, 
through NATO and Truman Doctrine, the military during this period did modernize its 
infrastructure and equipment and received training abroad. However, the influence of the 
military over formal politics waned in time and the living standards of officers 
declined.285 The armed forces were also upset with the way that the DP’s rule changed 
the value system of the society. Not only was the military going through a difficult 
situation, in terms of their prestige and economic status, they also perceived that the 
Democrat’s emphasis on materialism and lack of respect for the army was leading the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
282 See Harris 1965, 63-66 for more on the position of the armed forces during the transition to multi-party 
politics.  
283 However this does not mean that the CHP unconditionally supported the military establishment. In fact, 
prior to the election of DP government, CHP had taken a number of steps to reduce the significance of 
military’s formal powers over the politics. These include assigning General Staff to the Minister of Defense, 
setting up National Defense Council to coordinate defense matters and retiring officers of age (Harris 1965, 
65). 
284 For more on the relationship of the military with DP, see Tachau and Heper 1983.  
285 Accord to Karpat (1970, 1662), the cost of living increased eleven fold from 1950-1953 to 1960 while 
the salaries increased by double. The ministerial positions held by the members of military lost their 
influence over the cabinet and some duties regarding defense previously under the military command were 
transferred to the minister of foreign affairs. For more on the plight of the military during the Democrats 
rule, see Karpat 1970. It is also important to note that it was not only the members of the military who were 
faced with economic difficulties, other salaried people such as university professors, teachers and civil 
servants also suffered as a result of rising inflation (Zürcher 2004, 230). 
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country into chaos (Karpat 1970, 1661-1664).286 Another sensitive issue for the armed 
forces was the secular character of the state.287 For the military that perceived itself to be 
the guarantor of Atatürk’s reforms, the growing use of religion for politics was against 
the national character of the state.288 However strong the disdain that segments of the 
armed forces held against the DP, the government’s insistence of exercising its 
majoritarian prerogatives, lack of any checks and balances against its domination over 
political and economic life and the opposition’s inability to respond to growing 
polarization paved the way for the military to usurp power.289 
2.2.7 The 1961 Constitution 
 The Constitution of 1961 is renowned for being the first constitution prepared by 
a constituent assembly and approved with a referendum (Hekimoglu 2010 and Kili 1971, 
23). However, the constitution is far from being a work of a representative process. It was 
shaped by the National Union Committee (Milli Birlik Komitesi) that had carried out the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
286 When dissident army officers began to organize their first secret military organizations, they considered 
naming it “Iade-I Itibar Cemiyeti” (Society for the Restoration of Respect), indication that the loss of 
prestige was one important motivation behind the coup (Karpat 1970, 1665). 
287 Heper and Güney (2000) argue that the military assumed the role of guardian of secular republic. 
288 It was not so much that DP embarked upon a campaign of integrating Islam into politics, but it was their 
reliance on religion to recruit electoral support from the masses. Under the DP government, Koran began to 
be recited in Arabic, opened mosques all over the country and religious teaching became the standard in 
schools rather than be an elective. Democrats also welcomed the role of brotherhoods in society and 
maintained the support of Nurcu movement. The strict secularism under the CHP had already began to be 
relaxed in mid-1940s but the DP expanded it further, leading oppositional groups to suspect that they were 
drifting away from the secular principles of the state and exploiting religious sentiments for political 
purposes. 
289 Junior officers orchestrated the coup and although the armed forces as a whole supported the coup and 
senior officer Cemal Gürsel was the leader of the junta, it did fear that NUC could undermine the hierarchy 
of the military (Zürcher 2004. 243-244). The decision of the NUC to purge most of the generals and some 
of the colonels and majors, as well as continued coup-plotting during the 1960-1963 period indicates that 
there was no unity among the armed forces. 
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coup of May 27, which together with the indirectly elected House of Representatives 
(Temsilciler Meclisi), made up the Constituent Assembly.290 
 Before embarking on the overthrow of the government, the revolutionary officers 
did not agree on important matters such as the duration of the coup or the ideology and 
the political and economic policies to be pursued in the aftermath of takeover (Karpat 
1970, 1665-1666).291 Kili (1970, 65) argues that the military establishment shared the 
“general consensus” of the Turkish intelligentsia that constitutional change was necessary 
and thus immediately after the coup plans for a new constitution was initiated.292  Indeed, 
the NUC on the very first day of the coup asked law professors from Istanbul University 
to draft a new constitution.293 Known as the Istanbul Commission, it was chaired by 
Sıddık Sami Onar and reflected a wary attitude towards the executive power294; it 
proposed to create autonomous administrative agencies and a second chamber partly 
appointed and partly elected by voters with at least middle school education (Özbudun 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290 For a detailed account of the making of the 1961 Constitution, see Weiker, Walter F. The Turkish 
Revolution 1960-1961: Aspects of Military Politics. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1963, p 65-72. 
291 The only agreement that was reached was to organize the Committee of National Unity to oversee the 
transition to civil rule after a yet undetermined period. 
292 The armed forces believed that at the root of Turkey’s problems was “the concentration of all political 
and administrative power in one-chamber parliament” and thus a new constitution was necessary to bring 
an end to “the supremacy of the one-chamber legislature”. Before a new constitution could be ratified, on 
June 12, 1960 an interim constitution (essentially, with some of the provisions of the 1924 Constitution 
amended or repealed with Law No.1 and No. 157). 
293 Initially there were seven members from the Istanbul University's Law School. Three faculty members 
from the Law School and the School of Political Sciences of Ankara University later joined them. These 
law professors also issued a statement providing their support for the coup on the grounds that the DP 
government had acted unconstitutionally. The law professor also helped NUC prepare a provisional 
constitution that provided a legal basis for the coup. 
294 Onar did not trust politicians and therefore preferred to have a document that would curtail their 
decision-making power with regards to institutions (Zürcher 2004, 244). Two other members of the 
commission that did not agree with him, Tarık Zafer Tunaya and Ismet Giritli were later asked to leave the 
commission. 
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2011, 9).295 A second group of academicians from the Political Science Department of 
the Ankara University on their own initiative also drafted a general framework on the 
new constitution and the electoral system.296 Because the official Istanbul Commission’s 
draft constitution had many controversial aspects and was not received favorably by the 
public297, the National Union Committee (NUC) decided to convene a Constituent 
Assembly (Özbudun 2011, 10).298 A bicameral Constituent Assembly, in which the NUC 
composed of the coup organizers, made up one chamber and the Assembly of 
Representatives partly appointed and partly indirectly elected made up the second 
chamber.299 With a number of DP members on trial and the party officially closed 
(September 29, 1960), the Assembly of Representatives excluded the Democrats.300 An 
additional measure to rid the Assembly of Representatives from DP influence was the 
decision to exclude persons who had provided support for “the unconstitutional and anti-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
295 A member of the Istanbul Commission Ismet Giritli reports that they conducted a questionnaire with 
members of universities, political and professional personalities, journalists, intellectuals and regular 
citizens to discern their opinions on the new constitution and studied the constitutions of other countries, 
especially that of Italy and Germany because they had “recently thrown off dictatorial regimes and 
established successfully an order based on Western concepts of democracy” (1962, 5-6). 
296 The Ankara University’s initiative was led by Professor Yavuz Abadan and insisted on the specific 
composition of the constituent assembly that the NUC ultimately came to establish. 
297 The Istanbul Committee’s draft was also criticized for being too long, 200 articles in length (Giritli 1962, 
7). 
298 The Law No. 157 and 158 outlined the composition, regulations and rules of the Constituent Assembly. 
Giritli (1962) considers the Law No.157 a kind of provisional constitution, it also provided the timeline for 
the transition to a normal administration by October 29, 1961 and addition to the constitution, instructed the 
Constituent Assembly to draft a new electoral law. 
299 The constitutional committee of the Constituent Assembly was the main organ of constitution-making 
and it was chaired by Professor Enver Ziya Karal and Professor Turhan Feyzioğlu (Zürcher 2004, 245). 
300 The top leaders of the DP government, namely the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and Minister of Finance Hasan Polatkan were executed on 16 and 17 September 
1961 following an ad-hoc trial of leading party members, among others on charges of violation of the 
constitution. The President Celal Bayar was spared. Twelve other death sentences were commuted. 
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human rights policies by their activities, publications, and behavior until the Revolution 
of 27 May”  (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 15).301 As such, the members of the 
Assembly of Representatives were either appointed by the NUC or by the Head of State 
(General Cemal Gürsel, the chairman of the coup) or indirectly elected by the members 
of provinces and representatives of two existing parties; the CHP and the CKMP (the 
Republican Peasant Nation Party).302 Thus, in terms of party affinity, the coopted 
Assembly of Representatives was close to CHP and in terms of social composition, to 
great extent, it represented the Turkish intelligentsia  (Tanör 1986, 10) or what is 
regarded as Kemalist state elites (Isiksel 2013, 713, note 46).303 Regardless, the NUC 
served as an upper chamber in the Constituent Assembly and was able to control the 
drafting process. 
 During the 1950s, the opposing Republicans had long maintained certain demands 
which in their opinion would reverse the deteriorating the Turkish democratic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
301 Art. 2, Law No. 157 (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 15). 
302 The official composition was according to the following scheme: “(1) ten members selected by the Head 
of the State (General Cemal Gürsel); (2) eighteen members selected by the NUC; (3) members of the 
Council of Ministers; (4) 75 members indirectly elected from provinces in which one delegate from each 
village, neighborhood headmen and primary school headmasters in sub-province centers, members of the 
executive committees of professional organizations, and members of the executive committees of political 
parties had the right to vote; (5) representatives of the two existing political parties, the CHP and the 
Republican Peasant Nation Party (CKMP); the former was given 49, and the latter 25 sears; (6) 79 
members chosen by professional organizations and certain associations (bar associations, representatives of 
the press, veteran associations, traders’ associations, youth representatives, trade unions, chambers of 
commerce and industry, teachers’ associations, agricultural associations, representatives of the universities 
and judges” (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009,14- 15). According to Turkish daily newspaper, Cumhuriyet the 
Assembly of Representatives had 222 CHP supporters, 25 CKMP supporters and 25 independents (quoted 
in Oron 1961, 547). A member of the Istanbul Commission and the lower chamber, Professor Hıfzı Veldet 
Velidedeoğlu puts the figure at 225 CHP supporters commission (quoted in Akan 2013). 
303 Tanör (1986, 10) adds that while there was no representative of landless peasants, there were only six 
trade unionist, representatives of the labor force. With the addition of the military under the NUC, the 
overall Constituent Assembly was “dominated largely by the the state elite (the military, the bureaucracy 
and the university professors) and the CHP, the principal spokesperson of those elites (Özbudun and 
Gençkaya 2009,16). 
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development. In the 11th CHP convention held in 1959, these points were outlined in a 
manifesto (Ilk Hedefler Beyannamesi) and later became the cornerstone of the 1961 
Constitution (Tanör 1986, 10).304 Without a doubt, the CHP thanks to the composition of 
the Assembly of Representatives was able to dominate the drafting process and thus see 
through that its objectives were adopted by the new constitution (Özbudun and Gençkaya 
2009, 15). Thus, novelties of the 1961 Constitution such as the second chamber and the 
Constitutional Court, as well strengthened measures for an independent judiciary and 
expanded rights and freedoms were first articulated by the CHP that had been “troubled 
by the illiberal majoritarian policies of the DP government” (Özbudun and Gençkaya 
2009, 15). These demands were also shared by the armed forces. A new constitution was 
envisioned as a remedy for the problems that had led to breakdown of the political order. 
The armed forces had to come to the conclusion that “the concentration of all political 
and administrative power in a one-chamber parliament” was the main shortcoming of the 
previous framework and to prevent that from happening again, institutional mechanisms 
that would provide supervision over elected officials was seen as the necessary antidote 
(Varol 2013b, 54). One member of the NUC discussing why the military intervened 
asked in an interview, “If the administration in the country fails to provide leadership, if 
there is not a constitutional court, a senate, who is going to defend the Republic?” 
(Karpat 1970, 1669). In many respects, the constitution was envisioned as “a cure for past 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
304 Translated as “Declaration of First Objectives,” the document called for a new constitution, which 
would establish a bicameral Parliament, a Constitutional Court, a Supreme Board of Judges and provide for 
freedom of press, autonomy for universities and constitutional guarantees for social security and social 
justice and advocated for an electoral system of proportional representation. Other parties also issued their 
demands for constitutional change, see (Tanör 2014, 357-38). 
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ailments” (Kalaycioglu 2005, 93).  
 The Constituent Assembly convened on January 6, 1961 and to facilitate the 
process elected 20 people that would serve on the Constitution Commission.305 The 
commission had the two drafts; the Istanbul and Ankara drafts at its disposal as 
preliminary material of which the former served as the main study and the latter as 
secondary text (Gözler 2013, 36 and Giritli 1962, 6). However, these drafts were not 
necessarily the guiding material for the members. The Ankara draft was too general while 
the Istanbul draft was mainly focused on limiting executive authority, and in doing so had 
drifted from outlining a sensible text (Kili 1971, 68 and Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 
14)306. The commission having completed its own draft, presented it to the Assembly of 
Representatives, which from March 30th to May 27th debated it.307 Thus, on the first 
anniversary of the 1960 coup, known by its supporters as the May 27 Revolution308, the 
Constituent Assembly with the gathering of both chambers, NUC and the Assembly of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
305 In return, the Constitutional Commission to facilitate its work worked in smaller sub-commissions: Sub-
commission on the Preamble, General Principles and Fundamental Rights; Sub-commission on the 
Legislature, the Executive and their mutual relations; Sub-commission on the Principles concerning 
Administrations. Economics and Finance; Sub-commission on Judicial Organs and the Constitutional Court. 
A Redaction Committee was responsible to oversee that the text was properly edited (Kili 1971, 67-68). 
Five of its members also had been former members of the Istanbul Committee (Oron 1961, 547).  
306 The Istanbul draft had proposed the establishment of a second chamber in which part of the members 
would be appointed and part would be elected by voters with middle school education and creation of 
autonomous administrative agencies. Moreover, the members of the Istanbul Commission could not agree 
with one another, which they expressed by also submitting their dissenting opinions. (Kili 1971, 68 and 
Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009,15) 
307 The commission started its work on January 9 and presented the draft to the Assembly of 
Representatives on March 9, 1961. From the beginning, NUC had set a deadline for the Constituent 
Assembly, the first year anniversary of the coup with a one time 15-day extension option. In the event that 
the Constituent Assembly could not complete its duty by then, there would have been a new election to 
form a new Constituent Assembly (Yazıcı 1997, 69). 
308 In 1963 by the new parliament, the date of the coup May 27 was declared a national holiday, called the 
Liberty and Constitution Day. It ceased to exist after the promulgation of the 1982 Constitution. 
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Representatives approved the final draft with only two abstentions and 260 yes votes.309 
However, before reaching this phase, the draft was debated thoroughly and modified 
under the watchful eyes of a revolutionary council, NUC. The drafting process as well as 
the following debates witnessed the profound impact of the experiences of 1950s to the 
point that it was regarded as a reaction Constitution310 – “a constitution which 
encompassed several principles and established several institutions which would prevent 
a repetition of the events of the 1950’s in Turkey” (Kili 1971 145).311  
 Certain provisions of the draft led to heated debates.312 Indeed, the draft 
introduced new concepts such as social justice, social state, public interest and human 
rights, which had no precedent in Turkish constitutional history until then.  Thus while 
the members of the Constituent Assembly easily achieved consensus on political 
concepts, much discussion was devoted to social and economic concepts (Kili 1971, 143). 
It raised fears among conservative members that the constitution could lead the way to 
socialism. Thus changes were introduced to the draft that secured property rights and 
private enterprise (Kili 1971). Art. 2, which stipulated the characteristics of the “Second 
Republic” used the term “social justice” and omitted others that existed in the previous 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
309 Two houses in total had 295 members and on 27 May 1961, 262 members were present.  
310 Varol (2013a, 737) lists those problems that the military attacked because it had led to democratic 
erosion in the 1950s: “abuse of government power, oppression of political dissidents, and a decay of the 
Republic’s founding principles”. Provisions that are considered as measures to prevent a repetition of the 
past include, the proscription against the exploitation of religion for the purpose of political or personal 
benefit and provides for party and association closures for those who violate it, establishment of a 
Constitutional Court empowered with judicial review, guarantees of job security for civil servants and 
enumeration of rights and freedoms (Giritli 1962). 
311 Kili (1971, 145) does not agree with this view shared by some commenters. According to her, the 
Constitution was not simply a reaction- it had its own set of objectives. 
312 See Kili 1971 for a comprehensive review of these debates. See Akan (2013) for a thorough review of 
debates on laiklik (laicism). 
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text, “reformist”, “etaist” and “nationalist”.313 The discussion reflected the political 
division within the CHP and the final text accommodated the concerns of those who 
feared the prospect of communism and concerned over the omission of nationalist 
character of the state and of those who wanted to state the newly acquired social aspect of 
the Republic (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 15-16). Thus, the final text agreed on the use 
of the phrase “national”, rather than “nationalistic” and having mentioned “social justice” 
in the preamble added that the characteristics of the state include “fundamental tenets set 
forth in the preamble”.  
 A proposal to purge the judiciary of supporters of the ousted DP before new 
institutions began to function was killed off with the intervention of former president 
İsmet İnönü, now serving as a member of the Constituent Assembly (Oron 1961, 547).314 
 It was decided beforehand that the draft would be put up for popular vote. Ismet 
Giritli (1962, 4) one of the Turkish professor who was a member of the Istanbul 
Committee and of the Constituent Assembly state that there were two motivations for 
insisting on a referendum; to give public a chance to express their opinion and to receive 
a confirmation and approval for the May 27 Revolution and the impending transition. He 
adds that the public’s opinion is vitally important because “constitutions drafted by 
Constituent Assemblies based on limited voting and handicapped by the resulting partial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
313 The draft article stated the following: “The Turkish Republic is democratic and secular, based on human 
rights and liberties and on the fundamental principles of work and social justice” (Oron 1961, 547). 
314 According to Heper (1998, 218), İnönü played the role of the mediator to reconcile the differences of 
opinion between NUC and the Assembly, in order to facilitate military’s return back to its barracks. 
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representation should be submitted to approval by popular vote” (Griritli 1962, 4).315 All 
political parties except the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi-AP), heir to the dissolved DP 
expressed their support as well the country’s prominent unions and federations (Oron 
1961, 551).316 A referendum, a first in Turkish history, was held on July 9, 1961. With 
81% participation, it resulted with 61.7% yes votes and 38.3% no votes.317 
 The new constitution, in effect by July 20 included a preamble, six parts, 157 
articles and 11 transitory articles.318 It is renowned for its liberal content, especially with 
regards to individual rights.319 The international developments of the era such as the 
European Convention of Human Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the 1949 German Constitution had a profound impact on the drafters (Isiksel 2013, 713 
and Varol 2013a, 736). 320 In addition to civil liberties and political rights and freedoms 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
315 Foreign correspondents from the Times (July 27, 1961) also agree that the referendum was intended as a 
vote of confidence (quoted in Oron 1961, 551). 
316 These include the Confederation of Workers’ Trade Union, General Congress of the Zonguldak Mine 
Workers’ Union, the National Students’ Federation and the National Youth Organization as well as the 
head of the Religious Affairs Directorate (Oron 1961, 551). 
317 As quoted in Oron (1961, 551), it was the opinion of foreign correspondents that the NUC did not 
tamper with the results and the voting was free and secret. However, the NUC did have the financial and 
otherwise to travel the country and make the propaganda for a yes vote.  
318 There was no preamble in the previous constitution. In the 1961 text, it was employed to legitimize the 
coup and glorify the Turkish nation and the Kemalist reforms. 
319 The decision to provide for expanded rights and freedoms also stemmed from the goal of providing 
constitutional limits to what can be achieved by legislature. Giritli (1962, 7-8), a professor of law and one 
of the drafters that worked in the Istanbul Committee and was a members of Constituent Assembly, state 
that “having benefited from the bitter lesson of the application of the Constitution of 1924, it was decided 
that the function of determining the limits of rights and freedoms should not be relegated to the lawmakers, 
instead it is the Constitution itself that spells out in principle the limits of the authority to be vested in the 
legislature”. 
320 According to Scotti (2014) Italian and German models influenced the Turkish Constitutional Court. The 
French constitutional model influenced the decision to establish a senate. 
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now expressed more in detail and with more safeguards inscribed321, it also provided for 
social rights such as labor rights322 and made the state incumbent to accomplish 
developments in the economic and social field and to realize that the person is free from 
all obstacles to enjoy these inalienable rights.323 It provided for land ownership for 
farmers with no or insufficient land and allowed for expropriation and nationalization to 
be governed by (future) pertinent laws, while guaranteeing property rights, freedom of 
contract and private enterprise.  
 A major goal of the drafters of the constitution was to employ the state to solve 
Turkey’s social and economic problem. Thus, the constitution embraced measures to 
realize economic development and for that purpose established the State Planning 
Organization (Devlet Plânlama Teşkilâtı) (Art.129). The reformist intellectuals were 
proponents of social justice, not only because of their moral conviction but also because 
they perceived it as a way to ward off communism (Tanör 1986, 11).324 Regardless of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
321 Articles 14 through 34 cover civil liberties that include: right to improve oneself materially and 
spiritually, freedom from torture and ill-treatment, privacy, immunity of domicile, freedom of 
communication, freedom of travel and residence, freedom of though and faith, freedom of education, 
freedom of press, the right to publish books, newspapers and periodicals, the right of assembly, the right to 
form associations, the right of rebuttal and protection against unwarranted arrest and guarantee of ordinary 
channels of justice. Art. 54 through 62 cover political rights 
322 These include right to strike, right to collective bargaining, right to paid days of rest, right to join trade 
unions and made the state incumbent to protect workers, promote employment, assure decent wage and 
regulate economic and social life to realize the goal of attainment of a dignified standard of living for 
everyone. 
323 The 1924 Constitution, the only provision that can be considered a social right was free and compulsory 
primary education for all (Oron 1961, 551). The 1962 framework enumerated social and economic rights 
Art. 35 through 53. 
324 Giritli (1962, 11), one of the drafters explain that after World War II, it has become pertinent for the 
state to embrace a social character to enjoy freedoms in a collective society and for the state to realize its 
economic potential. He cautions that the absence of social safeguards can lead to upheaval and even regime 
collapse as totalitarian movements might prevail when the state becomes indifferent to social grievances. 
He explains that it is the same logic that led to the formation of Alliance for Progress.  
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origin of their disposition, the drafters interpreted the Kemalist understanding of etaism 
within a leftist ideological discourse (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 16). However, the 
Constitution did not go as far as embracing a doctrine of social welfare. While it did 
provide for the right to social security and medical care, the new charter also stipulated 
that the state would carry these social and economic goals to the extent that its economic 
development and financial resources allow (Art. 53). 
 1961 Constitution differed from the previous not only in terms of expanded and 
enumerated rights and freedoms but also in terms of separation of the powers and checks 
and balances between the three branches of the government (Kili 1992). In order to 
establish an effective system of checks and balances, the new text introduced the 
following changes: a second chamber (senate), a Constitutional Court empowered with 
judicial review, a strengthened Council of State that reviews all acts of executive 
agencies and relative autonomy for public agencies such as the universities and Radio 
and Television Corporation (Özbudun 1990, 190).325 Moreover, to balance out the power 
of elected assemblies, the new constitution also provided for an independent judiciary326 
and job security for civil servants. These measures stemmed from the experience of the 
1950’s and were governed with the intention of prevention of abuse of power by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
325 Another guarantee against possible abuse was inscribed in the provision that states, “sovereignty is 
vested in the nation” by providing that “The right to exercise such sovereignty shall not be delegated any 
person, group or class. No person or agency shall exercise any state authority which does not drive its 
origin from the Constitution” (Article 4). Thereby, the constitution drifted from the understanding of 
sovereignty as the rule of majority. 
326 Another institutional novelty of the 1961 Constitution was the addition of Supreme Council of Judges to 
be responsible for all personnel matters regarding judges (Article 143 and 144). The constitutional also 
provided that judges may not retired or dismissed without their consent.  
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elected majorities (Tanör 1986, 10).327 The fear of majorities was the underlying majority 
to introduce a senate of which 150 members would be popularly elected, 15 members that 
would be appointed by the President and lifetime members that included the members of 
the coup makers- the National Unity Committee and former Presidents of the Turkish 
Republic. 328  
 Another novelty of the new framework was the constitutional recognition of 
political parties as necessary and indispensable entities of democratic political life (Art. 
56).329 However, inspired by the West Germany, the Constitution empowered the 
Constitutional Court to dissolve political parties that threatened the democratic order and 
republican principles (Giritli 1961, 14). Thus, besides the authority to review the 
constitutionality of legislative acts, the Constitutional Court, which was established on 
the rationale that its absence had led to the passage of laws deemed in violation of the 
constitution in the previous decade, was empowered to review on the constitutionality of 
political parties.330  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
327 Giritli (1962, 14), a professor of law and one of the drafters that worked in the Istanbul Committee and 
was a members of Constituent Assembly state that the “experience has demonstrated that greatest threat to 
freedom in our time can emanate from parliamentary majorities that abuse their legislative power”. A 
similar motivation lies for providing constitutional job security for civil servants. Giritli (1972, 10) explains 
that “the practice of forcing civil service personnel into retirement or that of subjecting them to arbitrary 
disciplinary action on the part of an authoritarian administration had become all too prevalent under the 
former regime in recent years”. 
328 The lower chamber, National Assembly was to composed of 450 members. 
329 The 1961 Constitution allowed for “a wider spectrum of political activity” than the previous constitution 
did (Zürcher 2004, 246). A new party that focused on workers’ rights emerged, Workers Party of Turkey 
(Türkiye İşçi Partisi, TİP). Varol (2013b) who argued that the 1960 coup was a reformist one and created 
an “impetus for democratic growth” highlights the plurality of political parties as one example of coup-led 
pluralist social-political order. 
330 During the constitutional debates, one of the members of the Assembly Şükufe Ekitler challenged the 
idea of empowering a non-elected institution with such powers but others did not agree with her position. 
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 Considering that it was drafted under the tutelage of the military, it is no surprise 
that the 1961 Constitution did incorporate authoritarian feature.331 Deep distrust towards 
civilian politicians rendered armed forces taking on direct influence over the political 
process. The military’s self-ascribed role as the guarantor of reforms was translated into 
an institutional framework with the establishment of an advisory National Security 
Council (Millî Güvenlik Kurulu).332 The military high command (Chief of the General 
Staff and representatives of the armed forces) could participate in the government 
through its role in the National Security Council, which also included the ministers and 
was presided over by the President of the Republic (Art. 111).333 As already mentioned, 
members of the military were to gain the status of permanent/lifetime senators (Art. 70) 
which ensured military supervision over the legislative process. The Turkish General 
Staff was made answerable to the prime minister, which elevated its rank in state protocol 
(Jenkins 2007, 341-342). The constitutional framework guaranteed that no penal, 
financial or legal responsibility could be brought against members of NUC for their acts 
and decisions between the period May 27, 1960 and January 6, 1961 (Isiksel 2013, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Another representative Suphi Batur’s to allow individual application to the court for cases of violation of 
basic rights also did not find support from the rest (Belge 2006, 661-662). 
331 Another important development in civil-military relations was the establishment of of the Army Mutual 
Assistance Association (OYAK). It created an independent investment fund for retired armed forces 
officers. It provided the military with an independent economic power concerned with the political and 
economic stability of the country, see Ahmad 1993, 130-131.  
332 NSC was authorized with the duty of “notifying to the Council of Ministers the fundamental views 
necessary in taking decisions and coordinating efforts concerning national security” (Art. 111). After a 
military intervention, the article was amended to include “advising”, replacing the phrase “notifying”.   
333 The office of presidency was, according to parliamentary system principles, ceremonial.  
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714).334    
 Isiksel (2013, 714) argues that the framers of the 1961 Constitution did not act 
with liberal intentions when they provided for the separation of powers, the independence 
of the judiciary, and a system of checks and balances. Their goal was to “fragment state 
power in order to sap the power of the majoritarian legislature, which they viewed as 
subject to partisan capture and potentially threatening to Kemalist predominance”. Thus, 
by providing autonomy to different public institutions, they wanted to ensure that the 
state elite would be able to exert control. These counter-majoritarian institutions included 
the NSC, Constitutional Court, State Planning Organization, and the High Council of 
Judges.335 In the case of the Constitutional Court, as can be discerned by the authorities 
that can refer cases to it, it was “not established as an impartial referee of a contract 
between Republican and Democrats, but as the guardian of a Republican constitution 
against Democrats” (Belge 2006, 664). Overall, these “bureaucratic enclaves against 
elected governments” were intended measures to safeguard the political power of 
Republican groups against possible populist governments (Belge 2006, 663).336 As the 
next chapter will demonstrate, the much-criticized institutions of the 1982 Constitution 
emanate from the 1961 Constitution. Additionally, the experience of drafting a new 
constitution following a coup d’état made a bad precedent on Turkish 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
334 This provision was stipulated under Transitory Article 4 and caused a long discussion during the debate 
on the constitutional draft. Only after it was amended to include provisions that would allow for these acts 
and decisions to be replaced or modified (but not annulled based on unconstitutionality) it was accepted to 
provide immunity to NUC members (Oron 1961, 548). 
335 The Constitution also strengthened the authority and autonomy of the Council of State. 
336 Belge (2006) describes this “understanding” among the military, civilian bureaucracy, CHP and the 
intelligentsia as the “Republican alliance” and finds the Constitutional Court as its main avenue to maintain 
its acquired privileges. 
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constitutionalism.337 Thus, on the one hand, the Constitution expanded the basic rights 
and freedoms, introduced social right such as collective bargaining and right to strike and 
shared a general affinity towards a social state and took measured to limit the domination 
of the majority but on the other hand, the military’s tutelary role over the elected 
parliament originated from it.338 
 Among conservative circles, the 1961 Constitution, especially its progressive 
elements in terms of rights and freedoms were deemed as inappropriate for the Turkish 
context for being all too permissive (Ahmad 1993, 146). However for others, albeit 
progressive in terms of civil liberties, the 1961 Constitution because of the turbulent 
political context it was meant to govern, did not ensure realization of these provision. 339  
Thus, it was not able to appease those who favored a strong state, as well as those who 
wanted to see a state with a social character. The drafting process, which excluded DP 
and hence, the political view shared by half of the population, also remained another 
controversial aspect of the constitution (Parla 2007, 138). The Justice Party (AP), 
successor of the ousted the DP, considered the document as illegitimate (Kalaycıoğlu 
2005, 123).  Added to that was the Constitutional Court’s proclivity to prioritize public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
337 The drafting process of the 1982 Constitution was far less representative and under no circumstances 
resembled a consensual democratic process. 
338 In contrast, Varol (2012) argues that Turkish armed forces had a “democracy-promoting constitutional 
role” and acted as “the guardian of constitutional democracy”. 
339 The 1960s witnessed ideological politics. Especially at the university level, the left wing ideologies 
became more prominent, the country became less isolated from the outside world and began to question the 
alliance with the United States (Ahmad 1993, 139). 
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order and security over upholding constitutional guarantees (Belge 2006).340  
 The 1961 Constitution before being replaced in 1982, encountered significant 
amendments that eroded its celebrated liberal spirit.341 Among them the 1971 and 1973 
amendments stand out as the most noteworthy and comprehensive.342 Yet the 
amendments introduced before then are also significant for the way they were handled by 
the newly established Constitutional Court. Before moving forward with the 1971 and 
1973 amendments that came as impositions of the armed forced whom by 1971 had once 
again became upset with the civilian politicians, a discussion of the Constitutional 
Court’s activism in this period is helpful to clarify the way that Court took it upon itself 
to safeguard the constitution against the majoritarian impulses. 
 The first amendment to the constitution was introduced in 1969 and modified the 
provision on election qualifications for deputies.343 The 1961 constitution intended to 
keep out legislatures that were distanced from the political game during the coup and did 
not allow election of persons convicted of certain crimes even though “they may have 
been pardoned” (Art. 68). The 1969 amendment eliminated this provision regarding the 
pardon and allowed for eligibility in cases of pardon. Although, the 1961 constitution did 
not have a provision on adjudication of constitutional amendment; the Constitutional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
340 A view shared by some constitutional experts such as Professor Ali Ülkü Azrak is that had there been a 
constitutional court under the Democrat Party government, acts in violation of the constitution would not 
have taken place and the military would not have intervened (Hürriyet Daily News May 26, 2010). 
341 The amendment rule of 1961 called for a two-thirds majority of both chambers but different than the 
1982 constitution did not have any authority placed in the president to veto the amendment proposal or take 
it to referendum.  
342 During the 1971-1973 period dubbed as “March 12 regime” there were three instances of amendment-
making, the first on June 30, 1971, the second on September 22, 1971 and the third on March 15, 1973. For 
a review of all amendments to 1961 constitution see Tikveş, 1977. 
343 Article 68 and temporary article 11 were amended on October 6, 1969. 
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Court decided to exercise judicial review.344 With respect to the 1969 amendment, the 
Court determined that this constitutional amendment was unconstitutional with respect to 
form (Barak 2011, 323).345 Although the court declared itself competent to review the 
constitutionality with respect to both form and substance, in this instance stated that the 
amendment rule (Art. 155) was not observed and therefore on procedural grounds the 
amendment was unconstitutional (Roznai and Yolcu 2012, 195-196 and Gözler 2008). 346  
 The Constitutional Court both with respect to form and procedural grounds also 
examined the second amendment of April 17, 1970 regarding the timeline of elections347. 
Although the Court found no irregularity, the decision to review the constitutionality of 
amendments with respect to their substance has been controversial and made precedent to 
Court’s later assumption of power.348 The Court determined that Art. 9, an eternal clause 
that establishes the form of the Turkish state as a republic provided itself the grounds to 
review on the substance of amendments. Furthermore, the Court interpreted the phrase 
“republican form of state” to include other relevant but not mentioned characteristics 
such as the rule of law, secularism, social state and democracy. These acts of unilateral 
assumption of power by the Constitutional Court prompted one of the 1971 amendments 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
344 Decision of June 16, 1970, No. 1970/31. For more see Gözler 2008. 
345 It was the Worker Party who had appealed to Constitutional Court to review the amendment. The 
subsequent 1971 constitutional amendment that reorganized the powers of the Constitutional Court and 
empowered it to specifically review with respect to form also determined that only parties that have at least 
ten representatives in the parliament could petition the court for cases of judicial review. 
346 The grievances of politicians sidelined by the 1960 coup was ultimately remedied with April 16, 1974 
amendment (the seventh instance of amendment-making to 1961 Constitution) that altered Article 68 and 
temporary article 11. 
347 The amendment was introduced to delay the Senate election for one year and four months. The same 
day Turkish parliament passed another constitutional amendment that dealt with the conservation and 
development of forests (Article 131). 
348 Decision of April 3, 1971, No. 1971/37. 
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that introduced specific limitation to judicial review power of the Court. 
2.2.8 The 1971 and the 1973 Amendments 
 The 1960s witnessed the mobilization of groups both on the left and right side of 
the political spectrum and the growing conflict between them, especially youth groups.349 
In an atmosphere where political assassinations and labor strikes became all too common, 
the party system attempted to incorporate two political outsiders, National Action Party 
(Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi-MHP) and National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi- MNP). 
In the aftermath of the 1960 coup, the armed forced became quite involved in daily 
politics (Sakallioğlu 1997, 155).350 Although the high commanders of the armed forces 
were able to communicate their policy preferences through the National Security Council 
and benefited from salary increases and updated equipment, the radical group within the 
military ranks that wanted to see the conservative AP government out and social reforms 
promised by the constitution enacted was still pursuing conspiracies to oust the elected 
government and establish a long-term military rule (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 18).351 
The inability of Süleyman Demirel, the AP Prime Minister to put an end to subversive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
349 Kidnappings, bank robberies, bombings, murders and street violence had become routine (Özbudun 
2000, 33). 
350 The first example of military involvement was the October 21, 1961 protocol signed by a number of 
generals that were upset with the results of the 1961 general elections. The elections, contrary to armed 
forces’ hopes did not result with a CHP victory but one for Justice Party, the heir to ousted DP. İnönü was 
able to convince these generals who considered the elections null and wanted to close down political parties 
that there were other ways to communicate with party leaders about the preferences of armed forces (Yazıcı 
1997, 73-74). 
351 The NSC had become the institutional mechanism for the armed forces to intervene in day-to-day 
politics, although its advisory role was limited to matters of “national security and coordination”. 
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activities amidst growing economic recession ignited the armed forces.352 The higher 
rank intervened and issued a memorandum on March 12, 1971 in order to preempt an 
approaching coup by young officers akin to those that had carried the 1960 coup (Zürcher 
2004, 258). While the “coup by memorandum” did not lead to the military assuming 
power directly, it did force the government’s hand to resign.353 According to the authors 
of the March 12 regime, the government had led the country into “anarchy, fratricidal 
strife, and social and economic unrest”354 and failed to realize the reforms envisioned by 
the constitution and thus asked for "the formation, within the context of democratic 
principles, of a strong and credible government, which will neutralize the current 
anarchical situation and which, inspired by Atatürk's views, will implement the reformist 
laws envisaged by the constitution". Otherwise, “in accordance with the powers vested in 
them by the laws to protect and preserve the Turkish Republic”, the armed forces would 
take over the power itself.355 Demirel complied and a direct military takeover of the 
government was avoided and an above-party government was established.356 
 The official accounts maintain that constitutional change was not initially an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
352 Students were not only ones mobilized, to counter the working class protests on 15-16 June 1970, a 
martial law was declared in two cities. Landless peasants also began to occupy private farms. 
353 According to Tachau and Heper (1983, 23) the main difference between “the 1960 and the 1971 
interventions was that the military commanders now apparently wished to keep the regime intact with only 
moderate changes designed to shore up its authority against challenges, particularly from the political left”. 
During this period, the military commanders governed behind the scenes while entrusted civilians led the 
cabinets: Nihat Erim (March 1971-April 1972), Ferit Melen (May 1972-April 1973), and Nairn Talu 
(April-October 1973). 
354 Özbudun (1990, 191) calls it a “half-coup” because “the military chose to govern from behind the scenes 
instead of taking over directly”. 
355 English translations are from Özbudun 2000, 33-34. 
356 The problems encountered by the Greek junta deterred the Turkish military to directly govern (Ahmad 
1993, 149). 
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objective of the coup, but was later developed in response to growing political violence. 
However, Tanör (2012) argues otherwise. The Chief of Staff in 1970 had requested for 
constitutional amendments that would help social changes catch up with economic 
developments and with the March 12 intervention the request became an official 
demand.357  
 The interim government was instructed to accomplish three objectives; to stamp 
out political violence, to enact constitutional amendment that would strengthen the 
executive branch and to carry out social reforms envisioned by the 1961 constitution, 
specifically the land reform (Özbudun 2000, 34).358 While the first objective was hard to 
achieve and domestic strife once again became the motivation behind the 1980 coup, the 
third objective was not pursued by conservative military officers (Demirel 2005, 250).359 
The second objective of altering the constitution was accomplished by two moments of 
constitutional change in 1971 and 1973.360 Around business circles, there was a growing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
357 On March 12, the armed forces delivered two different sets of memorandum, one for heads of the 
parliament and senate and one for the President Sunay. The memorandum for President Sunay did include a 
section on constitutional amendments, specifically for eight articles between Article 10 and 34. 
Additionally on the day of the coup by memorandum, the armed forces set up a task force of three experts 
to work on constitutional amendments (Yazıcı 1997, 117). 
358 Although some commenters have suggested that the interim government led by Nihat Erim initially did 
not have constitutional reform on its agenda, the increasing domestic turmoil forced its hand, such 
conclusion is contradicted by the fact that especially during the NSC meetings constitutional amendment 
was an issue that was widely discussed and immediately after the intervention a study group was founded 
by General Staff (Tanör 1986, 32-35).  
359 Immediately after the 1971 intervention, radical officers were retired or dismissed (Özbudun and 
Gençkaya 2009, 18). A land reform was enacted in June 1973 but it was later annulled by the 
Constitutional Court in 1977 on procedural grounds. In four years, only a small portion of land was 
distributed to landless peasants (Hale 1994, 208). 
360 In 1971, two sets of amendments passed. First with Law No. 1421 on June 30 (2 articles modified- 
Article 56 and 82) and then with Law No. 1488 on September 22 (35 articles were modified and nine 
transitory articles were added) constitutional change was introduced immediately after the March 12 “coup 
by memorandum”. The 1973 amendment took place on March 15 with Law No. 1699 (5 articles modified 
and 2 transitory articles were added.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  159	   	  
concern for mass mobilization and social demands that translated as a desire for public 
order based on the fear that it could lead to regime collapse (Tanör 2007, 30-31). 
According to the 1961 Constitution, a two-thirds majority in both chambers was the 
required quorum for amendment. Since the AP was already in favor of introducing 
constitutional amendments that it believed would help stamp out the atmosphere of 
turmoil and strengthen the executive power, it was the CHP that needed convincing 
(Tanör 2007, 39-40).361 The declaration of martial law on April 26, 1971 despite the fact 
that the political violence did not amount to the necessity of such measures leads Tanör 
(2007, 42) to conclude that it was intended to speed up the amendment-making process. 
With CHP convinced to jump on the bandwagon, the constitutional amendments 
supported by the military establishment passed in 1971 and 1973. Amidst crackdown on 
youth organizations, unions, professional associations with martial law declared in 11 
provinces out of 67, as well as strikes and lockouts made illegal, bookshops and 
newspapers ordered to censor, the climate of repression did not allow for any public 
discussion on the proposed amendments (Ahmad 1993, 152).  Once again, constitutional 
change took place without genuine bargaining among political elites and no solid input 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
361 According to Tanör (1986, 26-29), Justice Party (AP) did not necessarily have a negative attitude 
towards the constitution and had maintained that despite some of the frictions caused by the institutions 
established by it, overall did not break the functioning of a democracy based on checks and balances. 
Nevertheless, during the 1969 election campaign the AP had proposed constitutional reforms which would 
strengthen the legislative power of the executive, remove lifetime senators, allow holding plebiscite, ease 
the convocation of the assembly, prevent the abuse of interpellation, establish a High Council of Education 
that would mediate the relation between the government and the universities, regulate the universities and 
Turkish Radio and Television Corporation while maintaining their autonomy, reorganize the composition 
and function of the Supreme Council of Judges, allow for the appointment of prosecutors by the 
government and take measures to fight against communism and other extra-constitutional entities. 
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from non-political actors.362 
 Despite the fact that the armed forces shared the conviction that constitutional 
amendment was necessary, there was a discord especially between the General Staff and 
Air Force (Tanör 2012, 35 and 209). The armed forces prepared drafts, held meetings 
with party leaders and government officials and under martial law executed pressure to 
oversee the adoption of a list of constitutional amendments.363  
 The amendments overall accomplished to reverse the progressive elements of the 
constitution and tipped the balance towards the executive and restricted civil liberties. In 
fact, the amendments championed by the armed forces and approved by the parliament 
were far more conservative than endorsed by the AP, which believed that “the liberal 
1961 constitution was a ‘luxury’ that made the governance of the country impossible” 
(Özbudun 2000, 34 and Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 17). With martial law renewed 
every two months, there was no open debate about the amendments. Inside the parliament, 
there was one notable objection against the proposals and that was from Mehmed Ali 
Aybar, a former member of Workers Party who stated that “The proposed amendments of 
the Constitution are against the philosophy and the basic principles of our current 
democratic Constitution; their aim is to proscribe socialism and for this reason cannot be 
reconciled with the contemporary understanding of a democratic regime” (quoted in 
Ahmad 1993, 52). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
362 One exception was a conference held by Economic and Social Studies Conference Board, the acclaimed 
NGO today known as Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV).  The seminar organized 
on June 28, 1971 discussed amendments to 1961 constitution (Tanör 2007, 207) 
363 The pressure was mostly on the opposition Republican People’s Party. The “extra-parliamentary” 
coercion was exerted mainly on the right-wing segment of the party to co-opt their support to satisfy the 
necessary quorum (Tanör 2012, 216). 
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 The amendments had four profound effects on the original text. First, the armed 
forces gained a wider autonomy: the establishment of High Military Administrative Court 
allowed the military to enjoy autonomy from review by civilian courts, declaration of 
state of exception was relaxed, trial of civilians for matters not related to military affairs 
by military courts became possible364, the defense budget was exempt from civilian 
supervision and the military’s position in the NSC was strengthened. It created “a double-
headed political system: the civilian council of ministers coexisted with the national 
security council on the executive level, and the military system of justice continued to 
operate independently alongside the civilian justice system” (Sakallioğlu 1997, 157). 
Second, the review power of the courts was limited: constitutional review restricted to 
form and small parties were no longer allowed to petition the court.365 This was a reaction 
to Constitutional Court’s decisions to review with respect to substance in previous 
constitutional amendments366. Third, the executive was strengthened: the Council of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
364 The infamous State Security Courts were established through an amendment to Article 136 of the 
Constitution (15 March 1973). Law No. 1773 of 26 June 1973 provided for details on these permanent 
courts’ organization and jurisdiction. For more on State Security Courts, see Hale 1977 and Yazıcı 1997, 
129-132). Another institutional set up, regarding the universities that would be carried on under the 1980 
Constitution was the University Supervisory Council. The body under the authority of the prime minister, 
had the power to issue disciplinary action against university members and was therefore criticized for 
undermining university autonomy. 
365 The original 1961 Constitution did not have a provision on the judicial review of constitutional 
amendments. The omission has led the Constitutional Court to assume authority and annul the 1969 
amendment that had allowed persons convicted of certain crimes but pardoned subsequently to be eligible 
for election. The amendment was introduced to open the way for politicians penalized during the 1960 coup 
to rejoin the political game.  
366 Article 147 with respect to Constitutional Court’s powers was amended. The amendment clarified that 
the Court could only review the constitutionality of constitutional amendments with respect to their form 
(and not their substance). However, because the Court interpreted that the prohibition to amend the 
republican form of state as a condition of form, until 1980 coup, in five cases reviewed under the 1971 
amendment the Constitutional Court adopted this broad interpretation of “form”(see Gözler 2008 for these 
five cases: Decisions of April 15, 1975, No. 1975/87; March 23, 1976, No. 1976/19 and October 12, 1976, 
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Ministers were granted the power to issue decree laws having the force of law and 
authorized to take decisions on taxes, and the authority of the legislature to interpellate 
was restricted. Fourth, civil liberties were curtailed: restrictions on rights and freedoms 
assumed a general and vague language and expanded, declaration of martial law was 
loosened, civil servants were banned from establishing unions, academicians were forbid 
from party membership and small political parties were excluded from financial support 
from the treasury, the principle of “lawful justice” was embraced leading the way for the 
formation of State Security Courts and custody limit was extended (Tanör 1986, 44-49, 
Tanör 2014,  412-418, Gözler 2013, 41,Yazıcı 1997, 118-133, Karatepe 2009, 228-230 
and Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 18-19).  
 The amendments failed to respond to decaying law and order. Increasing 
polarization at the mass level and fragmented party system, which repeatedly caused 
institutional deadlock were still blamed on the 1961 Constitution. The armed forces once 
again carried out a coup in 1980 that aimed at political, economic and social restructuring 
that meant drafting of a new constitution.  
2.2.9 Discussion 
 The early history of Turkish constitutionalism is a tale of constitution drafted in 
response to crisis, attempts to maintain unity and shake off imposition of reform from 
outside. The declaration of the 1856 edict was motivated by the desire to appease 
Ottoman Empire’s allies in the Crimean War, while the 1876 constitution was signed on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
No. 1976/46; January 28, 1977, No. 1977/4; September 27, 1977, No. 1977/117). Thus “in practice, the 
Constitutional Court brought in substantive review through the back door” (Roznai and Yolcu 2012, 196). 
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the brink of a war with Russia with great powers about to gather in Istanbul in response 
to multiple uprisings in the Balkans. The 1909 amendments were initiatives of the Young 
Turk movement concerned with the unity of the crumbling empire.  
 The constitutional texts of the modern Turkey also followed a similar course. The 
1921 Constitution, the first constitution of modern Turkey was a wartime text that served 
as a mechanism to unite the nation during the independence movement. The 1924 
Constitution represented the ideals of Turkey that had just overcome military occupation 
and was ready to join the family of constitutional states. The Constitution of 1961 
followed a coup d’état that was carried out by radical young officers who wanted to 
remedy the shortcomings of the previous text that had allowed for authoritarian 
tendencies of a majority party to grow. The important and constitution-altering 
amendments of 1971 and 1973 similarly followed a military intervention that was 
motivated by domestic turmoil. 
Table 2.2: Constitutions of the Turkish Republic 1924-2010 
Constitution Endurance Number of 
Amendments 
1924 36 years 5 
1961 21 years 7 
1982 Current 17 
 
 Three other commonalities deserve our attention. First, Turkey did not experience 
a popular constitution-making. While the first two constitutional documents, Tanzimat 
Fermanı of 1839 and Islahat Fermanı of 1856, were unilateral concessions by the Sultan; 
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the first constitution of Turkish political history Kanun-i Esasi was drafted by a 
commission composed of appointed ulema (legal scholars of Islam) and civil officials. In 
the history of the Turkish Republic, the first two constitutions (1921 and 1924 
Constitutions) were drafted by the parliament and in both situations because of the 
limited representative power of the assembly, in the former because of the limitations of 
war-time circumstances and in the latter because it was dominated by the Kemalist 
vanguard, failed to fully represent the diversity of the new state. The 1961 Constitution is 
significant as it was the first time a constituent assembly and a referendum was utilized. 
However, that constituent assembly which was comprised of coup organizers serving in 
the upper chamber and indirectly elected or appointed representatives that specifically 
excluded the supporters of ousted DP serving in the lower chamber also did not amount 
to a representative body. The constitution came to reflect the preferences and interests of 
state elites. Similarly, the amendments of 1971 and 1973 that were approved by a 
parliament did so under the threat of direct military take-over and the pressure of martial 
law. 
 Second, the constitutional changes were reactions to what was perceived as the 
shortcomings and failures of the previous arrangement. This is most observable in the 
relationship between the government branches. With the first experience of 
constitutionalism cut short at the discretion of the sultan and the 30 years of despotism of 
Abdulhamit following that, the Young Turk initiated amendments of 1909 strengthened 
the legislative at the expense of the powers of the sultan. The 1921 Constitution and 1924 
Constitutions placed the emphasis of an assembly based on the notion that only the 
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elected assembly was representative of the nation in which sovereignty rested. The 
experience of strong executive under the sultan and then the Union and Progressive Party 
had led to a fear of abuse of power by the executive, which led the drafters to establish a 
powerful assembly in which there were no effective checks on the legislative. However, 
the implementation of the 1924 Constitution proved to be the opposite, in which the 
executive dominated first by the CHP, during the single party rule and later by DP, 
during the multi-party period led to “domination of the executive body” rather than the 
“supremacy of parliament”. The experience of 1950s under the Democrats had proved to 
the Republicans, which dominated the Constituent Assembly of 1960-1961 that abuse of 
power by elected majorities is a threat under the existing system. The inference led the 
drafters to embrace on the one hand, the principles and mechanisms of separation of 
powers, the independence of the judiciary, constitutional guarantees for rights and 
freedoms and a system of checks and balances and on the other hand counter-majoritarian 
institutions such as National Security Council, Constitutional Court and State Planning 
Organization where important powers were delegated to the bureaucracy. The 
atmosphere of domestic strife experienced in the late 1960s and early 1970s, prompted 
the adoption of constitutional amendments in 1971 and 1973 that curtailed constitutional 
liberties, strengthened the executive and provided greater autonomy for the military.367 
 A third feature is the role of the military in the constitution-making process in 
modern Turkey. The draftings of the 1921 and 1924 constitution do not amount to an 
instance of direct military involvement in the process but the parliament (self-appointed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
367 For more on Turkish constitutions’ attempts at solving the country’s problems, see Sevinc 2012. 
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in the former and result of controlled elections in the latter) was dominated by former 
military officers. The 1961 Constitution is the epitome of a constitution drafted under the 
supervision of the armed forces. Not only was it a result of the military takeover of May 
27, 1960 but also the Constituent Assembly responsible for the drafting process exhibited 
the influence of its conspirators. As the subsequent 1982 Constitution, the 1961 
Constitution was introduced in the wake of military’s overthrow of government. 
Regarded as leaving a bad legacy, it is also important to recognize that the experience of 
coup-induced constitutional change was not unprecedented. The emergence of the second 
constitutionalist period (1908-1918) under the Young Turks also bore similar traits. 
Regarding the 1908 Revolution and the reinstituting the constitutional rule, Anderson 
(2008) explains the contrasting situation: 
“On the one hand, it was a genuine constitutional movement, arousing popular 
enthusiasm right across the different nationalities of the empire, and electing an 
impressively interethnic parliament on a wide suffrage: an authentic expression of 
the still liberal zeitgeist of the period. On the other hand, it was a military coup 
mounted by a secret organisation of junior officers and conspirators, which can 
claim to be the first in a long line of such episodes in the Third World. The two 
were not disjoined, since the architects of the coup, a small group of plotters, 
gained empire-wide support virtually overnight in the name of constitutional rule 
– their party numbering hundreds of thousands within a year. Nor, formally 
speaking, were the objectives of each distinct: in the vocabulary of the time, the 
‘liberty, equality, fraternity and justice’ proclaimed by the first were conceived as 
conditions of securing the integrity of the empire sought by the second, in 
common citizenship shared by all its peoples.” 
 
 The saga of constitutional change in instances controlled by the military started 
off with the amendments of 1909 and experienced again with the 1961 and 1982 
constitutions as well that of the 1971 and 1973 amendments. As the chapter on the 
drafting process of 1982 Constitution will demonstrate, the officers that orchestrated the 
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1980 takeover, also tightly controlled its advent. 
2.3 Lessons from Chilean and Turkish Constitution-Making 
 The previous two sections aimed to provide an account of Chile and Turkey’s 
constitutional history in order to contextualize the drafting process, to outline the content 
of the constitution and to assess the relationship between the number of constitutions 
promulgated in each country. This exercise allowed us not only to gather background 
information on each country’s constitutional history but also observe whether there is a 
path dependent relationship between the country’s constitutions. While I have discussed 
common traits observed within case study in their separate discussions, the following 
section will aim to recognize common characteristics across each case.  
 First, we observe a two-way interaction between political, economic and social 
developments and constitutional change. On the one hand, a constitution’s shortcomings 
may be a cause for a crisis while on the other hand; constitution may be utilized as a legal 
instrument to solve a crisis. We can observe examples of this reciprocal relationship in 
both cases. For example, the crisis that ultimately led to the promulgation of the 1925 
constitution in Chile stemmed from the political stalemate that failed to respond to the 
social demands. The Congress in its attempts restrict executive’s powers began to use its 
constitutional prerogatives as delaying tactics. In return, a new constitution became one 
of the demands of political parties, the President and the military. Another example from 
Chile is the 1828 constitution. A crisis over the election of the vice-president, which was 
partly because the constitution was open to interpretation on this subject, led to the 1829 
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civil war. The internal strife put an end to the liberal project of the 1828 constitution and 
in return, a new constitution of 1833 provided for a centralized and authoritative system. 
In the Turkish case, this relation is most vivid with the 1961 constitution. Lack of checks 
and balances against the majority party in the 1924 constitution was the main root of the 
problem that ultimately led to military coup of 1960. In return, a new constitution of 1961 
was put to use to oversee that there would be no repetition of such crises and established 
a number of counter-majoritarian institutions that aimed to end the supremacy of the 
Parliament and to supervise the elected officials. Another example from Turkey is the 
1909 constitutional amendments. The personal rule of Abdulhamid II demonstrated the 
weaknesses of the 1876 charter. For the Young Turks that led the revolution to restore the 
constitution, their goal of transforming the crippling empire could not be achieved 
without constitutional change. Thus, the 1909 amendments aimed to strengthen the 
legislative at the expense of the powers of the sultan who had failed to maintain the unity 
of the empire and thwart off the encroachment of outside powers. 
 Second, we observe a reactive relation between constitutional texts. Constitutional 
drafters informed by the experience of past constitutions try to remedy the perceived 
shortcomings of the previous texts. Related but different than the first point observed, this 
reactive response is observed in both Chile and Turkey. For instance, Chile’s 1925 
Constitution, which reestablished the dominance of executive and ended the 
parliamentary style of politics, was a reaction to the perceived excesses of the legislative 
power as it was practiced under the Parliamentary Republic. Similarly, Turkish 
constitution-making had been informed by the shortcomings and failures of the previous 
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arrangement. For example, the experience of strong executive under the sultan and then 
the ITC led to a fear of abuse of power by the executive; in return the 1924 Constitution 
sought to establish a powerful assembly with no effective checks on the legislative.  
 A third commonality is the lack of experience with a representative constituent 
assembly. True, both Turkey and Chile at times established constituent assemblies in 
order to draft new constitutions, but either the composition was partly elected or 
interfered with. In the Chilean case, the 1822 Constitutions had a constituent assembly, 
which partly included elected representatives but O’Higgins made sure that his supporters 
would be elected. The small commission that prepared the 1833 Constitution was not 
elected and not representative while the commission that drafted the1925 Constitution 
had representation from across political parties but appointed by the President, was seen 
as packed with Alessandria supporters. In the Turkish case, only the 1961 constitution 
was drafted by a constituent assembly, which failed to be representative- as it was 
designed by the coup-organizers. The 1921 constitution was prepared by a self-appointed 
constituent assembly but in wartime conditions, and was not the end result of a 
representative and deliberative project.  
 In both cases, we also observe precedents for military involvement in 
constitution-making, albeit in different degrees.368 As Nunn (1976, 181) explains 
“civilian control of the military has been the rule more than the exception”. An early 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
368 Chile, after the consolidation of the state in 1830 until 1973 was “under direct military control for only 
thirteen months: once after the civil war of 1891 and twice during the years between 1924 and 1931” 
(Constable and Valenzuela 1991, 20). In modern Turkey, the 1960 military takeover was a full-fledged 
coup that lasted one and half years, the 1971 coup by memorandum was a partial intervention in which the 
military-backed civilian cabinet maintained the state power. 
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example from Chile is the military revolt that aimed at preventing the promulgation of the 
federalist constitution of 1826. Other examples include the 1924 event known as saber-
rattling that forced the Congress to pass a number of legislations and precipitated the 
1925 coup that produced a new constitution which was drafted under the threat of another 
military intervention.369 The Turkish case has less subtle examples of military 
involvement in constitution-making. The 1961 Constitution was drafted following a 
military coup and a new constitution was one of the goals of the coup-makers who 
participated in the constituent assembly. The 1971 and 1973 amendments were specific 
demands of military rulers who refrained from outright intervention during this episode. 
The 1908 Young Turk Revolution was essentially a military coup by junior officers that 
wanted to reinstall the constitution and fortress it against the abuse of power by the sultan. 
The 1921 and 1924 constitutions while were not a product of direct military interference, 
were drafted by parliaments dominated by military officers. Nevertheless, within their 
own region, both countries are regarded as exceptional cases of constitutional rule. 
Comparatively, that might be the case but nevertheless we observe interruptions to 
constitutional rule. In the Chilean case, the country did experience two brief interruptions 
in 1924 and 1932, not including the 1829 and 1891 civil wars. All in all between 1830 
and 1973, “Chile experienced only thirteen months of unconstitutional rule under some 
form of junta, and only four months under a junta dominated exclusively by the military” 
(Valenzuela 1999, 192). Turkish experience with constitution-making begins late 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
369 Nunn (1976, 191) acknowledges that the military pressure led to the Constitution of 1925 but adds that 
military was excluded from politics.  
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compared to Chile and does include more significant interruptions such as the period 
between 1876 and 1908 when the sultan refused to abide by the constitution.  
 Another trait we observe is with respect to amendments. The two main 
constitutions of both countries before the enactment of authoritarian constitutions (the 
1833 and 1925 Constitutions for Chile and the 1924 and 1961 Constitutions for Turkey) 
were amended extensively (Table 2.1 and Table 2.2). While it may not be interesting that 
constitutional amendments were introduced to the constitution, what strikes out in these 
two cases is that amendments were not proposed in order to transition from one type of 
regime to another. In the Chilean case, the 1833 constitution, which was designed for a 
central presidential system came to accommodate a parliamentary style government 
without actually going through an amendment-making process. In the Turkish case, the 
1924 Constitution, which did not have any provisions that would prepare the legal basis 
for an authoritarian one-party regime was utilized for the one-party rule and the transition 
to multi-party system did not necessitate a constitutional revision that would facilitate this 
move.    
 These observations across two cases are informative for the chapters on 
authoritarian constitution-making in Chile and Turkey and amendment-making process 
for the two countries. Keeping in mind that constitutions have an “afterlife” and 
constitutional history of a country matters, examining the subsequent constitutions of 
Chile and Turkey in light of the predecessor documents will guide us about the tradition 
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of constitution-making process and features of past constitutions and how they relate to 
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Chapter 3: Breakdown of Democracy- Polarization, Deadlock and Chaos 
 The breakdown of democracy in Chile and Turkey that ultimately gave way to 
political, economic and social transformation under the guidance of a new constitutional 
framework is a subject of its own. Besides the fact that the conclusion on what led to the 
1973 coup in Chile and 1980 coup in Turkey has been inconclusive, it is also beyond the 
scope of this study. Thus, I will briefly comment on the factors that contributed to 
increasing polarization and confrontation; the social and economic factors and 
concentrate on the constitutional background that produced an institutional deadlock 
before moving on to the making of authoritarian constitutions. 
3.1 Polarization of the political party system 
 In many respects, the Chilean political party system was more diverse in terms of 
ideological disposition compared to the Turkish system, which remained under one-party 
rule until 1946. Despite this important difference, we do observe that the inability or 
unwillingness of political parties to cooperate plays an important role in the breakdown 
of democracy as it leads to further polarization and institutional deadlock. 
3.1.1 Chile’s Political Party System 
 The Chilean political system, which was grounded on the 1925 constitution, 
began to crack once incentives that had long generated negotiation and compromise were 
lost. A number of changes helped eliminate incentives for cross party bargaining. The 
1958 elections marked the beginning of mass-politics in Chile and the division of the 
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political space into the three alternatives of left, center and right (Sigmund 1977, 23).370 
A new political party, the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC), Christian Democratic 
Party, composed of progressive and young Catholics371, which had split from the 
Conservative Party (PCon), began to vigorously take over the political center that had 
been previously dominated by the Radical Party (PR).372 The Radicals had shown a 
willingness to engage in pre- and post-alliances with other parties from either side of the 
political spectrum.373 However, that flexibility became less likely with time. Starting with 
the 1952 presidential elections, the left became more radicalized, especially after the 
Cuban Revolution; it began to put its own working-class candidates (Scully 1992, 113). 
The right assumed on an “entrenched and defensive” attitude, and the Chilean political 
party system grew increasingly rigid (Scully 1992, 112).374  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
370 The 1952 presidential elections had seen the “momentary triumph of antiparty politics” with the election 
of Carlos Ibáñez (Scully 1992, 134), 
371 Mobilization of the electorate in the 1950s coincided with the electoral growth of Christian Democrats. 
372 The right, specifically the Conservative Party was the main competitor of the Christian Democrats, not 
the Radical Party. The PDC’s ideology was grounded on Catholic belief with a concern for the issues 
plaguing the lower class.  They were influenced by the Catholic social doctrine and had embraced the 
economic position of CEPAL; assuming a “Christian inspired vision for resolving the sharpened social 
conflicts in Chilean society” (Scully 1992, 148). 
373 This strategy had proven to be successful and the Radical Party was strong between 1932 and 1952 
(Scully 1992, 112). However, the party began to deteriorate and get discredited with corruption and 
clientalism and as a result lost its appeal by being unable to accommodate the demands of the expanding 
electorate. The frustration with the Radical Party led to “a generalized crisis of party politics in Chile” 
(Scully 1992, 113), which in return helped the rise of Carlos Ibáñez, an Army general from the 1930s in the 
1952 elections. 
374 After the 1950s, the right began to lose their electoral strength. Since the independence, the right’s 
stronghold was the rural vote since the landed oligarchy was able to provide the right parties with a stable 
constituency, from the inquilinos. However, the breakdown of their alliance with the Catholic Church that, 
by then had acquired a more socially conscious attitude and the growing migration, partly the result of 
industrialization and partly the result of agricultural stagnation meant that the traditional voters of the right 
joined the ranks of urban sector. In the countryside, improved roads and systems of communication and 
growing availability of education increased social activation. With the repeal of the ban on Communist 
Party (Ley n.º 8987, de Defensa Permanente de la Democracia) in 1958, the party began to organize in the 
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 The formation of the Christian Democratic Party carved a new political space for 
voters, especially among the peasants, women and the urban poor (Scully 1992, 108). In 
this atmosphere, the “new and ideological center”, dominated by the enthusiastic 
Christian Democrats, presented itself as “less willing to play the game of political give-
and-take” (Valenzuela 1999, 216). Unless, forced to engage in a coalition with other 
parties (for instance, when they collaborated with the right on the issue of copper, and 
with the left on agrarian reform), they most importantly wished to govern as a single 
party (Valenzuela 1999, 218).375 The PDC, unable to break the tripatriate deadlock of 
Chilean politics only helped to further solidify it. 
 A number of institutional changes also inadvertently contributed to the 
disappearance of system of the compromise and accommodation. Most important among 
these institutional reforms were the 1958 electoral reforms, which put an end to joint 
electoral list among parties and introduced measures to implement the secret ballot. The 
joint party lists had been instrumental in encouraging alliances between various parties to 
the extent that it blurred the lines of divergence between opposing positions (Scully 1992, 
134). Also, the 1958 electoral reforms made it compulsory to submit any electoral pacts 
at the national level to party leaders and to announce them at least 120 days before the 
elections and completely banned electoral pacts at the province level (Scully 1992, 134). 
These reforms enacted right before Carlos Ibáñez left office, had the “unintended effect 
of eliminating an important tool for cross-party bargaining, thereby reinforcing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
countryside as well (Scully 1992, 135). The electoral reforms, mentioned above also curtailed their ability 
to influence the vote in the countryside. 
375 The strategy of PDC during this period is known as camino propio. 
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tendencies toward polarization already present with the party system” (Scully 1992, 
134).376 Just as crucial was the introduction of government-printed single ballots (the 
system known as Australian ballot, known in Chile as cédula única) intended for use in 
the elections. These guaranteed the secrecy of the vote 377. Until then, individual political 
parties were free to use their separate cedulas –ballots.378 This change had the effect of 
reducing fraud and vote buying (cohecho).379 
 As a result of the 1959 Budget Law, the Congress’ responsibility over budget was 
transferred to the executive and the incentive for parties to interact and bargain during 
resource allocation issues was gone. 380 Additionally, the constitutional reforms of 1970 
provided further powers to the president.381 The center and right had enacted these 
reforms with the belief that they would be the ones occupying the presidential seat while 
the Congress could have strong left presence. The already strengthened executive branch 
now possessed decree power, which could provide Salvador Allende more flexibility in 
pursuing the Unidad Popular’s project of achieving transition to socialism. Congress was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
376 Baland and Robinson (2012, 605) argue that the introduction of a single ballot (cedula unica) was “most 
likely an attempt to destabilize the status quo” but nevertheless most parties supported it. 
377 Previously suffrage was extended to women in 1952. Another electoral reform of 1962 provided for 
mandatory voter registration (Scully 1992, 107). This reform simplified the registration process thusly 
increasing the number of registered voters (Scully 1992, 142). The 1970 constitutional amendment reduced 
the voting age to 18 and abolished the literacy requirement. 
378 Before the 1958 reforms each voter had to request the ballot for the party of their choice  in order to cast 
their vote. In practice, this meant that it was possible; to know to which party that person was going to vote 
for beforehand. This was especially problematic in the countryside where the inquilinos were simply 
provided with the ballot of the party that their employer preferred and taken to the polling stations (Baland 
and Robinson 2012, 605). 
379 The reforms also increased the penalties for voting fraud and bribery (Loveman 2001, 222). 
380 In 1959, a new budget law was introduced and a Budget Bureau was established. 
381 The 1970 Amendments expanded the legislative powers of the president.  
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also prohibited from engaging in certain issues such as social security and pensions, 
leaving only little room where the legislators could engage in bargaining.  
 Valenzuela (1994: 131) argues that when the Congress, which had been the main 
forum of accommodation, got sidelined, Chile’s polarized party system grew even more 
hostile. Political leaders’ unwillingness to make political alliances with rival political 
parties sharpened the level of confrontation (Scully 1995: 128). While both the Christian 
Democrats and the left (FRAP; Frente de Acción Popular –the coalition of left-wing 
parties in the 1958 and 1964 presidential elections and UP; Unidad Popular- the coalition 
of left-wing parties in the 1970 presidential elections) shared very similar economic 
visions, especially in regards to the necessity of expanding the role of the state in the 
economy, they were not able to work together. Three factors help explain the growing 
competition between Chile’s left and center. Both wished to attract the votes of organized 
workers, thusly competing at the union level to have influence over them. The PDC’s 
inherent affinity towards the Catholic Church impaired the chances of an alliance with 
Marxist parties. Also significant was the role of the United States in fueling the rivalry.382 
The United States’ ideological opposition to Marxism in Latin America shaped its 
preference towards the Christian Democrats, channeling funds to their campaign in the 
1964 presidential elections (Faúndez 2007, 100-101).383 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
382 During a visit to Chile, Fidel Castro’s sister berated the evils of communism, which only helped to fuel 
fears against a Marxist candidate. 
383 For more on U.S. covert activities in Chile, see Kornbluh 2003. 
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 Thus, even before the election of Salvador Allende and prior to UP’s initial steps 
towards policy implementation, the political context was susceptible to polarization as a 
result of the uncompromisingly rigid party system. During the 1964 presidential 
elections, the right recognized that Frei was the only viable alternative against the 
presidency of Allende, and pledged its support to the Christian Democrat candidate; the 
agrarian reform, peasant unionization, increased property taxes, and changes introduced 
to property rights enacted by the PCD upset the right, prompting them to refuse to agree 
on a pre-election candidate in the 1970 elections (Scully 1992, 163).384 In 1970, the 
fourth-time presidential candidate Allende finally won the elections. He had received the 
plurality of the votes by a narrow margin.385 According to the constitution, in the event 
that no candidate received an absolute majority, the Congress was entrusted with the duty 
to choose the president from the two highest vote getters. Despite the internal and 
external pressures, the Congress, as it has been the political convention, upheld the 
tradition of confirming the presidency of the candidate with the highest votes, or Allende. 
 However, when Allende assumed the presidency, the coalition had control over 
less than 40 percent of the legislature. Thus, to implement the policies that would carry 
Chile to socialism, UP was forced to negotiate with an unwilling Congress. The inability 
and/or unwillingness of political parties to negotiate, polarized the fragmented political 
system and increased the tension between the different forces of society. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
384 The right saw the agrarian reform “as the death of all forms of private property (rather than the death of 
the latifundio)” and decided to join forces (Scully 1992, 160). The Conservative and Liberal parties formed 
a new party, namely the National Party in 1966. 
385 Allende had won approximately 30,000 more votes than the second-placer Jorge Alessandri, the 
candidate representing the right (Oppenheim 2007, 34). 
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3.1.2 Turkey’s Political Party System 
 Before the 1960 coup and the constitution of 1961, “party competition took place 
within a narrowly defined political space that excluded ideological politics and explicitly 
religious or ethnic political parties” (Sayari 2002, 10). The electoral system helped 
augment the electoral share of the winning party, giving the Democratic Party (DP) a 
larger representative proportion in the parliament and essentially creating a two-party 
system with the CHP. Because the DP won in three consecutive elections (1950, 1954 
and 1957), there was “no turnover in government”. Hence the minority party CHP 
remained on the sideline and DP maintained a confrontational attitude (Sayari 2002, 12). 
Despite the fact that CHP and DP were close to the center of the party spectrum, there 
was growing polarization between the two because there were “differences over the 
practice of democracy in a country that had a relatively long history of parties but a short 
one of democratic politics” (Sayari 2002, 12).  
 The 1960 coup had three effects. First, the DP was closed down with its three 
most prominent members, including the former Prime Minister Adnan Menderes 
executed. Several parties of the right began to compete for the DP’s center-right votes. 
While Süleyman Demirel’s Adalet Partisi (AP) proved most successful in attracting DP 
votes, the electoral right was split between a number of political parties.386 Second, the 
constitution recognized, for the first time, political parties as necessary and indispensable 
entities of democratic politics. Although the constitution granted the newly established 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
386 The AP was able to achieve victory in the 1965 and 1969 elections assuming power alone. However, the 
fragmentation of the AP vote starting in 1973 gave splinter parties weight in the parliament. 
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Constitutional Court the authority to review on the constitutionality of political parties, 
the legal and constitutional changes lifted restrictions on the formation of ideological, 
sectarian and religious parties. Third, the Turkish electoral system switched from 
plurality to proportional representation system. As was the case with Chile, when Turkey 
switched from a cumulative voting system to proportional representation, following the 
adoption of the 1925 Constitution, the country experienced the proliferation of political 
parties. In fact, both countries following the introduction of new constitutions (1925 in 
Chile and 1961 in Turkey) adopted the D’Hondt version of proportional representation. A 
series of weak coalition governments “dependent on the fickle loyalties of the minority 
parties” (Hale 1994, 215) were a result of an electorate split with no party gaining 
absolute majority. The new system made it easier for smaller parties to gain 
representation in the parliament and to play a role in the formation and dissolution of 
coalition governments (Sayari 2002, 12). As a result, the period between 1973 and 1980 
witnessed weak coalition governments and a minority government (1979-1980).     
 The political atmosphere that accompanied the Constitution of 1961 allowed 
for the emergence of new parties, including the Turkish Workers Party (TİP) on the left 
of the political spectrum, the neo-fascist Nationalist Action Party (MHP), and the Islamist 
National Order Party (MNP) on the right side of the political spectrum and sectarian 
(Alevi) Unity Party (BP) as an ethnic-based party.387 These new additions to the Turkish 
political party system facilitated the fragmentation and ideological polarization of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
387 Turkish Workers Party refers to Türkiye İşçi Partisi (TİP) Nationalist Action Party to Milliyetçi Hareket 
Partisi (MHP), National Order Party to Milli Nizam Partisi (MNP) and Unity Parti refers to Birlik Partisi 
(BP). 
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system. The newcomer Workers Party was banned in 1971. The party was not necessarily 
a revolutionary or radical party. One of its accomplishments was to introduce an 
alternative discourse that went beyond the issue of nationalism and formulate Turkey’s 
problems within the framework of class struggle. While its electoral strength was not 
remarkable, it helped change the political rhetoric and politicized especially the young 
segments of the Turkish society (Ahmad 1993, 157). With its dissolution, the Turkish 
political scene was left with a “deep ideological vacuum” (Ahmad 1993, 157). In the late 
1960s and early 1970s, the CHP was going through a transformation of its own led by its 
secretary general Bülent Ecevit. The party had embraced a left of center stance (ortanın 
solu), a position that was not welcomed by its conservative members who in turn decided 
to leave the CHP and form a new party.388 When CHP’s chairman and former president 
İsmet İnönü gave his support to the high command during the 1971 military intervention, 
Ecevit who was critical of İnönü resigned, only a year later to succeed him as the new 
chairman of CHP. The Turkish Republic’s oldest political party embarked upon a new 
social democratic road. It led to “a major shift in Turkey’s political discourse because one 
of the principal parties had openly adopted an ideological position which had hitherto 
been outside the political consensus” (Ahmad 1993, 157).  The Ecevit-led CHP remained, 
as the only representative of the left in parliament, in contrast to a number of right-wing 
political parties.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
388 The breakaway party was founded by Turhan Feyzioğlu and joined by fellow form CHP MPs. Its initial 
name in 1967 was Reliance Party but in 1971 it was changed to Republican Reliance Party (Cumhuriyetçi 
Güven Partisi). 
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 Among the right-wing newcomers was an Islamic political party National 
Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi- MNP), headed by Necmettin Erbakan. This new 
political party represented an overtly anti-secular political movement Milli Görüş 
(National View) and its political party. Although electoral support for it remained small 
because it challenged the secular basis of Turkey, its discourse further polarized the 
country. The Constitutional Court, which was envisioned by the drafters of the 1961 
Constitution as another institutional mechanism to ensure the observance of democratic 
order and republican principles, in order to prevent a recurrence of the political crises 
prior to the 1960 coup, was empowered to review the constitutionality of political parties. 
This power was first exercised on MNP that was closed down on 20 May 1971.389 
However it was soon replaced with the National Salvation Party (Millî Selâmet Partisi- 
MSP).390 
 An example of the frail coalition governments that plagues Turkish politics during 
this period was the parliament that resulted from the 1973 election- divided among CHP 
(33%), AP (30%) and smaller parties (37%). Among these smaller parties was the NSP, 
which with its image that combined Islam with anti-imperialism, helped secure the third-
most votes in the 1973 elections.391 An uneasy coalition between CHP, a staunchly 
secular political party and the Islamic-based NSP, was able to survive for a little over a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
389 See Shambayati and Kirdiş (2009) and Koğacıoglu 2004 for more on party closures. 
390 The party founded in 1972, had gained 11.8% of the votes in the 1973 elections. 
391 For instance, Erbakan criticized the West, capitalism, the dependence on foreign capital and called for 
return to Islamic values including interest-free banking and more close relations with fellow Muslim 
countries. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  183	   	  
year (Hale 1994, 216).392 The same Constitutional Court that closed down National Order 
Party did not act on its successor National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi- MSP) 
which leads Shambayati and Kirdiş (2009, 776) to conclude that by 1973 “the state either 
did not view Islamism as a threat or, more likely, viewed it as a useful ally in combating 
the growing leftist movements”.393 
 As a junior partner of the uneasy coalition, Erbakan was not thrilled with Ecevit’s 
growing popularity. The coup in Cyprus and a call for the island’s unification with 
Greece further complicated the matters. The Turkish government decried that an 
international agreement, which provided for Cyprus’ independence and the rights for its 
Turkish minority had been violated and as a guarantor of the agreement, along with 
Greece and Great Britain- who were unwilling to act, it held the right to intervene 
unilaterally. Turkish troops landed on the island and acquired 40% of the land without 
first negotiating a ceasefire.394 Ecevit, hoping to capitalize on his hero status over the 
Cyprus intervention called for new elections and resigned, committing a “political 
blunder of historic magnitude” (Ahmad 1993, 165). The right-wing parties refused to 
accept early elections. Consequently, the country had no government for 241 days. After 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
392 Ahmad (1993, 161) argues that despite their differences the parties did share certain common goals: 
“The CHP and the MSP had much in common in so far as their programmes were concerned. Both parties 
claimed to believe in a democracy that guaranteed fundamental rights and freedoms, a mixed economy, and 
economic development with social justice. Both were committed to protecting small enterprise, the state 
control of major national resources such as minerals and oil, and the creation of heavy industry. Both were 
opposed to ‘big capital’ and its growing hegemony over the economy and society”. 
393 It was eventually closed down after the 1982 coup. 
394 The Cyprus operation also had a profound impact for the armed forces. It enhanced the military’s 
prestige, empowering it with an actual task and assisted in forging cordial relations with the Ecevit 
government (Hale 1994, 218).   
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a short-lived non-partisan government, Demirel managed to form a coalition known as 
“the Nationalist Front” with three other right-wing parties; National Action Party’s 
(MHP) leader Alparslan Türkeş served as a deputy prime minister. The Islamists and the 
nationalists were able to capitalize on the fragmented situation: by serving in the 
government395, by using it to provide patronage for their supporters, by capturing key 
posts in different segments of the bureaucracy, and by legitimizing their rhetoric. Once 
again, the general elections of 1977 resulted with an electoral division. While the 
Republican Party (CHP) was able to capture 41.4 % of the votes, it wasn’t enough 
majority.396 Ecevit’s decision to set up a minority government backfired as it did not earn 
a vote of confidence from the parliament. With Ecevit and Demirel, once again refusing 
to unite in order to form one grand coalition, the latter once again solicited the small 
right-wing parties of the MSP and MHP to form a short-lived government. Poor showings 
in the local elections, growing political violence all around the country, and fears that the 
party was moving closer to the extreme-right led to defection from the party and failure 
to reach a vote of confidence from the parliament. Ecevit forced the formation of a 
government with independents, all ex-Justice Party (AP) members and other 
conservatives (Ahmad 1993, 170). The ideological differences between the CHP and AP 
as well the personal competition between the party leaders, Demirel and Ecevit polarized 
the political party system (Özbudun 1990, 194 and Birand 1987, 15).397 While a coalition 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
395 The government was also known as the ‘Rightist Front against the Left’ (Ahmad 1993, 165). 
396 In order to get a majority, out of the 550-member parliament a party needs to capture 226 votes. The 
CHP was short by 23.  
397 Birand (1987, 16) finds it “tempting to view Turkish politics of the 1970s as a gladiatorial contest 
between two evenly matched and equally formidable opponents”, referring to Ecevit and Demirel. 
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between these two political parties would have provided for a stable government, each 
were hoping that they could increase their votes and come to power as a single party in 
the following elections, instead chose to rely on fringe parties (Zürcher 2004, 262-263). 
The unwillingness of Demirel and Ecevit to form a coalition government, which seemed 
like the ideal solution to Turkey’s multiple problems, also troubled the armed forces. The 
top-leader of the impending coup sent out a letter of conciliation to party leaders and the 
president, signed by the commanders of four branches of armed forces, pleading for a 
joint cabinet. The coup ensued nine months later, on September 12 1980 (Yazıcı 1997, 
147).398 
 The constitutional and electoral structure of Chile and Turkey led to a polarized 
political party system. While the Chilean presidential system that had previously 
promoted political alliances and cross-party bargaining was replaced with a fierce 
competition between the center and the left, the Turkish parliamentary system that had 
led to majority governments in previous decades was replaced with short-lasting coalition 
governments. In both cases, we observe that there was a three-way electoral split. In the 
Chilean case, this was between the ideologically different right, left and center, while in 
the Turkish case this was between two parties close to center but coming from the left 
and right side of the political spectrum, as well as a group of smaller parties that are 
ideologically diverse but vital for the coalition-making process. In both cases, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
398 The Turkish armed forces had gathered on December 21, 1970 to discuss whether a military takeover 
was necessary and if so, under what conditions that would take place. The decision, which ensued from that 
meeting, was to give political leaders another chance and the letter was sent out as a warning. The written 
communication is quoted in Yazıcı 1997 (148-149) and the sequence of events is detailed in Birand 1987 
(93-115). 
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ideological polarization was coupled by the unwillingness of political parties to cooperate 
based on the ambition and wishful calculation that they would govern alone in the future. 
3.2 Institutional Deadlock 
 The political parties’ inability/unwillingness to cooperate, fragmentation of the 
political party system and increasing polarization gave rise to institutional deadlock in 
both countries. While in Chile, the impasse was over a number of constitutional 
amendment initiatives; in Turkey it manifested itself over the election of a new president 
by the parliament.  
3.2.1 Chile: Institutional Deadlock over the Amendment Proposals 
 A major component of the Allende campaign was to create a socialized sector of 
the economy (Oppenheim 2007, 36). 399  The program called for a three-way division of 
property areas; social, mixed and private (área de propiedad social (APS), área de 
propiedad mixta (APM) and área de propiedad privada (APP)). The goal was to change 
the property relations by expanding the role of the state in the economy and breaking the 
power of the small economic elite so that it could lay the foundations for a peaceful 
transition to socialism. It became the most controversial initiatives of the Allende 
government, dragging the country into a constitutional crisis that helped precipitate the 
coup by increasing the tension at the institutional and mass level. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
399 The other goals included the further implementation of the 1967 agrarian reform, the establishment of a 
single house legislature, a national unified educational system and the institution of social welfare programs. 
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 After waiting a year, the PDC proposed an amendment regarding the organization 
of the economy and submitted it to the Senate on October 14, 1971 (Falcoff 1991, 
145).400 Known as the “Three Areas Amendment”, it defined the division of the 
economy. 401 The first would consist of enterprises that the government could socialize 
and directly control (social sector-APS). The second would contain enterprises partly 
owned by the state and partly owned by private firms (mixed sector- APM). The third 
would consist of enterprises that remain in private hands (private sector-APP). This 
division was in line with the UP program except for an additional fourth area introduced 
by the PDC. Based on the Yugoslav model of worker-run cooperatives, the PDC proposal 
called for self-managed workers’ enterprises, which the UP considered problematic since 
they believed it would turn workers into petit-bourgeois (Oppenheim 2007, 58, note 21).  
 The PDC proposal’s main goal was to establish the limits of government’s 
nationalization policy and to limit the scope and pace of nationalization. Thus, it required 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
400 For the Allende government, there were a number of questions regarding both the substance and the 
procedure of establishing a socialized sector of the economy. In terms of substance, it was not clear which 
industries would be socialized and what kind of control workers would have over the operation of these 
industries (Oppenheim 2007, 52). As for the procedural matter, the Allende government needed to decide 
whether it would choose the legislative route or rely on the executive decrees, buy the private industries 
directly from their owners or buy the majority of the stock of public corporations (Oppenheim 2007, 44).  If 
it were to choose the legislative route to pass a constitutional amendment, then the question was whether 
this would be a general provision that would specify the criteria and procedure of nationalization (like it 
was done with the 1967 amendment that outlined the expropriation for agricultural land) or it would be a 
specific provision targeting a specific industry (such as was the case with the amendment nationalizing the 
copper). Both options had their drawbacks. While it would be very difficult to agree with the opposition on 
a general provision for the socialization of the economy, it would be extremely time-consuming to pass a 
constitutional amendment for every industry to be socialized (Oppenheim 2007, 52). Thus during its first 
year, the Allende government delayed the introduction of a proposal on establishing a socialized sector of 
the economy. Another problem was the lack of agreement with the UP coalition. In November 1970, 
Allende tried to get the UP agree on a proposal for an APS constitutional amendment however the Political 
Committee failed to come to an agreement (Oppenheim 2007, 52). Even in its early days, the UP coalition 
was divided between moderates and radicals (Oppenheim 2007, 56). 
401 The Christian Democrat senators Renán Fuentealba and Juan Hamilton introduced it. As such, it was 
also known as Hamilton-Fuentealba bill, named after its authors. 
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separate legislation for the expropriation of each and every enterprise. In order to transfer 
industries from the private to the state or mixed sector, that decision would first need to 
get the ratification from Congress.  The proposal declared all expropriations performed 
without congressional approval after the date that the bill was introduced to the Congress 
(October 14, 1971) illegal; this required the government to return assets to private owners 
(Falcoff 1991, 145).402 The PDC proposal also included the repeal of the Decree Law 
520403, a loophole (resquicios legales) that the Allende government had relied on to avoid 
a specific and new legislation for its socialized sector program and to allow the 
government to temporarily takeover private firms, and establish state control permanently 
when required.404 The circumvention of the legislative route and perversion of the decree 
law had raised much discontent from the opposition and had been the primary source of 
conflict between the government and the comptroller-general.405 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
402 The PDC proposal used the term “estatificar” to indicate that it was the state, not the nation that was 
taking control of industries (Sigmund 1977, 159). 
403 The Decree Law 520, adopted during the short-lived Socialist Republic of 1932 and later validated in 
1952 and 1966 allowed the government to temporarily take control in the event of disruption of production 
or distribution as a result of owner sabotage or black marketing or labor disputes (Oppenheim 2007, 54) 
However, the industry requisitioned temporarily must be producing or distributing articles of basic 
necessity (Sigmund 1977, 133). Those industries temporarily taken over the government did not constitute 
to be socialized, the decree law only allowed the government to administer it while the industry faced 
difficulties.  If the government wished to expropriate it, it had to offer full payment in cash and get the 
approval of its board of legal advisors (Sigmund 1977, 133). A similar tactic was also used to take control 
over rural estates. According to Article 171, campesinos’ illegal occupation of farms or illegal strikes 
enabled the president to authorize a government official (interventor) to intervene in order to resume 
operation (Loveman 2001, 251). The disruption in the production tended to force owners to sell their farms. 
404 In some cases, the government was forced to intervene when workers did spontaneous seizures of 
factories (tomas). 
405 The comptroller-general disagreed with Allende’s use of decrees of requisition and maintained that the 
decree did not authorize expropriations. Allende government chose to use decree of insistence to override 
the comptroller general’s decisions. See Sigmund 1977, 158-159 on Decree Law 520. 
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 From the perspective of the Allende government, the law aimed to relegate the 
expropriation mechanism under the control of the Congress. Fearing that it would curtail 
the powers of the executive, the president hastily sent his own version of the amendment 
to the Congress a few days after the Christian Democrats submitted it to the Senate on 
October 19.406 The opposition majority in the Congress rejected the bill in January 1972. 
The UP government’s efforts to appease the Christian Democrats failed and those small 
and medium sized business owners who felt threatened by the program did not change 
their perspective.407 Meanwhile, the Three Areas Amendment- the PDC proposal - 
swiftly moved through the legislature, gaining Senate approval on November 18 and 
Chamber of Deputies on December 21, 1971. As dictated by the constitutional 
amendment mechanism, the proposal was sent off to to President Allende for corrections 
and modifications in early 1972. Issuing 33 objections, he vetoed it.408 The senate 
overruled the president’s veto by a simple majority on July 7. The event sparked a 
constitutional crisis that further ratcheted up tensions between the opposition and the 
government.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
406 Luis Corvalán, the Communist Party leader and senator, drafted the UP proposal. It called for the 
nationalization of 150 industries and did not specify plans for the already requisitioned industries. 
407 The government offered to reduce the number of enterprises up for nationalization to 90 in order. 
However, in subsequent events Allende uttered a different number on the issue of industries to be 
nationalized (Falcoff 1991,147). See Table 5.6 (Falcoff 1991, 148) for a comparison of UP’s constantly 
changing definition and limitation of APS, which was “brought about by the visible manifestation of 
internal coalition pressures, the force of events themselves [tomas etc.], and the shifting evaluations of his 
[the president’s] advisors as to what constituted the most opportune mix of tactical and economic 
consdirations” (Falcoff 1991, 149). 
408 From the perspective of the executive, the PDC proposal that would have only allowed legislatively 
authorized expropriations, threatened to prevent the socialization process and also reverse steps already 
taken (Oppenheim 2007, 58). 
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 The problem stemmed from a lack of clear stipulation on the necessary majority 
to override the presidential veto. The 1970 reforms regarding the process of constitutional 
amendment had failed to state whether a simple majority or a two-thirds majority was 
required. The omission led both sides to insist on their own interpretations as it served 
their purpose. While the government, not wanting the approval of the PDC version of 
constitutional amendments insisted that just as it was the case for ordinary legislation, a 
two-thirds majority was necessary; the opposition, lacking an absolute majority, 
maintained that a simple majority was sufficient, and that if the president still insisted o 
vetoing it, could take the plebiscite recourse that the 1970 amendment provided. While 
Allende refused to take the risky plebiscite option, he insisted that the government was 
ready to take the matter to the Constitutional Tribunal409 if the Congress disagreed on the 
required majority. Allende believed that the court would vote in-line with the 
government’s position, while the Christian Democrats maintained that the court lacked 
the authority to interpret amendments to the constitution (Cohen 1994, 111). 
 The constitutional crisis threatened to take the nation into its fatal end. The 
disagreement over the rules of the game meant that in order to solve the impasse, the 
moderates on each side of the debate would have to agree on a compromise on the 
substance of the amendment (Cohen 1994, 111). While the Christian Democrats feared 
that the radicals within UP ranks could resort to illegal means to accomplish their goals, 
the Allende government did not want to fall short of its aims of expanding the state’s role 
in the economy. An unsuccessful attempt to reach a compromise through two rounds of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
409 The Constitutional Tribunal was also established with the 1970 reforms. 
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talks between the PDC and the UP in March and June 1972, further indicated the level of 
polarization. After the failure of the first round of talks, the conflict over the amendment 
led to confrontations in the streets. In 1972, the inability to reach a compromise led to 
further radicalization, with moderates on each side becoming further isolated (Cohen 
1994, 112). 410  The disagreement over the division of the economy and the limitations of 
the nationalization program were not limited to differences between the government and 
the opposition. The efforts fell apart partly because Unidad Popular could not maintain an 
internal cohesion between the ideologically different members of the coalition (Medina 
2011, 84-85). 411 
 As a desperate attempt to contain the crisis, Allende invited members of the 
military, including the Army Commander-in-chief Carlos Prats to join his cabinet in 
November 1972. 412 The presence of military members in the cabinet was effective in 
putting an end to the truckers’ strike (October strikes, 1972) and in providing a sense of 
confidence for the upcoming congressional elections in March 1973 (Cohen 1998, 115). 
However, the fact that the armed forces were needed and called in as arbiters in the 
country’s political conflicts also demonstrated the weakness of the government and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
410 The failure of the negotiations between the government and the opposition, increased the level of 
polarization. In order to enhance their strength against the UP, the Christian Democrats decided to establish 
an electoral alliance with the National Party, known as the Democratic Confederation (CODE) for the 
March 1973 congressional elections (Oppenheim 2007, 62). Despite this alliance, the government received 
44% of the votes and the opposition failed to receive the two-thirds of the congressional seats to impeach 
the president. 
411 In order to discuss UP’s approach, the members of the coalition met three times in El Arrayán in 
February 1972.  
412 Prats became the minister of interior, a navy officer became the minister of public works and a member 
of the air force became the minister of mines. Prats and others agreed to join the cabinet on the condition 
that Allende would seek an agreement with the Christian Democrats or call a plebiscite (Falcoff 1991, 153). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  192	   	  
involvement of the military in daily political affairs also caused polarization within the 
military (Oppenheim 2007, 65). 
 After long deliberations and negotiations, the Chamber of Deputies ratified the 
Senate’s decision to override the presidential vetoes of the constitutional amendment on 
April 25, 1973. Allende, rather than taking recourse to people, sought a ruling by the 
Constitutional Tribunal regarding the required majority for a constitutional amendment to 
override the presidential veto. 413 The decision of the Constitutional Tribunal to declare 
itself incompetent to rule on the issue of constitutional amendment on May 30, further 
increased the tensions.414 It could be interpreted as the court refusing to take part in a 
crisis that had galvanized the masses or it opting to support the position of the opposition, 
which had also argued that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction on this matter. The 
polarization at the institutional level had reached a tipping point. The opposition initiated 
the steps to impeach four members of the president’s cabinet and eight UP provincial 
intendants with right wing politicians began to calling for military intervention (Cohen 
1994, 116). The attempted coup of June 29 (tancazo) manifested the growing agitation 
within the military. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
413 Even though, the Congressional spokesman had stated that the plebiscite was Allende’s only option, the 
president maintained that he planned to promulgate parts of the proposal where there had been no 
congressional-executive disagreement and ask for a court ruling on the rest of the matter (Sigmund 1977, 
207). However the comptroller-general overruled Allende’s attempt. 
414 The court based its decision on Article 78(b), letter (a) which mentioned ordinary legislation, 
international treaties and plebiscites and omitted to mention constitutional amendments on the matter of 
areas where the court was empowered to resolve constitutional issues (Falcoff 1991, 146). Only one of the 
five members of the court agreed with Allende’s position that by referring to “law”, the Constitution also 
authorized the court to issue on the constitutionality of amendments (Sigmund 1977, 207). 
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Other Polarizing Amendment Initiatives 
 Other attempts by the UP government to carry out its program of sweeping 
economic, political and social reforms only helped to polarize the situation further. One 
was the constitutional amendment for the expropriation of International Telephone and 
Telecommunications Company’s (ITT)415 holdings in the Chilean telephone company 
submitted in May 1972.  Another was a proposal for a constitutional amendment that 
would establish a unicameral legislature, which was submitted on November 10, 1971. 
According to the draft constitutional amendment that the UP sent out to Congress, the 
unicameral legislature would be elected concurrently with the president for six years 
beginning in 1976. The legislators, like the president would have to wait a term to be 
reelected for a second and last time. The president would be granted the authority to 
dissolve the Congress once during his tenure. The legislators would be precluded from 
having paying jobs during their term. The draft also included a measure to subordinate 
the Supreme Court by limiting the terms of the members of the court to those of the 
president. In line with the election promises, the draft also included guarantees of housing, 
social welfare, healthcare, and employment (Sigmund 1977, 161-162). Considering that 
the modifications would have weakened the Congress, it was unlikely it would adopt it. 
And as expected, the draft was vehemently opposed. Sigmund (1977, 162) interprets it as 
Allende’s attempt to introduce his campaign proposals for the upcoming 1973 
congressional elections. Therefore, Allende chose not to use his authority to call for a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
415 ITT had offered funds to the US government to prevent Allende from taking office (Oppenheim 2007, 
35). 
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plebiscite, while the proposal was put on hold indefinitely. 
 Another area of planned reform was education. The Allende government’s plan to 
create the National Unified Educational system (Educación Nacional Unificada), which 
aimed to increase the availability of scholarships, build schools and day-care facilities, 
decrease illiteracy, and provide adult education also included controversial aspects 
(Oppenheim 2007, 38). The plan to establish a unified educational system also involved 
the state’s incorporation of private schools, which raised suspicion from the Catholic 
Church and from parents who wished to send their children to those schools that provided 
education exclusive to the middle and upper classes (Oppenheim 2007, 38). The 
opposition argued that ENU was an “attempt to turn the educational system into a 
massive indoctrination program” (Cohen 1994, 116). 
 UP’s program to implement and expand the agrarian reform was also not without 
controversy and constitutional debate. In June 1972, the Christian Democrats proposed a 
new constitutional amendment that would prohibit the seizure of farms less than forty 
basic hectares and give a shorter timeline to campesinos (peasants) to convert the 
asentamientos (peasant cooperatives established under the 1967 agrarian reform) into 
cooperatives or individual holdings (Collier and Sater 1993, 349) 416. It added to the list 
of constitutional issues that increased the friction between the government and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
416 The 1967 agrarian reform provided that all estates larger than 80 basic hectares (approximately 200 
hectares) could be expropriated and redistributed to peasants. The redistributed land for the next three to 
five years, would be cultivated in the form of asentamiento and afterwards the peasants would decide 
whether they preferred to keep is as a cooperative or divide it into individual holdings (Oppenheim 2007, 
49). The amendment, out of the fear that the UP government could act on introducing its own type of 
cooperatives soon, proposed to have the peasants to decide within a year if they wished to form a 
cooperative or not (Barlow 1978,71). 
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opposition.  
3.2.2 Turkey: Institutional Deadlock over the Election of the President 
 The 1971-1973 constitutional amendments, which strengthened the executive 
branch, restricted civil liberties and established a wider autonomy for the armed forces; 
responded to demands long championed by the AP. These changes were also pushed by 
the military establishment with the goal that they would help respond to decaying law and 
order. However, these resulted in intensifying political violence. A slew of criticisms 
were directed at the 1961 Constitution, namely that a bicameral assembly was slowing 
down the legislation process; that the Constitutional Court was impeding the parliament, 
and that the Council of State was delaying the work of government. During the 1971-
1973 constitutional amendments, these issues partly taken into consideration.417 As the 
following years demonstrated, a major shortcoming of the 1961 Constitution that 
established a bicameral parliamentary system with a head of state elected from among the 
members of parliament was that it failed to indicate the procedures to take when the 
parliament was unable to produce a cabinet and/or elect a new president. The previous 
section explored the difficulties of governing under weak coalition; this section will 
examine the political crises faced by these weak coalitions when electing a new head of 
state in 1973 and 1980; the latter which was only resolved with the military coup. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
417 For instance, the judicial review power of the Constitutional Court was restricted to form and this was a 
reaction to the court’s activism in the previous years. 
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 The 1973 presidential election was a bitter process.418 The presidency had 
acquired a significant role since the 1960 coup. The post was utilized to convey military’s 
preferences to civilian government (Nye 1977, 211).419 Although the two chambers 
elected the president in a joint session, the high command would informally designate the 
candidate of their choice to be approved by the parliament (Ahmad 1993, 155).420 That 
year, the military high command had settled on Commander of the Land Forces General 
Faruk, as the presidential successor to General Cevdet Sunay. Despite all the maneuvers 
to prepare Gürler for the post, Ecevit and Demirel agreed not to opt for the high 
commanders’ candidate.421 These maneuvers included extending Gürler’s post to allow 
him to maintain his rank, retiring other generals to provide Gürler a brief stint in the 
position of Chief of Staff and appointing him senator from the presidential quota (Ahmad 
1993, 155). The disagreement led to a short but a serious political crisis (13 March to 6 
April) that was ultimately settled on a compromise name, retired Admiral Fahri Korutürk. 
The parliament elected Korutürk the new president under the watchful eyes of the 
military establishment, the members of which were all present in the parliament during 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
418 Nye (1977, 210) maintains that “(t)he 1973 presidential election was perhaps the most critical political 
vent to occur in Turkey since the I960 military coup. It was a test of the strength of Turkey's civilian 
institutions and constitutional procedures as well as a test of the military's patience with civilian politicians 
and compromise politics”. 
419 According to Nye (1977, 211) the 1960 constitution helped politicize the armed forces and since then 
the president has acquired “the important extra-constitutional role as mediator between the armed forces 
and the political party”. 
420 Previous presidents were Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1923- 1938), Ismet Inönü (1938-1950), Celal Bayar 
(1950 -1960), Cemal Gürsel (1961-1966), and Cevdet Sunay (1966-1973)- all except Bayar, who was 
imprisoned after the 1960 coup, were career military officers. 
421 For more on the background of this crisis, see Nye 1977. 
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the balloting.422 This ordeal was particularly striking since the constitutional amendment 
that would extend President Sunay's term of office for two years to 1975 was proposed 
but ultimately rejected by both houses.423 Another constitutional solution supported by 
the AP was to amend the constitution to allow for the election of the president by direct 
universal suffrage (Nye 1977, 225). Under the new prime minister, Naim Tulu, 
constitutional amendments of 1973 as well as important legislations such as the 
University Law that established the University Supervisory Council, passed.  
 The election of the president in 1980 proved once again tortuous. With President 
Korutürk’s term scheduled to expire on April 6, there was no agreement between the 
political parties, let alone other actors. Additionally, none of the available candidates 
received much enthusiasm. Supported by the CHP, one of the candidates, was the former 
air force commander Muhsin Batur, the other one championed by AP was the former 
commander of the first army Faik Türün- both retired generals were major actors of the 
March 12 regime.424 Meanwhile, the Senate speaker Ihsan Sabri Çağlayangil, was 
installed as acting president of the Republic. None of the candidates were able to muster 
the required majority and the efforts of Çağlayangil to mediate between Ecevit and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
422 The parliamentary procedure took place under extreme conditions, “The armed forces continued to 
make their influence felt by taking several ‘precautionary’ measures. Military leaves were canceled in 
Ankara. Troops and armored vehicles surrounded the Parliament where the two houses were meeting in 
joint session. Security forces were stationed at roadblocks around the capital to search incoming cars. 
Newspaper speculation about the military's intervention in politics was banned and in particularly any 
articles which could "affect the will of Parliament." Finally, about sixty top-ranking military officers, 
including the chief of the General Staff sat on the GNA’s balcony to closely follow the balloting (Nye 
1977, 218). After 15 consecutive ballots, the parties agreed on Korutürk (Zürcher 2007, 261) whose 
election was seen as a win for the civilians (Ahmad 1993, 155) 
423 The amendment garnered 300 votes, falling short by one vote (the quorum was 301 votes). 
424 Initially the AP’s candidate was Saadettin Bilgiç, a former deputy and minister of defense. At most, he 
received 210 votes where the quorum to elect a new president is 318 (Birand 1987, 133). 
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Demirel did not resolve the impasse. 425 According to the constitution, there was no 
timeframe or recourse previously established to break the impasse over electing a new 
president. The only manner to end the debacle would require that one of the candidates 
achieve the necessary two-thirds majority vote. A series of inconclusive ballots where 
even political parties refused to appear in parliament to prevent their members from 
supporting another’s candidacy demonstrated that this time an institutional crisis could 
not be avoided.426 The crisis over the election of a new president drew the country into a 
six-month-long of impasse, in which the Demirel government governed the country by 
decrees with the force of law (Kalaycıoğlu 2005, 117). The presidential stalemate became 
a growing concern for the Turkish armed forces (Demirel 2003, 268).427  
  Once again, a constitutional amendment was sought as a solution to overcome a 
political crisis. Early in the impasse, in May 1980, when it slowly became apparent that 
no candidate was going to be able to muster the required votes, the AP proposed a 
constitutional amendment that would allow for the direct election of the president by 
popular vote, one that would also restructure the post to enable the head of state to have 
more powers and prerogatives (Birand 1987, 133).428 The idea of a constitutional change, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
425 According to Article 95, in the first two ballots required a two-thirds majority and in the following ones 
absolute majority was sought. 
426 Batur received at most 303 votes. Twenty CHP MPs did not support his candidacy. The ex-general’s 
seat in the senate expired shortly after. The quorum to elect a new president is 318 votes. The candidate 
must be a member of the parliament (Birand 1987, 133). 
427 It is important to note that the armed forces were involved behind the scene much earlier when the issue 
of next president came up. In early February, Evren asked a veteran CHP member, Orhan Eyüpoğlu 
whether he would consider to be a candidate and showed concern that political parties’ inability to agree on 
this issue and “caused a prolonged vacancy at the head of the state” (Birand 1987, 130). 
428 The initiative came after the AP refused to accept CHP’s proposition to form a government along with 
NSP. The JP also proposed to have early elections (Birand 1987, 133). 
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both in the form of an amendment and a replacement were being considered among 
circles that deemed the existing constitutional framework as “too liberal and far too 
concerned with checks and balances to provide the kind of resolute executive power to 
drag Turkey out of its deepening structural crisis”  (Birand 1987, 133). In early 1980, for 
example Demirel stressed his opposition to the constitution thusly: “It is me who says 
that you cannot govern the country with this constitution. I have said this in 1969. Eleven 
years have passed... An important majority of reforms that we wished to bring forth in 
our 1969 election manifesto have been realized during the 1971 crisis. But the dosage of 
some of these is inadequate. It is not enough to administer the drug, it is necessary to do it 
with the right dosage” (Tanör 2012, 63-64).429 However, the 1982 Constitution in many 
ways was more authoritarian than what the AP had championed for (Tanör 2012, 63-67). 
 In the last months before the coup, two seminars were organized and one 
constitutional draft was prepared independent of the Parliament.430 In a seminar held by a 
prominent Turkish daily newspaper, Tercüman participants discussed various alternatives 
of government and electoral systems; expressed criticisms to the existing constitutional 
structure; and one conservative politician Turhan Feyzioğlu (chairman of Republic 
Reliance Party- a breakaway from CHP) even considered the necessity of a democratic 
order when the state survival was in jeopardy (Tanör 2012, 67-69).431 A report prepared 
by conservative politicians Adnan Başer Kafaoğlu (non-elected senator) and Coşkun 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
429 Translated from English by the author. 
430 For an overall discussion on the two seminars and one constitutional draft, see Balcıgil, 1982.  
431 The seminar was organized on April 19, 1980; it was entitled “Making the Political Regime Function: 
Our Constitution and Electoral System” (Siyasî Rejimin İşler Hale Getirilmesi, Anayasa ve Seçim 
Sistemimiz) (Gözler 2000). 
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Kırca (former deputy) was published in a journal and stressed that the country faced two 
massive problems; economic depression and communism. Their suggested solution was a 
new constitution, one that would create a powerful state with a strong office of 
presidency supported by non-elected institutions (Tanör 2012, 69-72).432  Istanbul Bar 
Association and Istanbul University’s Political Science Department held another seminar 
that contrary to others did not champion an authoritarian constitutional order.433  
 The left, which in fact also had its own suggestions for constitutional change, 
fearing that an environment of chaos was promoted to prepare for that, became an avid 
supporter of the exiting charter (Tanör 2012, 75). Believing that “Latin American 
solutions” were being considered to make it easier for Turkey to adopt neoliberal 
economic programs to respond to economic crisis, Ecevit understood the AP and center-
right circles’ lobby for a strong presidency and authoritarian constitution as part of this 
mentality (Birand 1987, 134).434 Thus, when Demirel approached Ecevit regarding a 
constitutional amendment that would allow for the direct election of a president equipped 
with more powers, he refused arguing that they would instead aim to find a consensus 
candidate, like they had done in the past. “The irony of the situation was that the talks 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
432 Some of their recommendations were later adopted in the 1982 Constitution. For a discussion on this 
draft, see Tanör 2012, 69-72 and the original report is available at “Rejim ve Anayasamızda Reform 
Önerisi”, Yeni Forum, Cilt 1, Sayı 17, 15 Mayıs 1980.  
433 The seminar took place on May 10, 1980 and titled “The Functioning of Democratic Constitutional 
Order, Seminar on Realizing Constitutional Rights and Liberties” (Demokratik Anayasal Düzenin p0-
İşlerliği, Anayasal Hak ve Özgürlüklerin Yaşama Geçirilmesi Semineri) (Gözler 2000). 
434 The package of neoliberal economic reforms (known as the January 24 program) is discussed in detail in 
the next section. 
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between the two leaders in fact led to a heightening of political tensions rather than 
promoting a détente” (Birand 1987, 135). 
 The presidential stalemate hampered the parliament on other pieces of legislation 
as well. The deadlock, particularly was over two bills regarding law and order, drawn up 
to respond to the political violence sweeping the country- to be specific, “State Security 
Court” and “States of Emergency” legislations which the CHP found to be problematic 
(Birand 1987, 148). On July 24, in a fine hour of an act of reconciliation, facilitated by 
Çağlayangil, Demirel and Ecevit met to resolve the impasse stemming from these two 
AP-backed legislations. The meeting revealed that the two bills, which would enable the 
armed forces to have broader powers to combat political terror, originated from the 
demands of the armed forces (Birand, 1987, 155). However, the two leaders once again 
failed to reach a compromise and prevent the impending coup.  
 After more than 115 rounds, the parliament ultimately failed to agree on a 
candidate. In the event that the parliament failed to elect a president from its ranks, it was 
deadlocked. The constitution did not allow for any nominee outside of the parliament to 
be a presidential candidate. 435 The question of who was going to be the next president 
became obsolete when the military seized power. 
  Prior to both the intervention of the armed forces, and the draft of a new 
constitution under a military regime, Chile and Turkey suffered from institutional 
deadlock. In the case of Chile, the Allende government had specific goals that required 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
435 In order to appoint someone outside the parliament, that person could be assigned to the senate from the 
presidential quota. 
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legislative action, including constitutional amendments. The initiative to create a 
socialized sector of the economy first put the opposition and the Allende government in 
disagreement over the substance of the proposal, where both sides pursued separate bills 
and later over form regarding the necessary majority to override the presidential veto. 
The problem became a matter over conflict over the rules of the game that could not be 
resolved in the parliament or by the Constitutional Court.436 In the case of Turkey, the 
impasse was over the parliament’s inability to produce the next head of state. 
Constitutional amendments were considered as a solution to overcome the crisis but one 
such initiative failed to receive the necessary majority, while the other remained only an 
idea. Without the compromising attitude of political parties in the parliament, the 
institutional deadlock worsened.  
3.3 Economic and Social Strife 
 The polarized and fragmented political party system and the ensuing 
parliamentary deadlock explain part of the problem. What happened at the institutional 
level exasperated the economic and social situations at the mass level and vice versa. 
Political violence increased, economic conditions worsened; polarization at the 
institutional level reflected a growing polarization among societal forces. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
436 According to Oppenheimer (2007) the fact that the source of conflict stemmed from a very legalistic 
issue demonstrates the respect for the law and the constitution, albeit with each side insisting on its own 
interpretation. It also reflects how “the political elite had learned to channel strident political conflict into a 
constitutional system where the rule of law was paramount” (Oppenheim 2007. 62). 
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3.3.1 Strikes and Protests: Chile and Turkey Compared 
In the case of Chile, the UP government had specific goals to attain the necessary 
conditions for “transition to socialism”. One such objective was to improve the economic 
welfare of Chile’s poorest citizens. For that purpose, the government adjusted wages and 
salaries to attain redistribution of income and spur consumption; invested in public works 
to provide new venues for the unemployed and increased social expenditures for 
education, health and housing (Bethell 157-168). However, the increasing government 
spending and the growing demand for consumption compounded to the lack of 
investment and the inability of traditional and recently nationalized industries to generate 
surplus led to a growing deficit and inflation.437 Additionally, the mismatch in supply led 
to shortages, black markets and rising prices (Bethell 1993, 164). The supply and 
distribution problems meant that people had to wait long lines in markets and hoard basic 
goods (Oppenheim 2007, 59). Well-to-do women showed their discontent by banging on 
pots and pans.438 Since locally produced goods were scarce, the government was forced 
to import agricultural products, causing foreign reserves to dry up. The United States’ 
pressure on international banks to ensure that Chile would not be able to receive credit 
forced the country to look for alternatives in Europe (Collier and Sater 2004, 345).  
 On the sociological front, the idea of socialism antagonized the private sector, the 
business class, most of the middle class, as well as the parties of the right and center 
(Gonzalez 2008, 22). Farm and factory seizures, and illegal strikes forced the hand of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
437 By mid-1973, inflation was over 300% (Loveman 2001, 250). 
438 In December 1971 thousands of women staged “March of the Empty Pots”. 
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government and exasperated the economic crisis and political tensions. Strikes called by 
the gremios, employers and professional associations, against the UP government’s 
projects channeled this dissatisfaction and paralyzed economic activity.439 One such 
strike occurred in October 1972, when the truckers’ association call for action based on 
the fear that the UP government was about to nationalize the industry spread to different 
sectors of the economy and throughout the country (Openheim 2007, 62).  Allende asked 
three military officers to join his cabinet and declared a state of emergency to end the 
month-long paro (strike). Allende faced much difficulty in settling strikes, particularly 
the very costly one in copper mine of El Teniente in the winter of 1973, which lasted 76 
days, and the second truckers’ strike that continued for three months until the coup of 
September 11. 
 The series of weak coalitions precluded Turkey from having an economic policy, 
let alone one with transformational objectives. The fact that there was no political party 
in the parliament with a radical left ideology did not stop the right-wing parties from 
alleging that communism was a real threat for Turkey. Although Ecevit had captured the 
imagination of urban and rural workers, it was far from being a revolutionary change. At 
the rhetorical level, there was much discussion; in reality, the economy was managed by 
short-term responses and faced a near-collapse.440 Turkey had witnessed economical 
growth and industrialization through the import substitution industrialization that had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
439 For more on the rampant increase in strike activity, see Valenzuela 1988, 61-63. 
440 For a detailed analysis of the economic developments of this period, see Barkey 1984. 
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been successful in the 1960s, but it had run its course by the mid-1970s.441 The oil shocks 
of the 1970s further drained the country’s foreign reserves. By 1977, Turkey’s balance of 
payments were in deficit; the inflation was steadily rising and the country was 
accumulating foreign debt and annual growth rate was at a mere 0.4% in 1979 (Hale 
1994, 223). These soon reflected in the daily life of citizens; working-class families had 
difficulty making ends meet, power cuts occurred daily, those living in the cities had no 
heat; and shortages in basic commodities forced individuals that could not afford them to 
resort to the black market.  
 The armed forces were also invested in keeping a stable economy. The OYAK 
(Army Mutual Assistance Association) fund, which was managed by the army and 
created by the deductions from officers’ salaries quickly made the armed forces a major 
actor in the economy. The military establishment was dissatisfied with the aging state of 
their equipment and facilities (Birand 1987, 25).442 Ecevit’s appeal with labor was 
waning and strikes had become all too common by the summer of 1978 (Birand 1987, 
45). The Ecevit government of 1978 started negotiating with creditors, the IMF and the 
World Bank; these culminated in $1.8 billion loan promises for Turkey on the condition 
that the its government initiate reforms to eliminate import and export controls, reduce 
subsidies, raise prices, float interest rates and cut government expenditure, Turkey was 
promised (Zürcher 2004, 268). The austerity measures were not welcomed by labor. 
Turkey’s business class was discontent with the country’s first “social democratic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
441 Between 1963 and 1976 the average annual rate of growth was 6.9 per cent (Zürcher 2004, 266). 
442 Although it was not the main reason, the American arms embargo of July 1975 followed the Cyprus 
invasion (Birand 1987, 25-26). 
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government”. The industrial plants had become impossible to run due to strikes and 
shortages of what would have been imported raw materials (Birand 1987, 45-46). The 
Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Associations (TÜSİAD) ran a full-page 
advertisement criticizing the Ecevit government. Market traders and transportation 
companies threatened the government with a general strike à la Chilean truckers’ strike 
that had crippled the Allende government, with Demirel going as far as to suggest that 
Ecevit’s fate would be similar to that of the deposed leader of Chile (Birand 1987, 46). 443   
 It was under the Demirel government of 1979 that his undersecretary -future 
prime minister and later president Turgut Özal initiated the so-called “January 24 
program” that launched Turkey’s neo-liberal economic transformation. 444 However, the 
program was not welcomed by the working sectors of the society; unions carried out 
strikes, occupied factories and clashed with security force. “It became clear that there was 
widespread resistance to what was called the ‘Chilean solution’ (a reference to the 
policies General Pinochet had introduced in Chile after his coup against President 
Allende)” (Zürcher 2004, 268). Özal was aware that in order to accomplish the program’s 
goals, Turkey would need a stable political and social atmosphere. Thus, one of the aims 
of the coup became depolitizing Turkish society and eliminating dissent from all aspect 
of society; thusly preparing the necessary conditions for a stable economy (Ahmad 1993, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
443 Demirel usually referred to Ecevit as “Büllende” (after his first name Bülent) (Ahmad 2003) 
444 Özal continued his role as the primary technocrat responsible for overseeing the restructuring of the 
economy in the post-coup period. 
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179-179) 445. Talk about a new political system that could possibly emulate de Gaulle’s 
constitution of 1958 took hold among intellectual circles (Ahmad 1993, 178-179).  
3.2.2 Political Violence Leading Up to the Coup: Chile and Turkey Compared 
 Both Chile and Turkey went through years of political violence before their 
respective military coups. In both countries, leftist terrorism in the early 1970s (before 
the election of Allende in 1970 Chile, and before as well as after the 1971 military 
intervention in Turkey) was pursued to ignite revolution. In Chile, it started during the 
last year of Frei regime and gradually increased under Allende’s government (Loveman 
2001, 248). General René Schneider was assassinated shortly after Allende’s election to 
eliminate opposition against military coup.446 A leftist group (VOP-Vanguardia 
Organizada del Pueblo) assassinated Frei’s former minister of the Interior Edmundo 
Pérez Zujovic in June 1971. The most active extreme left group MIR (Movimiento de 
Izquierda Revolucionario) advocated expropriation of all land and estate by force, arming 
people for a possible confrontation. While the number of killed remained considerably 
low (between November 1970 and early 1973, about 35 people were killed), the political 
violence increased rapidly following the March 1973 election (Sigmund 1977, 288).  The 
extreme left convinced that socialism could only be achieved by force, confronted the 
extreme right ready to take on counterrevolution after the election of Allende. Right wing 
armed vigilante groups most notably Patria y Libertad, organized economic sabotage- 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
445 Based on interviews with Evren, Demirel (2003) argues that the unstable economy was not the main 
concern for the armed forces. It was the lack of order that led the military to take over the government. 
446 Schneider’s assassination was the first act of political murder since Diego Portales’ assassination that 
took place in 1837 (Huneeus 2007 35). 
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bombed raildroad bridges, ports and electrical transmission tower, orchestrated retomas 
to reclaim farm and factory seizures, organized and financed strikes, with the intent of 
disrupting daily life (Oppenheim 2007, 71).447  
 The extreme left and right confronted each other in violent street brawls, engaging 
in a “vicious circle of action and reaction”, to the point that a poll conducted in August 
1972 found that 83% of Chileans thought that there was a climate of violence 
(Valenzuela 1988, 69).448 Revolutionary factory workers living in the outskirts of 
Santiago, who had initially organized to push the government to takeover factories, 
subsequently responded to the strikes of gremialistas (employers’ associations) by 
forming self-defense and mutual assistance organizations in industrial belts449 or 
cordones industrials -to prevent newly appropriated lands and factories to be reclaimed 
by their former owners (Loveman 2001, 254). Despite demands from center and right 
wing parties, Allende did not opt for harsh measures to repress the extremists in his own 
camp. As a result of this antagonistic polarization, both sides began stockpiling weapons 
in anticipation of an armed confrontation450. Allende signed into law a new arms control 
law (Ley de control de armas) that restricted the use of automatic weapons to the armed 
forces and Carabineros, and authorized the military to search civilians and seize such 
weapons (Collier and Sater 2004, 349). The UP government evaded a coup attempt on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
447 Other right-wing paramilitary groups included Sobrenia, Orden y Libertad and PROTECO. 
448 One such issue that saw hoards of people taking to the streets was Allende government’s proposal to 
create a Unified Education System. 
449 These industrial belts were areas where the pro-government works have established control. 
450 According to Sigmund (1977, 288) it was the accumulation of arms that prompted the military to 
prepare for a coup in June 1973.  
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June 29, 1973, thanks to the swift action of the military establishment’s constitutionalist 
camp.451 One of Allende’s naval aides and best friend, Commander Arturo Araya was 
assassinated on July 26 (Oppenheim 2007, 72). With extreme leftist groups trying to 
instigate a navy mutiny the armed forces launched a massive crack down against what 
they assumed was an attempted infiltration by the former aimed at instigating 
insubordination within using the news arms control law (Collier and Sater 2004 355-
356).452 
 Political violence in Turkey was graver than that experienced in Chile.453 Before 
the 1980 coup, Turkey had gone through ten years of rampant political violence. 
Beginning with the student movement of 1968, leftist groups clashed with the police over 
their perception of social inequalities and lack of reform. The politicized discontent was 
channeled into violent action directed mostly against Turkey’s security forces over their 
relationship with the West (Zürcher 2004, 257-258). 454 The ultra leftist groups engaged 
in bombing attacks, robberies and kidnappings, creating an atmosphere of chaos and 
emulating the urban guerrillas of Latin American countries.  The early 1970s witnessed 
the surge of right-wing violence carried out by the youth militants of the Action Party, the 
so-called Grey Wolves. Aiming to subdue the electoral support of social democrats, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
451 For more on the June 29 incident, known as tanquetazo see Valenzuela 1988, 98-103. 
452 The practice was based on an October 1972 law that aimed to restrict the ownership of automatic 
weapons, which gave the armed forces and the police the right to search and confiscate firearms. The 
military gradually intensified the implementation in the second half of 1973, searching factories and 
shantytowns for arms (Loveman 2001, 256). 
453 For more on political violence leading to the coup, see Bal and Laciner 2001, Birand 19867, 48-65 and 
Sayari 2010. 
454 Protests against the arrival of American Sixth Fleet in July 1968 and February 1969 (Bloody Sunday) 
showed that the anti-American sentiment was prevalent among the leftist groups. 
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right-wing terrorism also received their match from the left-wing militants organized 
under the Revolutionary Left’ (Dev-Sol) and the ‘Revolutionary Way’ (Dev Yol) (Ahmad 
1993, 166). Despite the right-wing terror directed at it, the CHP was able to increase its 
electoral strength in the 1975 senate elections, gaining the support of the Confederation 
of Revolutionary Workers’ Union (DISK) for the upcoming general elections. One of the 
most brutal attacks orchestrated with the collaboration of state forces was the Taksim 
Square massacre of 1977 during the May Day rally- an event organized by DISK.455 The 
Ecevit-led government had to put aside the social democratic program in order to respond 
to continuing waves of violence. Political murders, assassinations against prominent 
figures and heavy repression in the Kurdish countryside highlighted the pains of growing 
polarization and the ineffectiveness of the police force.456 The government decided to 
utilize the Blue Berets of the gendarmerie, as it feared that the police force was biased in 
this political conflict  (Ahmad 1993, 171).457 Squirmishes in the streets and on university 
campuses between right and left militants had become a daily occurrence. At the root of 
the political violence was the growing ideological polarization of the country (Özbudun 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
455 The first May Day rally since mid-1920s was organized in 1976. The bloody 1977 one was the second 
one. Bullets fired from the upper floors of the Intercontinental Hotel caused chaos and ended with an 
estimated 34 to 42 people killed, only two of which died from bullet wounds, the rest were killed from the 
commotion. Conspiracy theories still exist that maintain that it was a counter guerrilla operation that had 
the support of CIA. 
456 The assassination of the daily newspaper Milliyet’s editor, Abdi Ipekçi, on 1 February 1979 was a 
complete embarrassment for the Ecevit government. His assassin Mehmet Ali Ağca, believed to be Grey 
Wolf managed to escape from prison. He later shot and wounded Pope John Paul II in 1981. 
457  Zürcher (2004, 263) argues that the police was mostly dominated by right-wingers: “During the 
Nationalist Front governments of the years between 1974 and 1977, the police and the security forces had 
become the exclusive preserve of Türkeş ’s MHP, and even under Ecevit’s government of 1978–79, they 
had remained heavily infiltrated by fascists who shielded and protected the Grey Wolves.” 
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1990, 193). According to figures announced by Ecevit in 1978, there had been 800 deaths 
as a result of political violence (Ahmad 1993,172).458 The Alevi community, a religious 
minority, which tends to be left leaning, also became the target of neo-fascists.459 The 
worst incident came in late December 1978, when the Grey Wolves attacked Alevis and 
other left-wingers in Kahramanmaraş, an attack which resulted in more than one hundred 
casualties. The event once again demonstrated the incompetence of civilian security 
forces to respond to violence. Supporting military forces were sent from a nearby town to 
quell the Alevi pogrom.460 Ecevit complied with demands for further action and declared 
martial law in Istanbul, Ankara and eleven Anatolian cities. However, the government 
was not able to establish law and order. Furthermore, martial law helped militarize and 
politicize the conflict (Özbudun 1990, 193). Kidnappings, bank robberies and attacks on 
public rallies led to an atmosphere of constant terror and anarchy. In the nine months 
between December 1978 and September 1979, 898 people were killed; during the next 
twelve months, up until the coup of September 1980, 2,812 more were killed (Hale 1994, 
224). The opposition’s tactics to discredit the Ecevit government further undermined an 
already precarious state of law and order and political stability. Also in 1978, that the 
neo-Marxist Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK- Partiya Karkerên Kurdistani) was formed by 
Ankara University student Abdullah Öcalan, becoming an actor in the on-going urban 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
458 According to the same figures, the government had made government had made 1,999 arrests, of which 
1,052 belonged to right wing organizations and 778 to the left-wing. 
459 Attacks in which homes and shops of Alevis were destroyed took place throughout 1978. In the 
Anatolian cities of Malatya, Sivas and Bingöl, Alevis became victims of violent assaults. 
460 For more on this incident, see Birand 1987 59-61. 
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guerilla terrorism.461 The public lost its confidence in the government, while the left and 
trade unions distanced themselves from Ecevit over his emphasis on security matters; the 
military became highly critical over his “‘soft’ attitude to terrorism and Kurdish 
separatism” (Zürcher 2004, 262). The Ecevit government survived until October 1979 to 
be replaced with another Demirel cabinet-  this time without the neo-fascists Action Party 
(MHP) and Islamist Salvation Party (MSP) not taking positions. However, the political 
violence targeting important political figures continued with the assassination of former 
primer minister Nihat Erim by left-wing militants and former DISK president Kemal 
Türkler as well as one of the founders of Workers Party by right-wing militants. 
University campuses and neighborhoods became the scene of ideological 
confrontations.462 “Liberated zones,” where security forces had no control over; were 
declared, the most prominent example being the Black Sea coastal province of Fatsa, 
where the mayor set up People’s Committees.463   
The ideological and sectarian polarization, political killings and mass murders 
created serious unease within the military. With the declaration of martial law, the armed 
forces witnessed first hand the severity of the situation. Also problematic was that the 
military feared a growing polarization was creeping within their ranks (Birand 1987, 61). 
Thus, from mid-1979 onwards, the question became “when and how to intervene”. 
According to Demirel (2003), it was the atmosphere of anarchy that led to the military’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
461 For more on the Kurdish movement and the history of PKK, see Marcus, 2007. Additional information 
on the armed forces’ position on Kurdish issue before the coup, see Birand 1987, 39-42. 
462 See Mardin 1978 for a detailed analysis of sociological factors that contributed to this political violence. 
463 See Morgül 2007. 
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decision to intervene and argues that “if unaccompanied by a strong government to 
restore order even the election of a president, or formation of another fragile government, 
would not have made much difference but merely prolonged the process” (274).  
However, the military decided to wait out for the impending senate by-elections and the 
international loan that the Ecevit government was in the process of negotiating (Birand 
1987, 61).  
 Amidst the deadlocked parliament, and relentless political violence that had 
exponentially mounted by 1980, the armed forces also grew wary of the perceived threat 
of Islamic fundamentalism. The Islamic revolution in neighboring Iran aroused fears that 
Turkey also could face such a threat. A mass meeting in Konya464 over Israel’s 
declaration of Jerusalem as its capital witnessed conservative demonstrators calling a 
return to sharia law. The September 6 Konya meeting was “the last straw”, according to 
one of the coup organizer generals. Fear of communism was as strong as the fear of 
Islamic fundamentalism, not just for Turkey but also for its Western allies, and 
specifically for the United States. The Iranian Revolution altered Turkey’s strategic 
importance for the Western alliance (Ahmad 1993, 174 and Birand 1987, 65-69). Other 
international events, such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, also demanded the 
urgent need for a stable Western partner in the region. While there has been speculation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
464 Another act of defiance of secular principles that the MSP had carried out was to not the end the Victory 
Day celebrations on August 30 and instead go to a funeral of a holy man in a Black Sea town. 
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regarding U.S. involvement in the Turkish coup d’état, unlike the allegations pertaining 
to Chile it has not been documented and has remained uncorroborated.465  
3.4 Discussion 
  An atmosphere of strikes and hyperinflation, growing scarcity of consumer goods 
and basic products, social unrest in the streets, political violence and politicized military 
were common elements before the military coup in Chile and Turkey. These problems 
helped deteriorate the already fragile political setting. In both cases, the political system 
was fragmented and polarized which reflected in the general public as well. In Chile, the 
Congress, which had traditionally been an institution that cultivated accommodation, 
witnessed hostile politicking and deadlock. In Turkey, the political system deviated from 
single party governments (during the 1930s and 1940s under the CHP and in the 1950s 
under the DP) that did not need and, therefore, did not have the experience of 
accommodation to and negotiation with weak coalition governments that were unable to 
respond to problem, let alone elect a new head of state. Despite the fact that Chile and 
Turkey were governed by different political systems (a presidential system in the case of 
Chile and parliamentary for Turkey), the political crisis in both countries was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
465 Birand (1987) reports that following the military coup on September 12, Paul Henze, the US National 
Security advisor sent a memo to President Jimmy Carter saying, “Our boys did it”. Efforts by Turkish 
lawyers to gather more information from the Central American Intelligence have been denied, see, “CIA 
rejects lawyers’ request for Sept. 12 coup information” Todays Zaman December 19, 2011 available at 
http://www.todayszaman.com/national_cia-rejects-lawyers-request-for-sept-12-coup-
information_266169.html 
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characterized by polarized and fragmented political party systems as well as institutional 
deadlock.466  
  In both cases, the institutional structure did not guarantee stable majoritarian 
democratic governments. However, the differences are recognizable as well. In the 
Chilean case, the struggle was between the president and the Congress. In the Turkish 
case, it was within the parliament. Before the election of Allende, a coalition of center 
and right parties compromised on a number of important constitutional amendments in 
1970. Following Allende’s election, these center and right parties that had not expected a 
victory for the UP coalition demanded a set of constitutional amendments before 
approving his candidacy in the Congress. Although, it would be an overstatement to 
argue that the 1970 “Statute of Constitutional Guarantees” was imposed on Allende, they 
were constitutional changes that were pursued by the opposition to safeguard the 
constitutional order against the Allende administration’s plans for a new institutional 
order. The Allende government, with the support of all political parties, was also able to 
pass a constitutional amendment to realize the nationalization of copper. However, the 
transformational goals of the UP government, some of which required constitutional 
amendments, became the principal source of conflict in the Congress during the 
following years. In Turkey, the 1971 and 1973 amendments in Turkey followed the 
armed forces’ memorandum, - ultimatum in a way to government. Although some of the 
constitutional changes were long pursued by the civilian conservative camp, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
466 Also important to add is that, despite the fact UP government was a coalition of parties, this was the 
result of pre-election coalition building, whereas in Turkey the more than ten coalition governments that 
existed in 1970s were products of post-election arrangement.  
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amendments were approved during a climate of repression and censorship, with martial 
law in effect in eleven provinces as well as strikes and lockouts forbidden, the changes 
introduced in Turkey were not products of accommodation and compromise as it was the 
case in Chile.467 Nevertheless, the 1971 constitutional amendments in Chile that Allende 
had signed before the Congress confirmed his presidency, like the 1971 and 1973 
constitutional amendments in Turkey that the partial intervention of 1971 set in motion, 
failed to become the constitutional remedies that could help avoid the breakdown of the 
institutional order.   
Additionally, what does unite the two countries’ experience is the breakdown of 
the existing constitutional order resulted from the inability and/or unwillingness of 
political parties to negotiate, which polarized the fragmented political system and 
increased the tension between the different forces within society. Content with playing a 
zero-sum game, political parties in both cases did not yield to accommodation of each 
other’s concerns.  Increasingly, the crises experienced came to be interpreted not as 
temporary setbacks but as deep-rooted structural problems. In the Turkish case, Birand 
(1987, 19) explains that the extreme political parties’ polarizing rhetoric contributed to 
“the growing crisis of legitimacy”, which was later interpreted as “crises of the regime”. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
467 In terms of content the amendments also shared more differences than similarities. In both cases, the 
executive power was strengthened and the armed forces gained wider autonomy. The amendments in Chile 
established a Constitutional Court, whereas those in Turkey restricted the formation of the court’s judicial 
power of the court to form. In Chile, these amendments expanded civil rights and freedoms, recognized 
political parties and social organizations as legal persons; in Turkey, rights and liberties were curtailed, 
small parties were deprived of financial support from the state and the declaration of martial law was 
relaxed. In both cases, the executive was granted the power to issue decree laws with the force of law. 
Although some of the changes may be similar, a detailed examination reveals that the motivations behind 
them were different.  
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In the Chilean case, Garretón (2003) defines it as an “institutional legitimacy crisis” in 
which political parties bore great responsibility for pursuing self-interested politics and 
drifting away from bargaining and negotiating. It was not only the polarization and 
fragmentation of the political parties and the deadlock in the parliament/congress that 
paved the ground for the breakdown of the constitutional rule. The erroneous economic 
policies and reactionary forces also played a role. However, the political crisis preceded 
the socioeconomic crisis. In time, the institutional crisis became generalized to all aspects 
of life in the form of economic hardship and social strife (Oppenheim 2007, 75). The 
armed forces were not silent until the final hour before the coup. The politicians in both 
Chile and Turkey helped politicize the army. Demirel, despite being against army’s 
involvement in politics did push for legislations that were supported by them and would 
equip the TAF with greater powers to combat rampant political violence. The Allende 
government did ask three military officers to join his cabinet to appease the conflict in the 
Congress. There were prolonged periods of states of exception where the armed forces 
became participants of political violence. In Chile, a failed coup attempt on June 19, 1973 
(El Tanquetazo) signaled the frustration of the armed forces. In Turkey, a letter drafted by 
the soon-to-be coup leader General Evren was a warning to politicians to get their acts 
together.  
 In Chile, the Chamber of Deputies passed a resolution on August 22 with the 
support of the Christian Democratic and the National Party; it called on the military 
members of the cabinet to intervene and “put an immediate end to all situation” that have 
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violated the Constitution and the laws.468 Thus, reminiscent of the 1891 crisis, the 
President and the Congress clashed over upholding the Constitution.  At the institutional 
level, Allende had lost the support of the majority of the Congress, the comptroller-
general and the Supreme Court. On August 23, General Prats, who had lost the credibility 
of the military resigned; and General Augusto Pinochet took over as the head of armed 
forces. The constitutionalist camp within the armed forces gave away to coup-plotters. 
With no other viable political solution, President Allende began to reconsider the 
plebiscite option to solve the constitutional impasse. Although, the chances of winning 
more than 50 percent of the vote were slim, considering that in March the UP had 
received 44% in the congressional elections, a plebiscite could help ease the tension 
between the executive and the legislative branches and appease the tense situation in the 
streets (Oppenheim 2007, 75). Allende proceeded to convince his coalition partners. 
Taking recourse to a plebiscite seemed to indicate that the UP was yielding to the 
opposition’s interpretation of the process of amendment-making but it could also help 
derail coup plans. On September 11, the day Allende was planning to announce that a 
plebiscite was going to be organized on the issue of APS, the coup took place. According 
to Oppenheim (2007, 75) the plebiscite decision “hastened the coup”. General Augusto 
Pinochet, whom Allende confided in about his plans to call for a plebiscite, along with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
468 A previous resolution by the Supreme Court had also complained about the president’s disregard of 
court orders. The Chamber of Deputies’ resolution passed by 81 votes to 47, meaning that it was approved 
by almost two-thirds of the members. It listed specific charges regarding constitutional violations and 
national laws: ruling by decree, ignoring the decisions of the courts, ignoring the decrees of the comptroller 
general, silencing the media, supporting armed groups, violating the constitutional guarantee of property 
right and giving support for the illegal takeover of farms and industries, making politically motivated and 
illegal arrests etc. The resolution did not provide a legal basis for a coup but it did demonstrate civilian 
opposition’s support for it (Loveman 1988, 262). See Gargarella 2013, p. 127-128 for more on the 
relationship between the Allende government, the Supreme Court and the Congress. 
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the support of other three branches of the armed forces executed the coup.469 The military 
junta declared that they assumed power to “reestablish the broken institutional order” 
(quoted in Couso 2011, 401).470 
 In Turkey, the breakdown of talks of reconciliation between Ecevit and Demirel 
confirmed the armed forces’ conviction that an intervention was inevitable.471 Unaware 
that plans have already been cooked for the overthrow of the government, political parties 
continued their usual parliamentary maneuverings. The AP campaigned for new elections, 
the National Assembly’s Constitutional Commission, chaired by an MSP deputy prepared 
a report which was delivered to the parliament by MSP, contended that in the event that 
early elections were held before the election of a new president, the swearing ceremony 
of the newly elected deputies would be considered unconstitutional (Birand 1987, 162). 
As the austerity measures of the January 24 program shocked the economy, Turkish 
companies were making illegal transfer of funds to the United States. The CHP and MSP 
joined forces and were able to pass a censure motion against AP’s foreign minister, 
which forced him into resignation. As the day of the armed forces’ designated date for a 
coup, September 12, approached all plans were secretly carried out. As it was the case in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
469 Allende originally planned to announce the plebiscite on September 10 but on that date postponed it to 
11th. 
470 This statement was part of the first declaration made by the Military Junta on September 18, 1973-Law 
No.1. This was the decree that legally established the military junta 
471 Initially, “Operation Flag”, the codename for the coup was scheduled for July 11, but because Demirel 
survived the vote of confidence on July 2 and because some officers were in favor of waiting out the 
Supreme Military Council’s annual meeting of deciding on promotions and retirements in August as well as 
the negotiations with OECD regarding Turkey’s foreign debt it was postponed but not cancelled (Birand 
1987, 145). On August 9, General Kenan Evren, the Chief of Staff met with other top commanders and set 
the date for intervention as September 12 (Birand 1987, 160). A NATO event called “Anvil Express” 
offered a plausible cover-up for troop movements and other unusual activities in preparation for the 
military takeover. 
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Chile, the coup was going to take place within the hierarchical chain of command. When 
the hour came, the coup was announced on public radio and the contents of a letter 
penned by General Evren were announced:  
 “The state, with its major institutions, had been rendered inoperable, the 
 Constitutional institutions are deadlocked in contradiction or buried in silence, 
 caught up in a sterile bickering and intransigence, the political parties have been 
 unable to create the consensus to save the state and take timely measures towards 
 that end. Thus, groups of wreckers and secessionists have escalated their activities 
 to the extent of jeopardizing our citizens’ property and security of life” (Birand 
 1987, 186-187).  
 The blame rested squarely on political parties and constitutional institutions that 
had failed to resolve the crises.472 Political leaders were rounded up in a courteous 
manner escorted out of their houses by offices in attendance and taken to an army resort 
in Çanakkale. Unlike Chile, the operation was executed without a loss of life.    
 When the armed forces took over the government, they were quick to point out 
that the constitutional structure had failed to function. The coup members were convinced 
that unless the constitution’s inherent constraints were addressed, the political crisis could 
repeat itself. The next section will examine the constitution-making process under 
military regimes in Chile and Turkey and demonstrate that the constitutions were 
designed in light of the country’s past history of political and interinstitutional crises. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
472 In his keynote speech, delivered on September 12 mid-day, Evren added, “Those institutions which were 
expected to find solutions against economic crises and anarchy, to make new laws to ameliorate the 
situation, remained unconcerned about the nightmare descending upon our country” (Birand 1987, 192). 
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Chapter 4: Authoritarian Constitutions Compared: The Antidotal Authoritarian 
Constitutions of Chile and Turkey 
 This chapter seeks to uncover the constitution-making process following the 
military take-over in Chile and Turkey. In doing so, the following pages: 1) provide a 
historical account of the drafting processes, 2) offer a comparative study of authoritarian 
constitutions, and 3) contribute to the bourgeoning literature on authoritarian 
constitutions. Authoritarian constitution-making might seem counterintuitive at first. In 
an authoritarian context, where repressive state forces are the main mechanisms to 
control society, a written constitution might come off as a farce. However, a closer look 
at the functions of authoritarian constitution demonstrates that they serve many purposes 
and are not merely sham documents (Ginsburg and Simpser 2014). Thus, by looking at 
the drafting process in Chile and Turkey, this chapter will answer: Why do authoritarians 
adopt a constitution? What purposes do they serve? Beyond our initial instinct that 
authoritarian ruler/s adopt it to help legitimize themselves in the eyes of domestic and 
international actors, as are the cases for Turkey and Chile will demonstrate that they 
serve long-term functions and specific purposes. The chapter will first provide a 
discussion of the authoritarian constitution-making and its variety of functions. Secondly, 
I will outline a subcategory of authoritarian constitutions- namely antidotal authoritarian 
constitutions that are backward-looking, transformative, designed to serve both under 
authoritarian and democratic rule, and equipped with the necessary structures and 
procedures to ensure the survival of the constitutional order. The chapter will then move 
onto an examination of the constitution-making process under the respective military rule 
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of Chile and Turkey. A detailed analysis of the process will shed light on the actors 
involved and their ideological preferences, specify the political, social and economic 
context in which the constitution was drafted and in which the public referendum took 
place; as well as provide the rationale for certain constitutional preferences. The chapter 
will then move on to a comparative analysis of Chile’s 1980 Constitution and Turkey’s 
1982 Constitution from the framework of antidotal authoritarian constitutions. The 
chapter will conclude with an assessment of similarities and differences between the two 
cases highlighting that both constitutions responded to perceived institutional weaknesses 
that had led to the breakdown of democracy, were aimed to be enduring and 
transformative documents, included a transitional formula and calendar and provided for 
certain legal mechanisms to ensure that the constitutional order remain self-enforcing.  
 In order to understand what led the military rulers of Chile and Turkey to adopt a 
constitution, it is imperative to first consider the logic (or lack there of) behind 
authoritarian constitution, in general. The puzzle rests on the general assumption that 
constitutions are written to be followed as a guideline that put limitations on the exercise 
of political power. However since authoritarian rulers tend to consider themselves above 
the rule of law, the prevailing view has been that authoritarian constitutions merely serve 
the purpose of “window dressing” (Albertus and Menaldo, 2012).  Indeed, the source of 
power tends to be informal in authoritarian regimes. However, the existence of 
authoritarian constitutions that provide weak rights protection -such as the Saudi 
Constitution, which stipulates that the state shall protect human rights to the extent that it 
is in accordance with the Sharia (Art. 26)-  is a testament that goes contrary to the idea 
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that authoritarian constitutions only serve the purpose of offering “cheap talk” (Law and 
Versteeg 2014). Authoritarian constitutions can be candid in regards to what the rulers 
intend to accomplish. Stilt’s (2014) study of the 1971 Egyptian constitution, a text which 
had identified political goals, made promises to both domestic and international 
audiences and provided for decision-making mechanisms also demonstrates that it is 
misleading to categorically dismiss authoritarian constitutions as sham documents.  
 It is also worthy to note that constitutions are not the only institutions that are 
presumed to accompany democratic regimes but they are also adopted by authoritarian 
ones. Legislatures (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007), elections (Lewitsky and Way 2002), 
political parties (Gandhi 2008) and judiciaries (Ginsburg and Moustafa 2008) are also 
common features of authoritarian regimes.473 Thus, the question of what purpose, if any, 
formal institutions in general serve in an authoritarian setting has occupied literature and 
can be instructive when it comes to understanding the paradox of authoritarian 
constitutions. While the previous literature on authoritarian institutions had focused on 
their unintended consequence of weakening regime durability, contemporary literature 
argues that authoritarian institutions are introduced by political elites who wish to 
strengthen their ability to exert greater political power and ensure the endurance of their 
rule (Pepinsky 2014). A constitution is one of the tools employed by authoritarian rulers 
to cement their stronghold over the regime. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
473 A recent trend in comparative literature is the study of political institutions in authoritarian regimes, 
Pepinsky (2014) calls this “institutional turn in comparative authoritarianism”. See Gandhi (2008) for more 
on how “nominally democratic institutions” play a crucial role in non-democratic regimes. 
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 For one, constitutions establish how the different structures of government will 
operate and facilitate coordination among institutions and elites (Ginsburg and Simpser 
2014). Authoritarian constitutions help coordinate the political and economic elites 
during the early formative periods of a regime (Albertus and Menaldo, 2012). By 
providing a written guideline that organizes the state apparatus and allocates power 
among different actors, a constitution may help an authoritarian regime function in an 
organized fashion. A common problem shared by authoritarian rulers is the absence of an 
established mechanism for intra-elite coordination that would facilitate their organization 
and decision-making (Ginsburg and Simpser 2014). Constitutions that provide a division 
of power between the different actors of an authoritarian regime and clarify the different 
functions expected may help avoid internal division problems likely to be faced by the 
governing elite (Hardin 2013). 474 By establishing the rights and privileges of the elites 
and setting out a new distribution of power among them, the authoritarian constitution, 
according to the findings of Albertus and Menaldo (2012) enhance a regime’s longevity. 
475 Indeed, authoritarian constitutions have been employed in the Latin American context 
as a tool for the authoritarian ruler to prolong his rule and provide a façade of legitimacy 
(Hartlyn and Valenzuela 1998, 13-14).476 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
474 The “coordination theory” is one of the two main schools of constitutional theory, with the other being 
“contractual theory” (Hardin 2013, 51). 
475 The argument is based on constitutions adopted in the early stages of a dictatorial regime and also hold 
that the constitution provides for increased investment and economic growth (Albertus and Menaldo 2014). 
476 Specific examples include both civilian and military authoritarians such as “Perón in Argentina (1949), 
Vargas in Brazil (1934, 1937), Pinochet in Chile (1980), Terra in Uruguay (1934), Gomez (1931), López 
Contreras (1936) and Pérez Jiménez  (1953) in Venezuela” (Hartlyn and Valenzuela 1998, 14). 
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 Authoritarian constitutions serve as “coordinating devices” for those political and 
economic elites that has helped the authoritarian leader grasp power, ensure their loyalty 
to the regime and co-opt others that might threaten their rule (Albertus and Menaldo 
2014) 477. An effectively functioning constitution that is able to allocate power among 
elites and generate popular expectations raises the cost of engaging in another act of 
coordination (Hardin 2013). The 1979 Constitution of Iran’, although was a reflection of 
the theocratic vision of Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers, it also included the beliefs 
and preferences of leftist Islamists who were his allies (Chehabi and Schirazi 2012, 186). 
The constitution that regulates access to power becomes a “self-enforcing system” 
(Ginsburg and Simpser 2014). Brown (2002)’s work on Arab constitutions reveal that 
rather than being hypocritical pieces of paper, constitutions do lay out the authoritarian 
functions and serve as one of the mechanisms for the authoritarian ruler to assert his 
authority. 478 Przeworski (2014) argues that the authoritarian constitutions serve as 
“operating manuals”, which organize the government structure, formulate a system of 
decision-making and establish the state’s relation with the people. Albeit unintentional, 
the manual might become a constraint for those in power.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
477  According to Albertus and Menaldo (2014) the list of functions that the authoritarian constitutions serve 
that help create a stable distribution of power include the following: 1) define who the ruling elites and 
weaken the existing ones that belong to former regime, 2) establish institutions and rules that help share the 
rewards of the new regime, 3) set up institutions that would oversee the implementation of these rules, 4) 
prevent the rise of an alternative autocratic coalition, and 5) regulate the distribution of power and 
reallocate property rights. 
478 Based on the experience of Arab countries, Brown’s analysis (2002) concludes that the primary goal of 
an authoritarian constitution is not to constrain the state power as it is in the Western context, but to 
enhance it. Thus, they are not sham documents but nevertheless nonconstitutionalist ones. 
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 The authoritarian constitution may also serve as a marketing strategy. This role of 
authoritarian constitutions characterized as “billboards” by Ginsburg and Simpser (2014) 
provide an outlet for leaders to communicate with both domestic and international 
audiences their political and economic intentions. Constitutions serve as “mission 
statements”, a character relevant for both democracies and authoritarian states (King 
2013). These signal the authoritarian rulers’ preferences and set promises. 479 Mexico’s 
1917 constitution born out of revolutionary fervor included such ideological provisions 
that provided information regarding the path the country set out to follow. Similarly 
Iran’s post-revolution constitution has a clear ideological content (Chehabi and Schirazi 
2012). In doing so, authoritarian constitutions establish a political discourse that over the 
long-term may alter people’s values (Ginsburg and Simpser 2014). A constitution is also 
an opportunity for rulers to make credible promises. By providing for a Supreme 
Constitutional Court and protection of private property, Egypt’s 1971 constitution was 
addressing itself to foreign audiences, namely to project to investors that it was safe to do 
business with Egypt (Stilt 2014, 119). To the extent that the constitution provides for 
plurality of actors in the decision-making process and weakens the concentration of 
power and its arbitrary use, the authoritarian regime’s other projects might receive a more 
favorable reaction from the public. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
479 According to the typology provided by Law and Versteeg (2014), civilian authoritarian rulers are more 
likely to make promises and ideological statements to help mobilize their audiences because they cannot 
rely on repression as military rulers can, nor can they rely on historical or religious claims as monarchies 
can do. 
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 In cases where its provisions are hollow or pure fiction, they merely serve as 
“window dressing”. This characteristic is especially correct for the basic rights and 
freedom under authoritarian constitutions. Without an actual enforcement mechanism 
either at home or abroad, sham constitutions provide an opportunity for authoritarian 
rulers to create the illusion of a respectful member of world community (Law and 
Versteeg 2014 and Meyer et. al. 1997). In some cases, however, authoritarian 
constitutions accurately reflect the political structure and state-society relations.480 
Brown’s (2002:xiv) work on the Arabs’ experience with constitutions demonstrate that 
the documents are not simply meaningless words on a paper but to the extent that they are 
constructed, “render the political authority of the state more effective and secondarily to 
underscore state sovereignty and establish general ideological orientations”, they are not 
devoid of substance. In cases, such as the 1936 constitution of the Soviet Union where 
the regime is outright authoritarian, the constitution’s institutional provisions – its 
“operating manual” may provide a truthful reflection of the regime in practice (Getty 
1991). In short, certain parts of a constitution may reflect reality while the rest may 
simply be incorporated to the document as “window dressing”.  
 Getty’s study (1991) of the Stalin constitution of 1936 demonstrates that 
constitution-making itself may be the goal, even under totalitarian rule. In the case of the 
Soviet constitution, in addition to the motivation to respond to changing dynamics, the 
constitution-making process provided an opportunity to liken itself akin to its Western 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
480 According to Law and Versteeg (2014) monarchical and military rulers, rather than civilian authoritarian 
rulers tend to adopt constitutions with weak commitments. 
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allies and distance itself from its fascist opponent Germany. Its “propaganda value” as a 
grand scheme of popular participation provided a different picture of Soviets on the 
domestic front as well, where it contrasted with reports of political oppression. Thus, the 
process of drafting a new constitution in itself might attract authoritarian rulers as it 
provides the impression to both domestic and international audience that the regime is 
embarking on an important political venture (Ginsburg and Simpser 2014). Getty (1991) 
argues that the commission chaired by Stalin took the task of drafting a new constitution 
very seriously. Although not bearing much significance during Stalin era, the process was 
not devoid of much significance, it was not simply an attempt to provide “window 
dressing” but the turn of events that would ensue led to its promises remaining 
insignificant.481 His account presents a paradox- of what the authoritarian leaders 
originally intended may not correspond to how the constitution eventually functions. The 
gap between the text and compliance to its provisions is not inherent to authoritarian 
constitutions (Law and Versteeg 2014). According to Ginsburg and Simpser (2014) that 
is due to the fact that constitutions, authoritarian ones in particular, also function as 
“blueprints”, meaning that they provide a goal- and desire-driven plan for the future 
rather than offering attainable targets for the present. Also worth considering is the 
possibility that the process of writing a new constitution, may arise from the intention of 
launcing a grand political project may be the main motivation, rather than be driven by 
specific strategic goal. Or, as an alternative explanation, authoritarian rulers may wish to 
defy a document that enjoys a privileged normative status is in itself may be the goal. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
481 In term of content some of the provisions were “window-dressing”, however the decision to introduce a 
new constitution was not solely addressed at providing a sham document. 
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Authoritarian rulers may choose to adopt a constitution even though they do not have the 
intention to comply with the rights and liberties set forth for its citizens and blatantly 
ignore the document in order to signal to the opposition of their willingness to violate 
rules if in a show of the strength of their regime (Hollyer and Rossendorff 2011). 
Regardless, the arduous process of drafting a constitution suggests that at some level the 
authoritarians credibly signaling their political intentions.  
 Authoritarian constitutions as a subcategory of constitutions are also not 
homogeneous within themselves (Law and Versteeg 2014). The following section will 
provide a discussion of the authoritarian constitutions drafted with specific goals of 
attaining long-term transformation à la Chilean and Turkish ones, although not limited to 
these two specific cases.  
4.1 Antidotal Authoritarian Constitutions 
 A common feature shared by the Chilean and Turkish constitutions is that the 
existing documents drafted during their respective authoritarian period have survived the 
transition to democracy. Among a greater pool of constitutions drafted under non-
democratic rule (56% of all existing constitutions)482, there exists a smaller subcategory 
of constitutions written under authoritarian rule that were retained by democrats 
(approximately 20%).483 Thus, the seemingly peculiar cases of the Chilean and Turkish 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
482 The most recent data from 2008 show that authoritarian constitutions make up 56 percent of all 
constitutions in force. Out of 178 constitutions, about 20 percent of these in force today, which were 
written by authoritarian leaders, have survived a transition to democracy (Elkins et. al. 2014, 145-147). 
483 According to the data provided by Elkins et al. (2014) constitutions that were drafted by authoritarians 
but that have survived a transition to democracy have comprised 10 percent of all the constitutions drafted 
since 1789. The data covers the period between 1789 and 2008 and includes 846 constitutional systems.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  230	   	  
constitutions are not alone. While countries such as Spain, Brazil, South Africa, and 
recently Egypt and Tunisia engaged in constitution-making as part of the general 
framework of regime change, Turkey and Chile- as well as others such as Taiwan (1947), 
Peru (1993), Mexico (1917), Portugal (1976), Nicaragua (1984), Japan (1947), India 
(1949) and Hungary (1949 which recently did in 2011) did not opt for a constitutional 
replacement. 484 Needless to say, each is a different case 485. Yet, the certain 
characteristics shared by the Chilean and Turkish authoritarian constitutions are worthy 
of attention and its discrete subcategory. 486  
 The Chilean and Turkish authoritarian constitutions are frameworks intended by 
its drafters to produce enduring changes in the countries’ political, social and economic 
outlook. The constitutions reflect certain objectives based on the prior experience of the 
country with respect to then perceived failures of the prior constitutional systems. The 
constitutions in these settings are strategic choices by the authoritarian rulers to entrench 
certain sets of principles, values, practices and policy goals for the long-term future that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
484 For the full list, see Ginsburg (2014, 8 Table 1). 
485 The Mexican and Indonesian constitutions were drafted in the aftermath of revolution and their 
respective struggle for independence, as such these have acquired popular legitimacy over the years- a trait 
shared by the Indian constitution. The Nicaraguan constitution drafted under the Sandinista influence but 
was not structured to constrain alternative political forces. The Peruvian constitution that followed the 
autogolpe (self-coup) of 1992 was tailored to pursue free market reforms and allow Alberto Fujimori, the 
president and architect of the constitutional crisis of 1992 to run for a second consecutive term. The 
Japanese constitution of 1947 was drafted under external influence when the country had already embarked 
on a slow transition to democracy.  Only the Portuguese constitution shares certain similarities with the 
Turkish and Chilean cases in that it was drafted under the guise of the armed forces (yet through a 
constituent assembly) in the aftermath of a military (left-leaning) coup, providing the military with 
significant political power. However, it differs in the sense that the military coup, also known as the 
Carnation Revolution for its absence of violence that usually accompanies military takeovers, overthrew an 
authoritarian regime and paved the way for ultimately towards a transition to democracy. 
486 Professor Tom Ginsburg (2014, 7-10) also recognizes the parallels between these two cases. 
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will ensure that past “mistakes” will not be repeated after the authoritarian rulers step 
down. These constitutions differ from other authoritarian constitutions in the sense that 
they are specifically conceived to oversee a return to democracy. Thus, these are intended 
by their drafters to serve both authoritarian and democratic rulers. In order to ensure that 
their post-authoritarian vision remains intact and that the successor regime is constrained 
by the legal framework inherited from previous authoritarian rulers, the constitution also 
provides for a set of institutional and procedural constraints that are explicitly designed to 
cement the status-quo established by the authoritarian rulers. These constraints that 
appear in the form of counter-majoritarian institutions ensure that the system set up by 
the authoritarian rulers is self-enforcing (Alberts, Warshaw, and Weingast 2012). These 
institutions may come in the form of structures, such as advisory councils with 
supervisory role over elected bodies; constitutional courts with judicial review; appointed 
legislative members; the requirement of a supermajority to pass certain types of 
legislations including constitutional amendments; electoral rules that misrepresent 
political choices and restrictions on legal prosecution of formal rulers (Alberts, Warshaw, 
and Weingast 2012, p. 71-75).487 
 In short, the authoritarian constitutional framework, informed of past crises, aims 
to bring about permanent change; envisions a return to democratic rule; and contains 
legal tools that will veto attempts to alter the established structure.488 This specific type of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
487 With respect to constitutional courts, there is a growing literature on judicial empowerment through 
constitutionalization which argue that judicial review serves as political insurance against possible electoral 
defeat (Ginsburg 2003) and help the threatened elites to enhance their hegemony (Hirschl 2004). 
488 Tom Ginsburg (2014, 2) provides a similar definition for what he calls “transformational authoritarian 
constitutions” which: 1) are explicitly framed to assist in restructuring a return to electoral democracy after 
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authoritarian constitutions is goal-motivated and as such, do not merely exist to serve as 
“window dressing”. 489  To the extent that the objectives of these constittuions are 
motivated by prior constitutional experience, they are backward-looking490. However 
their aspiration to bring about permanent change and generate political, social and 
economical transformation reflect their forward-looking characteristic. The authoritarian 
leaders may possess a skeptical attitude towards democracy and its vagaries and fear 
what might majoritarian decision-making may bring, which are both rooted in their 
reading of past political crisis.491 Thus, the authoritarian constitutional framework 
preferred becomes one in which policy-making prerogatives are restrained. Here, Law 
and Versteeg’s (2014) analysis of different strains of authoritarianism may provide a 
useful explanation of why the Chilean and Turkish cases fall under this discrete category 
of authoritarian constitutions.492 Their findings indicate that there are differences in 
respect to de jure and de facto rights protections between the three types of authoritarian 
regimes: monarchical, civilian and military. The authors find that military regimes, which 
are the authoritarian leaders in the case of Chile and Turkey, are more likely to adopt 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
a period of time; 2) reflects certain policy goals designed to be permanent; and 3) contain an enforcement 
mechanism to ensure that both these goals are met”. 
489 Yet certain provisions, such as rights and protections may have been embedded to not to evoke too 
much criticism. 
490 The reactive aspect of constitution is not specific to authoritarian constitution. Studying the making of 
Spanish constitution within the context of the Spanish transition to democracy in the late 1970s Andrea 
Bonime-Blanc (1987, 13) defines constitution-making “at its best is a comprehensive attempt at social and 
political problem solving. 
491 See Schäfer (2002) for more discussion on how the memory of past conflicts shape constitutions in 
liberal constitutions. 
492 As mentioned before, nearly 20% of current constitutions are constitutions drafted under authoritarian 
period but are retained by the democrats. I have listed some examples under the footnote 11 and believe 
that a further analysis beyond the scope of this study is necessary to determine whether these examples are 
analogous to Chilean and Turkish cases. 
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weak constitutions that offer few rights protections but tend to be more sincere regarding 
compliance with their constitutional promises.493 It brings to mind whether other traits of 
authoritarian constitutions can also be traced back to the kind of authoritarian discussed. 
 Military rulers come to power by force and usually with the justification that their 
takeover was the only option available to rescue the country from chaos and reinstate the 
democratic order. Accordning to Law and Versteeg (2014), military rulers have the 
disadvantage of lacking any claims to historical or religious legitimacy that monarchial 
types of authoritarian regimes possess. However, in circumstances where the armed 
forces as an institution have historically played a role in the political development of a 
country and are regarded as the guardian of the political order, they may exhibit domestic 
legitimacy. Regardless of whether that is the case, the initial support that may result from 
the dire pre-coup circumstances and, the esteemed position in which the armed forces is 
held by the public will gradually fade out. The need to regenerate public support and the 
inability to solely rest on force to govern may lead military laders to initiate a process of 
institutionalizing their rule, in order to secure legitimacy in the eyes of the domestic and 
international community. 
 Should the desire to acquire legitimacy be the only factor in prompting the 
military rulers to promulgate authoritarian constitutions, these texts are deemed “sham 
constitutions” to be discarded soon after the transition to electoral democracy. However, 
the specific type of authoritarian constitution in question is intended to be an enduring 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
493 This finding is also valid for monarchial regimes. 
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document that is equipped with tools that will ensure the document’s survival after the 
authoritarian rule.  
 Gabriel Negretto’s study (2014) on authoritarian constitution-making in Latin 
America investigates the motivation behind military rulers’ decision to adopt a new 
constitution.494 According to him, military rulers choose to write constitutions in order to 
pursue their long-term goals of political, social, and economic transformation, as well as 
to exert their influence during the post-transition order. In cases where military rulers 
want to achieve “permanent goals such as promoting a particular model of economic 
development, eradicating certain political options, or transforming the nature of political 
competition in the country”, and seek “fundamental and lasting changes in the social and 
political order”, then drawing up their own constitution would serve their purpose (90). 
According to Negretto (2014, 90) “The loftier the objectives that military rulers pursue, 
the longer they may need to remain in power and the more important it becomes to put 
their decisions on a relatively solid legal basis”.  Military regimes that come to power 
with strong convictions about civilian governments’ failures, purporting to be nation’s 
“saviors” may see constitution-making as installing their preferences on a legal 
foundation which is intended to survive their period in power. Yet, constitutions drafted 
under the military tutelage do not necessarily survive to democratic rule (Negretto 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
494 Looking at the Latin American cases (for the period 1900 to 2008) Negretto (2014) finds that only one 
third of military regimes have adopted a new constitution. During this period, a large majority (70%) of the 
constitutions adopted are authoritarian, a large majority of which (67%) occur under a military authoritarian 
rule. However, within the total of authoritarian regimes only a small minority adopted a new constitution 
(33% of military regimes and 24% of civilian regimes). For more information regarding the Latin 
American authoritarian constitutions, see Negretto (2014). 
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2014).495 The right political context, according to Negretto’s findings, include partisan 
support in the form of an informal alliance with a civilian party; this, he adds, assists in 
ensuring the constitution’s longevity once the electoral democracy resumes.  
 Aside from the availability of partisan support, institutional constraints embedded 
in the constitution aimed at restraining the incoming regime also, help ensure that the 
constitution survives the transition. These enforcement mechanisms, in the form of co-
opted or newly installed organizations, such as courts and other bodies or institutional 
mechanisms such as quorums and electoral rules ensure that the changes introduced by 
the military regime are protected, that policy making is insulated from the majoritarian 
politics and that the armed forces in general as well as participants of the authoritarian 
regime, preserve their privileges.  
 Where such an authoritarian constitution is able to oversee the transition to 
electoral democracy, it is able to transmit certain delimiting characteristics of the 
authoritarian ruler to the ensuing civilian regime. In the mean time, the constitution 
drafted by the military rulers offer the façade of legal grounds for its actions. The 
constitution’s higher normative status demands compliance from the people, especially if 
it was ratified by popular vote. According to Negretto (2014) military rulers opt for 
adopting a new constitution in order to demilitarize their method of exerting control. A 
constitution, especially one that is not purely imposed from the top down, is helpful for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
495 Among the Latin American countries, between 1900 and 2008, out of 39 authoritarian constitutions, 31 
of them were in force only for the duration of authoritarian rule and only 8 of them continued to be in force 
after the country makes transition to democratic rule (Negretto 2014, 88). 
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military rulers to create the pretenses of a representative government. Simpkins’ report 
(2004) on Nigeria indicate that the country’s 1999 constitution which was a product of 
military regime, actually helped reduce the role of military in governance because the 
military through constitution-making succeeded in serving its own purposes. 
 That said, the authoritarian constitution functions as a guideline for the orderly 
transition to electoral democracy. The constitution may or may not determine a specific 
timeline for the withdrawal of authoritarian rulers. However, an outlined mechanism that 
lays out the terms of the transfer and the ensuing timeline may be quite useful for the 
military rulers (Ginsburg and Simpser 2014, 4). Such an ordained mechanism will give 
civilians an incentive to abide by the constitution and also bolster the military 
authoritarians’ claim of “legitimate” rule. Considering that a democratic transition is 
inevitable, the military rulers may also find it useful to have a fixed timeline that will 
provide them with greater leeway to take necessary measures to ensure the preservation 
of their objectives and prerogatives after withdrawal from power (Negretto 2014). A 
military-backed candidate may also be offered as the official choice that will help 
guarantee continuity during what is presented to the public as a tenuous political 
transition.496 
 A distinction possibly relevant for all constitutions that are not completely tainted 
in the eyes of the general public is their ability to provide an authoritarian discourse 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
496 On this matter, Negretto (2014, 93) postulates that the capacity to retain the constitution drafted under 
the military rule depends on whether a political party aligned to the outgoing military regime is able to win 
in the first electoral contest or at least gain enough votes to be a veto player. 
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through its language and ideological character (Bonime-Blanc 1987). As they have a 
higher normative status simply for being the principal legal document of the country, 
aonstitutions operate as “hallowed vessels”, which are “adorned with political and 
ceremonial weight” (Elkins et. al 2014, 149).  These constitutions endowed with 
enforcement mechanisms that will safeguard it against future infringements have the 
potential to carry on the political idiom created by the autocratic leaders to the post-
authoritarian period and perpetuate the authoritarian rulers’ institutional and normative 
legacy. 
 Regardless of its firm political, social and economic objectives and the 
constitution framers’ strategic purpose of overhauling the existing system, it does not 
necessarily mean that the constitution will be able to function as the drafters intended. 
Even though, the authoritarian constitution drafting process is most likely limited in 
contributions from outside the regime, it still reflects an agreed arrangement among its 
elites. Military rulers, who aim to introduce a constitutional arrangement that will 
transform the political, social and economic order and ensure its survival once they leave 
power find themselves in a conundrum. In order to guarantee that the constitution won’t 
be discarded and their personal and institutional interests will be maintained in the future 
democratic regime, the process of constitution-making must profess to have a 
representative character (Negretto 2014, 91). 497 A constituent body and/or political 
referendum, rather than an executive commission may be effective to claim that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
497 Within the Latin American context (between 1900 and 2008), the preferred method for drafting a new 
constitution is by a constituent congress or assembly in which the military rulers exert influence (Negretto 
2014, 86). 
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process is credible.498 Yet, in order to draft a document that would realize the goals of the 
military rulers the process must also be tightly controlled. This requires that the body in 
charge of constitution-making be under the influence of the military either by direct 
appointment or by ensuring the pro-military delegates obtain the majority. Negretto 
(2014) argues that a civilian partner of the military serving in the constitution-making 
body would help give credibility to the representativeness claim while also strengthening 
the likelihood that political referendum would result in a favorable outcome for the 
military rulers without the need to resort to electoral manipulation or coercion. But, such 
a seemingly representative process, tightly-controlled from top-down will produce an 
agreement among the regime elites; however small that circle might be. 
 The above discussion is not intended to make the claim that the shared 
characteristics of the authoritarian constitutions in Chile and Turkey can be explained 
solely by the type of authoritarian rule but to raise the possibility that the fact the 
constitutions are a product of military rule might play into the reason why certain traits 
are common in both cases. Certainly there are other cases of military rule where the 
authoritarian constitution has survived to democratic periods, such as the Constitution of 
Panama and other examples where the document was prepared by an authoritarian 
government but not of military type, such as the Constitution of Mexico.  The four 
characteristics shared by the Chilean and Turkish constitutions namely, 1) being informed 
by past crises- backward looking, 2) aiming to bringing about permanent change- forward 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
498 For a comprehensive discussion on the why constitution-makers adopt referendum; i.e. popular 
ratification, see Lenowitz 2013. 
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looking, 3) envisioning a return to democratic rule- surviving the transition, and 4) 
containing legal tools that will veto attempts to alter the established structure- 
constraining, as well as the armed forces’ role in drafting the documents offer a striking 
comparison. 
4.2 Antidotal Authoritarian Constitution-Making Process 
 A word of caution is necessary before moving onto the discussion on the cases of 
authoritarian constitutions in Chile and Turkey. Studying authoritarian constitutions has 
its difficulty in terms of attaining information regarding the internal decision-making 
process and internal power dynamics. Barros (2012) draws attention to the specific 
problem of “autocratic secrecy. 499 Looking from the outside, indirect evidence such as 
the official speeches, legislations and policy choices may be easily interpreted as clues 
that shed light on the actual organization of an authoritarian regime whereas in reality, 
these may serve as part of the “public myth” that the regime is trying to create (Barros 
2012, 20) 500. Simply studying public government acts and outcomes may not be enough 
to reveal the internal configuration of power and in fact may help misrepresent the 
internal processes at work. Considering that access to archives of an authoritarian regime, 
the most reliable source for research may not be available, studying the actual autocratic 
constitutional law may serve as a viable alternative. Although by themselves, legal 
sources may not be sufficient to lift “the authoritarian veil of secrecy”, they do provide 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
499 Also described as “authoritarian non-publicity”, the tendency to conceal the internal politics may also 
been in democracies, however it is more likely in authoritarian regimes (Barros 2012, 4). 
500 Among these equivocal sources that might distort information for researchers, one can include 
interviews (public or research-related) and memoirs. 
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crucial information for research on authoritarian regimes (Barros 2012, 25). Just as one 
can rely on constitutional rules to understand the system of government and structures of 
power in democratic regimes, legal sources in authoritarian regimes can also be useful in 
providing information on the authoritarian rule, its internal power dynamics and its vision 
for the promulgation of the authoritarian constitution. However, without access to 
archives, just as the other indirect sources, legal sources will also provide limited 
information.  
 To examine the four characteristics of the antidotal authoritarian constitution, I 
will rely mainly on the constitutional text. However, in order to complement the analysis, 
I will initially be reviewing the process of constitution-making carried out during the 
authoritarian military rule in Chile and Turkey. Such a review will offer insight as to the 
rationale for certain choices opted by military rulers and their civilian counterparts. 
4.2.1. The Making of Chile’s 1980 Constitution 
 The Chilean armed forces took over the government on September 11, 1973.501 
While the junta pledged to respect the 1925 constitution, the new regime soon after began 
issuing military edicts and decree laws, however; these, effectively placed the country 
under dictatorial rule that violated the constitution while also attempting to create the 
illusion of legal formality (Constable and Valenzuela 1991, 19 and 127). 502  The junta 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
501 The four-man junta composed of General Augusto Pinochet, Admiral José Toribio Merino Castro, 
General Gustavo Leigh Guzmán and General César Mendoza Durán, respectively commanders of the army, 
navy, air force and national police swore itself to power. With Decree Law no. 28 of November 16, 1973 
which interprets the Law no 1, the junta took over “the constituent, legislative and executive powers”.  
502 Decree Law no 1 declared that “the military junta will guarantee the full efficacy of the faculties of the 
judicial power and will respect the Constitution and the laws of the republic as far as the circumstances 
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decreed to close down the Congress, to dissolve the Constitutional Court, effectively put 
all political parties in indefinite recess and to suspend the right of habeas corpus and 
banned labor unions. 503 Two days after the coup, on September 13th, the junta asked a 
young constitutional law professor Jaime Guzmán Errázuriz504 to study plans for a new 
constitution; he soon became “the single most influential advisor to the government on 
institutional issues” (Barros 2002, 89). 505 Additional members including law professors 
and former congressmen later joined the Constituent Commission (Comision de Estudios 
de la Nueva Constitutcion Politica del Estado) and met for the first time on September 
24. From their point of view, these scholars and former politicians had taken on an 
important mission “to improve Chile’s republican institutions in order to prevent future 
violations of the rule of law, such as the ones done by the Allende government” (Couso 
2011, 406).506 For the members of the Constituent Commission, “the trauma of the 1972-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
allow” (Couso et. al. 2011, 34)  Decree Law No 4 issued on September 18, 1973 declared a “state of 
emergency” and Decree Law 5 of September 22 further stipulated that this should be understood as Chile 
was “in a state or time of war”(Loveman 2001, 263).  
503503 Until December 1977, Chile was ruled under a “state of siege”, the harshest form of state of exception. 
From then on, other forms of states  of exception was applied (Oppenheim 2007, 128). Parties that made up 
Unidad Popular were immediately banned, in 1977, the military junta dissolved the rest of the political 
parties. 
504 According to Cristi (2000), Guzmán was influenced by Carl Schmitt’s understanding of constituent 
power. See also Pollack, 1997. 
505 Decree No. 1064 (October 25, 1973) which stated that “[T]here is a need for a new constitution in order 
to reconstruct, renew, and improve the fundamental institutional order of the Republic”, set up the 
commission (Couso 2011, 406, note 62). It was formally subordinate to the Ministry of Justice (Barros 
2002, 90). 
506 The commission originally included four law professors; Enrique Ortúzar, Jaime Guzmán, Sergio Diez, 
and Jorge Ovalle. Ortúzar was also a former minister of justice during Alessandri’s rule and had worked on 
a draft for constitutional change. Guzmán was also the founder and leader of the conservative-liberal 
political movement called Gremialismo. Diez was formerly a senator from the National Party, while Ovalle 
was a former member of the Radical Party (Huneeus 2007, 151). Alejandro Silva Bascuñán and Enrique 
Evans de la Cuadro, both Christian Democrats joined the commission a few weeks later. The decision to 
broaden the commission came after the Minister of Justice Gonzalo Prieto Gandara responded to the 
Christian Democrats’ pressure and asked for an expanded commission (Barros 2002, 88). Gustavo Lorca 
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1973 had revealed too many fault lines for any of them to advocate rehabilitating the 
prior constitutional edifice” (Barros 2002, 221). However, the antagonism was against the 
failures of the certain institutional mechanisms and not democracy or constitutionalism 
per se.  
 They produced two documents on September 26 and November 26, 1973 
outlining their goals and objectives. Albeit different in tone, both documents envisioned 
restricted roles for political parties, as well as expanded and constitutionally recognized a 
role for the armed forces (Hawkins 2002, 110-111). The members of the commission 
understood their task as drafting a democratic constitution that takes into account the 
1973 political crisis (Barros 2002, 91). The commission, also known as the Ortúzar 
Commision after the prominent law professor that headed it, worked on a draft behind 
close doors. The military government did not disclose that the 1925 constitution was 
abrogated in order to protect Chile’s international image (Cristi 2000, 1770). The military 
junta, in the meantime ruled by decree. 507 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
who was a former member of Liberal Party also joined the commission. Before then, the commission 
included supporters of the former president Jorge Alessandri. Alicia Romo was the only female member of 
the commission, she was appointed towards the end of 1973 (Huneeus 2007, 151). Thus, by December 
1973, the commission had 8 members. 
507 In order to legitimize its rule by decree and prevent the Supreme Court from exercising judicial review, 
another decree, DL no. 128 (November 11, 1973) stated that “on 11 September 1973, the Junta has 
assumed the exercise of constituent, legislative and executive powers” (Cristi 2000, 1770)- this decree was 
meant to clarify DL no. 1. It further stipulated that if a decree had conflicted or were to conflict in the 
future with the constitution, this would mean that the constitution through this decree had been modified 
(Couso et. al 2011, 74). A later decree (DL no. 788 of December 2, 1974), enacted to clarify the previous 
one declared that “future decrees that are, in part or totally, tacitly or expressly, contrary to different to any 
norm within the Constitution, will only amend if its is explicitly said that the Junta does so in the virtue of 
its constituent power” (quoted in Cristi 2000, 1772), which effectively declared all decrees to be 
amendments to the 1925 Constitution.  See Barros 2002 (92-96) for the constitutional commission’s views 
on the status of the 1925 Constitution. See Barros 2002 (96-107) for the Supreme Court’s position on 
decree-laws. 
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 Pinochet expressed his vision for the country in a speech he gave one month after 
the coup in which he said that a new constitution would be  “the supreme expression of 
the new institutionally, as the destiny of Chile will strengthen within its model” (quoted 
in Weeks 2001, note 13). On March 11, 1974, the military government published a 
guideline written by Guzmán and titled Declaration of Principles 508. Up till then, the 
military had not acknowledged its desire to remain in power for an extended period of 
time. The document stated that it was important to “change Chileans’ mentality” and 
added that “it has no intention of limiting itself to being a mere administration, a 
parenthesis between two similar, party-based governments- or, in other words, this is not 
a ‘truce’ for reordering and then returning power to the same politicians so much to 
blame, by action or omission, for the virtual destruction of the country” (Huneeus 2007, 
142). The statement foreshadowed the long-term transformation intended by the military 
rule.  
 The commission did not have a deadline since the military was not necessarily 
looking forward to having a legal framework that would require them to return to their 
barracks (Huneeus 2007, 152). The commission working through its subcommissions on 
property rights, the judiciary, the electoral system, political parties, domestic 
administration, administrative decentralization, the media, and administrative disputes 
launched a process that would take five years to complete (Huneeus 2007, 172 note 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
508 According to Loveman (1988, 263-264) the declaration was “(g)uided by ‘the inspiration of Portales’ 
and an eclectic ‘fusion’ of anti-Marxist nationalism and ‘Christian and Hispanic traditions’”. However it 
also reflected the varieties of views shared by the members of the military junta, hence it was a rather 
general text (Huneeus 2007, 142). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  244	   	  
76)509. The commission did receive the input of figures that opposed the Allende 
government. First, they prepared a general framework (Bases de la Institucionalidad) 
approved in June 1974 that established “the ground rules for the institutional foundation” 
(Huneeus 2007, 152). The commission later moved on to working on specific issues 
starting with nationality, citizenship and moving on to constitutional rights and duties. 
However, the commission’s task, at the request of the military regime, got sidelined when 
the regime advisors could not agree on the type of new institutional order. In time, even 
regime supporters became critical of the military rule for excluding civil participation, 
calling for a “new institutional foundation” that would be established with the input of its 
civilian allies. International pressure, highly critical of regime’s activities, began to 
mounting against it. In order to respond to these critics and to gradually introduce a new 
constitutional order, the military regime enacted a series of Constitutional Acts (ACs)  
(Loveman 2001, 270). For this purpose, a constitutional act (the first) created the Council 
of State that began to work like a civilian advisory body to the junta510. The second 
constitutional act established the fundamentals of Chile’s institutions while the third 
defined the constitutional rights and duties. The fourth constitutional act defined states of 
emergency (Huneeus 2007, 153 and Hawkins 2002, 87-90).511 These constitutional acts 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
509 Civilian lawyers were employed in subcommissions. Many belonged to center-right PDC or right parties 
(Barros 2002, 90, note 7).  It was not actually until March 1978 that the commission began drafting articles 
regarding political institutions (Hawkins 2002, 111). 
510 The creation of the Council of State on January 1, 1976 was a measure to provide some much needed 
legitimacy to the military government. For this purpose, former presidents, ministers and commanders of 
the armed forces were asked to participate. Former president Eduardo Frei refused to join the council 
(Hawkins 2002, 111). However two former Presidents of the Republic, Jorge Alessandri and Gabriel 
González Videla were members of the Council of State. 
511 At this time, it was envisioned that constitutional acts would later make up the articles of the new 
constitution, however this idea was later abandoned.  
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provided as “transitional institutions” would allow “the government a legal-institutional 
base of support, but would not supersede military authority or endure beyond the period 
of military rule” (Hawkins 2002, 111).512 
 When the military government banned all the political parties in March 1977, 
including the Christian Democrat Party, commission members Alejandro Silva Bascuñán 
and Enrique Evans, both Christian Democrats resigned.513 Jorge Ovalle was also soon 
dismissed from the commission. Three new members, Luz Bulnes, Raúl Bertelsen and 
Juan de Dios Carmona were appointed in their place (Huneeus 2007, 153)514. The 
piecemeal process of enacting constitutional acts rather than a full constitution was 
criticized by regime supporters, evidenced by calls for further institutionalization by the 
conservative newspaper El Mercurio (Hawkins 2002, 115) and other critics that pointed 
out the lack of civil participation (Huneeus 2007, 153). Those who did participate in the 
process were the civilian advisors to the military regime. Most notably, the economic 
advisors who effected the central features of the constitution’s economic model were all 
members of the military regime’s economic team known as the Chicago Boys (Couso et. 
al 2011, 36). 
 More importantly, though, an internal crisis among the members of the junta gave 
way to a permanent constitution (Barros 2002, 181-209).  Until the enactment of ACs, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
512 The constitutional acts only make up one portion of military’s legal tools that also include military 
edicts and decree laws. See Loveman 2001, 272-274 Table 10.1 
513 Couso et. al (2011, 35) contends that Bascuñán resigned over human rights abuses committed by the 
military. 
514 Bulnes and Bertelsen were constitutional law professors; Dios Carmona was a former minister of 
defense. 
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junta had ruled by decree, arguing that it had constituent power. With the introduction of 
the ACs, the military regime faced the threat that only constitutional acts would be 
recognized as having constitutional status. In order to prevent such a legal catastrophe, 
the military regime opted for the enactment of an additional Constitutional Act that 
combined the existing decree-laws, specified the legal structure of the junta and its public 
power. It launched a debate on the separation of powers between the executive and 
legislative junta that resulted in a divisive internal crisis (Barros 2001,16-17). 515  The 
navy and air commanders refused to accept a proposal that would weaken their influence. 
This led to the abandonment of the plan to follow a course of gradual institutionalization 
in order to accelerate the drafting of a new constitution516. Also a growing point of 
concern for the military regime was the international isolation it faced due to President 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
515 Barros (2001 and 2002) demonstrates that other members of the military junta also played significant 
roles. The internal records later revealed indicate that the Pinochet did not singlehandedly established the 
content of the 1980 constitution nor did not force his term to ensure his dominance. In fact, the outcome of 
the rules distributed roles to other commanders as a compromise. Pinochet had to strengthen his position in 
the army. He had joined the coup plotting only two days prior to the event and unlike the officers of the 
navy and air force, the army was not heavily involved in the conspiracy and those vested in the plot ranked 
below him. Therefore Pinochet who was named president of the junta foremost needed to consolidate his 
power. His compromise for being named as president included maintaining the composition of the junta 
and the autonomy of the military branches, which ensured that he would not be able, concentrate power and 
control lawmaking. Several mechanisms allowed the other members of the junta to establish separation of 
power when it comes to legislative process. System of legislative commissions provided that each 
commander of navy, air force and national police would be responsible for their own legislative 
commission and only in national defense matters, there would be a joint commission. Other than that, 
Pinochet would not preside over a separate commission. Other mechanism that secured separation of power 
was the unanimous decision rule. With each member of the junta holding the veto provided an 
“institutionally protected role” in the legislation process for commanders in exchange for Pinochet 
dominating the executive. The other military branches were also able to protect themselves from possible 
army encroachment regarding promotions and retirements (Barros 2001, 13 and 21-22). 
516 One of the main contentions of Barros (2002 and 2001) is that the 1980 Constitution was a compromise 
between the members of the junta. While Pinochet wanted to institute a dictatorship of the army, the navy 
and air commanders rejected any proposal that would eliminate their influence and establish a permanent 
authoritarianism. Therefore, this intramilitary conflict which is only uncovered by Barros’ archival work 
demonstrates that the 1980 Constitution locked in the organizational structure of the junta with respect to 
executive and legislative powers. And while “the constitution appeared to prolong Pinochet’s rule … it also 
protected the junta by elevating its powers to constitutional rank” (Barros 2001, 17). 
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Carter’s pressure after it was revealed that DINA had participated in the Orlando Letelier 
assassination in Washington, D.C. (Barros 2002, 209-216). Chile also encountered a 
difficult situation with Argentina over the Beagle Channel (Huneeus 2007, 153).  These 
factors prompted Pinochet announce Chile’s new institutional order and its timeline for 
the end of military rule. In a speech delivered on Youth Day on July 9, 1977 at 
Chacarillas, Pinochet disclosed his vision for a gradual transition and for the first time 
uttered the phrase “protected democracy” (Ensalaco 1995, 257).517 According to the 
timeline stated in the speech, there would be three stages to complete the new political 
regime’s institutionalization: recovery, transition and normalcy (González 2008, 39 and 
Oppenheim 2007, 115). The recovery stage referred to the military regime’s practice 
since 1973 and also included plans to complete the rest of the constitutional acts that 
would effectively repeal the 1925 Constitution (Huneeus 2007, 154). The second stage, 
the transition period would witness a civil-military joint government518 , this would be 
followed by the final stage of constitutional normalcy in which, the civilians would 
inherit a tutelary democracy- one “that would be authoritarian, protected, integrative, 
technified, and of authentic social participation” (quoted in Ensalaco 2000, 127).  
 Besides the timeline and the acknowledgement that new political rules would 
ensue, there was not much more specification on the new constitution. However, four 
months after the Chacarilla speech on November 15, 1977, Pinochet provided the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
517 The speech was authored by Guzmán and Sergio Covarrubias, Pinochet’s chief of staff who also helped 
Guzmán persuade the general (Hawkins 2002, 114-115). 
518 According to the plan indicated in the speech, the junta would continue to exercise power, one-third of 
the legislature would be designated by Pinochet and Council of State would have an institutional role 
(Oppenheim 2007, 115). 
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commission with a memo giving broad guidelines regarding the new constitution519. His 
main points in the memo were granting the armed forced with political power, limiting 
political pluralism, expanding the powers of the office of the presidency, having non-
elected members of the Congress and weakening the power of political parties (Huneeus 
2007, 154).520 The timeline set up by the Chacarilla speech was later abandoned by the 
military regime.521  
 After the instructions provided in the Chacarillas speech, the commission took 
one more year to finally present the draft constitution to Pinochet on October 30, 1978522. 
In the meantime, opposition figures formed a group, called the Grupo de Estudios 
Constitucionales in August 1978 to come up with an alternative constitutional project. 
Also known as the Grupo de los 24 the group included a total of 24 members that brought 
together the country’s prominent constitutional law scholars with former members of 
tCongress from different political parties but mainly Christian Democrats (Barros 2002, 
1972 note 8 and Constable and Valenzuela 1991, 283). They called for an election of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
519 Pinochet enlisted the help of justice minister Mónica Madariaga who together with Guzmán drafted the 
guideline. As Hawkins (2002, 115) emphasizes “As a result, Pinochet’s memo outlining government policy 
to the Constitutional Commission was actually drafted in part by one of the members of that same 
commission”. 
520 According to Barros (2002, 215), the memo was not intended as an instruction but was meant as a 
general framework to accelerate the pace of drafting and following the guidance of the Chacarilla speech.  
521 According to the speech, the third phase was planned to begin in 1985. 
522 The draft included many of the authoritarian elements that later were ratified by a plebiscite after the 
draft was worked on by the Council of State and later by Pinochet’s legal advisors. Thus, “notwithstanding 
many changes, the Junta maintained the basic organization and structure of powers as first defined by the 
Constituent Commission” (Barros 2002, 219). These include political role for the armed forces through a 
new organ called National Security Council, restrictions on political and civil rights for certain groups- 
namely Marxists, restrictions on presidential power to name military commanders and rigid amendment 
rules.  
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constituent assembly to no avail.523 For the junta’s constitution commission draft, the 
next stop was the regime’s advisory council, the Council of State, which was presided by 
former President Alessandri. 524 He had accepted to join the Council of State because he 
wanted to be in a position of influence on the drafting of the new constitution, which he 
hoped would include his own constitutional preferences (Huneeus 2007, 157) .525 The 
council witnessed debates considering alternatives to universal suffrage, including 
restricting voting to property owners (Spooner 1994, 147).526 Other issues discussed by 
the Council of State were the president’s powers over the military and the transitional 
period. Other than matters concerning the armed forces, the Council of State’s revision 
did not differ much from the one prepared by the Ortúzar Commission.527 The Council 
took twenty months (57 sessions) to debate the constitutional draft presenring its report to 
Pinochet on July 8, 1980. It included a five-year transitional period that would begin after 
the constitution is approved by a plebiscite 528. Pinochet did not welcome the changes 
made by the Council of State, mainly because it recommended that the president’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
523 Once it became obvious that the military’s own constitution project was underway and it was not likely 
that an elected constituent assembly was going to be established, the Grupo de los 24 began calling for a 
fair plebiscite (Barros 2002, 1972 note 8). 
524 Another former president, Gabriel González Videla (1946-1952), was also a member of the Council of 
State. 
525 During the last months of his presidency, Alessandri had also presented a constitutional reform in order 
to respond to what he considered be the Chile’s defects. 
526 For instance Pedro Ibáñez, a former senator from Liberal Party was against universal suffrage and was 
in favor of having mayors and regional administrators being presidential appointees. He favored using 
electoral collages to elect senators and opposed the election of president by popular vote. Alessandri also 
agreed with those who opposed universal suffrage but dropped it because he came to the conclusion that 
there was no better alternative. In the end, the proposal to eliminate universal suffrage was rejected by a 
vote of 13 to 2 (Huneeus 2007, 157-158. The most antidemocratic positions as advocated by Ibáñez were in 
minority (Barros 2002, 221-222). 
527 See Huneeus (2007, 159-160 and Barros 2002, 225) for differences between the two reports. 
528 See Huneeus (2007, 159) for the structure of the government during the transitional period. 
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powers over the military be weakened, that the military regime follow a concrete timeline 
and mechanism to transition to a protected democracy, that it was much shorter than 
preferred by Pinochet and that the junta leave legislation power to an appointed bicameral 
congress and remain as an advisory body.529 Alessandri was not given the opportunity to 
present the Council’s report to junta and the report was not made public. The former 
president resigned from the Council in protest (Huneeus 2007, 159).530 A team of jurists 
took on the task of rewriting the constitutional draft incorporating some of the proposals 
made by the Constituent Commission and the Council of State, as well as introducing 
some significant changes .531 Since there is no archive information on the drafting of the 
final text, it is not certain who were its authors (Huneeus 2007, 160 and Barros 2002, 
218).532  Thus, after five years of work by the constitutional commission, twenty months 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
529 According to Muñoz (2008, 127), Pinochet wanted to govern for 16 more years after the constitution is 
approved but it was suggested by Ortúzar that it would be rather long. Also see Valenzuela 1995, 50-51. 
530 Yet he did not publicly disclose the reasons for his resignation nor oppose the constitution before the 
1980 plebiscite (Valenzuela 1995, 53). It was only in May 1981 that he revealed that he had resigned over 
disagreements with the Junta’s modifications (Barros 2002, 226). 
531 In terms of content, the final text maintained the basic structure and organization of power drafted by the 
Ortúzar Commission and kept some of the recommendations by the Council of State, these included having 
a regionally based Senate (rather than a national Senate as proposed by the Constituent Commission), to 
maintain the voting age as 18, require presidents to be at least 40 years old and grant the Congress the 
authority to pardon those convicted by the Senate in a constitutional accusation (Barros 2002, 219 note 6). 
According to Barros 2002 (220),  “Perhaps the most controversial deviation from the two drafts was to 
grant participation to the National Security Council in selecting two of the seven members of the 
Constitutional Tribunal (Art. 81). Another important departure was the Junta’s decision to maintain the 
state’s exclusive, inalienable monopoly over mining property”. 
532 In fact, after the promulgation of the constitution when the junta considered allowing private individuals 
access to archives, the Secretary of Legislation at the time Aldo Montagna clearly expressed that there is no 
record on the junta’s work on the final draft (Barros 2002, 177-178).   However according to one study 
quoted in Huneeus 2007 (174, note 128), a task force organized under the Interior Ministry worked on the 
final version. The task force reportedly included three ministers Mónica Madariaga (justice minister), 
Sergio Fernández (interior minister) and General Santiago Sinclair (the head of the Presidential General 
Staff); four military auditors Fernando Lyon, Aldo Montagna, Enrique Montero, and Harry Gruenewald 
(Carabineros) who were legal advisors to junta members (respectively to army, navy, air and Carabineros) 
and Captain Mario Duvauchelle (the junta’s legislative secretary). Other ministers, including Miguel Kast, 
José Piñera, and Pablo Baraona contributed on specific issues.  
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of revision by the Council of State, the junta’s internal working group took a month and 
half month to introduce modifications (Arriagada 1988, 43). On August 10, 1980, 
Pinochet announced that a new constitution had been prepared and a referendum was 
going to be held a month later. The constitution was made public the next day, leaving 
only one month for the Chilean electorate to review it. The military regime mounted a 
campaign that could not be matched by the opposition.  The junta’s propaganda 
highlighted a bright future of economic prosperity533 contrasted against the threat of 
going back to chaos and the uncertainty of what would happen if the proposal was voted 
against.534 On the day of the plebiscite, there were no electoral registries, independent 
electoral oversight nor counting.535 The ‘Yes’ choice was marked with a star, the ‘No’ 
with a black circle. Although indelible ink was used, washing it off proved quite easy; 
this, aroused suspicions of ballot-box stuffing (Spooner 1994, 153) 536. This was in 
addition to the fact that blank votes were counted as “Yes” votes (Barros 2002, 172 note 
8). When opposition leader Andrés Zaldívar complained about electoral fraud, he was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
533 Promises included jobs, housing, more people able to afford cars, televisions, telephones etc. (Arriagada 
1988, 44). During the months leading up to the coup, Chile’s economic success promised a bright future 
(Contsable and Valenzuela 1991, 193). 
534 For instance, Pinochet warned that if the constitution was rejected in the plebiscite, “This would signify 
the turn to the political and juridical situation existent in Chile on September 10, 1973” which implied that 
it could demand further military intervention (quoted in Oppenheim 2007, 117). 
535 The military regime had destroyed electoral registries in 1974, claiming that the Allende government 
had altered them (Barros 2002, 172 note 8). The mayors appointed by the executive were in charge of the 
voting tables as well as the initial counts. The final regional and national counts were administered by ad- 
hoc designated officials (Barros 2002, 172 note 8). 
536 The former mayor of Antofagasta, Floreal Recabarren, showed that the election ink was easily 
removable (Spooner 1994, 153-154 documents his ordeal). 
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exiled from Chile for three years. 537 Aside from the fact that all political parties were 
banned and the country was still ruled under a state of emergency, there was no media 
campaign for the “no” option while on the other hand, the “yes” camp was able to 
mobilize its supporters. For instance, National Youth Secretariat (Secretaría Nacional de 
la Juventud) activists went to working-class neighborhoods to increase voter turnout. The 
opposition was allowed to hold one political rally, organized in a local theatre, Teatro 
Caupolicán, where the former president former president Eduardo Frei called for votes 
against the constitution.538. However, the fact that Communist Party partisans were there 
and that chanting was exploited by the military government to arouse fear and discredit 
the opposition (Huneeus 2007, 88 and Valenzuela 1995, 54). On September 11, 1980 the 
constitution was approved with 67 percent of the vites;539 and six month later on March 
11, 1981, the constitution went into effect. 
 The military rulers’ claim to legitimacy rested on the “the alleged need to 
transform Chilean society” (Londregan 2000, 58). Barros (2001) argues that the initial 
intent of the constitution was not to create a “one-man rule” regime. In fact, the 
constitution was a legal tool that helped avoid Pinochet’s intentions of instituting a 
dictatorship of army and of undermining the powers of the navy and air commanders 
(Barros 2001, 17). The constitution was employed as a “coordinating devise” that would 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
537 Eduardo Hamuy, a Chilean sociologist, also documented irregularities during the plebiscite (Spooner 
1994, 154). For more information on electoral fraud during the 1980 referandum, see Fuentes (2013). 
538 The meeting was held on August 10, 1980 and broadcast through a network of radio stations. Other than 
that, there was not much press coverage of the event, which was heavily guarded by the police and 
Carabineros (Muñoz 2008, 129). 
539 A total of 6,270,868 participated in the plebiscite, - with a total of 30% of the total votes against it and 
3% of the votes left blank or spoiled (Huneeus 2007, 87) 
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facilitate intra-elite coordination and decision-making (Ginsburg and Simpser 2014). By 
providing for a division of power between the different actors of the authoritarian regime 
and by clarifying the different functions expected from the junta members, it helped to 
avoid the internal division problems that were beginning to mount (Hardin 2013). The 
urgency to generate support and obtain legitimacy in the eyes of the domestic and 
international community, especially in the aftermath of the Letelier assassination and the 
growing difficulty to rest on force pushed the military rulers to initiate a process of 
institutionalizing their rule. A new constitution was deemed significant in such a highly 
legalistic society (Valenzuela 1995, 54 and González 2008, 31). If the sole motivation for 
drafting a new constitution was to generate “window dressing”, we would have expected 
a sham document. However, as the above discussion highlights, from the onset the 
constitution was intended to be a remedy for past problems, to be an enduring document 
would survive the authoritarian rule and steer long-term goals of political, social, and 
economic transformation (Negretto, 2014). Professing to be the defender of la patria and 
the protector of law and order, Pinochet and the members of the junta along with their 
civilian counterparts in the commission and the Council of State had strong convictions 
about the failures of past governments. According to Valenzuela (1999, 222), military 
rulers had two aims, to eliminate the parties of the left and their supports and to 
restructure Chilean political institutions.540 The two goals were interrelated as the 
commanders believed that “inherent weaknesses of liberal democracy” had enabled the 
left to capture the government and had driven the country into crisis. For the framers of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
540 Although the statement by General Leigh about “excising the Marxist cancer” hinted at a use of violence 
against leftists, the military rulers also aimed at eradicating the ideology (Huneeus 2007,47). 
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the new constitution, the key function of the document became the cementing of the 
institutional foundations of a Chilean state that would substantially reduce the political 
and economic problems that had led to the breakdown of the democratic rule (González 
2008, 39). Thus, the underlying reason behind the military regime’s decision to establish 
a new constitution was to correct the weaknesses and shortcomings of the previous 
constitution and to establish a safeguarded democracy that was going to be 
“circumscribed within clear constitutional boundaries and protected by various layers of 
checks and reinforced organs of legal and constitutional control” (Barros 2001, 19).  
4.2.2 The Making of Turkey’s 1982 Constitution 
 The Turkish armed forces overthrew the government on September 12, 1980. The 
junta organized under the organ called the National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik 
Konseyi -NSC)541 was presided by General Kenan Evren and included the commanders 
of land, sea and air forces and the commander of the gendarmerie. Unlike Chile, there 
was no discord between the five NSC generals throughout the military rule (Birand 1987, 
211).542 They assumed “provisionally” all the legislative and executive functions.543 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
541 The military dominated “advisory” organ established under the 1961 constitution and strengthened with 
the 1982 constitution, is called Milli Güvenlik Kurulu. It should be distinguished from the council that 
brought together coup organizers, which is called Milli Güvenlik Konseyi. However, both bear the same 
name when translated into English and therefore have the same acronym. Thus, to distinguish between the 
two, I use the English acronym NSC to refer to Milli Güvenlik Konseyi, the body that conducted the 1980 
coup and MGK with Turkish acronym to refer to the institution established by the constitution.  
542 The command structure of the armed forces were maintained and General Evren as the Chief of the 
General Staff assumed the role of the head of state. The five-member military junta agreed that Evren 
would be the one making statements on political matters to avoid the appearance of any discord among the 
commanders (Hale 1988, 164). According to Haggard and Kaufman (1995, 43) it was the unity of purpose 
and limited tenure in the Turkish military that ensured that the collegial military government did not 
experience internal division. 
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While the 1960 coup was defended on the grounds that the military command had taken 
control in order to protect the constitutional rule, the 1980 coup was justified on the 
grounds that weak and incompetent governments were throwing the country into chaos 
(Ahmad 1993, 1-2). The first statement issued by the NSC explained the goal of the 
military intervention as "protecting national unity and preventing a probable civil war” 
and “eradicating the reasons that prevent the functioning of democratic order” (Gözler 
2013, 42).544 Haggard and Kaufman (1995, 97) call it a “corrective intervention”. From 
the beginning, the armed forces hinted that they harbored no wish of ruling for a long 
period of time; their plan was to return power to civilian authorities once certain 
institutional changes, including “a constitution suited to the needs of Turkish society” and 
new electoral and political parties laws, were implemented (Birand 1987, 191).545 In fact, 
it was decided before the coup, on August 26, in a meeting held in the General Staff 
Headquarters that in the aftermath of the coup, a new constitution would be drafted and 
the law on political parties and electoral law would be changed. Although from the first 
day of the coup, it was made public that the transition to democratic order would take 
place once certain institutional changes were implemented, there was no set deadline. 
 In his key-note speech delivered on the day of the coup, Evren stated, “The notion 
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543 The NSC’s five members were General Kenan Evren, Head of State, Chief of Staff and President of the 
NSC; General Nurettin Ersin, Commander of the Land Forces; General Tahsin Sahinkaya, Commander of 
the Air Force; Admiral Nejat Tumer, Commander of the Navy’ and General Sedat Celasun, Commander of 
the Gendarmerie. 
544 See Yazıcı 1997, 150-151 for the full speech, Armed Forces’ no 1 communiqué.  
545 See Birand 1987 at 190-195 for the full speech.  
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institutions was interpreted as the protection of individuals even at the expense of the 
unity of the State, rendering the State and the Nation defenseless. The responsibilities 
accruing from the Constitution’s principle of ‘separation of powers’ were, in actual 
practice, allowed to deteriorate into a conflict of powers” (quoted in Birand 1987, 191). 
Thus, the armed forces understood their mission as initiating a restructuring process “to 
prevent anotherstate of political polarization, violence, and deadlock that had afflicted the 
country in the late 1970s” (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 19). Early on, the junta did not 
hesitate to make public their preferences for a new institutional structure, revealing that 
the armed forces had conducted preliminary work on a new constitution before the coup. 
For instance, in a speech delivered on September 16, four days after the coup, General 
Evren referring to the deadlock in the parliament during the election of the president 
preceding the military takeover, suggested a solution inspired by the Greek Constitution 
(Yazıcı 2009, 23-24).  
 The armed forces were convinced that for a thorough reconstruction that could not 
be easily dismantled once power had been transferred to a civilian government, it was 
necessary to have General Evren as the president. The intended transformation was to be 
enduring. (Birand 1987, 199-200). Evren refused the idea of also assuming the function 
of prime minister, wanting to avoid giving the impression to the outside world that this 
was a personal or a military dictatorship.546 However, they also sought civilian 
government under the military administration that they could command. Thus, they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
546 The high ranking commanders “for the sake of efficiency and effectiveness” preferred to see Evren take 
on both functions of president and prime minister (Birand 1987, 207). 
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agreed on a civilian with a military origin, retired Admiral Bülent Ulusu.547 Like the 
Chilean junta, the Turkish armed forces built the regime on legal grounds, with Law no 
2324 enacted on October 27, 1980, which affirmed that the NSC had assumed the 
functions previously exercised by the National Assembly and the Senate; the head of the 
NSC, also acting as head of state had assumed the functions previously exercised by the 
President (Sencer 1983, 19-20). The same law also declared that the 1961 Constitution 
would be in force until the promulgation of a new constitution. However, the same 
legislation also clarified that those acts adopted by the NSC, then and in the future, which 
would conflict with the constitution were to enter into force as amendments.548 Like DL 
128 in Chile, this was an NSC attempt to legitimize its rule and to negate the exercise of 
judicial review (Yazıcı 1997, 165).549 
 Legal instruments to draft a new constitution were soon introduced. On June 29, 
1981 (Law no 2485) the Law on Constituent Assembly entered into force. The 
Constituent Assembly was to be composed of two chambers, the NSC and the 
Consultative Assembly (CA). The Consultative Assembly, the civilian chamber of the 
body, was to be composed of 40 members directly appointed by the NSC and 120 
members selected by the NSC among candidates nominated by governors of each 
province. Those who functioned as members of a political party prior to the coup could 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
547 The Ulusu government received the vote of confidence of NSC, and hence assumed the legislative 
functions. 
548 Similarly, if the legislations passed by the NSC were to conflict with existing legislation, it would 
presumed to be an amendment to the law (Yazıcı 1997, 165). See supra note 32 for the similar decree 
passed by the Chilean junta.  
549 Despite the restrictions, the military rulers did not close down the Constitutional Court which along with 
the Council of State continued to function. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  258	   	  
not be nominated for a seat at the CA by provinces.550 However ,for directly appointed 
members of the CA, such a requisite was not sought.551 As its name suggests, the 
Consultative Assembly was conceived as a consultative body; its military counterpart the 
NSC had the final say. The draft prepared by the Consultative Assembly could be 
amended or rejected by the NSC and no mechanism to resolve the differences between 
the two chambers existed.552 General Evren’s account is a testament to the NSC’s 
overbearing power in drafting the constitution, “Before the Consultative Assembly took 
on the task of constitution, the draft was almost ready at the General Secretariat (of the 
NSC)” (quoted in Yazıcı 1997, 173).553 
 According to this bill, the Constituent Assembly’s duties included drawing up the 
new constitution, the law on referendum for the constitution, the law on political parties 
and the law on elections until a new parliament would assume the role following general 
elections, the date of which would be determined by the NSC. There was no deadline set 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
550 The previous Turkish constitution, the Constitution of 1961 was also a direct result of military 
intervention, as it was prepared under military influence. However, in terms of its adoption process the 
1961 Constitution is considered more “representative”. The House of Representatives of the 1960–1961 
period included opposition parties and other institutions while the Consultative Assembly of the 1981-1982 
period members of all political parties were prohibited from becoming members. 
551 See Yazıcı 1997, 168 for more specifics about the selection process. The governors were to nominate 
three candidates and the size of the province determined the number of members from each province. The 
governors themselves were also appointed by the NSC. It was also required that the members had received 
higher education. 
552 During the 1960-1961 period, the National Unity Committee (NUC)- the military committee that 
executed the takeover did not hold such absolute power over the House of Representatives. Özbudun, 
Ergun, and Ömer Faruk Gençkaya. 2009. Democratization and the Politics of Constitution-Making in 
Turkey. Budapest: Central European University Press, p. 20. 
553 According to some accounts, the NSC had delivered a constitutional draft to members of the CA that it 
finds trustworthy with the intention of directly influencing the work of this body (Yazıcı 2009, 25). 
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to complete the new constitution.554 It took 13 months to draft and approve the new 
framework. 
 The consensus among military ranks was that in order for the changes introduced 
by the NSC to endure, the political parties must be abolished (Özsoy 2010, 105). In a 
public speech regarding the abolishment of political parties, Evren listed the desire to not 
subject the CA to any type of political sway (Özsoy 2010, 105). A week before the 
Consultative Assembly convened, all political parties were abolished (first time in the 
history of Turkey) and their property was seized (Tanör and Yüzbaşıoğlu 2001, 30)555. 
Except for three people directly appointed by the NSC, all members of the CA had 
received higher education. Of the 160 members, 20% had military background, 50% were 
former civil servants. More than 70% of the CA were older than 50 years old; the 
majority was politically conservative (Tanör and Yüzbaşıoğlu 2001, 30)556. The armed 
forces’ distaste for politicians was not restricted to those who had served before the coup. 
Under the leadership of Aldıkaçtı an attempt by some members of the Consultative 
Assembly to establish a group called “Atatürkist Liberals” with the intention of 
transforming it to a political party in the future was suppressed by the NSC (Özsoy 2010, 
107 and Yazıcı 2009, 24-25).   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
554 The NUC of the 1960-1961 period had a firm one-year deadline. 
555 Law no 2533, which was passed on October 16, 1981 dissolved all their branches, women’s and youth 
branches and handed their property to the Treasury. Later with the Provisional Article 4, political party 
leaders were banned from politics. The first meeting of CA was on September 23, 1981. 
556 See also Soydan 1995. 
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 The Consultative Assembly chose 15 of its members to work on the “Constitution 
Commission”. On November 23, 1981, this commission began working on a new text 
under the direction of Professor Orhan Aldıkaçtı. There were eight academicians, two 
members of the military, two medical doctors, one engineer, one agriculturist and one 
unionist (of employer union) (Özsoy 2010, 84).557 Upon the request of the commission, 
universities, high courts, unions and professional associations sent their proposal558. 
Overall, these proposals embraced anti-liberal and anti-democratic notions (Tanör and 
Yüzbaşıoğlu 2001, 32). The drafters of the constitution were also directly influenced by 
the 1958 French Constitution (Tanör 2012, 97). As the commission was working on the 
draft, the NSC promulgated several new law-creating institutions including the State 
Auditory Board of Presidency (Law no 2443), Higher Education Council (Law no 2547), 
Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors (Law no 2461), Council of State (Law no 
2575) and regional administration courts (Law no 2576). These bills drafted and 
approved by the military junta acting through the NSC shaped the content of the new 
constitution (Tanör and Yüzbaşıoğlu 2001, 32-33). Reflecting reactive constitution-
making, General Evren’s speech on the anniversary of the coup suggested that the 1961 
Constitution was going to be the foundational text for the new constitution provided that 
all of its shortcomings and deficiencies were addressed by the Constituent Assembly 
(Özsoy 2010, 46).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
557 The list of members include Orhan Aldıkaçtı, Feyyaz Gölcüklü, Şener Akyol, Turgut Tan, Hikmet 
Altuğ, Tevfik Fikret Alpaslan, Kemal Dal, Feridun Engin, Feyzi Feyzioğlu, Ihsan Göksel, Rafet 
Ibrahimoğlu, Mumin Kavalalı, Recep Meriç, Teoman Özalp and Muammer Yazar. 
558 For a compilation of these drafts, see Gürbüz 1982. Also see Özsoy 2010, 127-146.   
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 The archives of the Constitution Commission remained secret, therefore the inside 
information that was uncovered in the Chilean context is missing for Turkey. The most 
relevant information that can provide clues regarding the working of the commission 
remains the dissenting opinion of members of the commission. For instance, one such 
critical member was Kemal Dal, who voiced concerns about the inefficient workings of 
the commission, namely the lack of organization, too much emphasis on information 
gathering without a roadmap, the inefficent use of time, the reliance on the 1961 
Constitution’s scheme to work on the new constitution and the debates remaining 
inconclusive (Özsoy 2010, 85).559 Every member had objections to multiple articles, 
which they had presented in writing; these were elaborated on later during the debates in 
the Consultative Assembly. However, the drafting process remains undisclosed. Likewise, 
the archives of the NSC’s own Constitution Commission, which was working 
concurrently with the CA, are not public either.  
 The commission presented its draft to the Consultative Assembly on July 17, 
1982. However, because the assembly was closed for vacation CA members had not 
received the draft in advance, a decision to postpone the debate for two days was made 
on August 2.560 The draft did receive critical comments by members of the Consultative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
559 For all the dissenting opinions, see Danışma Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, Cilt 7 Birlesim 120- 116’ya 1. ek, 
August 4, 1982 available on 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/DM__/d02/c007/dm__02007120.pdf 
560 Danisma Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, Cilt 7, Birlesim 119, August 2, 1982 available on 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/DM__/d02/c007/dm__02007119.pdf. All the minutes of 
the debates are available on TBMM’s website 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_dergisi_pdfler.birlesimler_diger_meclisler?v_meclis=5&m
eclis_kisa_adi=DM&diger_donem_adi=d00. The debates were conducted between August 2, 1982 and 
September 23, 1982 (Volumes 7, 8, 9, and 10). 
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Assembly. However, these reflected the overall criticism regarding its form and method, 
rather than its content.561  
 Some members did voice concerns about the lack of a preamble and transitory 
articles. Aldıkaçtı, the director of the commission, explained that their plan was to 
include these additional sections during or after the debates. As a matter of fact, a 
preamble and transitory articles were added later during the course of the debates (Özsoy 
2010, 85).  However the version introduced by the NSC differed greatly from the one 
later proposed and adopted by the CA.562  
 The CA altered several aspects of the commission’s draft including inserting 
compulsory religious education (Article 24)563, eliminating reference to agreements with 
international organizations (Article 5)564, strengthening the powers of the president 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
561 For instance the organizational scheme of the constitutional draft was criticized for being divided into 
too many subsections, which could confuse to layperson even a legislator. The language was criticized for 
not being contemporary and rather having religious overtones, employing slang words, not utilizing the 
concepts found in academic circles. One such critic Abdulbaki Cebeci recognized the urgent method of 
drafting the constitution, but he was also discontent with the fact that despite working on the draft for eight 
months, the proposal had many gaps and discrepancies. In terms of method, Cebeci was critical of the fact 
that the 1961 Constitution was the foundational text for the new constitution. According to him, this was in 
contrast to the claim of “constitution power” and would lead the new constitution to be understood as a 
‘reactive constitution”. Additionally, he was also critical of the fact the text was too long and not distilled. 
See Danisma Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, Cilt 7, Birlesim 120, August 4, 1982 available on 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/DM__/d02/c007/dm__02007120.pdf. 
562 The NSC’s preamble included legitimizing statements for the 1980 coup. Although some members of 
the CA had suggested including reference to the coup in the preamble, most led by Aldıkaçtı refused to do 
so. According to him, the goals principles of the coup are all within the body of the constitution. Thus, the 
Constitution Commission did not feel the need to integrate the September 12 coup in the preamble. “All its 
goals [the constitution’s] are the goals of September 12 and all of our goals” (quoted in Özsoy 2010, 97). 
563 Milli Güvenlik Konseyi Tutanak Dergisi, Cilt 7 Birleşim 118. October 18, 1982. 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/MGK_/d01/c007/mgk_01007118.pdf 
564 This provision was an aspirational one that anticipated future membership to European Union (Özsoy 
2010, 91). 
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(Article 112)565 and restricting the autonomy of universities.566 On certain subjects the 
CA embraced a much milder attitude; smoothing the commission’s draft.567 However, 
this was not because the Consultative Assembly had embraced a liberal perspective, it 
was because they intended to see an enduring document (Özsoy 2010, 93).  
 The foundational philosophy of the constitutional draft rested on the opposition to 
“communism, fascism, theocracy and every type of dictatorship”568, on the support of 
private enterprise and on the recognition of all freedoms but also on the restriction of 
their arbitrary use569. Another component of the new regime was an emphasis on religion 
as a unifying force. During debates on the floor of the Consultative Assembly, members 
suggested that the state should provide religious education to strengthen the bond 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
565 The CA’s proposal on presidential powers included the power to resend annulment decisions back to 
Constitutional Court and to request postponement of general elections. These powers were removed from 
the draft by the NSC. Instead the president was empowered to send constitutional amendments to 
referendum (Özsoy 2010, 90). 
566 See NSC’s Constitutional Commission’s report 1/397, October 17, 1982 available on Milli Güvenlik 
Konseyi Tutanak Dergisi, Cilt 7 Birleşim 118. October 18, 1982. 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/MGK_/d01/c007/mgk_01007118.pdf 
567 Özsoy 2010, 92-93 lists these changes introduced by the CA. Art. 13 of the commission’s draft 
regarding restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms was almost penalizing. The CA’s proposal 
provided a general restriction. Art. 12 in the commission’s draft included “the necessities of democratic 
public order” as a criteria for restriction of fundamental rights and liberties. The CA found it as too vague 
and instead adopted “the necessities of democracy that is based on freedom”. However, this provision was 
ultimately reversed by the NSC. Under the commission’s draft, “the danger of committing a crime” was 
listed as ground for arrest, this was removed following the debates in the CA. The commission’s draft 
provided for promulgating decrees having the force of law regulating rights and freedoms under ordinary 
periods. However, the CA as well as the NSC proposal provided that no such regulation could be 
introduced except for social and economic rights. Restrictions on freedom of expression and dissemination 
of thought were much more extensive in the commission’s draft than it was under the CA’s and NSC’s 
proposals. 
568 These concepts were uttered in the original proposal’s Art. 13 (restriction on the fundamental rights and 
freedoms) and Art. 77 (establishing political parties). References to these were removed from the proposal 
in the CA’s draft.  
569 The foundational principle is summarized in Kemal Dal’s dissenting opinion, see Danışma Meclisi 
Tutanak Dergisi, Cilt 7 Birlesim 120- 116’ya 1. ek, August 4, 1982 available on 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/DM__/d02/c007/dm__02007120.pdf 
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between citizens and the state and provide legitimacy to state authority (Özsoy 2010, 94). 
Moreover, state religious education was promoted as a source of installing public 
morality to individuals. It was for that reason that the CA’s proposal included compulsory 
religious education be provided by the state’s educational institutions. During the debates 
conducted in the CA, it was argued, in retrospect, that the state of anarchy that preceded 
the 1980 coup was the result of a youth that had not received religious and moral 
education (Özsoy 2010, 95). In order to strengthen the argument to install compulsory 
religious education, some members referenced to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights’ recognition of the freedom of teaching religion (Article 18) (Özsoy 2010, 87-88).   
 The CA approved the draft on September 23, 1982570, the NSC on October 18, 
1982.571 Along with the CA’s proposal, the NSC received the proposal prepared by its 
own Constitutional Commission, which did have significant differences with the CA’s 
version.572 It took the NSC one day to review and adopt the revised proposal.573 The NSC 
worked in secret and inserted the final version of the preamble and drew up the full list of 
provisional articles (Tanör and Yüzbaşıoğlu 2001, 34). The preamble included 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
570 The Consultative Assembly ratified the draft constitution by 120 votes in favor, 7 against and 12 
abstentions. For the proposal adopted by the Consultative Assembly, see the minutes of the debate on 
September 23, 1982 available on 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/DM__/d02/c010/dm__02010156.pdf 
571 The minutes of the NSC are available on 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_dergisi_pdfler.birlesimler_diger_meclisler?v_meclis=5&m
eclis_kisa_adi=MGK&diger_donem_adi=d00 
572 The NSC’s Constitutional Commission included Muzaffer Başkaynak, Zeki Güngor, Ismet Onur, Ilhan 
Köseoglu, Feridun Balatlıoğlu and Ersin Eserol. 
573 For the proposal of the NSC’s Constitution Commission see the additional document attached to the 
minutes on October 18, 1982 Milli Güvenlik Konseyi Tutanak Dergisi, Cilt 7 Birleşim 118. October 18, 
1982. https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/MGK_/d01/c007/mgk_01007118.pdf 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  265	   	  
legitimizing statements for the military coup, as well as illiberal statements that prepared 
grounds for thought crime. General Kenan Evren had disclosed that the NSC was to draft 
the provisional articles. When the NSC prepared them, they were simply inserted to the 
commission’s draft and the commission suggested to the CA not to dwell on these articles. 
As instructed, and without much debate, the provisional articles were added to the CA’s 
proposal. Regardless of the NSC’s direct role in preparing the transitory articles, the 
military chamber introduced other changes to its final version, including the provisions 
regarding bans on political party leaders (Özsoy 2010, 98). 
 In terms of ideological disposition, the CA and the NSC were not much different 
(Özsoy 2010, 91). However, the NSC’s final proposal did overhaul the text adopted by 
the Consultative Assembly. Only 40 articles were maintained, as proposed by the CA574. 
The rest were either modified substantively or redacted in terms of language, five articles 
were dropped and five new ones were added. For instance, the decision to expand the 
scope of the unamendable provisions was taken by the NSC. For the draft prepared by the 
Consultative Assembly, the civilian chamber had only included the republican form of 
state as the unamendable article and self-entrenched the unamendability clause. The final 
version adopted by the NSC included characteristics and symbols of the republic as 
unamendable articles. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
574 Eight of these were kept exactly as proposed by the CA, while 32 of them were kept in terms of content 
but their article number were changed. See NSC’s Constitutional Commission’s report 1/397, October 17, 
1982 available on Milli Güvenlik Konseyi Tutanak Dergisi, Cilt 7 Birleşim 118. October 18, 1982. 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/MGK_/d01/c007/mgk_01007118.pdf 
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 Not all changes inserted by the NSC were authoritarian. Since one major goal of 
the five-member military junta was to see stability and hence an enduring constitutional 
framework, they opted to moderate the CA’s proposal in certain aspects. One such 
example concerns the right to rest and leisure. Although the CA’s proposal had included 
the general right, it had not introduced paid weekends, holidays, and annual leave as a 
constitutional right for workers. The NSC’s final version did guarantee these as a 
constitutional rights to be regulated by law in order to ensure such shortcomings of the 
constitution would not make grounds for frustration with the text in the long term (Özsoy 
2010, 95).  
 The final version of Turkey’s new constitution was scheduled for a referendum 575. 
A nation-wide referendum was supervised under the extraordinary conditions imposed by 
military regime. The referendum combined the ratification of the new constitution with 
the election of the president. A “yes” vote for the constitution also confirmed Kenan 
Evren’s presidency (PA 1). It was implied that if the constitution was rejected the NSC 
regime would continue and the promised new Law on Political Parties and general 
elections would be jeopardized. Thus, voting in favor of the new constitution could be 
read as voting for a transition from authoritarian rule. General Evren opposed the idea of 
holding a separate referendum for the presidential election, arguing, “Let’s assume, the 
votes cast for me are high and the votes cast for the constitution are low. What will come 
out of it? Will this make me swell with pride? What is the point besides unnecessary 
expenditure” (quoted in Yazıcı 2009, 32). As for the suggestion that there should be other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
575 Law no 2707 announced that the constitution would be put to a referendum. 
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candidates besides him running for the presidency, he also found that unnecessary.576 
Thus, the circumstances of the referendum have been criticized and rightfully dubbed as a 
plebiscite for it also confirmed the prolonging of Evren’s presidency.  
 The 1982 referendum was to be a one-sided campaign. A NSC decree prohibited 
the expression of any views intended to influence voters’ decisions and banned criticism 
of the constitution’s transitional articles or of Evren’s speeched made in his pro-
constitution campaign. The NSC decree no 70 (August 5, 1982) and decree no 71 
(October 21, 1982) determined the restrictive rules for the referendum campaign.577  
Acting as the head of state, General Evren, was assigned the task of propaganda-making 
on behalf of the state.578 Accordingly, it was forbidden to criticize or to make 
contradictory statements against Evren’s speeches on the radio, television or campaign 
meetings around the country.  General Kenan Evren embarked upon an intensive 
propaganda campaign for the new constitution. According to Provisional Article 16, if a 
person whose name is on the electoral registry choose not to vote in the referendum, that 
person was banned from participating in any election and becoming a candidate for the 
next five years. The rules of the referendum intended to punish those who wanted to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
576 Evren argued, “Two, three, four candidates will come forward, are we going to run against each other? It 
is not possible to have elections without propaganda. Even if we say nobody should make propaganda and 
let the election take place like that. That is not the way that the elections happen. If propaganda is allowed 
in the current circumstances of the country, it is not suitable. That is why I said let it be like this [without 
alternative candidates] and I accepted” (quoted in Yazıcı 2009, 32). 
577 Decree no 70 regulated the period until October 24, while decree no 71 applied for the period between 
October 25 and November 5, 1982. Decree no 70 allowed for statements that intended to improve the 
constitutional proposal, no such opinion that is intended to influence a “no” vote was allowed. Because the 
proposal was published in the Official Gazette on October 20, the decree no 71 only empowered the head 
of state Kenan Evren the power to make propaganda (Özsoy 2010, 100-101).  
578 Evren was to introduce the constitution through media and visits to several cities around the country.  
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protest by absention. The voting took place under dubious conditions as well. Transparent 
envelopes were used violating the secret ballot principle (Özpek 2012, 153). White 
ballots indicated a “yes” vote, while blue ballot indicated a “no” vote.579  Ratified through 
public referendum (91.37%), the constitution also confirmed Evren’s presidency for the 
next seven years.580 Since there was no clear understanding of the course of action that 
the military rulers would take in the event that the draft was to be rejected in the 
referendum, it was understood that its rejection would only prolong the military rule581. 
The constitution entered into force as Law no 2709. 
 Soon on June 3, 1983 to be exact, new political parties laws and electoral laws 
were introduced. The proportional representation under the 1961 Constitution was 
replaced with a majority system. During the three years under military rule, a total 
restructuring of Turkey’s institutions took place. In total, the NSC regime passed 535 
laws and 91 decree laws (Yazıcı 1997, 154). Meanwhile, the armed forces relied on the 
business community’s support. “The most significant development during these three 
years was the unprecedented increase in the influence wielded by the private sector. The 
vacuum created by silenced politicians and cowed trade unions was filled –some would 
argue, over-filled – business interests (Birand 1987, 211). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
579 Since it was forbidden to campaign “no” for the constitution, critics made references to the color blue in 
different contexts to call out their opposition to the new constitution (Yazıcı 2009, 29 note 24). 
580  Provisional Article 1. The permanent formula for electing the president was indirectly through the 
parliament. Evren’s presidency deviated from this as he was elected directly by the referendum. 
581 Another point of difference with the 1961 Constitution is the referendum process. In the event that the 
public rejected the 1961 Constitution, the NUC would oversee the drafting of another text.     
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 The 1982 Turkish Constitution is an example of a project of pre-constitutional 
politics, a consequence of political processes (Bilgin 2008, 126). It is not just a new set of 
legal rules, but a manifestation of the underlying political philosophy. Its provisions are 
legal mechanisms of transformation, “whereby philosophical and ideological 
characteristics of political forces and discourses find a legally established refuge within 
the confines of a ‘superior law’” (Bilgin 2008, 126). It reflects the intentions of its 
drafters, who had assumed constituent power solely by their ability to exert military 
force. Having acquired the power with the assertion that the Turkish armed forces are 
going to solve the parliamentary impasse, and resolve the political polarization, a new 
constitution reflected an ‘answer’ to the pre-coup ‘questions’ (Varol 2013, 742). The 
extensive rights and freedoms afforded in the 1961 Constitution were held responsible for 
political polarization and the inefficiencies of the legislative branch were attributed to 
various political vacuums.  
The 1982 Constitution falls in the era of ideological transformation, when 
constitutions are employed as “instruments of social transformation” (Arjomand 2003, 9). 
According to Bilgin (2008, 136), its ideology is statist republicanism where the esteemed 
state has an interventionist role and individual interests are subordinated to the general 
well being of the republic. According to him, this is most evident in the language of the 
constitution, in phrases such as ‘the sacred Turkish State’, ‘indivisible integrity of the 
state with its territory and nation’ and ‘national security or sovereignty’ (Bilgin 2008, 
136). Also, the 1982 Constitution demonstrates a newfound emphasis on the country’s 
founding father Ataturk. Evin (1988, 211) explains this as an attempt to introduce an 
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ideology “to battle all other ideologies which had led to the fragmentation and 
polarization of the polity”. Ataturkism was introduced as a mediating moderate ideology 
that could be reformulated over and over as required to fend off any dissent to the 
military’s authoritarian construct (Evin 1988, 212). An additional formula that the 
constitution espoused to defend the constitutional order against extremes was to employ 
the state apparatus to disseminate religion and advocate unity around Islam. The idea of 
reinforcing religious feelings to counter polarization was advocated by a small group of 
conservatives known as Intellectuals’ Hearth (Aydınlar Ocağı).  
Like its Chilean counterpart, the Turkish constitution, a product of the armed 
forces’ conviction that having “saved” la patria from chaos, is an enduring reconstruction 
of the political, economic and social fabric was necessary, embodies the preferences of its 
authoritarian drafters, military and civilian alike. Military rulers had four goals in 
carrying out the coup; to halt terrorism and extremist groups, to revive economy and 
implement the reforms introduced under the previous civilian regime, to introduce a new 
constitution and other legal tools and to arrange a new working relationship with civilians 
(Hale 1988, 166 and Haggard and Kaufman 1995, 99). From the onset, the intention was 
not to establish military rule but to set right a defunct system. In fact, military rulers 
wanted to avoid a situation where the armed forces would stay in power for a long period 
of time (Hale 1988, 163. First, they feared that long-term military rule would politicize 
the armed forces and lead to institutional decay. Second, the armed forces being the 
carrier of Turkey’s modernization goals did not want to have Turkey drift away from 
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Europe (Hale 1988, 161-162).582 Perceiving themselves as the Turkish state’s only 
functioning institution, the armed forces understood their mission as not simply 
intervening and ruling but rather constructing a new order that would not allow for a 
recurrence of the parliamentary impasse and political violence seen in the 1970s. If the 
military rulers were in pursuit of simply furnishing their rule with the veneer of legality, 
the end result would have been a sham document. However as the examples above 
illustrate, they intended to see the document function for a long period of time. Its 
transformative features rest on its long-term goals. It was for that reason that NSC 
members had the final say in the constitution, moderated the provisions of the 
constitutional proposal that were deemed too harsh and therefore likely to lead to outcry. 
They wanted to ensure that the new order organized around a new constitutional text 
along with other legislations on elections and political parties that aimed to rectify the 
perceived institutional shortcomings would survive their rule and reflect their preferences 
and goals of political, social and economic transformation in the long term.  
4.3. Antidotal Authoritarian Constitution-Making Compared 
 In the aftermath of a coup d’état carried out by the military high command 
following years of institutional deadlock; political and societal polarization and 
fragmentation; and economic and social strife, new constitutions were introduced in both 
Chile and Turkey. These constitutions were not simply authoritarian texts that aimed to 
prolong authoritarian rule or provide window dressing to military rule. In both cases, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
582 Turkey’s membership to theParliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe was suspended after the 
coup and was readmitted back to the group in 1984 after working hard to convince the members that the 
post-1983 regime was democratic (Hale 1988, 162).  
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coups were carried out by a small senior cadre and remained within the hierarchical chain 
of command. There was no rotating presidency among the generals. The military 
intervention in both cases resolved an institutional impasse, the deadlock between the 
executive and legislative branches in the case of Chile and parliamentary deadlock over 
the election of the president in the case of Turkey. Although the repression unleashed by 
the armed forces in Chile was unmatched in the Turkish case, the military regimes of 
both countries enjoyed the support gained from a large of the population.  
 Both military regimes placed great emphasis on legality. <ilitary rulers did not 
intend to construct a military regime to govern their respective countries for an indefinite 
period of time. Their antagonism was not against democracy per se, but against the 
political actors and institutional mechanisms of the previous era. From the onset, in both 
cases one major goal of the ruling junta was to introduce a new constitution.  Having 
conducted the intervention with specific convictions concerning the failures of civilian 
governments and the shortcomings of the existing constitutional and legal arrangements, 
the armed forces of both countries embarked on a project of drafting a new constitution. 
In the Turkish case the process was pre-determined and quiete swift, while in the case of 
Chile, the armed forces carried on the drafting process for seven years and only hastened 
the project as intra-military conflicts began to manifest themselves.583 In both cases, 
civilians ideologically close to military rulers prepared the initial draft but the final text 
was hammered out by the military rulers to be approved through a public referendum. 
Despite the fact that a partially elected constituent assembly was operationalized in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
583 However, there was no set deadline in either cases. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  273	   	  
Turkish constitution-making process, this took place as the above analysis demonstrates, 
within the full supervision of the armed forces. In fact, the Constitution Commission in 
Chile worked with considerable autonomy despite the fact that its members were not 
elected (Barros 2002, 90). However, the constitutions did not simply reflect the 
preferences of the armed forces. In the case of Chile, the American-educated right-wing 
economists known as the Chicago Boys and in the case of Turkey, the Islamic 
conservatives known as Intellectuals’ Hearths represented the civilian opposition to left 
wing ideas in both countries and claimed to possess the ideological formula to ward off 
communism. These ideological dispositions were reflected in the constitutions. In both 
cases, a new legal document, albeit authoritarian in its genesis and effect, mitigated the 
international isolation faced by the military regime. 
 Although perhaps different in terms of ideology they were framed around, the 
rationale in both authoritarian constitutions, was to introduce an enduring document in 
light of past problems. The constitutions were historically charged. By dictating the terms 
of the post-military constitutional order, the military rulers were attempting to regulate 
the crisis of the previous era through a new constitution. Thus, for that reason, both 
constitutions, as will be explained further in detail, provided for a transitional period. 
Although both constitutions’ transitional formulas institutionalized the presidency of 
coup leaders, namely Pinochet and Evren, the Chilean case differs for the constitution in 
fact helped overcome an attempt by Pinochet to establish a dictatorship of army. No such 
intra-military rivalry existed in the Turkish case (Haggard and Kaufman 1997, 43). 
Although both of the military regimes were in pursuit of a constitutional arrangement that 
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would prevent the repetition of past mistakes/vices and transform the political, social and 
economic realms along lines that would not allow for the polarization and fragmentation 
that gave rise to a military coup, the constitution, in the Chilean case, was also employed 
as an intra-elite coordinating device that would allow for the autonomy of the military 
branches and prevent Pinochet from controlling lawmaking. 
 In both cases, the constitution was a legal tool to entrench a protected democracy 
and not establish an enduring purely authoritarian rule. In that sense, the constitutions had 
a dualistic nature. The authoritarian elements existed alongside a structure that could (at 
least potentially) allow a democratic rule. Although much emphasis was placed on the 
guardian role envisioned for the armed forces, in both cases the armed forces were not 
conceived a role where they would dominate politics (Barros 2002, 240-249 and Hale 
1988, 163). The armed forces were to act as a “permanent safeguard” and “ultimate 
guarantor” and were to only come into play if all other institutional mechanisms, that will 
be described below, fail to function. Through various layers of checks, the constitutions 
introduced constraints on the future political system. As Haggard and Kaufman (1997, 
271) also point out “The institutional arrangements imposed by the Turkish military 
paralleled those in Chile”. The conceived role for the armed forces in this new 
constitutional arrangement was not to perpetuate their authoritarian rule but to avoid 
another future institutional breakdown and potential military intervention (Barros 2002, 
241 and Hale 1988, 163). However, by doing so, the designed constitutional framework 
weakened civilians’ powers vis-à-vis the military.  
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 Both constitutions went through several stages and were not simply imposed top-
down. However, the final version of each was modified according to the ruling military 
rulers’ preferences. The final product was up for referendum in both countries and the 
circumstances of the public vote were dubious in both cases. The public had a short 
period of time to review the document; no opposition campaign was allowed, political 
parties were banned, the voting process was suspicious, there was no clear understanding 
of what would happened if draft was rejected in the referendum; and the referendum for 
the constitution was also combined with the election of the president and took place in 
the extraordinary conditions of military rule.  
 Both Chile and Turkey are cases of non-crisis transitions where the “transition 
occurred against the backdrop of successful economic reform, high rates of growth, and 
relative macroeconomic stability” (Haggard and Kaufman 1997, 267).584 The transitional 
formula ensured that entrenched legal tools would remain intact for a determined period 
of time and that transition would take place in an orderly fashion. To supplement the 
constitutional framework, other relevant legislations most notably law on electoral rules 
was introduced by the military establishment.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
584 According to Haggard and Kaufman 1997, whose study also includes Thailand and Korea as other cases 
of non-crisis transitions, certain features are common. Challenges to authoritarian rule are politically 
motivated, rather than economic. The authoritarian incumbents dominate the process of constitutional 
reform. The elected officials must endure significant authoritarian enclaves with important military 
prerogatives. In terms of political pluralism, the system is limited. There may be exclusionary restrictions 
on certain political groups as well as having restrictive voter and party registration laws. In terms of 
political cleavages, the political system is dominated by center parties and the left is proscribed (Haggard 
and Kaufman 1997, 269). 
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  The following section will analyze in detail the substance of the constitutional 
framework in terms of the four characteristics of the antidotal authoritarian constitution: 
being informed by past crises- backward looking, aiming to bringing about permanent 
change- forward looking, envisioning a return to civilian rule- surviving the transition, 
and containing legal tools that would veto attempts to alter the established structure- 
constraining.  
4.4  Designing Antidotal Authoritarian Constitutions 
I. Backward Looking  
 The 1980 Constitution of Chile was drafted “looking backward at internal 
political-institutional problems that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s” (Barros 2002, 181). 
A close look at the articles of the constitution reveals that in many aspects, the 
constitution was intended to remedy perceived failures of the prior constitutional system. 
Barros calls it “binding the future out of the fear of the past” (Barros 2002, 226)585. These 
include deeming any political party, movement and organization that advocates class 
conflict, violence, totalitarian type of state or society and propagating doctrines 
attempting against the family as unconstitutional and assigning the Constitutional Court 
with the authority to punish such violations committed by persons whether or not they 
hold public office (Art. 8).586 The provision was directed at the experience of the Unidad 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
585 According to Barros (20002, 227), “the retrospective motivation was so strong that any number of these 
changes can literally be dated to specific conflicts that emerged during the 1960s and early 1970s” (Barros 
2002, 227). 
586 See Aldunate Lizana 2009 for more on Article 8 and “militant democracy” in Chile. 
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Popular government (Loveman 1988, 268-269)587. The constitution also strengthened 
private property rights and offered a constitutional injunction, known as “Recurso de 
Protección” for the protection of fundamental rights of the individuals in order to avoid a 
repetition of the state expropriationthat occured during the Allende years (Couso 2011, 
407). It introduced a second round for presidential elections between the two top 
candidates (ballotage) in order to prevent a minority President; the way Allende was 
elected with 36.6% of the votes.  
 Another innovation of the constitution was the nonelected senators. Accordingly, 
almost one-third of the Senate would be nonelected senators that would serve alongside 
26 elected senators588. In addition to former presidents who had served at least six years, 
there would be nine other senators appointed by different organs589, including the 
National Security Council- an advisory body composed of a majority of military 
members. The idea was to weaken the role of political parties and the weight of elected 
senators in order to avoid political demagoguery (politiquería) (Loveman 1988, 260).590 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
587 According to Loveman (1988, 268-269), the constitution aimed “to depoliti(z)e policymaking and 
administration in conformity with the often expressed view of junta leaders that ‘politics’ had been 
responsible for Chile’s pre-1973 crisis”. 
588 There would be two senators directly elected from Chile’s thirteen regions.  
589  According to the scheme, the Supreme Court appoints three members (two retired members of the 
Supreme Court and one former controller general), the president appoints two (one a former university 
president and a former cabinet minister who served for two years under a former president), four members 
of the military appointed by the junta (former head of the arm, air force, navy and Carabineros who have 
served for at least two years). The drafters did not want to equip presidents with too many powers, 
providing thus multiple organs the power to select senators (Barros 2002, 229). 
590 Politiquería was a term used by Pinochet, meaning “demagogic capture of the state by the elites of 
political parties” (Couso 2011, 411). He had stated that "A new constitution of the republic must allow for 
the dynamic development that today’s world demands, moving away forever from the politiquería, the 
sectarianism and the demagoguery of Chilean life, so that it is the supreme expression of this new 
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At the heart of this was a deep distrust in democracy (Couso 2001, 397 and Barros 2002, 
36-37) and “an acknowledgment of the intrinsically uncertain character of electoral 
outcomes” (Barros 2002, 228). Thus, the constitutional order the drafters envisioned was 
a protected democracy (democracia protegida), unlike the competitive democracy 
enjoyed by Chile before 1973 that had allowed “subversives” to come to power. 
Suspicion of political parties, especially in regard to working class activities can be seen 
in Art. 23, which prohibited union leaders from participating in a political party and 
provided penalties for political party leaders that intervened in unions. The constitution in 
many ways strengthened the executive, including granting the President the power to 
dissolve the lower house of congress once per term (Art. 32, no. 5). It established a strong 
presidential offce that enjoyed many legislative powers, including holding exclusive 
imitative to impose, eliminate or reduce taxes; create new public services, establish or 
alter remunerations, retirement payments, pensions, widows' and orphans' allowances and 
contracting loans or carrying out any other undertakings related to financial responsibility 
to the public (Art. 62). The president could insist on a legislation of his proposal even if it 
is rejected in one chamber, provided the President meets with the support of a 
supermajority in the other chamber (Art. 65). The president also held power to introduce 
amendments to a legislation or veto it.591 The presidential system envisioned in the 
constitution provided enhanced powers to the executive so that it could avoid party-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
institutional foundation and it is within these molds that Chile’s destiny is formed.” (quoted in Huneeus 
2007, 142).  
 
591 In addition to these, the president was empowered to impose time limits within which legislation must 
be approved or rejected. According to Siavelis (2000, 11-12) the presidential power in Chile was 
historically expanded gradually, however the preferences and experiences of the military government. 
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politicking and a hostile legislative, carry out efficient policy and safeguard the economic 
legacy and institutional order of the authoritarian regime (Siavelis 2000, 13-14).  
 In other aspects, the president’s powers were also limited. Most notoriously this 
was in respect to thepresident’s military authority. The president could appoint the chiefs 
of staff of three branches of the armed forces and the director of the national office only 
among the five senior officers (Art. 93)592. The president could not dismiss them either, 
except with the agreement of the National Security Council (MGK) in qualified cases.593 
Since the previous constitution was perceived to be too “liberal”, the 1980 Constitution 
specified rights and liberties in a much more careful fashion that but these were to be 
limited under conditions where it is contrary to morality, public order or security of the 
state594. On the one hand, the constitution strengthened the relative power of the 
president; while on the other, it introduced a number of mechanisms that would ensure 
that the president would not be able to circumvent the constitutional rule (Valenzuela 
1995, 51).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
592 Under the previous charter, the Senate had to ratify the president’s choices. However the new system 
was modeled after the structure of judicial independence with respect to irremovable appointments (Barros 
2002, 246). 
593 According to Barros (2002, 245), if the constitution allowed for the president the power to removed the 
heads of armed forces, the NSC’s function would have been ineffective. However, to counterbalance the 
president’s weakened role, the constitution establishes a fixed term of four years for the commanders to 
serve in their post. See Barros 2002, 245-249 for the positions of the Constituent Commission, including its 
different members and the Council of State regarding the powers of the NSC. 
594 This comes in addition to states of exception that provide for suspension of rights. 
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 The members of the Constituent Commission believed that the dispute between 
the Allende government and the Constitutional Tribunal595 was born partly because of the 
composition and appointment procedures of the justices (Barros 2002, 236-237).596 Thus, 
the new constitution increased the number of justices, demanded further qualifications 
and increased the weight of the Supreme Court in appointment and granted the National 
Security Council the authority to select two of the justices, to what is now a seven 
member court (Art. 81).597 The above mentioned crisis during the Allende government 
over the quorum required to override the presidential veto have led the drafters of the 
new constitution to clarify the Court’s power in settling disputes arising from enactment 
of constitutional reforms .598 The new constitution charged the court with the power to 
resolve questions regarding constitutionality, which might arise during the processing of 
constitutional amendments (Art. 82, no.2). 599 This comes in addition to the “mandatory, 
preventive review of the constitutionality of all organic constitutional laws and laws 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
595The constitutional crisis was over the necessary majority to override the presidential veto of a 
constitutional amendment (in this case, Christian Democrats’ “Three Areas Amendment”) and the court 
had declared itself incompetent to rule on the issue. 
596 The Constitutional Tribunal was established through the January 1970 constitutional reform and had 5 
members, three of which were designated by the President conditional upon Senate approval. The other two 
members were selected by the justices of the Supreme Court among themselves (Barros 2002, 236). 
597 Accordingly, three justices would be appointed by the Supreme Court from their members, one would 
be appointed by the President, two would be by the NSC and one would be elected by the Senate. 
598 Previously the provision on the Constitutional Court (established with 1970 amendment) had 
specifically mentioned projects of law and treaties among matters that may be referred to the court. 
Because of that, when the controversy over the “Three Areas Amendment” was referred to the court it had 
declared itself incompetent (Barros 2002, 238). 
599 The request must be made before the promulgation of law and can be made at the request of the 
President of the Republic, or of either of the Chambers, or of a fourth of their members in office (Art. 82). 
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interpreting the constitution” (Art. 82, no. 1). 600 Also, the tribunal was granted the power 
to question the constitutionality of the president’s decision to call a plebiscite, which was 
an option that the Allende considered right before the coup, in order to resolve the 
constitutional impasse (Art. 82, no. 4). 601 The 1980 constitution also provided that the 
Contraloría’s review of executive decrees had constitutional rank. Leading up to the 
coup, a conflict between the government and the Contraloría had led a major political 
crisis.602 Additionally, the Constitutional Tribunal was given a significant role in 
resolving future conflicts between the president and the Contraloría (Art. 82, no.6).603 
Another provision regarding the powers of the Constitutional Tribunal that was 
introduced in response to past problems was the power to resolve questions regarding the 
constitutionality of a decree having force of law (Art. 82, no.3). The reliance of the 
Allende government on decrees with the force of law (DFL) issued several decades ago 
in order to avoid a specific and new legislation for its socialized sector program and 
allow the government to temporarily takeover private firms and even at times establish 
state control permanently had also been one of the dire conflicts of the crisis leading up to 
coup. The circumvention of the legislative route had caused much opposition from the 
other parties and had been the primary source of conflict between the government and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
600 The chamber that originated the bill must forward it the to court within five days of its completion 
before the Congress. 
601 In addition to these checks on the president, the tribunal is also empowered to resolve complaints when 
the president fails to promulgate a law or promulgates an incorrect text (Art. 82, no. 5). 
602 Allende had relied on decreto de insistencia (decree of insistence) in order to override the Contraloría 
a’s decision (Barros 2002, 234-235). More on this, follows. 
603 In the event that the president disagrees with the Contraloría’s decision, he may raise his objections to 
the Constitutional Tribunal. 
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comptroller-general.604 The court was also granted the duty to report to the Senate before 
the latter takes a decision on whether the president (or president-elect) is incapable 
(because of physical or mental impediments) of remaining in office and whether it should 
accept or reject his resignation (Art. 82, no.9, with further stipulations in Art. 49, no. 7).  
Thus, beyond expanding the court’s review powers and providing nonpolitical organs an 
expanded role in the appointment of its members, the new charter also expanded its 
subject matter jurisdiction, all taking into consideration of past problems.605 
 General Evren of Turkey explained that “when investigating the causes of the 
horrible period we as a nation lived through before September 12, 1980, had sincerely 
believed that the main reason, or rather the impediment to prevent the events was the 
Constitution in force” (quoted in Yazıcı 1997, 173). The new framework introduced 
under military rule was also a historically charged constitution.606 Karpat (1988, 149) 
argues that the military rulers before the coup had decided on “the basic constitutional 
principles that would be enacted, the type of institutions that would be established, the 
division of labor between the "state" and the government, and the sort of mechanisms that 
would be needed to ensure smooth functioning after the return to civilian rule”. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
604  When the comptroller-general disagreed with Allende’s use of Decree Law 520 and maintained that the 
decree did not authorize expropriations, the Allende government had issued a decree of insistence to 
override the comptroller general’s decisions. See Sigmund 1977, 158-159. Additionally, the court has the 
power to resolve questions regarding the constitutionality of supreme decrees issued by the president in 
cases when either of the Chamber believes it impinges upon the domain reserved to law as provided in Art. 
60 (Art. 82, no. 12). 
605 The Constituent Commission also considered granting the Constitutional Tribunal the power to review 
presidential candidates before the elections. The Allende experience had prompted the drafters to consider 
taking such a precaution against future ‘anti-system’ candidates however ultimately decided not to grant 
such political power to the court (Barros 2002, 243). 
606 According to Örücü (1999, 35) the preamble of the constitution is a testament to the way that the 
constitution is a reaction to past events and problems. 
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reactive aspects of the constitution are easy to identify when one considers the 
constitutional and institutional bases for the crisis as well as the political, social and 
economic context leading up to coup.607 In fact, the new constitution adopted the scheme 
of the previous constitution to the point that Sencer (1983, 24) considers it merely “an act 
of amending almost all the articles of the 1961 Constitution”.608 
 A major criticism that was repeatedly pronounced was that the bicameral 
assembly was slowing down the legislation process.609 Under the new framework, the 
drafters intended to “to rationalize parliamentary procedure in terms of efficiency and 
effectiveness” (Gençkaya 1999, 11).  The 1982 Constitution’s response to the failures of 
the previous constitution was to concentrate legislative power in one chamber of what 
used to be a two-house parliament (Art. 7) and to reformulate the law-making and 
supervision functions of the parliament. Besides introducing a unicameral parliament that 
would facilitate efficient law-making, the legislative period was extended to five years to 
allow for a more uninterrupted term. The constitution also reduced the quorum necessary 
to convene and take decisions by the unicameral parliament.610 These changes were 
responses to what were perceived to be the inefficiencies of the pre-1980 system 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
607 For Kili (1992, 1970), the reactionary attitude is clearest in respect to rights and liberties. While the 
1961 Constitution mainly focused on “individual rights and freedoms and with matters related to social 
justice and social security”, the 1982 text focused on protecting the state (Kili 1992, 1070). 
608 See Varol 2016 on “constitutional stickiness”. 
609 The drafters of the 1961 Constitution had intended to block the monopoly of one political party by 
dividing the legislative power into two chambers and by introducing proportional representation. Its 
unintended consequence was that weak coalition governments that were unresponsive to country’s 
problems characterized the Turkish political system of 1970s. For instance, as the country was being swept 
into ideological and sectarian polarization, political killings and mass murders; the parliament was 
deadlocked over two bills (“State Security Court” and “States of Emergency” legislations). 
610 More on this is explained below. 
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(Gençkaya 1999, 5). Similarly, the drafters intended to thwart off the opposition’s 
delaying tactics, which had relied on interpellations and parliamentary investigations 
leading up to the coup, thusly increasing the necessary number of deputies to initiate such 
motions (Gençkaya 1999, 5).  
 A very clear case of constitutional innovation motivated by prior experience was 
with respect to the election process of the president (Özbudun 1988, 38). The 
parliament’s failure to elect a new president, even after 115 rounds not only demonstrated 
the political party fragmentation and polarization characteristic of late 1970s Turkey611, 
but also the absence of an institutional mechanism to overcome such a deadlock.612  The 
impasse became one of the most important factors leading up to the coup. The 1982 
Constitution allowed for the nomination of a candidate outside of the parliament, 
provided that it is supported by at least one-fifth of the total members of the parliament 
(Art.101). In order to avoid infinite rounds of presidential elections in the parliament, it 
provided a scheme where if ultimately the parliament fails to elect one of the candidates, 
new general elections would be held (Art. 102).613 The constitution also provides other 
mechanism to overcome deadlocks in the decision-making mechanisms, including the 
election of the president of the assembly (Art. 94) and the presidential power to call for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
611 The presidential election in 1973 was also an agonizing process. 
612 In the event that the parliament failed to elect a president from its ranks, it was deadlocked. The 
constitution did not allow for a candidate outside of the parliament nor did it enforce the abolishment of the 
parliament and call for new parliamentary elections. 
613 According to the scheme provided in Article 102, a two-thirds majority is required to elect a new 
president in the first and second ballot. If a candidate is not elected after two rounds, then after a three day 
interval, a third ballot would be held where the candidate that gets absolute majority will be elected. In the 
case that this is done accomplished in the third round as well, then the fourth ballot will be between the two 
candidates who have received the most votes in the third ballot. If all fails, general elections are to be held. 
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new elections (Art. 116) (Yürük 2003, 32).614 Additionally, the 1982 Constitution ended 
the election of members of the Constitutional Court by the parliament, which at times had 
been delayed for failing to meet the required majorities (Yürük 2003, 33).615 The quorum 
to convene and take decision was used as a delaying tactic by the opposition during the 
span of the 1961 constitution (Yürük 2003, 33).  In order to thwart off such attempts for 
partisan purposes, the drafters reduced the quorum and reformulated the convening and 
taking decision requirements (Art. 96).616 The minimum number to constitute political 
party group was also raised to twenty from ten, which would make it difficult for 
minority parties to take part in the activities of the assembly that allow participation in 
proportion to its number of members (Art. 95). 
 An opinion shared by some commentators was that the existing constitutional 
framework was “far too concerned with checks and balances to provide the kind of 
resolute executive power to drag Turkey out of its deepening structural crisis” (Birand 
1987, 133). Thus, another response was to empower the executive, especially the 
President of the Republic (Sencer 1983, 48 and Parla 2007, 4). Previously, the 1961 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
614 The 1961 Constitution did include a provision (Article 95) that would allow for renewal of elections, 
however the conditions were too strict to make it possible. New elections could have helped overcome the 
unsustainable weak coalitions. The election of the president of the parliament had led to impasses; this was 
eased under the new constitution (Yürük 2003, 32). 
615 Under the 1961 Constitution, the senate elected two members and the national assembly elected three 
members to the Constitutional Court (Article 145). 
616 The articles stipulate that, “Unless otherwise stipulated in the Constitution, the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly shall convene with at least one-third of the total number of members and shall take decisions by 
an absolute majority of those present; however, the quorum for decisions can, under no circumstances, be 
less than a quarter plus one of the total number of members”. Previously (Article 86 of the 1961 
Constitution), it required “an absolute majority of its plenary session, shall constitute a meeting quorum for 
each legislative body, and unless otherwise provided in the Constitution, absolute majority of the attending 
members shall constitute a quorum of decision”. 
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Constitution had recognized the executive solely as a “function”, which changed under 
the new charter that recognized it as both a power and a function (Sencer 1983, 26). The 
executive branch was vested with exclusive powers during states of exception. Under 
states of exception the executive (the council of ministers under the chairmanship of the 
president) had a free card of issuing decrees having the force of law that could not be 
reviewed by the Constitutional Court.617 The logic of empowering the executive was to 
avoid the slow process of legislative procedures in matters necessitating immediate action 
(Özcan 2012, 71). In a similar fashion to Chile, which had established a system of strong 
presidentialism (Fuentes 2012), Turkey’s new regime also deviated from the traditional 
parliamentary system by empowering the presidency that is traditionally a merely 
symbolic office (Özbudun 1988 and Gönenç 2008).618 Among the powers of the 
presidency, the constitution provided the President with greater leeway to call for new 
elections in cases when the Council of Ministers failed to receive a vote of confidence 
(Art. 116). The extended list of presidential powers are enumerated are under Art. 104 
which include legislative powers including the power to submit legislative acts to 
referendum619, executive powers including the power to appoint Chief of General Staff 
and call the National Security Council and judicial functions, namely the power to 
appoint members of the high courts. It is these appointive powers that stand out as being 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
617 These were regulated by Article 121 regarding states of emergency and Article 122 regarding state of 
siege, mobilization, and state of war. 
618 For a detailed analysis of the president’s role under the 1982 Constitution and how it neither conformed 
to the presidential nor parliamentary system, see Özbudun 1988. See Gönenç 2008 for the full list of the 
president’s executive, legislative and judicial functions and powers. 
619 The President does not have the power to initiate legislation but he promulgates the laws adopted by the 
Assembly within 15 days or sends it back for reconsideration (except laws related to budget) (Article 89). 
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excessive, which include the power to appoint the members of the Higher Education 
Council, rectors of universities, the members of the Constitutional Court, one-fourth of 
the Council of State and the members of the Supreme Council of Judges and Public 
Prosecutors etc. 620. According to Özbudun and Gençkaya (2009, 21) since the military 
drafters perceived the bureaucratic agencies, such as universities and high courts, “as 
highly fragmented, infiltrated by political parties and vulnerable to radical political 
ideas”, the president was assigned with the power to appoint their members.621 In spite of 
the inflated powers, the President has no accountability (except for treason) for his 
exclusive decisions and orders and no appeal can be made to any legal authority, 
including the Constitutional Court (Art. 105). For other presidential decrees, that require 
the signatures of the prime minister and relevant ministers, while the president holds no 
accountability, but the prime minister and the minsters do; this indicates a two-tiered 
executive under the established system. In areas where the constitution weakened the 
powers of bureaucratic agencies such as the review powers of judiciary and the autonomy 
of universities, the aim was not to strengthen the elected assemblies but to fortify the 
presidency. As Özbudun and Gençkaya (2009, 20) point out, the drafters assumed that the 
presidency would be controlled by the military. In Chile too, Pinochet and his allies had 
calculated that he would hold the presidency for an extended time period (Baldez and 
Carey 1999, 31). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
620 Other appointments that the president was entrusted to make were the chief public prosecutor, the 
Deputy Chief Public Prosecutor of the High Court of Appeals, the members of the Military High Court of 
Appeals and the members of the Supreme Military Administrative Court. 
621 Another blank check for the President is with regards to the establishment, principles of organization 
and the appointment of personnel of the General Secretariat of the Presidency of Republic for which the 
President is entitled to direct by presidential decrees (Article 107). 
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 The fundamental rights and liberties granted under the 1961 Constitution, 
although amended to a great degree with the 1971 and 1973 amendments, were regarded 
as one of the factors that led to political and social strife in late 1970s; this argument was 
repeatedly pronounced by the military regime.622 The atmosphere of chaos characterized 
by ideological and sectarian polarization, political killings and mass murders was one of 
the major factors that formed the rationale for military intervention (Demirel 2003). Kili 
(1992, 1070) understands the constitution’s focus on matters that affect the viability of 
the state as “a reaction to over a decade of widespread anarchy and violence in the 
country”. The response of drafters was recognizing rights and liberties but ultimately 
specifying the conditions under which they would be curbed to the extent that 
“restrictions become the rule rather than the exception” (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 
22).623 This is not only evident with the constraints introduced under states of exception 
but also with respect to the characterization of the republic.624 Previously, the document 
stated that the republic is “based on human rights”, whereas under the new framework the 
wording changed to “respecting human rights”. As Sencer (1983) notes, it is a 
meaningful change. In addition to restrictions spelled out under relevant articles of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
622 For instance, Kenan Evren in one of his speeches during his campaign for the referendum on the 
constitution expressed (October 24-November 5, 1982), “One of the failures of our old constitution was 
that because of this constitution the hands of the government established by the party that came to power 
were tied” (Yürük 2003, 31). Translation is my own. 
623 During his speech delivered on the day that the 1981 Constituent Assembly was convened, General 
Evren explained that the constitution would draw lessons from the political instability that led to the coup 
and explained the limits of rights and liberties: “While trying to enhance and protect human rights and 
liberties, the state itself also has certain rights and obligations as far as its continuity and future is 
concerned. . . . There are, however, limits to [citizens freedoms]; there is also a state founded by individuals 
that together make up a collectivity. . . . Individual freedoms can be protected to the extent that the will and 
the sovereignty of the state are maintained” (quoted in Bali 2012, 297 note 213). 
624 See Oder 2009 for details on the characterization of the republic under the 1982 Constitution. 
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constitution, the rights and freedoms in general can be restricted “with the aim of 
safeguarding the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, national 
sovereignty, the Republic, national security, public order, general peace, the public 
interest, public morals and public health” (Art. 13).625 Different than and separate to the 
restrictions, the constitution also prohibits against the abuse of fundamental rights and 
freedoms626. The aim of the framers was to prevent the misuse of certain rights and 
freedoms, although in technical terms they may be in accordance with the law. As Bilgin 
(2008, 139) highlights the constitution’s limitations “extended not only to actions but also 
to intentions”. Reminiscent of Art. 8 of Chile’s 1980 Constitution, Art. 14 states that 
there will be punishment for those who abuse the rights and freedoms and those who 
provoke others to do so. The same logic of stipulating rights and freedoms and later 
specifying the conditions under which these can be restricted is also used for articles on 
freedom of communication, movement, expression, press, association and the right to 
disseminate science and arts, the right to public periodicals, the right to use private media 
and the right to hold meetings and demonstration marches etc. In cases where the 
constitution did not specify the exact condition of restrictions, it either referred to Art. 13 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
625 The constitution is ill-famous for its contradictions, which is also the case for this provision. Art. 13 that 
provides for an extended scope on the restrictions of rights also states that these limitations “shall not 
conflict with the requirements of the democratic order of society and shall not be imposed for any purpose 
other than those for which they are prescribed”. According to Bilgin (2008, 138) Art. 13 is a case of 
“restriction by public reasons”. 
626 It provides that the rights and freedoms established in the constitution cannot be exercised for the 
purpose of “violating the indivisible integrity of the State”, “endangering the existence of the Turkish State 
and Republic”, “destroying fundamental rights and freedoms”, “destroying fundamental rights and 
freedoms”, “placing the government of the State under the control of an individual or a group of people”, 
“establishing the hegemony of one social class over others”, “creating discrimination on the basis of 
language, race, religion or sect”, and “establishing by any other means a system of government” based on 
language, race, religion or sect. 
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on general restrictions or postponed it to a future legislation. The logic of institutional 
design is evident in the report submitted by the Constitutional Council to the Consultative 
Assembly, which stated the goal was to have “a constitution that is appropriate for the 
necessities of the national fabric without breaking basic principles of democracy’, 
implying that the previous constitution’s expansive rights and freedoms have failed to 
take into consideration its compatibility with Turkey’s “capacity for democracy” (Bilgin 
2008, 137). Thus, the constitution’s framers embraced a “statist approach” and similar to 
Chilean drafters, favored safeguarding the state against its citizens rather than protecting 
its citizens from state authority (Özbudun 2011, 19).627 
 The drafters of the 1982 Constitution, like their Chilean counterparts, had very 
little trust vested in civilian politicians (Özbudun 2014, 296). It becomes evident in 
chapters that deal with political parties that authoritarian leaders intended to depoliticize 
the nation and limit the scope of politics.628 The constitution prohibits the formation of 
any political party that supports or intends to set up the domination of a class or group, or 
any kind of dictatorship (Art. 68).629 It bars political parties from establishing women and 
youth branches and from having political ties with associations, unions, foundations, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
627 The constitution also recognizes that duties and responsibilities accompany fundamental rights and 
freedoms. This is stipulated under Art. 12, which states “The fundamental rights and freedoms also include 
the duties and responsibilities of the individual towards society, his family, and other individuals”. 
628 Evren, in one of the speeches he delivered in his campaign for the constitution explained the rationale, 
“The new Constitution lays down a principle valid for all institutions ... a party will function as a party, an 
association as an association, a foundation as a foundation, a trade union as a trade union. Political activity 
is reserved for political parties. No institution which is not organized as a political party may engage 
in political activity. On the other hand, political parties should not interfere in areas reserved for trade 
unions, associations, professional organizations, and foundations” (quoted in Bilgin 2008, 139). 
629 See Yazıcı 2012, 228-270. 
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cooperatives, and public professional organizations (Art. 69). Members of the judiciary, 
university professors, civil servants and other public servants, as well as members of the 
armed forces are prohibited from becoming members of political parties. Considering the 
atmosphere of polarization in the late 1970s especially in universities, this move can also 
be interpreted as drafters looking backwards. Moreover, the new text assigned the 
Constitutional Court with the task of auditing and closing down political parties that 
acted unconstitutionally.630 Another case of suspicion was directed at associations. The 
constitution prohibited them from pursuing political aims, engaging in political activities, 
receiving support from or giving support to political parties or taking joint action with 
labor unions, public professional organizations, or foundations (Article 33).631 These 
restrictions on associations were aimed at depolarizing the society and minimizing the 
venue of political activity to the parliament (Yürük 2003, 34). Additionally, the 
prohibition against “joint action” was “aimed at curbing the formation of larger 
organizations or social movements that could possibly challenge the ‘fundamental 
characteristics of the Republic’” (Bilgin 2008, 139). Other civil society organizations 
such as trade unions and professional organizations were also weakened (Özbudun and 
Gençkaya 2009, 20). These restrictions placed on political parties, associations and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
630 Members of political parties dissolved by the Constitutional Court were banned from establishing a new 
party. It also prohibited any new political party from having a majority of its members from closed down 
parties (Art. 69). 
631 The article also provided that associations may normally be dissolved by the decision of a judge and 
further stipulated that they could also be suspended from activity by a competent authority where its delay 
could endanger the indivisible integrity of the State, national security or sovereignty, public order the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others, or the prevention of crime. 
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unions limited the channels of demand and “asserted the supremacy of the state over the 
realm of politics” (Evin 1988, 208). 
II. Forward Looking 
 The 1980 Constitution of Chile was not only drafted looking backwards at the 
problems that had emerged before the coup (Barros 2001, 19), but it also intended to 
transform the political, economic and social system of the country. Contrary to what is 
usually regarded to be “Pinochet’s constitution” because it prolonged Pinochet’s rule, it 
was designed to be an enduring document that would mold the state and society. Aside 
from establishing a protected democracy that would restrict the political activity of the 
left, the authoritarian drafters wanted to restructure the Chilean political institutions 
(Valenzuela 1999, 222). Their intent to transform Chile was ultimately the basis of 
military regime’s claim to legitimacy (Londregan 2000, 58). The constitution helped 
cement the transformation that was already launched under the ‘seven modernizations’ 
program  (Spooner 1994, 147-148).632 The aim to transform Chile is most evident with 
respect to the economic realm. The constitution provided for “one of the extreme 
protections to property rights in existence” and allowed for constitutional remedy 
(recurso de protección) in cases of its violation (Couso 2011, 407). More importantly 
though, it included economic and social features that were based on “the principle of 
subsidiarity” (Couso 2011, 412). By entrenching a certain economic and social model, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
632 It referred to the seven areas where major changes would be introduced: labor policy, agriculture, justice, 
regional decentralization, education, health and the social security. The specific goal was “depoliticization 
of industrial relations, privatizations of service provision in the area of health care, pension funds and 
education, and expansion of the court system” (Loveman 1988, 267). 
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the constitution was not only able to defend it against “the threat of legal loopholes and 
extra-constitutional practice”, (Cea quoted in Couso 2011, 409) but also ended the debate 
on economic questions (Couso 2011, 409). He justified it by arguing that political 
questions were linked to economic and social ones, and that in a world where economic 
activity is such a fundamental part of life, a constitution cannot stay impartial to it.  
 Supported by organic constitutional laws promulgated afterwards, the constitution 
aimed to establish a specific economic model. In order to organize this model based on 
free market ideology, it established an autonomous Central Bank (Article 93) and gave 
the president the exclusive authority to initiate legislation that would raise or reducs 
taxes633 (Couso 2012, 413). Military rulers, to a great exten,t followed the economic 
transformation guideline of a group of young, American-educated economists, known as 
the Chicago Boys.634 Having gained the trust of the military junta as economic advisors 
that helped reduce inflation during the 1974-1975 crisis, the Chicago Boys advocated 
transforming the economy from a state interventionism one to a free market economy 
(Couso 2012, 403-404). Their anti-communist position, as well as their strong conviction 
that their radical economic and social transformation would diminish the threat of 
communism, secured them positions of influence in key government positions and gave 
them the opportunity to promote their ideals during the drafting of the constitution. 
Although the final text of the constitution was not as ambitious as the Chicago Boys had 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
633 In Turkey too, the Central Bank was established as an autonomous institution. According to Haggard 
and Kaufmann (1995, 121) this was an attempt to empower independent agencies to veto policy changes. 
634 These young economists were trained at the University of Chicago under their mentor Milton Friedman 
who advocated monetarist policies. They were able to influence and transform the gremialista movement 
(Pollack 1997, 154-157). 
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advocated, it nevertheless aimed at the same ideological preferences (Couso 2012, 412). 
According to one of Chile’s most renowned jurists Professor José Luis Cea, the 1980 
Constitution became Chile’s first “full constitution” (constitución plena) because the 
previous constitutions had only been political ones and were short of including economic 
and social features (Couso 2011, 408). 
 The drafters of Turkey’s new constitution were also intent on bringing permanent 
change. Aside from measures to depoliticize the society, limit political activity to 
parliament and strengthen the state, the constitution also included provisions that over the 
long term aimed at rearranging labor relations and instituting a nationalist-conservative 
outlook to end the debate on leftist ideas.635 The new constitution restricted the 
establishment of trade unions and their activities, denied public sector workers the right 
to unionize and prohibited unions from having connections with political parties. The 
constitution also removed the welfare state provisions of the previous text (Kili 1992, 
1069). These maneuvers aimed to curb the power of the labor movement and to 
institutionalize the monetarist economy policy preferred by the military establishment 
(Duman 2014, 111).636 Pertinent to Provisional Article 8 (explained below), authoritarian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
635 Evren and his fellow military commanders shared a genuine albeit exaggerated fear of communism. As 
Kalaycıoğlu (2005, 127) explains, “They were of the opinion that Turkey was faced with yet another 
existential challenge by its Soviet neighbor in the 1970s and the early 1980s, believing that the communists 
had been plotting to divide Turkey up from the middle of Anatolia into an “eastern” and a “western” 
Turkey. The east of Turkey would rise up against the central government and be ready to signal the Soviet 
Army to come to their help and “emancipate them.” The leftist activism in Turkey was there to undermine 
the national solidarity of the country. The Kurdish nationalist activism was hiding behind the smokescreen 
of the socialists and the communists to divide the country into two. Evren and his colleagues seemed to 
conclude that the cure for such an existential threat was to “strengthen the state,” which had been rendered 
frail by the former, liberal political regime, coalition governments, and amoral politicians who mismanaged 
the economy to their benefits”. 
636 It was also a reaction to activism of the labor unions in the 1970s (Kalaycıoğlu 2005, 130). 
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leaders introduced relevant legislation that restricted the collective rights and freedoms 
listed in the constitution of trade unions, associations and of holding meetings and 
demonstrations.637  
 Authoritarian leaders came to regard Islam (Sunni) “both as a legitimizing for its 
[military’s] policies and as a unifying instrument against anarchy” (Eligür 2010, 94). 
Although one of the reasons for the coup was the fear of Islamic reactionary forces, the 
military hoped to co-opt Islamist groups by adopting Islam as part of its state ideology. It 
was “a conscious choice to utilize Islam” to end the left-right polarization and stabilize 
Turkish society (Eligür 2010, 102).  A group of right-wing intellectuals organized under 
the Intellectuals’ Hearth (Aydınlar Ocağı), became the main champion of what came to 
be known as the Turkish-Islam Synthesis (TIS). Hearth, which was founded with the goal 
of fighting against the dissemination of leftist ideas and of uniting the Turkish right, was 
given the opportunity to present its constitution draft to the National Security Council and 
later made the claim that the final version of 1982 Constitution overlapped as much as 
75-80% with their proposal (Kurt 2010, 116 and Eligür 2010, 102).638 Although the 
constitution and other relevant documents on education, religion and culture do not utter 
the word “Turkish-Islam Synthesis’, TIS provided the main set of values that guided 
military rulers who had adopted and implemented Heart’s ideas and integrated it as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
637 These include, the Law on Trade Unions (no. 2821), the Law on Association (no. 2098), and the Law on 
Meetings and Demonstrations (no. 2911). 
638 Two members of the Constitution Council (Şener Akyol and Yılmaz Altuğ, members of the Constitution 
Council had connections to Hearth (Eligür 2010, 102). 
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main ideological apparatus of the state (Eligür 2010, 101).639 This is evident in the form 
of compulsory religious education in schools provided in the constitution, regardless of 
their sectarian affiliation (Article 24).640 The State took on the role of disseminating 
religious education in order to realize that the functions of religion, namely to unite the 
country under the rubric of Sunni Islam, which would neutralize “the power of radical 
left-wing groups in Turkey, particularly Kurdish separatists and Alevi activist groups that 
were ideologically allied with Marxism” (Eligür 2010, 93). Also, by assigning the state 
with the task of educating the masses on religion, the 1982 Constitution aimed to prevent 
the propaganda of religious extremists and the spread of dogma (Kalaycıoğlu 2005, 130-
131). The Department of Religious Affairs, first elevated to constitutional rank through 
the 1961 Constitution, continued to function as the state’s instrument of monopolizing 
religion.  Although the constitution maintained the principle of secularism, including 
dictating the Department of Religious Affairs to function in accordance with the principle 
of secularism, military leaders deviated from their traditional position of being the 
guardians of secular state.641.However, in doing so, Evren and others downplayed the 
contradiction between secularism and state’s new relation with Islam. When making 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
639 Eligür 2010 (93-118) provide a thorough list of actions taken by the coup leaders that indicate their 
efforts to coopt the Islamists. In contrast to members of other political parties, members o National 
Salvation Party were prosecuted less harshly. Its leader Erbakan was released while awaiting his trial. The 
military leader, Kenan Evren established good relations with brotherhoods and on many occasions cited 
verses fro the Quran and Prophet Muhammad’s sayings. The military initiated policies to attract Saudi 
capital. The military regime also established relations with other conservative Muslim states. 
640 Additionally, the official explanation of the 1982 Constitution states that “Religious and moral 
education and instruction have been placed under state supervision and control in order to prevent 
exploitation and abuse” (quoted in Eligür 2010, 107).  
641 The 1960 coup among other reasons was taken to safeguard the secular Turkish state from ideological 
threats including the leftist and Islamist ones. 
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reference to Islam and the Quran, Evren relied on “concepts such as "literacy," "science-
knowledge," "civilization" "positivism" and "secularism", and highlighted his attempt to 
support the fundamental secular goals of the regime through Islam, but without changing 
the position the state held in its relationship with society” (Sakalllıoğlu 1996, 246). In 
embracing Islam, as an antidote for left-wing politics and a unifying force for the country, 
drafters also deemed it useful for safeguarding the envisioned market economy (Cizre 
Sakalllıoğlu 1996, 245). Inserting religion in social and political realm could appease the 
pious masses that were anticipated to be most marginalized as a result of economic 
restructuring.  
III. Surviving the Transition 
 The 1980 constitution of Chile was intended to serve after the transition to 
electoral democracy and, in fact, it also functioned as a guideline for an orderly 
transition. This is quite discernible in the way that the Chilean constitution is divided into 
two parts. In addition to permanent articles (14 chapters and 120 articles), the constitution 
also spelled out the structure and status of the military junta and set the rules by which 
the transition was to take place in the transitory articles (29 in total) (Couso 2011, 410).  
The constitution provided for a transitional period of eight more years  (1981-1989), in 
which Pinochet would continue to serve as head of state.642 Until a new Congress could 
be elected in 1990, the junta would resume the function of legislation. However, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
642 Sergio Fernández, the interior minister at the time explained that the transitional period was conceived 
to be a long process because it was ‘‘deemed necessary to carry through the modernization process. 
Economic recovery had to be consolidated to permit the institutional re-incorporation of the opposition to 
politics, and to strengthen the eventual democratic regime.’’ (quoted in González 2008, 45). 
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president would be granted additional repressive powers (TD 24) including the power to; 
“1) detain persons for up to five days in their own homes or places other than prisons 
(this term could be increased to fifteen days in the event of serious terrorist acts); (2) 
restrict freedom of assembly and limit the creation and circulation of new publications; 
(3) expel from Chile or prohibit from entering the country any individual propagating 
Marxist doctrines or effecting acts contrary to Chilean interests or that constitute a threat 
to internal peace; and (4) banish (relegar) individuals for periods up to three months to 
specific urban localities within Chile” (Barros 2002, 171). It provided for a specific 
timeline and for the terms of the transfer 643. “The idea was that if the junta put into 
operation as much of the text as possible, it would have less of a chance of being 
dismantled later, if the main body took effect only on return to civilian rule” (Barros 2001, 
19). As history shows, it forced the opposition’s hand (Concertación de Partidos por el 
NO) to abide by the constitution and the fixed timeline provided the military regime with 
ample time to take the necessary measures to ensure the preservation of their objectives 
and prerogatives after the withdrawal from power (González 2008, 46). Although 
presidents could not be immediately reelected, the rule excluded the transitional period, 
meaning that Pinochet could be reelected and remain in office for sixteen years.644 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
643 It provided for a transitional period of eight years after which a candidate nominated by the regime 
would run in a one-man presidential election in the form of a plebiscite.  According to TD 29 in the event 
that the candidate nominated by the military government does not get elected or if the junta and the NSC 
fail to agree on a candidate, the President (Pinochet) and the junta were to maintain office for an additional 
year after which elections would take place.  
644 According to Huneeus (2007, 161) “Mónica Madariaga, minister of justice in 1980, recalled that the 
original transition period, approved in a working group, was sixteen years, but that this was considered 
counterproductive to winning the plebiscite to approve the constitution, so the original period was divided 
into two eight-year periods”. 
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 Similarly, the Turkish constitution point-by-point outlined the transition formula, 
transitional calendar, the function and the composition of institutions during the interim 
period.645 Different than tthe Chilean case, where there was an elected legislature during 
the transition, general elections in Turkey were soon to take place for the election of the 
parliament. The referendum that approved the 1982 Constitution also confirmed the 
presidency of Kenan Evren646, the coup leader, the chairman of the Council of National 
Security and head of state, and gave him seven more years to oversee the transition to 
electoral democracy 647 (Provisional Article 1). This provided the coup leader ample time 
to control and supervise the incoming civilian regime. The other members of the military, 
i.e. the members of the Council of National Security were also to maintain their influence. 
For the next six years after the election of a new parliament, the NSC was to take on the 
name of Presidential Council to work alongside the President.648 During this interim 
period, the President was given much more stringent powers over the amendment process. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
645 In total the constitution included sixteen transitional articles. 
646 The permanent formula for electing the president was via the parliament indirectly. Evren’s presidency 
deviated from this as he was elected directly by referendum.  
647 Evren took on the function of head of state by taking an oath on September 18, 1980 following the coup.  
648 The functions of the Presidential Council included, a) “To examine laws adopted by the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly and submitted to the President of the Republic concerning: the fundamental rights and 
freedoms and duties, the principle of secularism, the preservation of the reforms of Ataturk, national 
security and public order set forth in the Constitution, the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation, 
International Treaties, the sending of Armed Forces to foreign countries and the stationing of foreign forces 
in Turkey, emergency rule, martial law and the state of war, and other laws deemed necessary by the 
President of the Republic, within the first ten days of the period of fifteen days granted to the President of 
the Republic for his consideration; b) On the request of the President of the Republic and within the period 
specific by him: To consider and give an opinion on matters relating to the holding of new general elections, 
the exercise of emergency powers and the measures to be taken during a state of emergency, the 
management and supervision of the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation, the training of youth and 
the conduct of religious affairs; c) According to the request of the President of the Republic, to consider 
and investigate matters relating to internal or external security and such other matters as are deemed 
necessary, and to submit its findings to the President of the Republic (PA 2). 
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Accordingly, to override the presidential veto of an amendment bill, the parliament had to 
have a three-fourth majority (PA 9). In light of the 1960 coup in which the military 
withdrew completely without an interim period, it is possible that the Turkish armed 
forces believed that the transitional arrangements in the new constitution “provided a 
neater means to their aim of safeguarding the order which they imposed on the country” 
(Mango 1983, 33).  
 The authoritarian leaders’ distrust of politicians was evident in the transitional 
period as well. The constitution stipulated that leaders of political parties (pre-1980 coup) 
were banned from all political activity, including establishing new ones, becoming 
candidate for office or taking on any type of role. All deputies and senators (with the 
exception of appointed ones) in office by January 1980 were also banned from political 
activity for the next year (PA 5).649 Without a doubt, this was an attempt to cleanse the 
political sphere from the culprits of the 1979-1980 crisis. The constitution also gave the 
Constituent Assembly the power to draft all legislation related to new organs, institutions 
and agencies established under the new constitution.650 As a result, the authoritarian 
leaders had time to take the necessary measures to ensure the preservation of their 
objectives (Negretto 2014). Most controversially, the transitional formula included 
immunity for the members of the Council of National Security and for all persons who 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
649 The same prohibitions applied for nonelected senators in cases where there were criminal cases brought 
against them for crimes against the state (PA 5). 
650 In cases when the Constituent Assembly’s term expired before the legislation could be completed, the 
parliament was directed to draft the necessary legislations within the first year of its election (PA 8). Along 
with the Council of National Security, Constituent Assembly was to cease to exist after the parliament is 
convened (PA 3). 
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had adopted and implemented the decisions as the Council was exercising its executive 
and legislative functions (1980–1983).651 The infamous PA 15 also closed the option of 
review of constitutionality for all laws and decrees passed by the National Security.652 
These measures ensured that the transition would follow the formula and timeline set up 
by the authoritarian incumbents, provided extra time to insulate the political regime for 
possible infringements and gave authoritarian leaders institutional mechanisms to 
supervise the incoming civilians for the foreseeable future. 
IV. Institutionally Constraining 
 To ensure that the constitution would survive after the transition to civilian rule, 
the drafters of the Chilean constitution designed a number of gatekeeper mechanisms to 
cement the status-quo established by the authoritarian rulers (Couso 2012). The drafters 
envisioned a ‘self-protected’ constitutional order, “secured by organs internal to the 
political-institutional regime, not by an external guardian, such as the armed forces” 
(Barros 2002 218). The intention was to equip the constitutions with as many checks to 
avoid a breakdown and resort to a coup and as well as provided the military regime with 
a solution as to “how to disengage from direct rule” (Londregan 2000, 2). The drafters’ 
reading of the past prompted them to conclude that “the intrinsically uncertain character 
of electoral outcomes” required them to strategically design institutions (Barros 2002, 
228). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
651 In Chile, this was done through an amnesty law on April 19, 1978 (Decree law 2.191) which provided 
impunity regarding human rights violations. 
652 Immunity against prosecution was not limited by a timeframe, as the transitional provision did not 
expire at a certain date. The 2010 amendment removed PA 15. 
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 The protected democracy was fortified by three layers (Barros 2002, 234). On the 
first layer, the constitutional rule was protected with traditional checks and balances 
including presidential veto, congress’ power of impeachment and judicial review. On the 
second layer, “extrapolitical organs of legal and constitutional control”, namely the 
Contraloría and Tribunal Constitucional provided additional recourse (Barros 2002, 234). 
The ideologue of the constitution, Jaime Guzmán explained tha the rationale in 
constructing such a constraining constitution was to ensure that “if the adversaries 
manage to govern they will constrained to follow a course of action not too different to 
that which we could desire because the range of alternatives that the court will impose on 
those who play in it will be sufficiently reduced as to make the opposite, extremely 
difficult” (quoted in Garretón 2011, 87). The powers of Contraloría and the 
Constitutional Tribunal are already discussed above. Both of these nonpolitical organs 
were intended to provide checks on the powers of the executive and the legislature. While 
the Contraloría acts as an auditor of the government with regards to expenditures, 
decrees and decrees having force of law and provides extra checks on president’s power 
to override’s the Contraloría’s decisions, the Constitutional Tribunal has the power to 
rule on constitutionality of legislation, amendments and constitutionality of groups and 
their ideologies among other powers.  
 The National Security Council was envisioned to be a third layer of defense653. 
The National Security Council (COSENA) composed of civilian and military members654 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
653 According to Ensalaco (1995, 260), the COSENA and the Constitutional Tribunal were to compliment 
one another. The COSENA was to appoint two of the court’s member and the COSENA could directly 
appeal to the court in security matters.  
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was designed as an advisory body that could provide the armed forces a supervisory role 
in the system of political decision-making (Art. 95 and 96)655 (Barros 2002, 240 and 
Fuentes 2000, 116-117).656 The military-dominated council had the authority to advise 
the president and any other authority established by the constitution on any matter related 
to national security.657 This comes in addition to the armed forces’ function to “guarantee 
the institutional order of the Republic” (Art. 90).658 As already mentioned, the armed 
forces have the authority to designate senators from the COSENA have autonomy on 
appointments, promotions and dismissals and appoint members to the constitutional court. 
In addition to these, the armed forces had a representative in regional development 
councils giving them an extra venue to control the municipal administration and 
education system (Loveman 2001, 290).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
654 Only certain members had the right to vote: the president of the republic, the presidents of the Senate 
and of the Supreme Court, the commanders in chief of the Armed Forces, the general director of the 
Carabineros, and the attorney general. Members that did not have the authority to vote include the ministers 
of the interior, foreign affairs, national defense, economy, and finance. 
655 Chile had a security council before the coup, but it was not of constitutional rank (Barros 2002, 234).  
656 The COSENA did not have veto power but it did have the power to influence decision-making. 
657 According to Barros (2002, 242), the Constituent Commission considered wide range of power for the 
NSC including the power to veto constitutional reform, statue, executive decrees and cabinet resolutions; 
review presidential candidates before elections; initiate legislation and approval before the declaration of 
state of siege. However, these proposals were abandoned by the drafters in order to not politicize the 
military and force them into conflicts with other state institutions. However, we again see that lessons of 
the past has guided the members of the commission. The reason that they (especially insisted by Guzmán) 
considered the power to review presidential candidates before election was because they wanted to avoid 
the election of Allende-like candidate. Article 8 could block a political party with totalitarian objectives but 
Guzmán wanted to avoid an independent with anti-system goals to run (Barros 2002, 243). Ultimately, the 
consideration was dropped because the drafters feared that it could only politicize and damage the NSC and 
the armed forces (Barros 2002, 244). 
658 However, the constitution does not define “national security” (Loveman 2001, 290). Also see Godoy 
1996 and Geisse and Arrayas 1989, p. 125-134. 
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 Another legal tool was, of course the office of nonelected senators.659 By 
incorporating these non-political actors into the legislative process (including amending 
the constitution), the drafters wanted to avoid overhauling the system.660 A stringent 
amendment-making mechanism was in place “to avoid any tampering with the regime’s 
legal apparatus (Chapter 14) ” (Huneeus 2007, 161). Certain chapters, entrenched 
specifically had a higher quorum than usual (two-thirds rather than three-fifth for the rest) 
and required the approval of two successive congresses.661 All amendments as we have 
seen are subject to constitutional review by the Constitutional Tribunal (Art. 82, no. 1) 
Although the infamous binomial electoral system which was introduced to moderate the 
strength of the left and transform the multiparty system into a two-party system, was 
established later with an organic constitutional law, the constitution entrenches the size 
and composition of two chambers, making it very difficult to alter the system.662 The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
659 The former presidents who have previously served at least 6 years automatically become members of the 
senate. In addition to that, nine senators are appointed for eight year terms- Supreme Court appoint 3, the 
President appoints 2 and the COSENA appoints 4. See Londregan 2000, 84-85 for specific requirements 
and its criticism. 
660 A constitutional reform project proposed during the last months of Alessandri’s presidency also included 
the idea of nonelected senators. The goal was the same, to weaken the role of political parties and the 
weight of elected senators (Huneeus 2007, 156). However, the 1964 constitutional reform project did not 
include former representatives of the armed forces as nonelected senators.  See Barros 2992, 224-239 for 
the logic behind designated senators. 
661 Although the Constituent Commission of Chile considered absolutely entrenching Article 8 on 
constitutional ban on Marxist parties, the junta did not include it as an unamendable article (Barros 2002, 
224). 
662 The drafters postponed the design of the electoral system, however they did identify as a “problem area”, 
meaning that it was to be blamed for past problems as well (Barros 2002, 251). The electoral law, 
introduced before the 1989 elections, modified the proportional representation system (d’Hondt formula) 
and introduced the binomial system where two seats are available in a voting area and under the assumption 
that two parties (or coalitions) would run for these two seats, the procedure for allocating the seats required 
that for a party to obtain one seat, it needed to get 33.4 percent of the votes but to obtain both seats it 
needed to get 66.7 percent of the votes. Effectively the system benefits the second largest party, in the case 
of Chile, the coalition of right wing parties (Siavelis and Valenzuela 1996, 77-99). See Siavelis, 2000, 31-
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intention in all of this was not necessarily to establish an authoritarian system, but a 
constrained one where the formula established by the drafters would survive in the post-
authoritarian order.  
 In the Turkish case as well, a crucial component of the constitution was 
establishing the necessary legal tools to ensure the survival of the document by 
establishing a complex set of institutional safeguards. Although some of the institutions 
set up by the 1982 Constitution existed under the previous framework, such as the 
National Security Council (MGK- Milli Güvenlik Kurulu) and the Constitutional Court, 
their composition and function had been altered to fortify the established structure against 
any future change. As mentioned above, the strengthened office of Presidency was 
designed as such a gatekeeper mechanism. Except Celâl Bayar, all former presidents had 
been retired army officers; thus, the powers granted to the president under the 1982 
Constitution were prerogatives that the drafters believed would be executed by someone 
that the military could exert influence on663. An additional novelty of the 1982 
Constitution was the State Supervisory Councilm which was directly attached to the 
office of the presidency and empowered to carry out investigations and inspections of all 
public organizations, professional organizations, employers' associations and labor 
unions etc. at the request of the President (Art. 108).664 According to General Evren, it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 for the rationale of adopting the binomial system. See Pastor 2004 for the process of adopting the 
binomial system. 
663 The fact that the constitution’s new formula for electing the president allowed for candidates outside the 
parliament is interpreted by Yazıcı (1997, 179) as providing the possibility for the election of army officers. 
664 This body was first established in April 1981 and with the 1982 Constitution elevated to constitutional 
rank. 
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was his idea to have such an investigative body as found in the general staff and branches 
of the armed forces (Yazıcı 1997, 183). 
 Aside from the short-term prerogatives for the armed forces during the six-seven 
years of transition, the Constitution also provided it with an overall supervisory role over 
civilian politics665. In this sense, the arrangements for the autonomy of the military 
paralleled those imposed in Chile (Haggard and Hauffman 1995, 113). The main 
mechanism of control was the MGK.666 Designed as an “advisory body” with a military-
majority667, the constitution dictated that the Council of Ministers must give “priority 
consideration”668 to the decisions of the MGK (Art. 118). The wide range of issues that 
fall under the MGK’s mandate ensure that the armed forces have a permanent channel to 
influence the political processes  (2008, 135).669 The fact that military members had a 
majority over civilian ones made it more likely that the council would “advise” military 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
665 See Yazıcı 1997, 182-207 for a through list of authorities of the armed forces after the transitional 
period. 
666 Milli Güvenlik Kurulu was first established under the 1961 Constitution. 1971 amendments 
strengthened it by giving it the power to advise, rather than to notify. The MGK of the 1982 Constitution 
provided a wider scope of areas where it could advise the Council of Ministers, strengthened its advising 
function and expanded the composition of the military vis-à-vis the civilians (5 to 4). These measures 
reinforced its tutelage over the elected organs (Yazıcı 1997, 185). 
667 The MGK included the Prime Minister, the Chief of the General Staff, the Ministers of National 
Defense, Internal Affairs, and Foreign Affairs, the Commanders of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force, and 
the General Commander of the Gendarmerie and was under the chairmanship of the President. 
668 Although the constitution did not provide an enforcement mechanism for when the government fails to 
“give priority consideration” to the MGK decisions, it is not clear whether the government was free from 
exercising its free will. According to Yazıcı (1997, 186-187), this is not because the wording of the 
constitution that instructs the Council of Ministers to “give priority consideration” to MGK decisions but it 
is because the civilians, the prime minister and three ministers who are members of the government also 
have signatures on the MGK decisions. 
669 Other prerogatives of the armed forces included exemptions from legal control mechanisms. These 
include exemption from the jurisdiction of State Supervisory Council and the Court of Account and 
exemption of judicial review for the decisions of the Supreme Military Council for matters related to 
appointments, promotions, and expulsions from the military.  
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solutions in cases that fall under their purview (Yazıcı 1997, 185). Moreover, states of 
exception provided the armed forces the legal means to share authority with the 
government (Yazıcı 1997, 1858-201). Under the constitution’s framework for states of 
exception, martial law could be declared for up to six months but required the 
consultation of the MGK670. However, another way to read the constitution’s states of 
exception provisions is to understand it as the armed forces’ effort to respond to 
“widespread acts of violence of either internal or external origin threatening the 
indivisibility of the country and the nation” without actually overthrowing the 
constitutional order. From this perspective, it is another mechanism to safeguard the 
established structure without resorting to a coup.  
 A criticism directed at the Constitutional Court under the 1961 framework was 
that it was impeding the parliament, and that mainly for such reason, the judicial review 
power of the Constitutional Court was restricted to form during the 1971-1973 
constitutional amendments. The 1982 Constitution clarified limitations on the powers of 
judicial review, restarted to form671 and by granting the president with the power to 
appoint its judges directly and indirectly, it aimed to insulate the ideological positions of 
its members.672 In order for the court to hear a case of annulment of constitutional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
670 Martial law is regulated under Article 122. State of emergency is regulated under Article 121.  
671 The Constitutional Court review regular laws and decrees on both substantive and procedural grounds 
but with constitutional amendments, it is limited to procedural challenges. 
672 According to Article 146, the President was given the power to appoint three members of the 
Constitutional Court directly and eight members indirectly among a pool of candidates nominated by YÖK 
and other high courts, including the High Court of Appeals, the Council of State the Military High Court of 
Appeals, the High Military Administrative Court and the Audit Court. The military high courts had a 
sizable influence. It is also important to recognize that because MGK participated in YÖK, through that 
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amendment, the referral must come either from the President, the main party in 
government, the main opposition party seated in Parliament, or alternatively one-fifth of 
the members of Parliament could petition the court (Art. 150). The Constitutional Court 
was also charged with the responsibility to audit political parties and decide whether they 
should be dissolved. Another judicial mechanism that would provide an extra layer of 
defense for threats against the constitutional order was State Security Courts. Composed 
of civilian and military judges and prosecutors, it was designed to prosecute offenses 
against the integrity and security of the state and characteristics of the Republic (Art. 
143). A bureaucratic organization that was intended to have both a transformational 
mission and a constraining mission was the Council of Higher Education (YÖK). With its 
director and members appointed by the president, this new body was in charge of 
regulating and disciplining all higher education institutions and their staff (Art. 130). In 
the short-term it would ensure that universities conform to the values of the state and in 
the long-term it would help depoliticize future generations.673 Through these layers of 
protection, that mainly revolve around the military, judiciary and the office of the 
president the authoritarian drafters wanted to safeguard the 1982 Constitution against 
“the vagaries of electoral politics” (Bali 2012, 289 note 187). 
 Another rampart against overhauling the system is the electoral system. Like its 
Chilean counterpart, the Turkish constitution of 1982 did not specify the electoral system 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
channel this military could exert influence. The court had a total of eleven regular and four substitute 
members.  
673 To complement these measures, the President was also given the power to appoint the presidents of 
universities. 
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except for establishing the size of the assembly (four hundred deputies) (Art. 75). 
However the Law on the Election of Deputies was also adopted during the NSC regime674. 
It maintained the d’Hondt version of proportional representation (PR), albeit with 
important modifications. Because the NSC and the Consultative Assembly considered the 
PR as one of “the causes of proliferation of parties and the fragmentation of the party 
system” and hence a significant component of the political crisis of the 1970s, it 
introduced a high threshold for political parties to enter the parliament (Özbudun 2011, 
63).675 “Designed to prevent the proliferation of political parties and the excessive 
fragmentation of the party system as well as to eliminate the more ideological minor 
parties”, the system required the political parties to get at least ten percent of the total 
votes cast nationally in order to get seats in the parliament (Özbudun 2011, 63).676 This 
maneuver was a deliberate attempt to establish a two-party system or at least a moderate 
multi-party system that unlike during the period of the 1961 Constitution would lead to a 
stable parliament (Haggard and Kaufman 1995, 100 and Yürük 2003, 33).677  Thus, in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
674 Law no. 2839 dated June 10, 1983. 
675 The new electoral formula provided one seat for each irrespective of the size of its population and then 
assigned the remaining seats of the National Assembly in proportion to the size of the population in 
electoral districts, which included multiple electoral ditricts for metropolitan provinces. As Kalaycioglu 
(2005, 131) points out this system tilted “the representation of the population in favor of the rural and 
agricultural interests of the country”. 
676 In addition to the national threshold, the original law also included a provincial threshold. After an 
amendment in 1995, which required that electoral laws reconcile the principles of fairness in representation 
and stability in government, it was found unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. 
677 In this sense, it can also be categorized as “backward-looking”. 
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both cases, military rulers through electoral engineering aimed to moderate the polarized 
multiparty system.678    
 The final mechanism that aimed to restrain the incoming regime was the 
amendment-making process. According to Art. 175, a two-thirds majority could adopt a 
proposal signed by at least one-third of the members of parliament. It required that the 
proposal be debated twice.679 The aspect of the provision that is designed to guard the 
constitution against change was the role it ascribed to the president. Accordingly, the 
president could send the amendment proposal back to parliament for reconsideration and 
in the event that the parliament adopted it once again without change, then the president 
had the prerogative to submit it to a referendum. The most rigid aspect of the constitution 
was with respect to unamendable articles. These refer to the first three articles of the 
constitution that established the republican form of government, stipulated its 
characteristics and provided for its symbols, which could not be amended or proposed for 
amendment.680 Considering the vague and long list of the characteristics of the state, this 
provision also aimed to secure the state against possible future infringements of its 
constitutional order.681 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
678 In both cases, the majoritarian electoral system was a modified version of the d’Hondt formula. 
Although the formulas used in both Chile and Turkey are proportional, they do not lead to proportional 
results. 
679 It stated that it cannot be debated under the urgent procedure. 
680 Art. 4 established the prohibition against the amendment of Article 1, 2, and 3. 
681 See Oder 2009 for a detailed analysis on irrevocable constitutional principles. 
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4.4 Discussion 
 Contrary to popularly held notions that authoritarian constitutions are “sham” 
documents, installed simply to prolong the reign of authoritarian rulers and preserve their 
privileges, the examples of the Chilean and Turkish constitutions demonstrate that a 
detailed study of such documents reveal a more complex institutional design. The study 
above determined that in both cases, the authoritarian drafters had four main objectives: 
to rectify what they deemed to be problematic aspects of the previous constitution, to 
bring about fundamental and lasting changes in economic, political and social realms, to 
formulate the terms of transfer of power and its timeline and to institute legal and 
institutional mechanism that will safeguard the established structure. These goals ensure 
that the authoritarian rulers are able to transmit certain delimiting characteristics of the 
authoritarian rule to ensuing civilian regime after the return to an electoral democracy.  
 In terms of the antidotal aspects of the Chile’s 1980 Constitution and Turkey’s 
1982 Constitution, some of the core convictions of the authoritarian drafters are similar. 
These include, a deep distrust of civilian politicians, suspicion towards the uncertain 
character of electoral outcomes and fear of left-wing politics (and left-right polarization). 
These convictions help explain the changes that these constitutions introduced, 
weakening the role of political parties, prohibition against certain political parties, 
restrictions against labor- political party relations, limitations on rights and freedoms, 
empowering the executive (the President specifically) and providing “reserve domains of 
power” for the military. Retrospectively motivated, these strategic institutional changes 
aimed to offer correction for past problems.   
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 In terms of transformative goals, both constitutions did intend to end the debate 
on economy. While the Chilean constitution took much concrete measures to pave the 
way for a free market economy, the Turkish constitution eliminated all aspects of a 
welfare state envisioned under the previous document. In Chile, the constitution 
strengthened property rights and restricted the social function of property. In Turkey, 
constitutional restrictions on the organization of labor were introduced. Both also aimed 
to depoliticize the society but the Turkish case moved a step further and introduced Islam 
as a unifying force. In both cases, we see that the authoritarian rulers were not alone in 
their transformative goals. The Chicago Boys were the real masterminds of Chile’s 
economic transformation and the Intellectuals’ Hearth of Turkey had long been 
champions of the Turkish-Islam Synthesis. What unites these two quite different groups 
was their opposition to communism. Although their prescription was completely 
different, they were motivated to provide an antidote for what they considered to be their 
respective country’s struggle against communism.   
 The transitional formula offered by the two constitutions provided a calendar. 
However, the legal guideline in some respects was different and the timeframe was much 
shorter in the case of Turkey. The transitional provisions of both constitutions intended to 
outline a specific formula that would give civilians an incentive to abide by the 
constitution and also bolster the military authoritarians’ claim of “legitimate” rule. These 
authoritarian constitutions specifically intended to return the power to civilians, but not to 
the status quo ante. In terms of gatekeeper mechanisms, i.e. the institutional constraints 
embedded in the constitution both constitutions also followed a similar logic, to utilize 
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the military, the judiciary and other bureaucratic organs to safeguard the established 
structure. In the case of Chile, this was amplified with the inclusion non-elected actors, 
senators, in the legislative process. Although their composition and function may be 
different, the Constitutional Court and the National Security Council (COSENA and 
MGK) in both countries are mechanisms to offer extra layers of protection to the system 
that go beyond regular checks and balances. The armed forces in both constitutional 
orders acquired a role in the system of decision-making. The amendment-making process 
and the electoral rules help insulate the established structure from majoritarian politics. In 
summary, both constitutions accomplished a number of things. They responded to 
perceived institutional weaknesses, insulated decision-making, designed counter-
majoritarian institutions, offered a transition calendar and a legal guideline that ensured 
that the constitution would survive the transition and inserted several mechanisms 
including a stringent amendment-making mechanism to avoid tampering with the 
regime’s legal apparatus. These constitutions were not designed to simply extend 
authoritarian rule or to offer “window dressing” to authoritarian rule. The Chilean and 
Turkish constitutions are specific cases of constitutional frameworks that are informed by 
past crises, aim to bring about permanent change, envision a return to democratic rule and 
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Chapter 5: Analyzing Amendment-Making Process: A Comprehensive Framework 
on Constitutional Change 
 Amendment-making lies in between ordinary process of law-making and the 
extraordinary process of drafting a new constitution. Almost all constitutions include a 
provision on formal constitutional amendment (Etkins et. al 2009, Rasch and Congleton 
2006).682 There is a voluminous literature on normative speculations as to optimal 
constitutional amendment procedures and empirical work on the relationship between 
procedure and rate of amendment, which will be explored below. Similarly, there is 
growing number of single-case studies (see Oliver and Fusaro 2011 and Contiades 2013). 
Although, the literature on amendments address varieties of areas that can factor into 
amendment-making that go beyond the procedural rules, it does not provide a 
comprehensive list of the components of the amendment-making process. 
 The initial premise of this framework is that constitutional amendment-making 
process does not take place in a vacuum. This framework accepts the established 
understanding that the procedures of amendment-making process as outlined in the 
constitution, impacts the rate and difficulty of amendment but also maintains that factors 
beyond the procedural rules help determine the constitutional change as well.  
 The literature suggests areas for further research. To fully grasp the dynamic 
behind constitutional reform, Dixon (2011) urges the study of configuration of political 
parties and popular attitudes toward the constitution. To the list, Rasch and Congleton 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
682 In 1978 a study by Maarseveen and Van der Tang calculated that less than 4% of all constitutions did 
not have a provision that stipulated how the formal amendment process is required to take place 
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(2006) add international pressure, constitutional tradition and the weight of pending 
problems, arguing that focusing on amendment procedure alone does not represent the 
actual mechanism that produces constitutional change. The Venice Commission (2010) 
also recognizes that formal rules matter and there is usually a connection between the 
formal amendment rules and the rate and importance of constitutional change. However 
the Commission adds that political, economic and social factors as well as the country’s 
“constitutional culture” are also important.683 A rather vague concept that would be 
difficult to capture in quantitative studies, constitutional culture refers to unwritten 
conventions about the extent of legitimate change as well as the conservatism or 
dynamism of actors involved in carrying out the reform. Roberts (2009) analyzing the 
causes and consequences of amendments in seventeen Eastern European countries argues 
that constitutional change must be understood within the political process. He finds that 
democratic development and European integration have been the force behind 
constitutional amendments for these countries.684 In order to study the impact of 
international pressure and domestic demand for constitutional change, “a closer 
investigation of the politics surrounding amendments” becomes necessary (Roberts (2009, 
115).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
683 For instance, analyzing the constitutional amendments in Central and Eastern Europe, the Commission 
argues that a general domestic consensus about European integration has been instrumental in bringing 
constitutional change. 
684 He analyzes the degree of democracy based on Freedom House ratings and checks for EU negotiations. 
The other factors he takes into account are: the difficulty of amendment procedure, the length of the 
constitution, fragmentation of legislative, whether there is an existing old constitution and whether 
constitution adoption was delayed. 
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 Providing a comprehensive study of constitutional change in Latin America, 
Negretto (2012, 750) argues that one must look at the length and detail of the constitution 
and the interaction between the amendment procedure and the fragmentation of the party 
system to understand the frequency of amendments. Studying solely the procedural 
obstacles or the amendment formula provides only part of the explanation. Factors 
internal to the constitution, such as its origin, age, length, degree of detail and democratic 
legitimacy also may play an important role in constitutional change. 
 The procedural rigidity of the amendment-making mechanism actually depends 
on external factors, especially with regard to qualified majorities. Constitutional change 
is possible and even frequent, however rigid the amendment procedure may be, if it takes 
place under a dominant party system. Regardless of the super-majority quorum, under a 
dominant party system it tends to function as an ordinary majority rule. Alternatively 
under a fragmented party system, a flexible amendment procedure may actually take on a 
rigid form and require a greater consensus among large number of parties (Negretto 2012, 
760). The substance of the amendment proposal also determines whether it is approved. 
In cases where there is “reform consensus” the fragmented nature of the parliament may 
be irrelevant if the parties have a common understanding to approve the amendment 
(Negretto 2012, 760). An example would be Sweden where there is a rigid amendment-
making procedure and fragment parliament but a high constitutional amendment rate that 
is usually achieved through cross-party negotiation (Closa 2012, 308-309). A minor and 
regulative change that is not controversial may easily get the approval of a large number 
of parties that would satisfy qualified majorities. In cases where the amendment includes 
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a variety of issues, different parties may have different incentives to support it and may 
actually lead them to cooperate in order to realize their specific goals. In such a scenario, 
it is more likely to see bargaining (Negretto 2012, 760).   
 Dixon and Holden’s (2012) study also suggests that the rigidity of the amendment 
rules may not be the only explanatory variable. The authors look at constitutional 
amendments rates at the state level in the United States and find that the size of the 
decision body (in their study, the house of representatives) affects the amendment rate. 
Their study also confirms that the age and length of the constitution is significantly 
correlated with amendment rate (see Lutz 1995, Ferejohn 1997 and Elkins et. al 2009). 
Another consideration to take into account is whether a certain amendment results 
in substantive constitutional change or not. It was common in the literature to 
differentiate between major and minor constitutional modifications. Major alterations 
were defined as “amendment” whereas minor alterations were described as “revision” 
(Lutz 1995, 240). However such a distinction is no longer operationalized in the literature 
because, as Albert L. Sturm (1970) indicates, the difference is difficult to specify.685 
Having said that, I still argue that not all amendments have the same effect on the rules, 
procedures, values, or rights outlined in the constitutions. As Lutz (1994) points out, 
attempting to make a differentiation between revision and amendment is “conceptually 
slippery”; but I contend that it is important to take into consideration the magnitude of 
change that the amendment will likely bring as it provides another dimension to our 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
685 Couto and Arantes (2008), for instance make the distinction between amendments that affect 
fundamental principles and amendments that are akin to public policy. 
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understanding of constitutional change. I suspect that demand for constitutional reform 
regarding “protection of consumers” will not be as grave as demand for constitutional 
reform regarding “composition and generation of the parliament.” Therefore, it is 
imperative to pay extra attention to certain amendments that generate major constitutional 
reforms and simply take into consideration the number of formal amendments686.  
The framework that this dissertation adopts is partly based on the points raised 
regarding the gaps in the literature on amendment making process and previous 
contributions to the literature on the variety of factors that impact constitutional change 
which include non-measurable aspects of constitutional change. Rasch and Congleton 
(2006) highlight the significance of difference between constitutional proposals and 
constitutional amendments, stressing that not every proposal actually results in 
constitutional change. Authors call for a “more complete model of the demand for 
constitutional reform so that the effects of ‘demand’ “can be clearly separated from those 
of ‘supply’” (Rasch and Congleton 2006:548).  While their study does not elaborate on 
what could possible be the factors that need to be analyzed under “demand” and “supply”, 
their case study on Norway depicts the difference between proposals and amendments. 
Thus, the framework for this dissertation will also take into consideration factors that 
affect constitutional change in two broad categories: demand and supply (See Table 5.1). 
While the demand side of constitutional change includes factors that affect desire for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
686  Rasch (2008) makes a similar argument when he maintains that we must distinct between symbolic, 
inconsequential amendment and major, status quo changing amendments in order to understand to what 
extent amendment procedures alter the existing structure. 
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change, the supply side of constitutional change includes factors that affect which 
proposals result in amendments. 
 Table 5.1 Demand and Supply Side of Amendment-Making 
Demand Side Supply Side 
Balance of Power Procedural Constraints 
Societal Forces and External Actors Informal Institutional Constraints 
Political, Social and Cultural Context Informational Constraints 
Characteristics of the Constitution Object and Content of the Proposal 
Constitutional Tradition  
 
5.1 Demand Side 
 On the demand side of constitutional change, the framework considers five broad 
areas that explain demand for change: 1) balance of power; 2) societal forces and external 
actors; 3) political, social and cultural context; 4) characteristics of the constitution and 5) 
constitutional tradition. As Rasch and Congleton (2006, 547) explain the political 
demand for constitutional change is affected by a variety of factors “just as the market 
demand for ordinary goods and services are affected by more than a product’s cost”.  
 Balance of Power 
 Considering that constitutional change takes place in a legislative assembly, 
whether it is within a presidential or a parliamentary system or whether it is unicameral 
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or bicameral, shifts in the balance of power provide an important explanatory factor. In 
order to capture the balance of power, a snapshot of configuration of political parties 
following the elections and the relative power across political parties needs to be taken 
into account. The configuration of political parties becomes significant when we consider 
the majority requirements to pass amendments. The threshold of votes required for 
constitutional change may be high or low but the ease of amendment is partly determined 
by how many parties are represented in the assembly. A super-majority requirement is 
not necessarily a hindrance when there is a dominant party. Frequent amendment under 
Mexico’s PRI regimes, amended 103 times between 1921 and 1996, was possible 
because Mexico was under one-party rule and despite the procedural hurdles- a two-
thirds vote in both houses and approval of the majority of state legislatures (Elkins et. al 
20009, 196). As Dixon (2011) speculates the course of passing an amendment will be 
quite easy for a country with one dominant party because the party will not require a 
parliamentary support from other parties. However, in countries with two major parties, 
reaching the requisite for passing an amendment will require “virtual bipartisan 
consensus” (Dixon 2011: 107). In the case of countries with multiple small parties, Dixon 
predicts that most likely “the difficulty of constitutional amendment will tend closely to 
track the formal super-majority requirements in the text of a constitution” (Dixon 2011: 
107). Both Roberts (2009) and Negretto (2012) utilize this variable in their analysis of 
constitutional change respectively in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Negretto (2012) 
measures what he calls as “level of party fragmentation” in terms of the number of parties 
in single or lower chambers of congress using the Laakso-Taagepera index which counts 
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the number of parties and also weighs the count by the parties’ relative strength. Roberts 
(2009) calls this “legislative fragmentation”. A study on constitutional change in EU 
member states, Karlsson (2016) finds that the number of governing parties impact 
whether states prefer an explicit constitutional amendment or an implicit one.687  
 Moreover, the balance of power impacts constitutional amendment in terms of the 
degree of polarization and mode of reaching consensus (Contiades, and Fotiadou 2013, 
426). By requiring a qualified majority, the amendment process in effect promotes a 
broad consensus among political parties and aim to ensure that the interests and rights of 
the political opposition are protected (Closa 2012, 298). The electoral system largely 
determines the outcome. In a majoritarian system, the stronger party has more power to 
exert its dominance over the constitutional change process compared to a proportional 
system where political fragmentation forces political parties to compromise and seek 
consensus. The degree to which the political opposition has a veto on constitutional 
amendment is determined by the balance of power, which in return is influenced by the 
electoral system. 
 However, an in-depth comparative case study offers the possibility of a much-
detailed account of changing balance of power. Questions such the number of political 
parties represented in the parliament/congress (or not represented or underrepresented); 
the political spectrum including the left-right or other country specific cleavages; the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
687 According to Karlsson (2014, 571), implicit constitutional change is defined as a change to the meaning 
of the constitution and may come as a result of either 1) a judicial decision that offers a new interpretation 
of the constitution; 2) amending an ordinary law; or 3) a new interpretation expressed by the executive or 
an agreement of all political parties. 
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ideological distance between political parties; whether alliance between political parties 
is practiced or available; whether political parties govern alone or in a coalition; whether 
there is turnover of government or whether a single party or a coalition governs without 
alteration of power can be captured with an in-depth analysis. Changes in the party 
competition, such as the emergence of new parties or the collapse of established parties 
as well as intra-party discipline also need to be taken into account. Here, the electoral 
formula plays a determinative role in setting up the balance of power. 
 Simply looking at the number of parties represented in the legislative assembly 
may not offer a thorough analysis of the legislative dynamic. The ideological distances of 
the parties in the parliament offer an additional lens. It is quite possible that parties with 
similar interests and motivations are represented in the legislative assembly and therefore 
creating necessary conditions to find common ground that would promote inter-party 
alliances. Shared principles or interests may create incentives that will contribute to 
cooperative outcomes (Negretto 1998). Political parties in their demand for constitutional 
change may reflect their convictions or interests and possibly seek vote-trading to realize 
them.688  
 The members of political parties may be motivated by certain ideas grounded on 
impartial reason, which are inspired by different sources. Personal or collective 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
688 Elster’s (1997) psychology of constitution-making offers a “trichotomy of reason, interest, and passion” 
to provide an account of the motivation behind the constitution frames’ actions. Similarly, Negretto’s 
(1998) reinterpretation of these three motivations to study constitutional reform in Argentina, provide a 
useful scheme to analyze “institutional preferences” of political actors. However these two studies explain 
the attitude of political actors in general, and not political parties in the parliament/congress and analyze 
constitution-making, not amendment-making. 
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experience with the previous institutions may give rise to certain beliefs (Negretto 1998, 
5 and Elster 1991, 477).689 Aside from information derived from experience, another 
source is the guidance of outside experts or the examples set by constitutions of other 
countries (Contiades and Fotiadou 2013, 427). These received feedbacks help construct 
the belief system of political parties and lead them to promote certain ideas and interests. 
Alternatively, one might argue that reference to experts by political actors is to “reinforce 
the persuasiveness of their positions of their positions and add prestige to them, boosting 
their legitimacy through technocratic language” (Contiades and Fotiadou 2013, 427).  
While the first source of information is looking backwards for guidance, the latter is 
inspired by contemporary guidance. 
 The political parties represented will also be motivated by interests. Elster (1995) 
considers three categories of interests: personal, group and institutional. His scheme is 
constructed for political actors in general but it may also be utilized for the sole analysis 
of preferences of political parties. Personal interest, as the name suggests indicates the 
preference of individuals or group of individuals based on their calculation of benefits 
they hope and predict to gain. As Negretto (1998, 5) points out, personal interest in the 
form of privilege or immunity is hard to pursue in the context of constitutions since 
documents aspire to be “general in scope and universal in application”. Recent examples 
from Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Ecuador and Azerbaijan that extended or abolished 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
689 Elster (1991) gives the examples of US constitution, Fifth French Republic, and the West Germany, 
citing that in each case framers took cautions to ensure that the failures experienced before would not 
repeat themselves. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  324	   	  
term limits through constitutional amendment are such examples of self-serving 
constitutional changes derived from personal interests. 
 Group interest refers to the interest of political parties. These may come in the 
form of shaping the machinery of government to benefit the individual party’s prospects 
such as increasing the public budget for elections or to respond to the interests of their 
constituency or expected constituency based on the calculation of future electoral support. 
As such the interests of political parties may overlap with those of societal forces shaped 
by ideological, ethnic or other differences and even certain territorial subunits. 
Institutional interests, on the other hand, refer to the interests of executive and legislative 
bodies (Negretto 1998). In contexts where the separation of powers is not strong, 
judiciary may also have a stake in the process. Constitutional Court that is responsible for 
deciding on the constitutionality of amendments has a clear interest when the 
constitutional provision deals with the judiciary. Constitutional Court may not have the 
power to write a role for itself in the constitution, but it may have the power to reject 
amendments that threaten its power or challenge the ideological convictions of the 
members of the courts. 
 Elster (1995, 380) explains that institutional interests play a role when a body 
incorporates an important role for itself in the constitutional provisions. Executive or 
legislative body may pursue a constitutional change that would strengthen its power vis-
à-vis the other. In cases where the incumbent president is able to promote his interests 
during constitutional change, amendments that alter the executive power may be possible 
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if institutional interests triumph (Negretto 1998). A difficulty that arises when one tries to 
identify interest-based motivations is that it is quite unlikely that an argument will present 
itself as promoting the benefit of a person, group or motivation. Political parties will 
instead appeal to impartial arguments, citing principles such as efficiency, democracy and 
governability (Elster 1997).690  
 When should we expect to see constitutional change derived from the incentives 
of political parties? Negretto (2010) offers two possible explanations. Either the political 
actors would like to change the existing institutions because the system fails to function 
or because the status quo fails to fulfill political actors’ interests. Therefore, we need to 
assess how the political actors perceive their expected utility from constitutional change. 
According to Fuentes (2011: 1744) one should concentrate on the expectations of 
political actors about the anticipated changes in the balance of power. He maintains that 
in every step of the amendment making process “actors adopt forward-looking strategies”.   
 Those who have the power to amend the constitution would be inclined to do so, 
if the existing constitutional design ceases to serve their interests. Such a context is likely 
appear following important shifts in party competition which include the emergence of 
new political parties and leaders and/or collapse of established ones (Negretto 2012, 756).  
 Political parties may not necessarily pursue their beliefs or interests; they may 
very well be governed by impartial reasons. Negretto (1998) classifies impartial 
motivations into two: efficiency-based and rights-based. Efficiency-based impartial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
690 Elster (1997:133) based on the evidence he gathered from case studies argue that political parties pursue 
changes that benefit them and when they present their cases they rely on impartial values. 
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reasons may promote government stability or economic growth and rights-based 
impartial reasons champion the protection of minority rights or human rights in general 
(Negretto 1998:6).  However, these two motivations are not mutually exclusive of each 
other.  
 The political ideology governs the impartial reason of political actors (Negretto 
1998). There are certain characteristics attached to parties on the left, center and right. 
Therefore, institutions and values promoted are reflections of political ideologies. A party 
espousing liberal ideology will likely support institutions protecting individual freedoms 
while a conservative party will likely aim for economic deregulation. Thus we should 
expect to see a correspondence between the official ideology of the political parties and 
the impartial reasons they bring forth. However, this hypothesis applies as far as 
institutionalized political parties are concerned. In cases, where the parties have a clear 
line of ideology, to decipher their preferences, studying the underlying political ideology 
will be helpful. However even in cases of most self-interested constitutional amendment, 
there would be an element of impartial reason and vice versa (Elster 1991, 474).  
 Examining the beliefs, impartial reasons and interests of political parties 
demonstrate their incentives for reform and capacity to strike cooperation across party 
lines. The issue of whether constitutional amendments will be able to pass despite 
legislative fragmentation partly depends on the alignment of party preferences. However, 
Negretto (1998, 4) predicts that usually “it is the presence of some major event, like the 
threat of a war, fear of regime collapse, or a recent experience with civil war or 
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dictatorship, which provide political actors with an ultimate incentive to forgo their 
differences”. Therefore, passions as derived from past experiences and contemporary 
concerns may help overcome legislative fragmentation. 
 Societal Forces and External Actors 
 Besides the legislative, amendment-making may also include popular 
involvement. Aside from citizen participation through referendum or constitutional 
amendment initiative by the electorate (ex. Switzerland), through social mobilization for 
constitutional change citizen may express their demand. Constitutional change whether 
through formal amendment or judicial interpretation come as a response to social 
mobilization (Siegel 2006 and Balkin 2005). Values of citizens may change over time or 
they may seek a more effective government, greater protection of human rights or 
alternatively the unintended consequences of the present arrangement may no longer be 
deemed favorable (Rasch and Congleton 2006, 540 and Oliver and Fusaro 2011, 5). 
 While the alignment of political parties help explain how the majority 
requirements to pass amendments are achieved, the level of popular support at the polls 
(which may not overlap with the political configuration if the country has a distorting 
electoral system) and the capacity of political parties to mobilize their constituencies, 
provide a much detailed picture of how demand is transmitted to legislative bodies.691 In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
691 Negretto (1998: 8) lists these two factors among the resources of constitution-makers that help them 
gain bargaining power during negotiations. The other two factors in his list are  “the actual or expected 
command they have over the votes of legislators or delegates in a constitutional assembly”, “the capacity to 
command the support of armed forces or foreign allies”. 
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cases where the political parties use constitutional reform discourse, to what extent that 
has a sway on the electoral outcome is another consideration. At this point, it is important 
to recognize the party system institutionalization. A question that needs to be asked is 
whether the parties have strong connections with their constituency or whether they 
function as window organizations.  
 The role of organized domestic actors in terms of their capacity to channel their 
demands for constitutional change is another factor that help explain how constitutional 
reform process unfolds. Looking at the role of organized domestic actors reveals whether 
the amendment/s came in response to popular pressure for constitutional change- what 
Bruce Ackerman (1991) defines as the “the constitutional moment”. 
 Societal forces may push for constitutional amendment because when it is 
successfully approved, they may claim credit in pushing and accomplishing change- such 
was the case with the social push for amendments during the PRI rule in Mexico (Elkins 
et. al 2009, 196). 
 The role that civil society organizations, business associations, unions and 
territorial subunit may help create popular pressure whether this is expressed in some 
form of political campaign or street demonstrations. It gives us a clue about the extent of 
public participation in the reform process. Literature suggests that for constitution 
stability, the amendment process must be inclusive (Elkins et al 2009: 78). Respect for 
the constitution lessens when the amendment mechanism is not inclusive. In cases where 
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the society feels that it is left out of the process, constitutional patriotism fades into 
constitutional disloyalty.  
 Foreign actors, whether they help fund projects which promote constitutional 
change or whether they impose constitutional reform as a condition for loans, forgiving 
debt or membership to a supranational organization also play an important role in 
pushing for constitutional change. International pressure may also reveal itself as an issue 
of prestige. Studies by Roberts (2009) and Albi (2005) on Eastern European countries 
consider the effect of EU membership. Similarly Karlsson (2014) and Oliver and Fusaro 
(2011) examine how accession to the EU creates a demand for constitutional reform. 
Examples from past and recent history also indicate that foreign countries may at times 
be directly involved in constitution-making of other countries whether this takes place at 
gunpoint as in the case of Japan (Moore 2002) or in the form of foreign advisors acting as 
consultants in the drafting of the constitution as in the case of Iraq. 
 Political, Social and Cultural Context 
 A point raised in the literature repeatedly is that a comprehensive understanding 
of the constitution-amendment making process requires an assessment of the political, 
social and cultural context (Contiades 2013). A single case or a small-N comparative case 
study can capture how the process unfolds interacting with the context of polity at hand. I 
identified three points that will provide snapshots of the political, social and cultural 
context: democratization impetus, level of polarization and encroaching problems. In 
cases where the demand for constitutional amendment is rooted in furthering democratic 
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credentials, the limitations and inefficacies of the democratic system may indicate where 
the demands for change come from.  The nature of the transition also set the tone of the 
contextual factors. Arato and Miklosi in their study on Hungarian constitution-making 
contend that “political conditions that favor negotiated transitions also increase the 
likelihood that constitution-making process will be discontinuous, more extended over 
time, and the work of different primary agents in different phases of constitutional 
consolidation” (2010, 368). Their argument rests on the proposition that a negotiated 
transition becomes possible when political actors are weak and thus feel the necessity to 
negotiate with one another, produce an elite-dominated consensus that suffers from 
“legitimacy deficiency” which lead them to conclude that these characteristics of 
negotiated transition prompt political actors to amend the constitution over a period of 
time692. 
 The extent of polarization at the societal level testifies to the existing cleavages 
among constituencies and henceforth at the legislative body. Instead of a centrist public 
opinion, in cases where there is a divided society across issues, the polarization between 
political parties will find resonance in society. When social polarization is rigid, it is 
difficult if not impossible to find “reform consensus” and amendments that succeed in 
getting approved will do so, despite a strong opposition from a segment of the society.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
692 The fact that negotiated transition produced a legal continuity with the past regime along with the 
absence of popular participation in the protracted constitution-making is responsible for “legitimacy 
deficiency” in the Hungarian case. For more on this particular case, see Arato and Miklosi (2010). 
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 Constitutional amendment may also be motivated by a desire to overcome the 
polity’s encroaching problems. In cases where the constitution fails to function properly, 
“the decision to initiate revisions is usually preceded by a perception of constitutional 
crisis among political elites, the media and the general public” (Negretto 2012, 57). 
Whether the problem is regulative, institutional or rights-related, if it sparks from the 
limitations or failings of the constitution, an amendment may be sought to respond to 
immediate problems693. Amendments may also be sought to overrule judicial 
interpretations of the constitution that is deemed no longer desirable, such as the 11th 
amendment in the US. 
 Therefore, analyzing the extent of encroaching problems will shed light on how 
demands for constitutional change are formed. For the most part, context matters. Certain 
conditions such as institutional crises and transitions to democracy or authoritarianism 
are more likely to generate constitutional replacement rather than amendment. However 
sustained discomfort with the existing constitution may result in gradual constitutional 
reform. 
 Characteristics of the Constitution 
 Another topic raised in the literature is whether the initial process of formulating 
the constitution has any impact on the amendment rate and the process of amendment-
making. The mechanism of how the origin of the constitution impacts the ensuing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
693 The literature on post-conflict constitution-making highlights how the process of enacting a new 
constitution is instrumental in post-conflict situations. Whether constitution-making follows a peace 
settlement or is a condition of laying down arms, it is best described as an attempt to resolve a conflict. I 
argue that reforming the constitution may similarly be an attempt to address less grave problems.   
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amendment making would be an indirect one. A constitution imposed, rather than a 
work of deliberation will more likely be open to more criticism and therefore generate 
more demand for its reform. On the other hand, one should expect to find a much rigid 
amendment making process if the constitution is prepared under an undemocratic 
manner since those preparing it would want to maintain its integrity for years to come. 
Therefore when considering the origin of the existing constitution as a factor on the 
amendment process, we should keep in mind how that interacts with other 
characteristics of the constitution such as its flexibility and rigidity. 
 Gönenç’s (2002) analysis on the future of constitutions in post-communist 
countries provides a framework that centers around the legitimacy of constitutions 
derived from political culture, the constitution-making process, and the effectiveness of 
resulting constitutions. His conclusions suggest that for countries in which transition is 
incomplete or democracy is not consolidated, future constitutional change is likely. 
Samuels (2006) analyzes constitution-making processes in twelve cases by studying the 
process in terms of its inclusiveness, representativeness, and participatory qualities and 
finds that the process has an impact on the transition to democracy and the nature of the 
resulting regime.694  
 The age of the constitution is another factor that the literature addresses. Lutz 
(1994) study was the first to associate constitutional longevity with amendment rate. 
This may be related to popular attachment for constitutions, some type of “constitutional 
patriotism” or veneration. As the constitution ages, the number of people living under 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
694  The twelve case studies are from Kenya, Colombia, Guatemala, Afghanistan, Rwanda, Fiji, Chile, 
Hungary, Indonesia, Nigeria, Bahrain and East Timor. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  333	   	  
the official document increases, raising “the costs of, or hurdles to, successful 
constitutional amendment” (Dixon and Holden 2012).  Alternatively, as the constitution 
ages, social circumstances change, increasing the demand for constitutional change. 
Dixon and Holden’s study confirm the cumulative age of the constitution is significantly 
and positively correlated with the rate of amendment. On the other hand, Rasch and 
Congleton (2006, 546) find that “the age of the constitution have no systematic effect” 
on their data on OECD countries. Therefore, we should consider how the age factor has 
a different impact in the context considered. 
 According to Lutz’ (1994) article on the constitutions of American states, the 
length of the constitution has the most significant relation with the amendment rate which 
he confirms with another test on national constitutions of 32 countries. Dixon and Holden 
(2012) article also confirms that the length of the constitution as a variable is statistically 
significant, a result previously confirmed by Ferejohn (1997) as well but do not 
substantiated in another study that examines amendment rates in EU states (Closa 2012). 
We also need to take into consideration the comprehensiveness of the constitution. In this 
sense, the length of the constitution is indicative for the level of detail. Longer the 
constitution is, the extensiveness of detail in the national charter will be higher, as 
opposed to a “framework” constitution. Such an example is found in Brazil’s 1988 
Constitution, which is unusually long and detailed to the extent that incoming 
administration needs to pass constitutional amendments in order to pursue a policy 
change. Classifying the provisions in the Brazilian Constitution as polity and policy type, 
Couto and Arentes (2008) find that among the 482 amendments that took place, policy-
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type changes or additions were twice the number of polity-type ones. Elkins et al (2009, 
104) have determined ninety-two possible topics that might be covered in constitutions 
and analyze the scope of constitutions according the number of topics covered in the 
document as a percentage of these possible topics. They find that the word length of 
constitutions and scope are highly correlated. 
 Amendment-making procedure to the extent that it creates the assumption in the 
mind of the political elite or public mind that it is difficult if not impossible to amend the 
constitution may reduce the demand for constitutional change through amendment. If the 
constitution is considered not flexible, other mechanisms such as judicial review, illegal 
methods of reform or constitutional replacement might be preferred over amendment if 
that is perceived politically costly. 
 Constitutional Tradition 
 The constitutional history of the country may inform us about the existing 
practices of constitution-making and changing. We should expect to see a continuation of 
frequent constitutional replacement if the country has become a graveyard of 
constitutions- such as tHispaniola, Dominican Republic and Haiti together have seven 
percent of the world’s constitution (Elkins et. al 2009, 2). This argument can be extended 
to frequent recourse to amendment. Dixon and Holden (2012) find a path-dependent 
relationship. Looking at constitutional amendments at a state level in the US, they find 
that if a state had amended its constitution in a given year, it was more likely than other 
states to amend it again two years after. Frequent recourse to amendment may be 
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indicative of the perceived legitimacy of amendment mechanism in public mind (Dixon 
2011, 106). 
 The mode of amendment-making, consensual vs. confrontational, beyond the 
formal requirements may also depend on public traditions or expectations based on 
practice  (Oliver and Fusaro 2011, 4-5). These may include practices that seek consensus 
between political parties, non-partisan constitutional reform, consultation prior to 
amendment and participation of experts and so forth.  
 Ginsburg and Melton (2015) develop a theory of amendment culture. According 
to the authors, simply relying on institutional explanations only provide part of the 
explanation. The authors offer a measure of amendment culture and posit it as an 
alternative to institutional factors that constrain amendment (Ginsburg and Melton 2015, 
691). According to their definition, amendment culture is “the set of shared attitudes 
about the desirability of amendment, independent of the substantive issue under 
consideration and the degree of pressure for change” (Ginsburg and Melton 2015, 699)695. 
Across countries, constitutions may have a different political weights ascribed to it, 
which may change over time. In cases where the constitution is veneered high, inclination 
towards replacement rather than amendment will be low. 
 Dixon (2011, 107) hypothesizes that if citizens are attached to the constitution, the 
amendment will be harder to achieve because those seeking change will have more 
difficulty to persuade that change is necessary. In cases where citizens view constitutions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
695 In order to measure amendment culture in the absence of data on the particular topic, the authors rely on 
the rate at which a country’s previous constitution was amended. 
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as above ordinary politics, it will be harder to alter it through constitutional amendments. 
Dixon (2011) argues that an important gap in the literature is the lack of a comparative 
study on “constitutional patriotism”. Most scholars attribute popular attitudes toward 
constitutions to the characteristics of the constitution.696 According to Dixon (2011, 108), 
constitutional patriotism is positively correlated with the age of the constitution meaning 
that the more the constitution ages, the population will feel more attached to the 
constitution. Another explanation she offers is that as time goes, the population increases 
which gives rise to many more difficulties in going through with constitutional 
amendment (Dixon and Holden 2012). A similar argument is also made by Griffin (1998) 
who claims that constitutions that age receive much more respect than newer ones and 
therefore proposing an amendment becomes politically costly. Another characteristic of 
the constitution, its length might also play into how it is perceived by the people. 
Constitutional patriotism is negatively correlated with the length of constitution (Dixon 
2011, 108), meaning people will identify themselves less with the constitution if the 
constitution is lengthy detailed (and possibly policy-oriented) document rather than a 
general framework. 
5.2 Supply Side 
 While the demand for constitutional amendment may increase over a variety of 
factors explained above, not all demands translate into constitutional change. First, the 
relevant political actors may never pick up some demands either because their realization 
is politically costly or the benefit expected is minimal. Among those demands that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
696 Levinson (1988) likens the American attachment to the Constitution to a religious worship. 
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political actors decide to pursue, not all of them may be realized.  Therefore, the supply 
side of constitutional amendment takes into consideration factors that affect which 
proposals result in amendments. Constitutional change proposals need to strain against 
procedural, informal institutional and informational constraints. Beyond these, the 
amendment-making process is confronted by the substance of the proposals. According to 
Dixon (2011) the aims and the language of proposed amendments, as well as the 
likelihood that the proposed amendment will result in litigation make up the supply-side 
factors that need greater attention in order to achieve a comprehensive knowledge of the 
factors that impact constitutional amendment. 
 Procedural Constraints 
 While certain factors raises the demand for constitutional change, others result in 
creating hurdles or limitations. Procedural constraints refer to amendment-making 
mechanism outlined in the constitution. Procedural constraints vary immensely from one 
constitution to another. For comparative purposes, different scholars have come with 
their own categories of amendment stringency but operationalizing it is not 
straightforward (Lane 1996, Lijphart 1999 and Rasch and Congleton 2006).697 Lijphart 
(1999, 219) considers four basic types of majority requirements: ordinary majorities, 
between two-thirds and ordinary majorities, two-thirds majorities or equivalent, and 
supermajorities greater than two-thirds. However, in many constitutions there are hurdles 
far beyond the majority requirement and involve actors outside of the elected 
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representatives of the citizenry. Many constitutions stipulate referendum, delays, 
intervening elections, ratifications national or subnational and so forth. Some provisions 
may be much forcibly entrenched such as higher supermajority requirements. 
Unamendability provisions exist in 40% of the world constitutions (Roznai 2013).  
 From an empirical perspective, Lutz’s pivotal article confirms that “the more 
difficult the amendment process, the lower the amendment rate” will be and considers 
different complexities of amendment making such as legislative majorities, intervening 
election (double vote), referendum threat or requirement (1994, 362). Ferejohn (1997) 
reconsiders Lutz’s data and conclude that the legislative complexities such as the special 
majorities, separate majorities in different legislative sessions or bicameralism help 
explain amendment rates. However, the author does not find the ratification requirement 
whether it is through popular referendum or ratification at the state level, to be a crucial 
factor in explaining amendment rate (Ferejohn 1997, 523). Rasch and Congleton (2006) 
question the findings of Lutz (1994) and Ferejohn (1997) since both scholars have 
neglected to take into account whether the amendment results in a major or minor 
revision.  
 For Rasch and Congleton (2006) studying veto players and the number of veto 
points has a stronger explanatory power. According to their definition, veto players are 
“actors whose agreement is necessary for amending the constitution” (543). Besides the 
legislative chamber, institutional veto players may include the voters in a referendum, the 
Constitutional Court and the president to the extent that their consensus is necessary to 
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achieve constitutional amendment.698 In other words, institutional authorities are the ones 
that impose constraints on decision-making in the amendment-making procedure.  
 The veto points refer to the number of decision points required to pass an 
amendment. In a case where the procedure of amending the constitution requires an 
intervening election, then that implies two veto points with respect to the parliament. 
Based on their calculations on OECD countries, the authors find “that the number of veto 
players and veto points have systematic effects on the amendment rates”, separating these 
variables from legislative supermajorities. Therefore, the key element that tells us about 
procedural constraints is the amount of consensus necessary.  
 Informal Institutional Constraints  
 Informal institutional constraints refer to institutional interferences outside the 
amendment making mechanism. Institutions which do not have roles stipulated for them 
in the amendment-making mechanism may still exert pressure on the process.  
 In general, Constitutional Court is outside the amendment-making process, an 
exception would be cases where courts have mandatory a priori judicial review of 
proposals for constitutional amendment such as in Ukraine. However, in cases where the 
Constitutional Court has a posteriori judicial review power, the possibility of the Court 
striking down an amendment on the basis of form or substance, may play into decision-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
698 In countries where the Constitutional Court exercises a priori review of amendment initiatives such as 
Romania, the court acts as a veto player within the amendment-making mechanism reviewing initiatives for 
constitutional amendments before the parliament begins the process. Alternatively, the Constitutional Court 
may exercise such a power during the processing of constitutional amendment or after the amendment is 
approved. 
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making of the legislative body. The legislative body anticipating an annulment of 
amendments based on the power of abstract review of the Constitutional Court may 
impose self-constraint on the parliament. In that sense, it is akin to what Elster (1995) 
considers a “downstream constraint” in the constitution-making process- the anticipation 
of preferences of those involved in latter stages.  
 In consolidated democratic systems, the military is outside the political affairs. 
However, in cases where the military continues to maintain its influence over politics, 
whether by exerting pressure in everyday political life through institutional mechanisms 
or by its mere strength posing threats over democratic stability, the amendment-making 
process may be constrained. Although the military may not have a formal veto power, 
through informal mechanism it may exert its influence. Depending on the context, other 
informal institutional constraints may present itself. These may range from the pressure 
of the church to business interests group that have the capacity to exert pressure and 
constrain the process.  
 Informational Constraints 
 While political elite may be tempted to pursue personal, group or institutional 
interests or seek impartial reform, they will be constrained by lack of ex-post information. 
Although, it might be possible anticipate what kind of benefits and burdens constitutional 
amendments may bring, which may also not be always clear as well, decision-makers are 
also not in a position to know who will benefit from the consequence of such a change. 
Rawl’s concept of “veil of ignorance” demonstrates how such constraint plays out. The 
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actors, not knowing what kind of place they will occupy in the future, might be persuaded 
to seek an option that favors the good for all. In a sense, the lack of information 
constrains the actors, leading them to act impartially. The consequences of certain types 
of constitutional amendments, especially those that result in changes to institutional 
design such as the regime type and the functioning of separation of powers are much 
harder to anticipate (Negretto 1998, 10). Political actors in such circumstances are 
expected to be constrained by genuine uncertainty about future payoffs, rather than self-
concern over who will reap the benefits. 
 Object and Content of the Proposal 
  The objective of the proposal plays into the factors whether the project of making 
an amendment will finalize. While it is difficult to categorize different types of aims for 
constitutional change, it is possible to diagnose how it is perceived by the population at 
large and the decision-makers. An amendment that will mend inefficiency in the existing 
constitution will be much more embraced than one that will introduce restrictions on the 
existing rights and freedoms. Similarly, whether the amendment is going to change a 
provision on policy or on polity will have different effects (Couto and Arantes 2008). An 
amendment that seeks to alter how the state institution functions will attract much more 
heated debate than one on regulative issues. Once we identify the aim of the proposed 
amendment, we will be able to partly recognize why that particular provision succeeded or 
failed in achieving constitutional change. Moreover, how politicized the issue that the 
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amendment seeks to address may also determine whether the political actors seek formal 
constitutional amendment or prefer an implicit constitutional change (Karlsson 2016). 
 It is not only the objective of the proposed amendment but also how it is framed 
must be taken into account. A constitutional change proposal that has a neutral language, 
rather than an ideological stance will likely generate much broader support. A proposal 
framed in an ideological language will only attract the support of those favoring those 
particular beliefs, while a neutrally drafted amendment making proposal will draw 
endorsement from different sides of the ideological spectrum.  
 An amendment proposal that is very difficult to decipher will not be able to 
translate its aim as opposed to one that is clearly stipulated. An ambiguous amendment 
proposal may generate misinformation and mistrust, raising the political cost for actors to 
throw their weight on supporting a poorly designed proposal. Related but different than 
ambiguous/clear differentiation, we must consider whether the amendment proposal will 
generate rule like or open-ended provisions. A rule like provision will be more clear but 
will raise different objections while an open-ended provision will be open to broader 
interpretation. Dixon (2011) highlights that whether an amendment proposal has a 
litigation potential or not will also add to its supply side factors. 
 The extent of issues addressed in an amendment proposal may impact how its 
message is decoded. Whether a single issue is the point of discussion or multiple issues 
are addressed at once may transform the appeal of the proposal. On the one hand, a single 
issue change will generate more focus on one specific issue and therefore will be much 
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more scrutinized, raising the likelihood of possible opposition. On the other hand, an 
amendment proposal that deals with multiple issues at once will not be able to transmit its 
aim clearly, especially if the issues are diverse. Thus, we must take into account the 
magnitude of proposed amendments, as one of the factors playing a part is the supply side. 
 Depending on how the demand and supply side factors play out, an amendment-
making process may be characterized as consensual or confrontational. A consensual 
constitutional amendment is born out of a process where no side dominates the decision-
making, where challenges to constitutional change is accommodated, cleavages between 
political forces are moderate and the resulting amendment does not generate a polarizing 
issue. In contrast, confrontational constitutional amendment-making is characterized by 
one-sided decision-making and exclusion of other relevant political forces where interest 
based concerns prevail over impartial reasons. We expect to see strong opposition to 
constitutional amendments and divisive and reinforcing political cleavages. The resulting 
amendment is a product of polarization (Table 5.2.). 
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5.3 Conclusion 
 The above section is intended to provide a review of the existing literature on 
constitutional amendments and build on it to provide an overarching framework that 
incorporates demand and supply factors that impact the amendment-making procedure. 
Going beyond procedural hurdles, the goal of this framework is to provide a road map for 
a single case or a small-N comparative study of constitutional amendment that can 
capture the dynamic in detail. An in-depth analysis will be able to take into consideration 
both the factors that impact desire for change (demand side) and those that affect which 
proposals result in amendments (supply side). Comparing constitutional amendment rates 
for countries with different procedures presents a challenge. Even the legislative majority 
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requirement depending on the context varies- making any general assumptions difficult to 
apply. Moreover, simply looking at the amendment rate may not be illuminating. 
Whether the amendment includes one issue or many, whether the change is a major or a 
minor one and a regulative or a fundamental one provides additional perspectives that 
may not be available with a cross-national data. The outlined framework is intended to 
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Chapter 6: Amendment-Making Processes After Transition from Authoritarian 
Rule 
 Does constitution-making follow a transition to democracy? Examining recent 
history demonstrates that regime change is not a sufficient condition for constitutional 
change. While Spain, Portugal, Brazil, South Africa, and countries of the Eastern Bloc699 
adopted a new constitution, following the breakdown of authoritarianism, others, 
including Hungary, Peru, Mexico, Chile, and Turkey, did not. Therefore a contemporary 
analysis suggests that there is no clear pattern. The study by Etkins et al (2009) considers 
whether regime change leads to constitutional replacement. Relying on data from the 
Comparative Constitutions Project that have compiled all data from all written 
constitution since 1789, the authors reveal that regime change in both directions (both 
from democracy to authoritarianism and from authoritarianism to democracy) does have 
a clear impact on constitutional change700 and that incoming democracies are more likely 
to replace the constitution than newly installed authoritarian regimes.701 As the authors 
conclude, regime change does impact constitutional change but they do not find it a 
sufficient condition. Reviewing the instances of regime change since 1789, they find that 
in approximately 19% of cases of democratic transition constitutional replacement takes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
699 The only exception is Hungary and as Pogany (1993) argues, the lack of constitutional replacement gave 
politicians on the right the opportunity to argue that the amended Constitution because it was inherited 
from the communist order, lacked democratic legitimacy. 
700 When compared to stable years, constitutions are 1.5 times more times likely to “die” or to be replaced 
after democratization. When there is a shift to authoritarianism however, constitutions are 1.3 times more 
likely to be replaced with a new one, compared to stable years. 
701 Further analysis demonstrates that while democrats are more likely to replace the constitution with 
regime change, constitutions are more likely to survive under a democratic regime. They find that a 
constitution under a persistent democratic regime is likely to last 21 years whereas it is 15 years under an 
authoritarian setting. 
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place within the one-year frame before/after regime change, and in approximately 27% of 
cases a shift to authoritarianism is accompanied by constitutional replacement within that 
one year time frame.702 Another finding of this pivotal study is that there is no link 
between the regime origins of the constitution and the direction of regime change. This 
means “new democrats who inherit an authoritarian constitution were not especially 
likely to replace the constitution” (137).703 Such a result shows that the lack of 
constitutional replacement in the Chilean and Turkish cases of transition to democracy 
where the democrats inherited authoritarian constitutions did not necessarily represent an 
abnormality. However, the same study also demonstrates that a regime change in the 
direction of democracy increases the likelihood of a constitutional change more than a 
regime change to authoritarianism. From that perspective, Chile and Turkey stand out as 
exceptional since in both cases the shift to authoritarianism was accompanied by new 
constitutions whereas shift to democracy was not.  
 Elkins et. al (2014, 161) find that those authoritarian constitutions, which 
experience democracy transition are similar to democratic constitutions in content, than 
are those authoritarian constitution replaced after the transition. Although it is not clear 
whether authoritarian rulers with long-term plans that anticipate a regime change prepare 
documents appealing to democrats or whether certain democratic provisions embedded to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
702 The authors emphasize that while regime change is related to constitutional change, it is not a necessary 
or sufficient condition. They highlight the case of Chile as an example of transition to democracy that is not 
accompanied by constitutional replacement.  
703 Authors cite Chilean transition to democracy in order to illustrate their findings where they admit that 
they were surprised to find that the civilians’ decision not to replace the authoritarian constitution was not 
an aberration. Therefore, they conclude that the lack of constitutional replacement might be explained by 
the accommodational positions taken during the transition. 
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provide for cheap talk are later employed under democratic rulers, according to the 
authors, the incoming democrats’ decision to repudiate or retain an authoritarian 
constitution depends on the content of the authoritarian text. 
 No two constitutions are alike as it is the case with their constitution-making 
processes. Chapter 4 outlined the shared characteristics of the 1980 Constitution of Chile 
and the 1982 Constitution of Turkey and chapter 2 provided a summary of the history of 
constitution-making and amendment-making in Chile and Turkey. However, the open-
ended reform process experienced by the Chilean and Turkish constitutions show certain 
parallels. Arato (2014) notes that Chile and Turkey’s pattern of constitutional 
development had been similar. Both cases are transitions to democracy without 
constitutional replacement where the civilians came into power within a constraining 
constitutional formula. The incoming government had to agree to rules within an 
authoritarian constitution drafted by an outgoing military regime. In terms of the 
characteristics of the constitution, both are products of military regime, born in the same 
period, and approximately have the same length704. Both are detailed constitutions and 
are not what the literature calls “framework” constitutions.  
 This chapter provides a careful analysis of constitutional amendments adopted in 
the post-transition period of Chile and Turkey and demonstrate that interlocking of 
number of factors that take into consideration both the demand and supply side of 
constitutional change play a simultaneous role. While the demand side of constitutional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
704 In order to compare the length of the constitutions, I relied on word count of the constitutions in English. 
The Turkish constitution (without preamble) has 28.539 words and the Chilean constitution has 26.037 
words. 
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change includes factors that affect desire for change, the supply side of constitutional 
change includes factors that affect which proposals result in amendments. Thus, 
comparatively the chapter analyzes the demand side including the balance of power 
between the political forces operating in the congress/parliament, including the 
configuration of political parties and differences in their preferences, that take into 
consideration the electoral formula and the party system; push for constitutional reform 
from societal forces and external actors; the political, social and cultural context 
including the nature of the transition from authoritarian rule, the level of polarization, 
democratization impetus and the extent of encroaching problems. The characteristics of 
the constitution as well as the constitutional tradition are also addressed. On the supply 
side of constitutional change, constraints imposed by the amendment-making procedure, 
informal institutional actors and limited information and the content of the proposed 
amendments are taken into consideration.  
 Arato (2014, 10) argues, “the two countries were remarkably alike, with the 
renewal of reformist process beginning in the late 1980s and continuing through the first 
decade of the 21st century. In both countries the task was first to eliminate or reduce 
authoritarian enclaves and reform tutelary institutions established by the outgoing 
military regime, and second, to produce a new structure adequate to the needs of our own 
century”. However, a careful examination of the amendment-making process reveals that 
the gradual constitutional reform experienced in both countries, followed different paths.  
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  The following section will offer a comparative analysis of the constitutional 
change where the focus is on the extensiveness of the amendment; initiating and carrying 
out the legislative process and the actors involved whether as those that are demanding 
change or resisting it. It will discuss the contextual factors that precipitated the 
constitutional amendment, to what extent change have been possible and the content and 
objective of the constitutional change. Following a chronological order, the chapter 
analyzes the amendment-making processes in Chile and Turkey and finds that in both 
cases, incremental change took place within legal continuity and within procedural and 
institutional constraints that were overall aimed at attaining consensual change. The 
discussion section analyzes the differences in approaches. 
6.1 Amendment-Making in the Interim Period 
 In both cases, neither regime collapse nor uprising brought about transition from 
authoritarian military rule. In this sense, these were not cases of ruptura democrática. 
The military regimes in both Chile and Turkey were not defeated in a war nor they were 
discredited705. The authoritarian camp remained cohesive.706 On the contrary, the 
transitional articles expressed in the constitutions, including the timetable, determined the 
transition formula. Having recognized this similarity, there is one significant difference. 
The prospect for eight more years of Pinochet rule was rejected by the Chileans in a 
plebiscite, although it occurred within the regime’s prescribed constitutional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
705 In Chile, the economic crisis of early 1980s and opposition mobilization in mid 1980s remained 
inefficient to bring down the military regime. 
706 See Barros 2002 for confrontation between the military junta and the executive (Pinochet) in Chile that 
was resolved thanks to the institutional framework, namely the unanimity rule, through compromise. No 
such detailed analysis of the working of Turkish military regime exists.  
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framework.707 In Turkey, there was no such rebuff of military rule. However, the 
civilians in both cases acquiesced to the constitutional rules as determined by the military 
regime. 
6.1.1 Chile: the 1989 Constitutional Reform and “the First Instance of Agreement”  
 Transitional formula and the Constitutional Tribunal’s landmark decision 
 Under the 1980 Constitution, following an eight-year term for Pinochet, Chile 
was to decide upon the first elected president.708 The opposition had mobilized in mid-
1980s and challenged the military regime to no avail.709  However, the upcoming 
constitutionally required plebiscite on a single candidate offered an opportunity for the 
opposition to defeat the general by his own rules. After the opposition groups debated 
among themselves the most effective tactics for challenging the military regime  
(abstentionism, presenting an alternative candidate, or armed resistance), they decided to 
confront the authoritarian system within the established structure (Loveman 2001, 303).  
The opposition, bringing together fourteen parties united under a loose coalition in early 
1988, embraced a tactic of “acceptance of the institutional rules of the regime in order to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
707 According to Heiss and Navia (2007, 163-164) the Chilean transition was more similar to a case of 
“transition from one administration to the next”, rather than a transition to democracy case. They argue that, 
because the process was pre-determined.  
708 According to the transitional formula in the 1980 Constitution, after eight years of Pinochet rule, a 
candidate nominated by the regime would run in a one-man presidential election in the form of a plebiscite. 
Pinochet had initially favored an uninterrupted sixteen year presidency however fearing that it would 
weaken the support for the constitution, it was decided to split the term into two eight-year periods 
(Huneeus 2007, 161). According to the conditions set in the constitution, if the military regime’s candidate 
did not get elected or if the junta failed to agree on a candidate, the President (Pinochet) and the junta were 
to maintain the office for an additional year after which elections would take place (TA 29) (Bethell 1993, 
194). 
709 Opposition groups began to mobilize in May 1983, for analysis of National Protests and its possible 
effects on the dictatorship, see Garretón, 1988 and 2003, 120-133. 
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change it” (Garreton and Espinosa 2000, 44 and Constable and Valenzueala 1991, 
305).710  The “no” campaign first had to convince the voters that the process could 
actually lead to the end of Pinochet rule. They had to make the voters trust that the 
process was credible and safe and that they could win. It required them to register a 
maximum number of voters.  
 A turning point for the opposition’s likelihood of victory was the Constitutional 
Tribunal’s decision.711 The court required an independent electoral commission (Tribunal 
Calificador de Elecciones -TRICEL) to be set up before the plebiscite and furthermore 
demanded other requirements regarding the terms of the plebiscite and future elections 
and plebiscites (Barros 2002, 293) According to the court’s decision, the electoral system 
as stipulated in the permanent text of the constitution had to be in force to assure the 
constitutionality of the plebiscite, including electoral registries, independent monitoring 
and counting. The court in later rulings struck down provisions from organic laws, related 
to the electoral system, which conflicted with the 1980 Constitution’s bill of rights. Thus, 
the tribunal revoked unconstitutional restrictions of rights found in the organic laws on 
voter registration procedures, party formation, voting, vote count, electoral campaigns 
that violate the guarantees of equality before the law and due process  (Barros 2002, 302-
305). Unlike the Turkish case, in which the first election after the transfer of power from 
the military regime was restricted and not fair, in the Chilean case, the decisions of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
710 Ultimately, in the 1988 elections Concertación por el No included 16 parties. Communist Party, later 
joined the coalition.  
711 The Constitutional Tribunal issued its decision on the organic constitutional law on the Tribunal 
Calificador de Elecciones (TRICEL) on September 24, 1985. 
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Constitutional Tribunal ensured an impartial electoral process. For instance, important 
provisions of organic constitutional law on political parties were revoked by the court, 
which helped safeguard the electoral process.712   
 The court declared several clauses of the organic constitutional law on TRICEL 
unconstitutional, including: provisional suspension of party formation by the 
Constitutional Tribunal under Article 8 of the constitution, prohibition against new 
parties from adopting the pre-coup names, norms related to internal party organization, 
articles authorizing the Director of the Electoral Service to determine and punish 
wrongdoings during legal party formation (Barros 2002, 304). Unlike the Turkish case, 
where Provisional Article 4 excluded pre-coup political leaders from all political activity 
and political parties were prohibited from reconstituting themselves under their original 
names, the decisions of the Constitutional Tribunal in Chile provided that such 
restrictions were removed before the elections, including the presidential plebiscite. The 
parties were able to reconstitute themselves and retain their historical linkages with the 
electorate (Mainwaring and Scully 1995).713  In addition to that, the forced exiles of Chile 
were able to return home by 1984 as restrictions loosened. The exile experience for the 
Chilean left had led to renovation and reconfiguration of the left parties. Life under 
European democratic socialism contrasted with the experience of state terrorism, altered 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
712 The junta approved the organic constitutional law on political parties on January 15, 1987 and the court 
made its decision on March 7, 1987. The court argued that these provisions conflicts with freedom of 
association and equality before the law and due process (Barros 2002, 304). For more on the Constitutional 
Tribunal power of prior review of constitutionality of organic constitutional laws, see Barros 2002, 302-306. 
713 The proscription against Marxist parties did force left parties to register under new party names such as 
the Party for Democracy (PPD) and the Broad Party of the Socialist left (PAIS). 
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the convictions of former left leaders and provided an important learning experience that 
pushed the later alliance between the Socialists and the Christian Democrats that 
contributed to the success of the NO campaign (Wright and Zúñiga 2007). 
 As a direct result of the Tribunal’s decisions, each registered party had a poll 
watcher at each voting table, the ballots were opened and counted publicly. To further 
bulletproof the voting, the opposition recruited and trained poll watchers for them to 
transmit information to the Command for the No and the Committee for Free Elections 
(Constable and Valenzueala 1991, 304). This independent and parallel vote count ensured 
that they could cross check the official figures. Funds from the United States, especially 
from the National Endowment for Democracy, also helped ensure that clean and fair 
elections would take place. The opposition united under one front led a successful 
campaign and running as the regime’s candidate, General Pinochet was defeated in the 
polls714.   
 Constitution Revised and Reformed: The 1989 Amendments 
 Partial revision of the constitution followed Pinochet’s defeat in the plebiscite. 
However, it would be misleading to conclude that voter rejection of Pinochet led to 
constitutional reform. It is true that Chile’s piecemeal process of reforming the 
constitution started immediately after the 1988 plebiscite.715 However the plebiscite did 
not automatically lead to a civilian democratic government. According to the constitution, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
714 The plebiscite took place on October 5, 1988. For the effect of campaigns see, Boas 2015. 
715 For the role of the 1988 plebiscite on the transition, see Manuel Antonio Garretón, El Plebiscito de 1988 
y la Transicion a la Democracia (Santiago, 1988). 
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Pinochet was to continue as the head of state for seventeen months, until presidential and 
congressional elections took place and the new government took over.716 After this 
interim period, the junta would dissolve but military commander would retain their 
positions and Pinochet would serve as the Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army 
under the new civilian government where the president did not have the power to remove 
officers from the armed forces or force their resignation (Weeks 2014, 105). Although 
Pinochet had lost the 1988 plebiscite, he had received 43% of the votes, indicating that an 
significant portion of the society still supported the status quo (Alberts, Warsaw and 
Weingast, 89-90). Even though the opposition tried to make the argument that the 
Chileans also rejected the 1980 Constitution, the fact that the plebiscite took place under 
the rules established by the constitution undermined it (Heiss and Navia 2007, 170).  
Upcoming open and free elections in which Concertación’s victory was certain provided 
the necessary incentives for the military regime and the right-wing political parties, 
particularly Renovación Nacional (RN), to consider constitutional change.717 For the RN, 
the main motivation for constitutional reform was to not allow the parties of the center 
and left to utilize the call for constitutional change (Barros 2002, 309). From the 
perspective of the military government, constitutional reform before the transfer of power 
ensured an orderly transition, durability of the overall constitutional structure and 
removing the issue of constitutional reform from the upcoming election’s agenda (Uggla 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
716 Transitional article 29. 
717 The RN following the Concertación’s victory in the plebiscite called for constitutional reform and 
presented a proposal in December 1988 (Uggla 2005, 59). The other right-wing political party is Unión 
Demócrata Independiente, UDI (Independent Democratic Union). It is founded by the Jaime Guzmán, the 
ideologue of the 1980 Constitution. For more on the establishment of UDI and its role as a crucial 
opposition party in post-transition, see Huneeus 2001. 
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2005, 58 and Siavelis 2008, 193).718 The moderates within the military argued that in 
order to strengthen the constitution’s legitimacy and therefore its durability, reforms 
championed by the opposition had to be approved.719 
 As for the opposition, they theoretically had two options; either to amend the 
constitution before the expected inauguration or to wait until taking office to amend or 
draft a new constitution (Uggla 2005, 57).720 According to the transitional formula 
established under the 1980 Constitution, any constitutional change before the first 
democratically elected government took office had to be approved by another plebiscite. 
This was a comparatively easier choice than waiting until after the inauguration and then 
following the amendment-making rule stipulated in the constitution (Valenzuela 1994, 
212). For Concertación, this was a more straightforward alternative because of their 
recent electoral victory and it would ensure that the upcoming presidential and 
parliamentary elections would take place under a slightly more democratic framework 
(Garretón 1989, 206). However, opposition leaders did not have the authority to negotiate 
directly with the dictatorship. It was the question of whether they would lend their 
support to the military government’s proposal on constitutional reform that made them a 
“strong veto player” (Heiss and Navia 2007, 170). Any constitutional reform package that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
718 Negretto (2004, 92) point to constitutional amendments that the military government may seek 
719 Cristi (2000, 1775) argues that the 1989 plebiscite provided an approval stamp on the amended 1980 
Constitution: “If the 1980 constitution, now valid in Chile, has democratic legitimacy, it is due to the 
plebiscite held later in 1989, after the electoral defeat of Pinochet in 1988”. 
720 With regards to why the Chilean parties did not negotiate a completely new constitutional framework 
during the transitional process, Michalak and Pech (2011) argue a middle-class interested in maintaining 
property rights is more likely to accept the existing standards established in the constitution as a blueprint 
for negotiations on constitutional reform. 
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did not receive the consent of the opposition was unlikely to get approved in the 
plebiscite. For the opposition, constitutional change in the interim period would allow for 
competitive presidential and congressional elections to take place in the most democratic 
setting possible (Garretón 2003, 139). 
 On the other hand, the military rulers feared that a loophole in the constitution 
could lead to the breakdown of the constitution (Lagos AI, 2013). While most of the 
chapters had stringent amendment making rules, the chapter organizing the rule itself 
could be amended by a simple majority of 60 percent and presidential approval.721 Thus, 
the authoritarian camp feared that the opposition once had the power could easily 
overhaul the system (Barros 2002, 309).722 However, for the opposition this carried the 
risk of provoking a military intervention (Uggla 2005, 58-59, Alberts, Warsaw and 
Weingast, 90, Roberts 1998, 142). Concertación did not want to risk pushing the political 
and economic right to accept democratic reforms by mobilizing the masses because this 
could potentially galvanize the right to challenge the democratic system (Roberts 1998, 
144). Thus, the opposition preferred to communicate their set of preferred modifications 
to the authoritarian leaders, allowing them to assess which among their democratization 
demands they would be willing to satisfy.723 The fact that the RN and Concertación were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
721 The higher quorum requirement stipulated in Article 118 did not cover the chapter (chapter 14) that 
includes the Article 118 on constitutional amendment (Barros 2002, 309). 
722 The provision on unamendable articles (Article 4) in the Turkish constitution potentially carried the 
same risk. While the first three articles are unamendable, according to Article 4, the article itself is not 
guaranteed such protection. Thus some scholars have argued that it is possible to change the unamendable 
articles, hence the whole constitution by amending the unamendability provision. See Yegen (forthcoming), 
“Debates on Unamendable Articles: Deadlock on Turkey’s Constitution-Making Process”. 
723 For constitutional change proposals, see Geywitz, I991, pp. 2 3-33.  
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bypassing the military regime and through a joint technical committee were studying 
constitutional reforms forced the hand of the military regime. Despite the ups and down, 
triangular negotiations led to changes in 54 articles, affecting 12 of the constitution’s 14 
chapters (Uggla 2005). 724 The final package, which was approved in a plebiscite in July 
1989 was a compromise between the center-left democratic opposition, the right wing 
opposition and the military.725 
  It was the dualistic nature of the constitution that allowed all sides to work within 
constitutional rules. For the military and the right-wing parties, preservation of some of 
the authoritarian provisions provided the incentives to cooperate on maintaining the 
overall constitutional framework, as for the democratic opposition it was the possibility 
of taking advantage of its democratic provision to further enhance its democratic 
credentials, was the main goal. 
 Elite-negotiated reforms were conducted behind closed doors without any 
organized participation from below (Montes and Vial 2005, 18). The reforms addressed 
1) restrictions on rights and freedoms, 2) institutional constraints with reserve domains of 
authoritarian influence, 3) barriers and checks against political participation, 4) obstacles 
to constitutional reform. The negotiated character of the reform meant that not all the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
724 For a comparison of the proposals prepared by the Concertación, the RN, the joint technical committee 
and the proposal finally submitted to the referendum, see Geisse and Arrayas, 1989. 
725 See Uggla 2005 and Montes and Vial 2005, 13-16 for precise points of trade-offs. Pinochet announced 
the constitutional reform package on May 31, 1989 and the referendum took place on July 30, 1989 and the 
reforms were approved with 86 percent of the votes, Ley no 18.825 (Uggla 2005, 65). 
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constitutional changes were to deepen democracy. Certain constitutional changes did 
benefit the interests of the military regime and the right-wing political parties.  
 In terms of softening the restrictions on rights and freedoms, Art. 5 was rewritten 
in order to incorporate respect for human rights and international treaties that Chile has 
ratified as a state duty. The modified article gave stronger guarantees to human rights and 
international treaties and linked these with the legitimate exercise of sovereignty.726 The 
reforms also eased restrictions under states of exception. Most significantly, presidential 
prerogatives to expel persons from the territory under a state of siege was eliminated.727 
Restrictions on the rights of information and opinion, the right of association and privacy 
of correspondence and communication were eliminated (Art. 41.2). The changes also 
guaranteed habeas corpus rights, regardless of the type of emergency powers exercised 
by the government. However, new restrictions on the right to travel within country, 
information and opinion were added (Art. 41.3). Furthermore, the clause stipulating that 
under states of exception individual rights and guarantees provided by the constitution 
(Art. 19.26) were suspended, was eliminated. The language of Art. 39 was changed to 
emphasize that rights and guarantees cannot be suspended, but the exercise of those rights 
and guarantees can, under certain situations (external or internal war, internal 
disturbances, emergency and calamity) be.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
726 According to Ensalaco (1994, 417), beyond the appeal to international norms, the clause intended to 
prevent the manipulation of nationalistic sentiments in order to counter international pressure in the face of 
human rights violations, as had happened with the 1978 plebiscite condemning a UN resolution. Addition 
to that, this limitation was intended to legitimate the right to appeal to the international community in case 
of revert to repression.  
727 The provision was directed at political opponents and therefore its removal could be also listed under 
reforms that addressed barriers and checks against political participation. 
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 A number of constitutional changes were directed at institutional constraints with 
reserve domains of authoritarian influence. The composition of the National Security 
Council (COSENA), which was designed as an advisory body aimed at providing the 
armed forces a constitutionally sanctioned supervisory role in the system of political 
decision-making was changed to include one more civilian member, the Comptroller 
General of the Republic (Art. 95).728 Under the original framework, the body had a 
military majority. The 1989 reforms’ addition of one more civilian voting member, along 
with the additional requirement that resolutions to be adopted by an absolute majority of 
members, ensured that military members, without the cooperation of at least one civilian, 
could not pass decisions in matters related to national security (Cea 2992, 115). Another 
amendment softened the clause on the authority of the COSENA. The original framework 
which stipulated that the COSENA had the power to “represent” its views and opinions 
was toned down and replaced to state that the COSENA would “make known” its views 
and opinions. For its critics, this provision was intended to provide a legal basis for 
military involvement in politics. Additionally, the article was amended to reduce the set 
of authorities that the COSENA could express its opinions to the President, the Congress 
and the Constitutional Tribunal.      
 The constitutional mechanisms that provided institutional checks against the 
exercise of popular sovereignty were not limited to the sphere of civil-military relations. 
Among the democratic gains of the opposition, the most significant were increasing the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
728 Concertación also wanted to include the president of the Chamber of Deputies in COSENA, however it 
was rejected (Heiss and Navia 2007, 181). 
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number of elected senators to dilute the power of non-elected senators (Art. 45)729, 
repealing the president’s authority to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies once during his 
term (Art 32.5), removing the provision that provided for automatic removal from office 
for senators and deputies that have voted on bills which were later found unconstitutional 
by the Constitutional Tribunal (Art. 57)730 and providing the Senate in case of 
presidential vacancy with the power to appoint a new president until the next general 
elections (Art. 29).731 These reforms were intended to extend the scope of popular 
sovereignty by removing unwarranted oversight by the Senate, the Constitutional Court 
and the President.732 
 The constitutional change also removed some of the barriers against political 
participation and introduced reforms to enhance political pluralism. The most significant 
achievement in this realm was the derogation of Art. 8. The original provision was 
essentially formulated against Marxist parties and prohibited any political party, 
movement and organization that advocate class conflict, violence, totalitarian type of 
state or society and propagate any doctrines attempting against the family. It also 
empowered the Constitutional Court to determine the constitutionality of such groups. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
729 The number of elected senators were increased from 26 to 38, the designated senators were kept. The 
reform achieved this by establishing that six of the country's thirteen regions would be divided into two 
Senate districts.  
730 The article continued to allow for the removal of office for senators and deputies involved in labor 
conflicts or student activities, promoting the disruption of public order and promoting changes in the legal 
institutional order by ways not provided for in the constitution (Art. 57) Reference to Article 8 in Article 57 
which included prohibition against anti-system parties was replaced with reference to Article 19.15 and 
provided for cases of removal from office. 
731 The constitutional change instead provided for immediate presidential elections. 
732 A further constitutional change removed the prohibition against Senate from holding special sessions to 
discuss matters alien to its functions (Art. 49).  
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However, under Art. 19.15, the reformed constitution regulated anti-system parties within 
the context of the right of association (Cea  2002, 115).733 Under the reformed provision, 
former Art. 8’s ambiguous references to family and class warfare were eliminated and the 
improved provision Art. 19.15 guaranteed political pluralism, made compliance to 
principles of democratic and institutional regime a requisite and proscribed only those 
parties, organizations and movements that advocate the establishment of a totalitarian 
system, as well as those which use violence, or advocate or incite it as a method of 
political action (Heiss and Navia 2007, 173). The opposition democrats’ discomfort with 
Art. 8 was supported by the RN, that also found banning ideas worrisome (Ensalaco 1995, 
263). While the original constitution’s prohibitions were expansive and were directed at 
intentions of these groups, the revamped provision specifies that they will be judged on 
the basis of their “objectives, acts or conduct” (Ensalaco 1995, 263-264). Furthermore 
Art. 9 was amended to ban those criminalized for terrorism charges from holding public 
office and other positions, thus reserving individual punishment for terrorism crimes, 
meaning actions rather than thoughts (Ensalaco 1995. 263).  
 Other amendments of the 1989 reform package also helped enhance the limited 
political pluralism envisioned under the 1980 Constitution. These include lifting the 
prohibition against participation of labor union members in political parties and activities 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
733 In order to reflect the transfer of some of the provisions of Art. 8 to Art. 19.15, necessary changes were 
made with articles that previously made reference to former. Thus, reference to Art. 8 under Art. 82 
regarding Constitutional Tribunal’s power to determine the constitutionality of groups and parties and to 
rule on the individual actions against institutional order was replaced with reference Art. 19.15. Similarly, 
reference to Art. 8 under Article 57 regarding the removal from office for senators and deputies, was 
replaced with reference to Art. 19.15. 
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(Art. 19.19)734 and broadened the participation of labor union leaders in politics by 
restricting dual leadership roles to only high-ranking labor union leaders (Art. 23). In this 
matter, the opposition also received the support of the conservative UDI, which believed 
that the provision made mobilization difficult for themselves as well (Ensalaco 1994, 
414). Another change was directed at the censorship clause that established the National 
Television and Radio Council. The provision (Art. 19.12) was modified to eliminate 
censorship for “other artistic expressions” and thus only censorship of film remained in 
the constitution.735 These changes did achieve to remove some of the most blatant 
restrictions on political pluralism that specifically aimed at curtailing the organizational 
capacity of the political left. 
 In terms of rules on the constitutional amendment process, as the above 
discussion highlighted, the military regime also was in favor of revising them to cover a 
loophole in the constitution that potentially could be manipulated by the opposition to 
amend the amendment-making rules in order to revamp the constitution. Thus, the 
constitutional changes addressed the supermajority requirements in the constitution, 
altered the procedure for making amendments and strenghtened the entrenchment of 
particular chapters. The original requirement that two consecutive congresses must 
approve constitutional amendments was eliminated, and therefore “delay” as a 
constitutional amendment hurdle, “the most formidable obstacle to meaningful reform” 
was removed (Ensalaco 1994, 427).  The supermajority threshold needed to push through 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
734 However labor unions were still prohibited from having political affiliations and organizing political 
activities with political parties (Heiss and Navia 2007, 174-175).  
735 The 2001 amendment removed the censorship system altogether and introduced a rating system. 
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an amendment that the president opposed was reduced from three-fourths to two-thirds 
and the number of votes, which the president is required to get approval to approve his 
preferred language is increased from simple majority to either three-fifths or two-thirds 
depending on the chapter of the constitution.736 As a result of these changes “the 
possibility of winning passage of an amendment despite the objection of a strong 
President is enhanced substantially” (Ensalaco 2004, 427)737. Considering that it was 
apparent that the opposition would hold the seat of the president following the transition, 
weakening the president's powers with respect to constitutional reforms, was not 
necessarily a concession to the democratic opposition, as it was also useful for the 
outgoing military government (Londregan 2000, 80). 
 Nevertheless, the constitutional change maintained the higher quorum for certain 
chapters, thus entrenching the “authoritarian core” of the constitution and expanding it to 
two other chapters on constitutional rights and duties and reform of the constitution 
(Ensalaco 1995, 266).738 Thus, the military’s goal of closing the loophole that left the 
amendment rules vulnerable for modification by the opposition and possibly opening the 
constitution for a thorough revision, was achieved in exchange for easing the rigidity of 
the amendment-making rules. The negotiated character of the constitutional reforms is 
evident from the trade-off that the democratic opposition got. In exchange for raising the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
736 Presidential prerogative to change the language of the amendment can also be listed among reforms that 
addressed under institutional constraints with reserve domains of authoritarian influence. 
737 The additional elected senators diluting the power of the institutional ones also help ease the amendment 
requirement.  
738 Under the original constitution, the entrenched chapters were I, VII, X and XI – bases of institutionality, 
constitutional court, armed forces and COSENA. The 1989 reforms extended the entrenchment to chapters 
III and XIV. These chapters require two-thirds rather than the general three-fifths threshold. 
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quorum for two additional chapters, the opposition was able to elevate constitutional 
rights and duties provision to the safeguarded chapters of the constitution (Ensalaco 1994, 
427-428).   
 The package also included concessions that served the military regime and the 
political parties allied with it. The constitutional reform strengthened the autonomy of the 
armed forces by providing that the appointments, promotions and retirements in the 
armed forces must conform to a supreme decree in accordance with the organic 
constitutional law (Art. 94). This provision essentially elevated the laws regulating the 
armed forces to the rank of organic constitutional law (LOC) and therefore constrained 
the executive branch from intervening in matters related to the armed forces. The fact that 
the law regulating armed forces changed from a regular one to a supermajority law is 
significant even in the face of reduced quorum for the LOCs.739 With the constitutional 
package of 1989, the quorum to enact, modify and repeal LOCs were reduced from three-
fifths to four-sevenths (Art. 63).740 Although the opposition would have preferred to 
reduce the requirement to absolute majority and prevent the minority power from 
blocking legislation, it was another issue of compromise (Londregan 2000, 80). The 
interim period until the presidential and congressional elections gave the military 
government ample time to enact the organic constitutional laws defining the crucial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
739 Constitution does not define what a LOC is but lists which matters are to be regulated by these laws. It is 
in general understood that these laws are on matters organizing public services and bodies established in 
the constitution (Couso et. al. 2011, 70-71). 
740 Organic constitutional laws are one of the five types of laws under the Chilean constitutional structure: 
1) ordinary laws, 2) laws interpreting the constitution, 3) organic constitutional laws, 4) special quorum law 
and 5) laws conceding general pardons or amnesties for terrorist crimes (Couso et. al. 2011, 70). 
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matters to be regulated by these laws such as the electoral process, the right to education, 
public administration, organization and functioning of the Congress and the 
Constitutional Court. This is significant, because according to the transitory articles of the 
constitution any constitutional change before the transfer of power to civilians required 
approval by a plebiscite, but organic constitutional laws could be enacted by the junta 
without any interference or approval by the public and other actors  (Londregan 2000, 80). 
The LOCs were able to specify and codify matters that even after the constitutional 
change required to be voted by high amendment threshold. 
 One final modification that conflicted with the interests of the democratic 
opposition was the addition that the first president's term was going to be four years, as 
opposed to six years, and this transitional president could not seek reelection. This 
provision curtailed the first post-coup democratically elected president’s term, which was 
expected to be from the opposition camp and therefore his maneuver for agenda-setting 
and reform. Additionally, it also guaranteed that the elected president would not be 
eligible to serve as an automatic member of the Senate once his term was over, as only 
the former presidents who had served six years were to be part of the non-elected 
senators. In addition to these concessions, those remaining provisions of the 1980 
Constitution which aimed to insulate the system from the vagaries of democracy not only 
helped to protect the status-quo established by the authoritarian rulers but also favor the 
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right-wing they aligned with. Nevertheless, the 1989 constitutional reform accomplished 
major and radical changes.741 
 The right-wing RN’s eagerness for a negotiated constitutional reform also helped 
them distance themselves from the military regime. In essence, each side pursued future 
payoffs by accepting certain concessions. What facilitated this compromise and 
cooperation by opposing actors was the duality of the constitution: the 1980 
Constitution’s vision for a protected democracy incorporated provisions that facilitated 
democratic process as well as provisions that constrained it. Thus, for the opposition, the 
constitution allowed enough democratic space to guarantee that, although distorted, they 
could achieve democratic representation; although restricted, enjoy rights and freedoms 
and although limited beyond a façade of democratic institution, it was a constitutional 
order. As for the military regime and its supporters, the remaining constraints provided 
the assurances to quell their anxieties for the future under a civilian regime. Without a 
doubt, following the constitutional reform the constitution was much more democratic 
but it also ensured that the military regime’s constitutional legacy would survive the 
transition (Uggla 2005, 66). 
 According to Londregan (2000, 9-10), in hindsight the military government was 
most probably willing to relinquish power to the opposition with more concessions. 
However, for the Concertación leadership, a smooth transition to democracy was the real 
priority (Constable and Valenzuala 1991, 312). More importantly, “the first instance of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
741 Here, I borrow Bilgin’s (2008) terminology “major and radical changes” and “minor and regulative 
changes”.  
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agreement” between the Concertación and the right wing opposition provided a crucial 
political experience for future instances of cooperation, especially regarding 
constitutional change (Uggla 2005, 51). The experience of a negotiated settlement among 
elites proved to be a working strategy in following years and was welcomed as a first step 
towards depolarization (Montes and Vial 2005, 13). 
 In addition to this gain, the experience of politically defeating the military 
government in the plebiscite and extracting concessions from the regime substantiated the 
opposition’s decision to maintain unity. It was the historical memory of the democratic 
overthrow that was partly rooted in their “inability to form a majoritarian socio-political 
pact that could embrace democracy and social change” helped keep Concertación united 
and maintain and broaden the coalition even after the plebiscite (Garretón 2003, 139-140 
and Avendaño 2011, 32).742 The Concertación, in the first general elections, agreed on a 
common program and the seventeen parties were able to unite under a single candidate 
for the presidency (Mainwaring and Scully 1997, 124). 
6.1.2 Turkey:  The 1987 Constitutional Amendment and the First Instance of Non-
Consensual Change 
 Transitional Formula 
 Although like Chile’s transition, Turkish one was also pre-determined, political 
parties played no part in the latter (Gillespie, Waller, and López 1995, 174). It was a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
742 Lagos (2013 AI) remembers that through the end of the negotiations, when he communicated his doubts 
about the limitations of the reforms (especially with regards to maintaining the binominal electoral system), 
he realized that if he objects, it would be the end of the coalition and he could not risk dividing the coalition 
before the presidential elections that is supposed to take place in four months. 
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military-imposed transition in which the party system was carefully scrutinized by the 
outgoing military regime. Following the end of military rule, an interim period was to 
commence, where General Evren would resume his function as the president and the 
members of the Milli Güvenlik Kurulu (MGK) (the rest of the junta leaders) would act 
under a temporary advisory body called Presidential Council. During this six-year period, 
the president was equipped with more powers over constitutional amendments. Thus in 
1983, only the formal military rule ended.743 In addition to this constraint, the political 
parties that existed before the coup, as well as their leaders were not allowed to compete 
in the 1983 elections because of a transitional provision in the constitution.744 The banned 
parties of the pre-coup period also could not reinstitute themselves under their original 
names, which over the long term contributed to loss of party identification and increasing 
volatility of voters (Kalaycıoğlu 2005, 134). In addition to that, the MGK according to 
the Provisional Section 4 of the Political Parties Law, had the power to shut down 
political parties and veto their candidates.745 Under these powers, the MGK closed down 
the center-right JP’s proxy party746 and vetoed social democratic SODEP’s candidates, 
effectively precluding it from running.747 The military also imposed a monetary fine for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
743 The first open election was held in 1987. 
744 In total 723 people were banned from politics, of those 242 persons were barred for 10 year and the 
remaining 481 for 5 years (Yeșilada 1988, 352). 
745 For a detailed analysis of the 1983 elections, see Ergüder and Hofferbert, 1988. 
746 This short-lived party was called Great Turkey Party, which was essentially a reincarnation of Demirel’s 
Justice Party. It was soon replaced by True Path Party (DYP). The MGK first shut down the Great Turkey 
Party, and later vetoed 30 of its 34 founder members.  
747 Social Democratic Party (SODEP) was led by Professor Erdal Inönü who was the son of Ismet Inönü, 
one of the founders of the Republic, Turkey’s second president and leader of RPP. 
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non-voters. Although following the MGK decision to allow political competition748, 
fifteen political parties emerged, only three political parties were allowed to compete in 
the first elections of post-coup period (Yeșilada 1988, 355-358) 749. One was a party that 
was closely linked with and supported by the military establishment, the MDP and the 
other one HP, was conceived by the military rulers to fill the vacuum left by the 
Republican People’s Party (CHP) and offer a “pastel pink socialism” (Hale 1994, 263).750 
The third party, which ultimately won the 1983 election and was the governing party 
until 1991, was Turgut Özal’s Motherland Party- ANAP751. Although ANAP was the 
least favorite of the military regime752, it was nevertheless a right-center political party 
whose leader Özal had previously proved himself as an apt technocrat by carrying out 
“the January 24 decisions” that initiated the economic liberalization under the Demirel 
government and later serving as the deputy prime minister in charge of economic affairs 
under the military government (Haggard and Kaufman 1995, 101). The party led an anti-
statist, democratic and economically liberal agenda and promised a swift return to 
democracy. It claimed to bring together all different factions of the Turkish political 
spectrum; nationalist, center-left, religiously conservative and center-right (Ahmad 2003, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
748 MGK announced its decision in May 1983 and allowed party formation for the upcoming November 
1983 elections. The final deadline to register the parties was August 26, 1983 (Yeșilada 1988, 355). 
749 In total, the MGK vetoed 719 parliamentary candidates (Hale 1997, 267). 
750 The Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi  (Party of Nationalist Democracy) was led by a retired general Turgut 
Sunalp. The Halkçı Parti  (Populist Party) was led by Necdet Calp, who was a civil servant that had served 
under Ecevit. For more on political parties in the post-coup period see, Turan 1988 and Yeșilada 2008.  The 
two parties set up by the military government survived for only a couple of years. 
751 For a detailed analysis on the rise of ANAP, see Kalaycıoğlu 2002. 
752 The retired General Turgut Sunalp and his political party Nationalist Democracy Party (MDP) was the 
military high command’s preferred candidate and right before the election General Evren on live television 
had endorsed him.  
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153)753. Özal appeared to the voters as “the only genuine democrat” (Zürcher 2004, 282). 
Most likely because the generals did not support him, Özal won the 1983 elections 
(Ahmad 1993, 190).  
  Figure 6.1: Percentage of Seats by Party, 1983 Elections 
 
In reality, despite being the least favorite of military rulers, ANAP turned out to 
be a cooperative partner of military authority. Özal did not push for democratization and 
prioritized economy over democracy. As the architect of the neoliberal reforms, he 
believed that he could not pursue his economic policies under a democratic setting 
(Ahmad 1993, 193). Unlike Chile, where for the incoming reformist democratic 
opposition, the existing authoritarian provisions embedded in the constitution was 
unsettling, for the Özal government at least some of the non-democratic provisions were 
necessary evils. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
753 On the one hand, ANAP highlighted that it was not a continuation of any of the dissolved parties of the 
past, it absorbed all their tendencies. It claimed to embody the Justice Party’s conservativeness and 
Islamism of the National Salvation Party and believed that it even had a social justice component. But 
according to Ahmad (1993, 192), “the party and government were overwhelmingly conservative and 
showed little concern for liberal, democratic values”. The more extreme left, i.e. The Turkish Communist 
Party and the Workers Party merged in 1988 under United Communist Party of Turkey (TBKP) in 1988. 
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 Lifting Political Bans and Changing the Amendment-Making Rule: The 1982 
Constitutional Amendments  
 The new party that came to power after the transfer of power to civilians was one 
that broke the monopoly of Turkey’s two dominant parties, CHP and AP.754 Unlike Chile, 
where center-left and left parties were united in one grand coalition, the left was 
divided.755 The center-left party CHP broke into two rival factions that vied for the same 
voters (Sayari 2002, 16). The Turkish left’s failure to govern during the end of the 1970s 
also had led to frustration in the eyes of its constituency. In terms of its organizing 
capacity, the 1980 coup had been the harshest on the left organizations. As a result of 
military persecution, those who were involved in left politics were imprisoned and 
tortured. Most found refuge in Germany.756 International developments in the 1980s, 
most importantly the gradual opening and restructuring of Soviet economy and politics, 
and the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union led to further loss of prestige for the 
Turkish left. Instead the vacuum was filled by “the religious revivalists, and ethnic 
nationalist Kurds and Turks” (Kalaycıoğlu 2005, 136). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
754 The new political party law came into effect on 24 April 1983. Although the ban on politics was lifted 
the next day, the MGK could veto any political party and the constitution maintained a political ban on 
political party leaders and parties of pre-1980 coup. 
755 In the 1983 election, the two parties of the left (SODEP and HP) were rivals, but later in 1985 these two 
merged to form Social Democratic Populist Party (Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti)- SHP. However, the left 
continued to be divided as it competed with another moderate party, Democratic Left Party (Demokratik 
Sol Parti ) – DSP, which was formed in 1985 by Ecevit’s wife Rahşan as he himself was banned from 
politics. Eventually SHP merged with CHP in 1995.  
756 It is estimated that following the 1980 coup, 105,000 people left the country and sought political asylum 
in other countries (Eğrikavuk, Hürriyet Daily News, February 27, 2011). For instance, Behice Boran, a 
prominent intellectual of radical left and deputy from the Workers Party of Turkey went to exile in Europe 
and died there. 
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 Özal and other members of the governing ANAP were influenced by Aydınlar 
Ocağı, the intellectual founders of the Turkish–Islamic Synthesis (Türk İslam Sentezı), 
the Turkish Constitution’s ideological formula to curb socialism (Zürcher 2004, 288 and 
Yeșilada 1988, 364-365). Thus, ideologically the incoming civilian leaders did not 
deviate much from the engineers of the constitution. In terms of economic policies, as the 
architect of the economic reforms known as January 24 decisions and the economic czar 
of the military government, his government embraced and broadened the economic 
liberalism of the Turkish economy. In exchange for pursuing further reforms in the 
economic realm, he was wiling to leave the military general leeway to maintain law and 
order. The Özal government demonstrated an unwillingness to pursue democratization 
reforms.  As was the case in Chilean constitutional reform, in the Turkish case the 
constitution and the rules laid down in the constitution limited the extent of modification. 
ANAP, which governed until October 1991, was not in favor of revamping the 
constitution (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2010, 37). The prime minister Özal stated that he 
preferred to allow the 1982 Constitution’s institutions some time to function before 
considering amendment-making.757 Although one might see General Evren, who had 
declared himself the “guarantor” of the constitution (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2010, 37), 
serving as the president as a veto player on constitutional reform, it does not form the 
entire picture. Evren did not use his presidential prerogatives regarding the constitutional 
amendments, and prime minister Özal maintained good relations with him that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
757 Özal did voice criticism for the 1982 Constitution for being a too detailed text and indicated that a 
constitution that solely includes a bill of rights would be his preference. Although he also favored a semi-
presidential system where the president with more extensive powers that is also directly elected by the 
people. However, these opinions did not formulate into an actual policy (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2010, 37). 
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“resembled one that was based on a consensual division of labor” with Evren in taking 
the lead on internal and external security and Özal in charge of economic matters (Evin 
2005, 31).758 Although Özal in some instances went against the military’s interests such 
as installing his candidate of choice for the position of Chief of General Staff and 
bringing up the issue of defense funds and the Kurdish identity, overall he did not 
challenge the legal and constitutional powers of the military. 
 The Özal government’s resistance to reform is also apparent with respect to other 
laws passed by the junta: the trade unions law, the higher education law, the law on 
election and political parties, the press law, the penal code law, the law on radio and 
television remained in the books (Ahmad 1993, 197). If anything the government 
embraced the restrictions and constraints imposed by these laws inherited from the 
military government. For example, between 1983 and 1987, the electoral law was 
actually amended four times and electoral districts were gerrymandered, in order to twist 
it to favor the governing ANAP and to the detriment of left and small parties. As a result, 
in the 1987 elections ANAP acquired 64.9 percent of the seats although it received only 
36.3 percent of the votes (Evin 2005, 32). 
  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
758 However, the President Evren did not use the delaying power granted to his office for constitutional 
amendments (as well as the PA 9 which stipulated presidential veto could be overridden for three-forth for 
the next six years after the transition) and did not send the proposal back to the parliament for 
reconsideration (Yazıcı 1997, 179).  
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Figure 6.2: Percentage of Seats by Party, 1987 Elections 
 
 The constitutional reform initiative of the Özal government was recognized by the 
opposition parties as such an attempt to foster its party interests, rather than deepen 
democracy.759 The 1987 constitutional reform package included four items, however two 
of these amendment proposals were crucial, regarding the amendment-making rules and 
lifting the ban on politicians of pre-coup period.760 According to ANAP, it was pertinent 
to alter the amendment-making rule (Art. 175) as it could potentially lead to political 
deadlock. Turkey had applied for European Economic Community (EEC) membership in 
1987 and Özal argued that an easier amendment making procedure would make it 
possible for Turkey to implement constitutional reforms more swiftly (Usul 2011, 91 and 
Rabinovich and Shaked 1989, 664).761 Originally, the constitution had required a two-
thirds supermajority rule and allowed for plebiscite, in the event that the parliament 
insisted on a constitutional amendment proposal overturned by the president. This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
759 See May 17, 1987 TBMM proceedings, available at 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d17/c040/tbmm17040106.pdf 
760 For a summary of the 1987 constitutional amendments, see Parla 1991, 147 and 148 
761 EEC with the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 was renamed the European Community and later was 
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provision reduced the minimum votes to three-fifths but the plebiscite became obligatory 
if the amendment was approved by three-fifths but less than two-thirds of the votes.762 As 
such the amendment-making rule was made relatively flexible and by utilizing the 
plebiscite mechanism the changes allowed the public greater role in amendment-
making.763 Özal argued in cases of deadlock in the parliament over constitutional 
amendment, public would settle the matter  (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 33).  However, 
the new rule also made the procedure much complicated (Parla 1991, 128).  
 The opposition argued that, the existing rule required cooperation and negotiation, 
while the proposed rule deviated from this principle.764 They proposed other measures 
that could buttress the new amendment making rule against majority manipulation. These 
included a three-fifths affirmative vote for the plebiscite, requirement that each article is 
put up in a separate vote and guarantee that the public is informed in case of a plebiscite. 
These motions were defeated and despite the opposition’s argument that the ANAP 
government was playing strategically by placing the modification on the amendment rule 
together with lifting the ban on politicians of pre-coup period and thus soliciting the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
762 The rule provided for two courses. In the event that the amendment passed by two-thirds, there was no 
need for a public vote however the president still possessed the authority to send it to referendum (or 
alternatively he can send it to parliament for reconsideration or sign into law). In the event that the 
amendment passed by three-fifths, the president either requires a referendum or sends it back to parliament.  
May 17, 1987 Act No. 3361 
763 Turkey held four plebiscites so far on constitutional amendments. The first was on September 6, 1987 
regarding the lifting the ban on pre-coup political leaders. The second one was held on September 25, 1988 
regarding ANAP’s proposal to change the timetable for local elections and it was rejected. The third and 
the fourth one were held under AKP governments on October 21, 2007 and September 11, 2010 
respectively. These will be discussed below.  
764 This was an argument held by SHP member Cahit Tutum, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Dönem 17, Yasama 
Yılı 4, Cilt 40, Birlesim 106, May 17, 1987, p. 552. 
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support of opposition parties who wanted to see their former leaders back in their 
political party. 
 This was a calculated move by Özal. The original amendment-making rules of the 
1982 Constitution applied in this instance, rather than the proposed procedure. Thus, the 
Özal government needed a two-thirds majority but had enough for three-fifth and hence 
needed the support of opposition parties. Therefore, by incorporating the removal of the 
ban on party leaders of the pre-coup era, he wanted to ensure that his proposal of 
changing the amendment-making rule, he would get the votes of the opposition. Very 
strategically, the ANAP constitutional reform proposal, therefore included three matters, 
increasing the size of the assembly, decreasing the voting age, relaxing the rigid 
amendment-making rules with the lifting the sanctions on political leaders of the pre-
coup era. According to the proposal, all the other provisions would directly enter into 
force, but the one regarding the removal of the ban on politicians of the ancien régime, 
would be conditional on the approval by a plebiscite.  
 ANAP did not want to appear as being opposed to lifting the ban on politicians 
for it rightfully gave the impression that the party was benefiting from this constitutional 
restraint on former leaders. Moreover, Turkey had just applied for EEC membership and 
the ban was one of the most blatant undemocratic provisions of the constitution that 
critics of Turkey highlighted as an indication of the country’s democratic shortcomings 
(Rabinovich and Shaked 1989, 664). They were nevertheless unwilling and hence opted 
to support the elimination of the ban, provided that it is approved by a public referendum 
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and in return, led a No campaign against it (Ahmad 1993, 196). The opposition on the 
other hand, contended a referendum for political ban was undemocratic for it concerned 
individuals’ basic political rights and voted against the constitutional reform proposal’s 
provision that linked the referendum conditionality for lifting the ban (Özbudun and 
Gençkaya 2010, 39). However, the DYP members that wanted to see the ban on political 
leaders lifted, gave their support to ANAP proposal. The division between the opposition 
and the government on the ANAP government’s insistence on taking the route of 
referendum as a way to defeat the proposal while appearing to be cooperative also led the 
opposition to apply to the Constitutional Court contending that the new amendment-
making rules should apply. However, their appeal for unconstitutionality was rejected by 
the court, which rightfully declared that its power was limited to review of constitutional 
amendments on procedural grounds (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2010, 39). The campaign 
was conducted in “a sort of shadow election campaign” (Rabinovich and Shaked 1989, 
664).  Özal and ANAP called for a “no” vote and urged the electorate to remember the 
chaos of the 1970s under these former leaders. Since all the opposition parties supported 
the “yes” campaign against ANAP’s “no” call, the plebiscite became a vote of confidence 
for the government.765 The vote took place on September 6, 1987, and by less than a 1 
percent margin, the ban was lifted.766  It was the first instance of non-consensual 
constitutional change applied to the 1982 Constitution.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
765 The orange color was used for the “no” ballot and blue was used for the “yes” ballot. 
766 The yes vote received 50.6% of the votes and the difference between the yes and no votes was a mere 
75.066.  
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 Realizing that the previously banned politicians would now be able to challenge 
Özal on the polls, in order to not allow Demirel, Ecevit and Erbakan enough time to 
regroup, he decided to hold early election and before that he altered the election law to 
introduce a second election barrier that would favor the governing ANAP.767 The 
opposition parties did not want to appear as if they feared a defeat at the polls and could 
not unite under a decision to boycott the early elections, were forced to a snap election. 
Thus the 1987 elections, where finally banned leaders and a wider spectrum of political 
parties were allowed to compete, did not result in a representative outcome, distorting the 
votes in favor of the major party.  
 The ten percent threshold, which was intended to minimize the number of 
political parties and prevent the extreme radical left and right to enter the parliament did 
not lead to its intended goals (Kalaycıoğlu 2005, 134). Those political parties allowed to 
compete by the MGK failed to institutionalize and disappeared from the Turkish party 
system (Yeșilada 1988, 372). Different than Chile, Turkish political party system suffered 
from lack of institutionalization and centered around political leaders. There was no 
political learning, derived from the experience of political fragmentation and democratic 
overthrow. In the short period that the military regime ruled, they were able to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
767 According to the formula introduced by the Özal government, in addition to the 10 percent national 
threshold, parties also had to pass a specific provincial barrier, ranging from 20-50 percent. In case where 
only one party was able to pass the second barrier, then the first party would acquire all the seats in that 
district. In case where the party was successful in passing the provincial barrier but failed at the national 
one, then it would lose all its seats, which would be distributed to other parties (Yeșilada 1988, 371). 
Additionally, the early election bill removed the party primary arrangements, providing the central 
management committees the authority to decide the slate of candidates for each constituency (Rabinovich 
and Shaked 1989, 664). The Constitutional Court annulled the provision of the bill on primaries, which 
required the government to allow political parties to hold primaries. It forced the government to adopt a 
new early election bill with voluntary primaries (Rabinovich and Shaked 1989, 666).    
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depoliticize the system.768 However, their desire to clear the political system by placing a 
constitutional ban on pre-coup leaders had the unintended effect of fracturing the center-
left and center-right and providing anti-system new comers a political space to compete 
with traditional parties (Ahmad 2003, 166-167).  
 The 1987 constitutional change was not the result of negotiation and bargaining, 
nor was it based solely on the incoming civilian regime’s goal of removing constraints 
and restrictions. The ANAP government was more than willing to abide by the 
constitutional set up and did not prioritize democratization. Although repealing the ban 
on former political leaders was surely removing one check against political participation, 
as the discussion above demonstrated, it was made conditional on altering the amendment 
rule. The other changes were minor and regulative changes, as opposed to major and 
radical changes.769 Although it can be argued that lowering the voting age and increasing 
the number of deputies may enhance political participation, there was no need for such an 
expansion except that these two modifications would also receive the support of 
opposition parliamentarians. As for the most crucial aspect of the constitutional change, 
the amendment-making rule, it was suspected that ANAP lowered the quorum to make it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
768 A number of measures, besides the adoption of a new constitution, which limited participation, were 
taken by the military regime. The Law of Associations (1983) did not allow soldiers, teachers, civil 
servants and high school students to form associations. Professional organizations were deprived of their 
autonomy and tied to government ministries. Only one of the pre-coup trade unions (TURK-IS) was 
allowed to function. The new laws on Trade Unions (No. 2821) and Collective Bargaining, Strikes and 
Lockouts (No. 2822) did not allow for any political activity and prohibited political strikes, general, 
solidarity strikes and occupation of work places. The autonomy of universities was impaired with the 
establishment of the Higher Education Council that sought to regulate any university activity (Yeșilada 
1988, 352-353). 
769 Bilgin (2008) makes the distinction between “minor and regulative changes” and “major and radical 
changes”. However he does not categorize Turkish amendments according to such a scheme. 
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easy for the majority party (hence ANAP) to pass constitutional amendments. This 
assertion is substantiated with ANAP’s constitutional amendment attempt in 1988 to 
allow for early local elections. ANAP, fearing that it could lose the elections wanted to 
hold it early. Thus, a proposed a constitutional amendment that modified Article 127 by 
providing that the parliament could decide to hold the local elections one year in advance 
and added a transitory provision that scheduled one for November 13, 1988.770 The 
motivation behind this constitutional amendment was clearly not to overcome the 
authoritarian provisions embedded the 1980 Constitutional but to promote party 
interests.771 ANAP government, which had suffered a decline in its popularity wanted to 
have the local elections soon when its support was still high (Özbudun and Gençkaya 
2009, 33). This maneuver failed when the proposal was defeated with 65% “No” 
votes”.772 
  The absence of democracy-enhancing constitutional change initiatives by the 
government does not mean that there was no such demand. In fact, from the moment that 
the 1982 constitution was promulgated, it was criticized by multiple sectors of the society 
(Özbudun and Gençkaya 2010, 37; Özbudun  2014, 8; Yazıcı 2009, 3-8; Karatepe 2009, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
770 The government’s decision to include the early election date in the constitution as a provisional article 
was criticized by the opposition as well as the later addition of this article in the proposal. The opposition 
SHP also criticized the nonobservance of 48-hour interval between two required debates on constitutional 
amendments. See TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Dönem 18, Yasama Yılı 1, Cilt 12, Birlesim 76 August 3, 1988, 
134-136. 
771 Another example of ANAP government’s lack of concern, even enjoyment for the limited democracy to 
the extent that it benefited the party is the electoral system. Not only did the ANAP government kept the 10 
percent threshold, it also introduced a second provincial barrier that favored the outcome for the ANAP in 
the 1987 elections.  
772 Akyüz (2012) provides an interesting comparison of the 1978 plebiscite in Chile, on UN’s criticism of 
human rights in Chile and the 1988 plebiscite in Turkey and argue that these two cases are examples of 
personalized plebiscites.  
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284).773 The two opposition political parties of right (DYP) and left (SHP) also produced 
constitutional reform proposals, which included removing some of the restrictions but 
differed with respect to presidential powers (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2010, 37-38). 774 
Both political parties critical of the drafting process and the substance of the 1982 
Constitution argued for the necessity of a new and civilian constitution founded on 
“national reconciliation” (Tanör 1986, 170). However, akin to Chile, these forces did not 
amount to a political mobilization that could potentially overhaul the constitution. It was 
not until 1995 that constitutional reforms that addressed the constraints on the decision-
making capability of democratically elected governments and restrictions on the rights 
and freedoms were negotiated and approved through an intra-party broad consensus. 
6.1.3 Discussion  
 Without over emphasizing a path dependent view of constitutional change, a 
comparison of the two cases demonstrates that the context of the transition plays a crucial 
role. Both cases were transitions to a limited democracy, because of the reserve domains 
of influence, limitations on the exercise of political representation and restrictions on 
rights and freedoms. Both transitions adhered to the timetable and the institutional setup 
established by the military regime. However, the constitutional reforms pursued in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
773 See Yazıcı 2009 for a summary of civil society proposals for a new constitution. The eight proposals she 
summarizes, are drafted by scholars at the request of different civil society organizations, with the 
exception of one that is drafted at the request of AK Party in 2007.  
774 SHP promoted weakening the presidential powers, expanding the political rights of civil society 
organizations, strengthening the autonomy of universities and the independence of judiciary (Özbudun and 
Gençkaya 2010, 37-38). On the contrary, DYP promoted restructuring the regime and establishing a semi-
presidential system. DYP was mainly critical of the tutelary and militaristic institutions established by the 
constitution such as the MGK and civil and political restrictions (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2010, 38 and 
Tanör 1986, 170-171).  
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interim period of Chile succeeded in removing some of the most blatant authoritarian 
features of the constitution, while in the Turkish case the initial constitutional reforms 
aimed at promoting the interests of the governing party (Ensalaco 1994, 409).775 The 
institutional effects of the transitional context, namely the consequences of the limitations 
on the electoral competition and political party alignments and fragmentations provide 
part of the explanation. Unlike Chile, where both the 1988 plebiscite and the 1989 
election were free and fair, the first elections after the transfer of power from military rule 
in Turkey were neither free nor fair (Bethell 1993, 199). Political parties in Turkey were 
banned from competing in the first post-coup elections, they could not reconstitute 
themselves with the same names and their leaders could not reenter the political fray. For 
the initial years of post-transition ANAP, “which claimed to synthesize the major pre-
coup tendencies without representing any of the conventional parties,” captured the 
government, which it utilized to pursue further economic liberalization rather than 
democratization (Aslan Akman 2012, 150). Constitutional change was a non-issue for 
ANAP government. Except for occasional commentary on preference for a direct election 
of the president, characteristic of semi-presidential systems, the Özal government did not 
pursue constitutional change (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 31). 
 In both countries, the incoming civilian regimes did not challenge the neoliberal 
model. For Turkey, this was a direct result of the incoming government’s ideological 
position. The fact that Özal was the engineer of the structural reforms that initiated the 
neoliberal order and had served as deputy prime minister in charge of economic affairs 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
775 See Jon Elster’s (1997) for the psychology of constitution-making on passions, interests and reasons. 
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under the military government indicates the ideological stance of the first post-coup 
civilian government. In Chile, this was both a “tactical concession” to alleviate the 
business sectors’ fears that the economic model would reverse under a center-left 
government and also a result of the realization that the Chilean economic model was 
well-functioning compared to the failures in other neighboring post-authoritarian 
countries of Brazil, Argentina and Peru (Roberts 1998, 146)776.  
 In Chile, the brutality of the military regime altered the conceptions and 
convictions of party leaders and old animosities between the center-left and left parties 
were set aside and new alliances were forged (Mainwaring and Scully 1995, 123). The 
Constitutional Tribunal’s landmark decision that demanded an impartial electoral process 
provided a fair field for the democratic opposition. The military regime’s ban on Marxist 
parties (Art. 8) was removed in the first instance of constitutional change. The opposition, 
having gone through a learning process were able to abandon their inability or 
unwillingness to cooperate, which had led to polarization and hence the breakdown of 
democracy. Although the military regime in Chile applied violence more systematically 
and attempted to depoliticize the government as well, it was unable to crush the political 
parties. Those that existed prior to the democratic overthrow were able to come back and 
lead the redemocratization process (Montes and Vial 2005, 19). In Chile, the political 
parties moderated their ideological positions and embraced coalitions and alliances over 
polarized party politics of the past (Scully 2000, 118-121). The previous political 
cleavages (religion and class based) had lost their significance in the face of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
776 The collapse of the Soviet Union also discredited the statist and socialist model. 
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democratic/antidemocratic regime cleavage (Scully 2000, 121). The lack of consensus of 
the 1970s that had aggravated polarization and fragmentation of political parties and gave 
the military the pretense to intervene gave way to consensual democracy (Scully 2000, 
51-62). Although the tripartite distribution of the electorate continued after the end of the 
military regime, the reconstituted party system shaped by the electoral law (Scully 2000, 
130) as well as the trauma of authoritarian rule led the political elites to abandon “the 
zero-sum logic of majoritarian politics” and to “seek accommodation and compromise 
over conflict in key areas of policy” (Mainwaring and Scully 1995, 135). Besides 
political learning (Garretón and Espinosa 1999), positive contextual features of the 
transition and the institutional factors (Scully 2000), other factors related to internal 
dynamics such as formal and informal power-sharing (Avendaño, 2011) explain why 
Concertación was able to maintain its unity and negotiate reforms with the military 
regime and the right wing opposition and carry the alliance towards winning the first 
presidential and parliamentary elections.  
  The circumstances of the democratic transition in Chile contrast significantly 
with Turkey. The continuing restraint on political parties and political participation in 
general, condensed the party system to the detriment of left and right political parties of 
the pre-coup period. It allowed for a majority party to appear and occupy the position of 
the dominant party in the immediate aftermath of transfer of power to civilians and push 
for confrontational amendment-making. In contrast, the positive contextual features of 
the Chilean transition set the tone for consensual negotiated constitutional reforms.  
However it should also be noted that the initial constitutional reforms in both countries by 
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easing the amendment rule allowed for better conditions for future constitutional reforms 
(Fuentes 2011, 1754).777  
6.2 Amendment-Making through Consensus-Building 
 The 1989 reforms in Chile eliminated some of the onerous anti-democratic 
provisions of the Constitution and softened others. In Turkey, the 1987 reforms removed 
the ban on former political leaders that leveled the playing field. These initial 
constitutional changes were followed by limited reforms. In the aftermath of 
constitutional change before the transfer of power to civilians in Chile and after the 
transfer of power in Turkey, for a period both countries did not experience major reforms. 
However, as this section will demonstrate, political forces in both countries had different 
approaches about transforming the constitution and strengthening its democratic features 
and eliminating its authoritarian ones. The previous section analyzed the role of the 
transition in setting the ground for the constitutional change. We observed that while both 
countries have had a cautionary approach regarding constitutional reform, which in both 
cases was motivated by a desire to not provoke a reaction from the military and other 
non-democratic forces and maintain the by-then functioning political and economic 
stability, they had major differences that can be attributed to the contextual features of the 
transition, namely limitations on the political participation, emergence of new actors, the 
level of party institutionalization, political learning and diffusion of ideas among the 
political elites. Here, the ideological alignment vs. differentiation among the departing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
777 However, it should be emphasized that for the two chapters of the 1980 Constitution of Chile, the third 
chapter on constitutional rights and duties and the fifteenth chapter on constitutional reform, the quorum 
was raised. 
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military government and the incoming civilian government is especially telling. Although 
in the Turkish case, one should highlight the limitations on political participation during 
the first post-coup election, it is also revealing that, in contrast to Chile, the first post-
coup government in Turkey was composed of a center-right party that shared certain 
ideological affinity towards the military regime especially with respect to the 
prioritization of economic liberalization to the detriment of maintaining the restricted 
rights and freedoms. 
 In this section, in order to explain the limited reforms enacted following the first 
post-coup presidential and parliamentary elections in 1989 in Chile and after the first 
elections in which bans on political leaders were removed in 1987 in Turkey, other 
explanatory variables explaining amendments are employed. These include balance of 
power between the political forces in the congress/parliament, electoral formula, party 
fragmentation, procedural rules, other features of the political system, including the 
formal balance of power between the executive and the legislature and veto players. We 
observe that both countries pursued consensual approach in this period. While the 
Chilean reforms were not as exhaustive as the Turkish constitutional changes, both 
countries  
6.2.1 Chile: Two Multi-Party Coalitions and Piecemeal Reform (1990-2000) 
 We observe that political balance remained constant in Chile while it alternated 
among different political parties, including newcomers in Turkey (Fuentes 2015, 1). 
Since the reinstallation of democracy, Concertación has won four consecutive 
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presidential terms. However, the terms of Aylwin (1990-1994) and Frei (1994-2000) 
government differed from the administrations of Lagos (2000-2006) and Bachelet (2006-
2010) with regards to their approach to constitutional reform (Fuentes 2012). During the 
Aylwin government, the issue of constitutional reform regarding non-democratic 
prerogatives was sidelined and “the first democratic government decided to live with 
them as the price of stability and a modicum of policy support on other issues from the 
democratic right” (Linz and Stepan 1996, 211). 
 CPD’s candidate Patricio Aylwin of the Christian Democrats, having won the 
1989 presidential election, faced several challenges. Despite the binomial electoral law’s 
overrepresentation of second place winners, Concertación, also won a majority in the 
lower house, the Chamber of Deputies and a plurality in the upper house, Senate.  
However, the nine additional institutional senators stripped the Concertación of its 
electoral majority in the Senate and gave the right wing opposition an effective veto 
power (Londregan 2000, 82). It compelled the Concertación government “into a position 
in which it had to seek majorities through negotiation and compromise in order to 
introduce change and reform in a gradual manner” (Siavelis 2000, 51).  
 Cooperative patterns were forced by the electoral system and the designated 
senators, as well as the anticipated vetoes from the National Security Council (COSENA) 
and the Constitutional Tribunal (Linz and Stepan 1996, 211). Moreover Aylwin 
government felt obliged to prove that it could maintain political and economic stability. 
The electoral support for the right was interpreted as the voters’ response to fear of 
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reverting back to instability. Thus, for President Aylwin addressing the authoritarian 
enclaves could not become a priority (Rabkin 1992, 142). Thus, the Aylwin government 
decided to postpone its political change platform except with regard to democratizing 
municipal elections and anticipating that the right wing parties would not be supporting 
constitutional change778, instead sought their cooperation on economic subjects such as 
tax reform and labor law reform (Fuentes 2011, 1761).779 
 As the previous chapter explored for Chile, the pre-coup proportional electoral 
system provided for multiple representatives in each district. It allowed for small parties 
to enter Congress as long as they were integrated into coalition blocks.780 The binomial 
electoral system established a two-member district system according to which in order to 
win both seats, one electoral block had to double the other one’s votes. The system 
encouraged the establishment of multi-party coalitions, rather than each political party 
running independently (Carey 2006). However, for both of the cross-party coalitions, 
these proved to be more than “marriages of electoral convenience” (Carey 2002, 253). 
Beyond the pressing matters of preventing Pinochet’s presidency, negotiating reforms 
and winning the upcoming elections, Concertación demonstrated to be a stable and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
778 According to Uggla (2005, 66), the RN had struck a deal with the military to not push further than the 
54 amendments, in exchange for military’s acquiescence for the reform package. 
779 Early in his term, Aylwin had stated the significance of constitutional reform: “Aylwin’s 1991 quote, 
“The institutional regime created by this Constitution is not a fully democratic regime. It is, as I have said, 
a protected democracy, with an intervention of the Armed Forces that goes beyond its proper role. A 
democracy full of moorings that impede the exercise of sovereignty on the part of the people and their 
representatives. Therefore, the goal of my government is to achieve successively all the constitutional 
reforms needed to eliminate all the barriers or obstacles that impede the full exercise of the democratic 
system in Chile” (quoted in Rabkin 1992,171”. 
780 For instance, the Communist Party despite garnering 5-8 percent of the vote could not get any 
representation in the Congress because it was excluded from the two coalitions (Loveman 2001, 320). 
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coherent alliance while maintaining traditional party organizations (Siavelis 2014). The 
electoral design did not yield to the intended goal of reducing the number of political 
parties.781 In fact, the smaller political parties adapted to the system and in order to win 
legislative seats, became part of larger coalition. The small parties, which might not have 
won representation under a PR system (without conducting preelection alliances) were 
able to maintain their existence because the binomial electoral system compelled “a 
process of negotiation of among all party sectors in order to form joint lists for 
parliamentary representation” (Scully 2000, 128). Larger parties, hoping to draw in as 
much as electoral support to double the other coalition’s vote, became more susceptive to 
provide the smaller parties with a disproportionate number of candidates (Scully 2000, 
127). 
 The framers intended the electoral system “to function as the linchpin of the 
authoritarian institutional framework holding the various authoritarian enclaves together 
and preventing reforms to the 1980 Constitution without the agreement of the Right” 
(Pastor 2004, 43-44).782 The bias of the electoral system, which rewarded second place 
finishers, coupled with gerrymandered electoral districts, was most apparent in the first 
post-transition elections (Siavelis 2000, 34 and Fuentes 2015, 1). The 1989 election 
results provided for an overrepresentation of the Right and distorted the voters’ choice as 
evidenced by Ricardo Lagos of Concertación losing the senate seat to Jaime Guzmán of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
781 However, in the sense that the electoral engineering was intended to consolidate a limited form of 
democracy, it has been successful (Rahat and Sznajder 1998, 429). 
782 The right-wing parties in total had an electoral support of 30-40% and by establishing an electoral 
system that benefits the second place winner in each district, it was intended to over-represent the right 
wing parties. 
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the right-wing coalition Democracia y Progreso783 despite the fact that Guzmán had won 
17% and Lagos captured 31.3% of the vote (Siavelis and Valenzuela 1996, 81)784. 
Because the Concertación list did not double the number of votes the Democracia y 
Progreso list obtained, the binominal electoral system produced a Congress where the 
right was overrepresented and held veto power over constitutional reform (Lagos 2013, 
AI and Alberts, Warshaw, and Weingast 2012, 92). Although the two-member district 
legislative elections did not result in a reduction of the number of political parties, it 
forced them to organize into coalitions as an adaptive strategy. The bipolar electoral 
competition between a center-left and right coalitions did promote cooperation and 
moderation, and democracia consensual (consensual democracy) became the Aylwin 
government’s central feature (Siavelis 2000, 51). 
Table 6.1: Necessary Quorums to Change the Constitution of Chile (post-1989 
Amendment) 
Chapters Quorum Chamber of 
Deputies 
Senate 
I, III, VIIII, XI, 
XII, XV 
2/3 80 25 
II, IV, V, VI, VII, 
IX, X, XIII, XIV 
3/5 72 23 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
783 Democracia y Progreso was the name of the right-wing coalition that brought together RN and UDI 
between 1989-1992. 
784 According to the binomial’s distinct formula, for a party (or in this case, a coalition) to win both seats 
available in one district, it needs to capture twice the votes obtained by the second-place party (or in this 
case, coalition). Thus, to win both seats, Concertación candidates in total should have received 66.7% of 
the votes. 
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 The cautious attitude of the Aylwin government can be attributed to contextual 
conditions that go beyond the congressional arithmetic. Aylwin and the center-left 
coalition came to believe in “the electoral payoff of a conciliatory governing style” 
(Rabkin 1992, 143). The moderate sector of the Concertación argued that confrontational 
politics would only strengthen support for RN and UDI (Rabkin 1992, 168). The political 
learning derived from the breakdown of democracy certainly contributed to the 
appreciation of cautionary and conciliatory approach. The Aylwin government’s finance 
minister Alejandro Foxley explained that “the long authoritarian recess created, almost 
imperceptibly, a new political culture which made possible agreements, accords, and 
consensus that had simply been unthinkable earlier (Scully 1996, 113).  
 Another reason that Aylwin administration chose to avoid constitutional reform 
was the precarious nature of the civil-military relations (Fuentes 2000, 120-125). Early in 
his term, he asked Pinochet to resign from his post for Chile’s sake, which Pinochet 
refused to dı (Scully 1996, 107-108). Before he was installed in office, in June 1989, the 
military had also issued a warning for the incoming civilians not to ignore the 
constitution. A revert back to military rule was a credible threat. Especially with regards 
to issue of past human rights violations by the military, Aylwin government had to act 
with prudence. Pinochet also took a clear stance against the government’s examination of 
human rights violations during the dictatorship. As an overt reaction to a judicial and 
congressional investigation of misuse of government funds that involved top military 
leaders including Pinochet’s son, the army had garrisoned its troops in December 1990 
(ejercicio de enlace). Aylwin also chose not to pursue the proposal for constitutional 
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reform suggested by his Minister of Education Ricardo Lagos that would reestablish the 
president’s power to remove high-ranking officers from the armed forces (Fuentes 2011, 
1762)785. These constitutional issues and courts’ interpretation of the 1978 amnesty law 
that allowed them to investigate human rights violations resulted in defiant military 
response in May 1993 when army units surrounded public buildings in downtown 
Santiago, the so-called boinazo (Scully 1996, 108 and Loveman 2001, 313). Such saber-
rattling exercises by the armed forces demonstrated the still delicate foundation of civil-
military relations (Weeks 2014).786 
 Thus, the only significant constitutional reforms under the Aylwin administration 
related to the democratization of municipal elections787. The reforms provided for the 
direct election of municipal councils and expanded political participation at the local 
level.788 The 1991 constitutional amendments provide a first instance of agreement 
between the left and right that result from changing political interests. The 1989 
constitutional package that was negotiated with the moderate right was the result of right 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
785 In May 1992, President Aylwin sent a proposal for reform of the Organic Constitutional Law on Armed 
Forces to Congress. It aimed to limit executivel prerogatives in relation to the hiring, firing, and promotion 
of members of the military and place Carabineros under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior, the 
proposal was rejected by the right-wing governments. 
786 See Loveman 2001, 331-335 for a full list of instances of conflicts and tensions in civil-military 
relations.  
787 Other reforms, include Ley Nº 19.055(April 1, 1991) changed Article 9 with respect to crimes on 
terrorism and pardons and Ley Nº 19.295 (March 4, 1994) that reduced the presidential term from 8 to 6 
years. See Cea 2002, 116-117. However in terms of policy reforms, Aylwin government’s consensual 
approach proved much more effective and resulted in many important changes (Loveman 2001, 316-318). 
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wing opposition’s willingness to distance themselves from the military regime in order to 
pursue future electoral payoffs. The 1991 constitutional amendments, on the other hand, 
were products of their realization that the existing configuration of organization at the 
local level would be to their disadvantage. This is because, according to the 
Constitution’s original framework, if left unchanged, Concertación would have had the 
power to appoint more than 300 mayors- considering the mayors’ power at the local 
level, this would have been against the interests of the right-wing coalitions (Montes and 
Vial 2005, 22-23). Two other reform initiatives by Concertación under the Aylwin 
government were defeated in Congress (Fuentes 2015, 7), demonstrating that in Chile 
accord was reached only when it served all parties. Arguing that the Aylwin government 
knew beforehand that the right-wing political parties would not support the reforms, 
Uggla (2005, 66-67) asserts that these proposals were intended to make the right-wing 
appear reluctant to change. 
 President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle’s initiative to pursue a major constitutional 
reform that would eliminate appointed senators, modify the Constitutional Tribunal, 
reduce the COSENA’s power and reestablish the presidential power to remove officers 
from the armed forces, came in the aftermath of a military uprising in 1995 (Fuentes 2011, 
1762). However ultimately, the proposal failed to proceed as political agreement could 
not be reached with the right wing opposition. The most important reform under the Frei 
government related to the reform of the Supreme Court.789 This reform changed the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
789  Other reforms under the Frei government include: Ley  Nº 19.448 (February 20, 1996) constitutional 
change established the date of municipal elections. Ley Nº 19.526 (November 17, 1997) created new public 
services for municipalities. See Cea 2002, 118. 
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judicial appointment process and added qualification requirements and increased the 
number of judges and prosecutors in the Supreme Court790. 
 The 1997 constitutional reforms came in the aftermath of a corruption-related 
impeachment attempt against the then president of the Supreme Court, 
Servando Jordan.791 The proceedings damaged the high court’s reputation and set the 
stage for judicial reform that would also be supported by the right-wing political parties 
(Pion-Berlin 2004, 500). This constitutional reform package passed easily. The RN and 
UDI, the two political parties of the right, by working to draft and pass this constitutional 
amendment were attempting to break away from a Supreme Court that was regarded as a 
political ally of the military government in order to improve their chances in future 
presidential elections. Motivated by a desire “to disassociate themselves from 
disreputable figures and institutions of the past, and demonstrate that they too could be on 
the side of change”, the right-wing parties that were unwilling to provide support to 
reform the high court during the Aylwin government now supported the bill (Pion-Berlin 
2004, 500).  However, the right wing parties were not solely motivated by a desire to 
distance themselves from the military establishment. Under the original framework, it 
was the President who had the authority to nominate the Supreme Court judges. 
However, the constitutional changes provided for senate confirmations (agreement of 
two-thirds of the senate) of all presidential nominees and the candidate pool was widened 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
790 These reforms regarding Supreme Court were done in two instances: Ley Nº 19.519  (September 16, 
1997and  : Ley Nº  19.541, December 22, 1997. See Cea 2002, 117. 
791 The proceedings were launched by the UDI Deputy Carlos Bombal but did not materialize as the 
impeachment vote failed to get the approval in the Congress (Pion-Berlin 2004, 500). 
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to ten individuals.792 Considering that the right-wing political parties, together with 
appointed senators, held veto power over these appointments, the constitutional change 
was in the interest of the right wing (Montes and Vial 2005, 22-23 and Agüero 2003, 
315).  
 Other piecemeal constitutional reforms that were democracy enhancing and/or 
progressive followed the changes introduced to the Supreme Court. These were on a wide 
range of topics. Constitutional amendments of 1999, provided for gender equality (Ley 
Nº 19.611- 16 June 1999)793 and mandatory preschool (Ley Nº 19.634 – October 2, 1999), 
changed the presidential election process and modified the composition requirements for 
the Tribunal Calificador de Elecciones (Ley Nº 19.643 November 5, 1999). 794 The Frei 
government also attempted an ambitious proposal to eliminate the nonelected senators, 
modify the Constitutional Court, reduce the power of the COSENA and change its 
membership and allow the president to remove commanders from their posts. However, 
the initiative that followed the 1995 military uprising was ultimately withdrawn as 
political agreement with the right-wing could not be established (Fuentes 2012). 
 The above analysis demonstrates that, for Chile, constitutional change for the sake 
of strengthening and expanding democracy was pursued “in a piecemeal and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
792 Moreover the court’s size was increased to 21 members, mandatory retirement for justices was set at age 
75 and conditioned that five members must come from outside the judiciary (Pion-Berlin 2004, 500).  As a 
result, the Supreme Court that was formerly stacked with Pinochet-era judges, rejuvenated. A further 
constitutional amendment Ley Nº 19.597 (January 14, 1999) provided that the Supreme Court must review 
any changes before they are introduced to organic constitutional laws on the organization and powers of the 
court. See Cea 2002, 118. 
793 In Article 1, in the provision that said “born free and equal in dignity”, the word “men” was replaced 
with “persons” and in Article 19, an additional phrase “men and women are equal before the law” was 
added. 
794 See Cea 2002, 119. 
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nonconfrontational manner and was left contingent on the government's capacity to build 
a consensus and negotiate reforms with its conservative parliamentary opposition” 
(Roberts 1998, 144). The electoral system and the resulting “parliamentary 
disproportionality” is partly responsible for the consensual but nevertheless limited 
constitutional reform under the Aylwin and Frei governments. (Rahat and Sznajder 1998, 
440). The fact that Concertación could not transform its electoral majority into a majority 
in Congress helps explain why the reform-oriented block could not pursue its goal of 
eliminating the nondemocratic provisions of the constitution. However, other institutional 
constraints- informal veto powers such as the military also played into the dynamic. 
Another factor that might explain why the reforms were limited is the absence of pressure 
for change from societal forces (non-legislative actors), including organized domestic 
actors such as the civil society organizations, business associations and unions or possible 
foreign actors. According to a 1997 public-opinion survey conducted by CEP, 
constitutional reform ranked second to last among “problems to which the government 
should dedicate more effort to solve” (Siavelis 2000, 196). In Chile, the absence of social 
mobilization, the fragmented state of political organizations and in general “withdrawal 
from nonelectoral forms of political participation” led to the absence of political pressure 
for change from the bottom-up” (Roberts 1998, 160). The absence of mobilization and 
general lack of disinterest with constitutional reform during this period help explain why 
the political system relied on bargaining at the political elite level.   
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6.2.2 Turkey: Incremental Reform through Intra-Party Agreements (1993-2001) 
 The procedure of amendment-making during this period displayed differences 
that can be explained by parliamentary arithmetic, i.e. the balance of power and the 
political context.795 We observe that during this period, political parties in the parliament 
relied on ad hoc conciliation commissions; an inter-party committee for the 1995 
amendments and an accord committee for the 2001 amendments796. Rather than 
amendment-making steered by the government in power, as we observed in 1987, for the 
two large constitutional changes during this period (the 1995 and 2001 amendment 
packages), the emphasis was on “parliamentary parties and their consensus producing 
process” (Arato 2008, 27). We observe that these were “adopted by large majorities in the 
TBMM of a highly fragmented and polarised legislature”, and in the case of 2001 ones, 
amidst an economic crisis (Kalaycıoğlu 2011, 271-272). However these remain as 
constitutional amendments that made the most comprehensive overhaul of the 
constitution, making up 13,6% of all amendments in the 1995 and 28,2% in 2001 
(Kalaycıoğlu 2011, 269). Although these broad inter-party agreements have not been 
easy and were strategically necessary, they were able to achieve multi-party consensus 
that could transcend partisan politics (Özbudun 2007).  The adoption of consensual 
procedures even in the face of staunch opposition from informal institutional constraints 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
795 As the next section will reveal, parliamentary arithmetic alone cannot explain the variance in procedure 
especially during the dominant party (AKP) period. Between 2007-2011, when the AKP broke the pattern 
of inter-party compromise tradition of 1990s and 2001, it had increased its electoral support but the 
percentage of parliamentary seats of AKP had become smaller. See Arato and Tombus, 2013, 4. During the 
making of 2004 amendments, AKP had almost 2/3 of parliamentary seats to amend the constitution, but 
received the support of opposition parties. However later, when AKP pushed through the 2010 amendments 
via a referendum, it had less parliamentary seats (less than 3/5). 
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of the regime have become important precedents for Turkey’s recent record of 
parliamentary process of constitution-making (Arato, 2010 36: 476). 
 Table 6.2: Parliamentary Approval of Constitutional Amendments 
Amendment (Year) Parliamentary Approval 
1995 360 approved, 32 rejected 392 participated  
1999 423 approved, 40 rejected 483 participated  
1999 448 approved, 45 rejected 506 participated 
2001 (Oct 3) 474 approved, 16 rejected, 494 participated 
2001 (Nov 21) 434 approved, 11 rejected, 449 participated 
Source: TBMM Tutanak Dergisi available at 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/kanunlar_erisim.Giris 
* In 1995, the parliament consisted of 450 deputies but after the 1995 amendment its size 
was increased to 550. 
 
 
 The 1995 Amendments through an Inter-Party Committee  
 The end of the ANAP majority government with the 1991 elections also ended the 
non-consensual method of constitution-making that prioritized party interests over 
democracy-enhancing goals. The elections brought in a coalition government of right-
wing DYP and left-wing SHP. As explained above, both of these political parties had 
been critical of the Turkish constitution, had prepared constitutional reform proposal and 
promised change as part of the their electoral campaign (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 
34). However, the parliamentary arithmetic for this coalition government was not enough 
for constitutional reform, either with two-thirds majority or three-fifth majority with an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  400	   	  
obligatory referendum. Even within DYP, there was opposition to constitutional change 
(Usul 2001, 94). Although the government announced, it planned to remove the anti-
democratic provisions of the constitution and other legislations such as the Penal Code 
and the State of Emergency Law enacted during the military regime, DYP was also 
hesitant to carry out these reforms for fear that it could alienate its nationalist 
constituency (Uslu 2001, 93). 
 With the end of presidential term of General Evren, leader of ANAP, Özal offered 
his candidacy for president. Although under the Turkish parliamentary system, 
presidential powers are expansive compared to other parliamentary system, it is still a 
mostly an symbolic position. However, Özal planned on relying on his influence over the 
party and hoped that through a handpicked successor, he could control both his party and 
act as if he were the president in a presidential system (Turan 2014, 59). Plans did not 
materialize when ANAP lost the majority in the 1991 elections and Özal’s presidential 
term (1989-1993) was cut short when he passed away in 1993. The fragmented party 
system came back and government by coalition became the only option. However this 
offered an opportunity for political parties to reach constitutional reform through 
consensual means.  
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 Figure 6.3: Percentage of Seats by Party, 1991 Elections 
 
 Initial negotiations took place between the two partners of the coalition 
government, DYP and SHP (later CHP). Although the left-wing SHP was in favor of 
constitutional replacement rather than partial amendment, it presented a constitutional 
proposal project, which overhauled the framework. The proposal maintained seventy-five 
articles of the 1982 Constitution, modified ninety-six articles, removed twenty-three 
articles and added one new article (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 35). The right-wing 
DYP’s proposal was much modest with proposed modifications to thirty articles. 
Coalition partners established understanding on a number of points including the repeal 
of certain provisional articles and modification of thirteen articles (Özbudun and 
Gençkaya 2009, 35).797 Once consensus was reached among the government coalition 
members, the other political parties represented in the parliament were asked to partake in 
the amendment-making negotiation. This was done under the leadership of the Speaker of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
797 The articles where initial consensus was reached included restrictions on fundamental rights and 
freedoms (Art. 13), freedom of expression (Art. 26), freedom of press (Art. 28), protection of printing 
facilities (Art. 30), freedom of association (Art. 33), freedom of assembly (Art. 34), right to vote (Art. 67), 
political parties (Art. 68), rules governing the activities of political parties (Art. 69), eligibility to become a 
member of parliament (Art. 76), the oath of the members of parliament (Art. 81), authorization of the use of 
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the Grand National Assembly, Hüsamettin Cindoruk. Because of the urgency of the issue 
as well as the existence consensus on the amendment, the parties moved forward with the 
repeal of the state monopoly on radio and television broadcasting (Art. 133).798  The 
constitutional reforms that would materialize in 1995, were sidelined for a period of time, 
because of political contingencies including the death of President Özal, the election of 
Demirel as the new president, the rise of Turkey’s first female prime minister Tansu 
Çiller and local election of March 1994 (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 35).  
 After the delay, the political parties resumed negotiations among themselves and 
an amendment proposal, including modifications to the preamble and twenty articles, was 
accepted between DYP, ANAP and CHP (former SHP).  Opposition came from the 
Islamist political party, Refah Partisi (RP). Heir to previously banned Islamist political 
parties, MNP and MSP, Refah insisted that unless the constitutional reform package 
included the elimination of last paragraph of Article 24 which states that “no one shall 
exploit or abuse religion or religious feelings, or things deemed sacred by religion in any 
manner whatsoever, for the purpose of personal or political interest or influence, or for 
even partially basing the fundamental social, economic, political, and legal order of the 
State on religious rules”, it would not vote for the proposal (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 
36-37).  
 The other small parties of the parliament (DSP and MHP) found the amendments 
insufficient but considering that they were important steps towards removing restrictions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
798 July 8, 1993, Law no. 3913. 
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on democracy, signaled that they would support it. The proposal, signed by 301 deputies, 
a number that ensures the required quorum to change the constitution without a 
referendum, once reached the parliamentary floor did not get the same support. The 
amendment-making reached an impasse to the point that none of the individual articles 
received a two-thirds majority. According to Özbudun and Gençkaya (2009, 37-38), the 
deadlock was over two issues. The Islamist RP’s position with regards to the elimination 
of proscription against the exploitation of religion resonated with conservative deputies 
from other right-wing political parties. The two main coalition partners CHP and DYP 
did not establish a firm compromise regarding the unionization of public employees, a 
polarizing issue for left and right political parties. Additionally, the other large political 
party ANAP was not enthusiastic to see the prime minister Çiller capitalize on achieving 
the constitutional reform (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 38). In order to resolve this 
deadlock, the Constitutional Committee withdrew some of the proposed amendments, 
initiated new round of talks, Cindoruk offered a procedural resolution on the voting of the 
articles and party leaders showed more willingness to compromise799. As a result, a total 
of fifteen amendments were approved with a strong majority and did not need to go 
through a referendum (See Table 6.2). 
 The 1995 amendments, a product of intense negotiation, resulted in significant 
changes that eliminated favorable mention of the 1980 coup from the preamble and 
provided a less militant wording; removed the bans on political activities of trade unions, 
associations, foundations, cooperatives and public professional organizations; allowed for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
799 For the details of the procedural resolution, see Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 38. 
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cooperation between these organizations and political parties; increased the number of 
members of the TGNA; lowered the voting age further to 18; provided for right to vote to 
Turkish citizens living abroad; provided for the right to unionize for civil servants (but 
not to strike); lowered the age to become a member of the political party; allowed the 
instructors and students of higher education institutions to become members of political 
parties; allowed political parties to establish women and youth branches, foundations and 
organizations outside of Turkey; eliminated the prohibition that prevents a deputy from 
resigning from his or her political party for joining another party and changed the 
consequences to members of an outlawed political party (Örücü 1995, 34).800 The 
provision that would have allowed for judicial review of the constitutionality of laws 
passed during the military regime did not reach the necessary quorum (Özbudun and 
Gençkaya 2009, 38).  
 Although, the 1995 amendments provided an important precedent for interparty 
cooperation and compromise, in terms of the extent of the democratizing the constitution 
it failed to live up to expectations. Especially with regard to the nondemocratic provisions 
embedded in the constitution with respect to the rule of law, fundamental rights and 
freedoms, military prerogatives and the arbitrary powers of the president the 1995 
reforms fell short (Kalaycioglu 2005, 128). The constitutional change did not address 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
800 For more on the process of the 1995 amendment-making, see Doğanay (2007): 388-408. The modified 
articles include 33, 52, 53, 67, 68, 69, 75, 84, 85, 93, 127, 135, 149, 171 and the preamble. Article 51, 54, 
76, 82, 128, Transitory Article 15 were not approved. The following were dropped from further discussion: 
Article 86, Transitory Article 17.  
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neither the Kurdish problem nor the demands of Islamic groups. However, the changes 
did enhance political participation overall (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 40). 
 Despite the fact that the reforms were carried out under a highly fragmented and 
polarized parliamentary system, they were able to reach consensus, except with the 
opposition of the radical party of RP (Kalaycioglu 2011, 272)801.  Despite the efforts of 
the military establishment to construct a two-party political system, by 1995, it had failed 
to materialize. The parties endorsed by the military disappeared, parties with roots to pre-
1980 came back and the system once again became fragmented (Turan 2014, 59-60). A 
plethora of political parties competing with one another on both the left and the right side 
of the spectrum emerged. As these parties promoted similar programs, stood for similar 
ideas and values and competed for the same votes, with no notable ideological difference 
between them (Kalaycıoğlu 2005, 134 and Ahmad 2003, 167).  
 Both in Chile and Turkey, the military leaders attempted to engineer a new 
electoral system but neither design did not turned out as intended802. For both, the 
distorting electoral rules aimed to reduce the number of political parties and marginalize 
small anti-system parties. Although in Turkey, the 10% threshold had “strongly 
majoritarian consequences to the benefit of first party in an election”, in Chile the 
binomial system gave advantage to the second party and did not give way to majority 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
801 The amendments were approved by a vote of 360 to 32. 
802 Negretto (2014, 92, note 15) theorizes that the military rulers may change electoral rules depending on 
the perceived shortcomings and attempt to “reduce the number of parties when the party seem has been 
traditionally fragmented or reduce the advantage of majority parties when strong popular parties were able 
to win large majorities in past”. 
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imposition (Arato 2014, 11). The favorable distribution of seats to the leading parties 
produced a majoritarian government in Turkey  in the 1983 and 1987 elections because 
the other political parties could not reinstall themselves yet. However once, the political 
leaders now headed under different party names, Ecevit as the DSP leader, Demirel as the 
leader of DYP, Türkeş as the leader of MÇP and Erbakan as the leader of RP returned, 
the fragmented and polarized politics as usual came back, as well. As Sayari (2007, 17) 
explains, the political ban had the reverse effect of “freezing party leadership” rather than 
sweeping the system from the old guard.   
Figure 6.4: Percentage of Seats by Party, 1995 Elections 
 
  Unlike Chile, where there were stable and cohesive legislative coalitions 
throughout the 1990s (Carey 2002, 222), Turkey experienced short-lived coalitions. The 
division within the right and the left political spectrum meant that the reformist SHP 
became the coalition partner of center-right DYP and as the junior partner, followed a 
rather timid program. The military government’s restrictions regarding the party 
competition has achieved its purpose of depoliticizing the party system but it had also 









1995 Elections - Percentage of Seats
Examples of pie charts
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  407	   	  
2007, 200)803. Not only was the left and right fractured, Islamists and the radical right 
were able to play an important role (Ahmad 2003, 168). As an unintended consequence 
of the electoral system, the Islamist RP achieved plurality with 21.4 percent of the votes 
but captured almost 30 percent of the seats in the 1995 elections.804 This was despite a 
Constitutional Court decision, which found the constituency (but not the national) 
threshold unconstitutional, taking into consideration the 1995 constitutional amendment 
that established that electoral laws must be based on the principles of fairness in 
representation and stability in governance. The 10 percent electoral threshold also did not 
discourage the proliferation of small parties. The number of political parties competing in 
each election increased during this period, from seven parties in 1987 to twelve in 1995 
and twenty in 1999 (Evin 2005, 32). The fragmented system combined with the electoral 
threshold produced post-election coalitions, which brought together unlikely 
combinations that produced weak and unstable coalitions especially after the 1995 
elections.805 For instance, a coalition government between DYP and ANAP, two right-
wing political parties with similar outlooks, supported by Ecevit’s DSP, tried to establish 
a rotating premiership but it lasted only ninety days. In addition to the electoral system 
distortions, the party closings by the Constitutional Court brought against non-system 
parties such as the Kurds and Islamists, altered the political domain through non-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
803 Other factors also contributed to volatility, which became a feature of the electoral politics of the 1990s, 
including “the weakening of party organizations and ties between parties and voters, and the entry of large 
numbers of new voters into the electoral market in each election due to Turkey’s growing population” 
(Sayari 2007, 200). 
804 In the 1995 elections, the combined vote of the parties that failed to pass the ten percent threshold was 
14.4. See Figure 6.4.	  
805 The electoral law also did not allow political parties have joint lists (Hale 2008, 236). 
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democratic means.806 Between 1983 and 2000, the Constitutional Court dissolved sixteen 
parties in total. During the event known as the February 28 Process, Turkish military 
issued a memorandum pressuring the government. At a MGK meeting on February 28, 
1997, the Islamist RP was forced to concede to military’s demands that aimed “to guard” 
the secular character of the republic. Earlier in the month the military tanks had made a 
display of power in Sincar where a RP mayor had organized what was perceived by the 
military a reactionary event. Dubbed as a post-modern coup, it led to the collapse of the 
RP-DYP coalition. It should be noted that throughout the 1990s Turkish political elite 
had an uneasy partnership with the military. The growing electoral strength of the 
Islamists gave the military the pretense to meddle in party politics on the justification that 
it was “the ultimate defender of secular democracy” (Narli 2000, 116). The escalation of 
Kurdish separatist activists in the 1990s intensified the Turkish armed forces presence in 
South East Turkey, which was partially under emergency rule and Northern Iraq, where 
Turkey made cross-border incursions into Northern Iraq.807 Thus, both in internal affairs 
and external matters, the Turkish armed forces in the post-coup period continued to 
dominate the political arena. The MGK, as conceived by the framers of the 1982 
Constitution provided a mechanism to exert pressure on civilians without further direct 
military intervention in politics. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
806 See Koğacıoğlu (2003) for dissolution of political parties by the Constitutional Court in Turkey. 
807 During the first Gulf War, Turkey had opened up its air bases for UN forces, after which Turkey 
continued to regularly intervene in Northern Iraq to fight PKK, where it has established a sizable presence.  
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 Unlike Chile we observe a greater willingness of veto actors to exercise their 
constitutional powers, rather than show restraint.808 In a political context where the 
Constitutional Court and the armed forces were seemingly omnipotent, constitutional 
reforms could not extend to related nondemocratic provisions of the constitution such as 
civilian oversight of the military and restrictions on rights and freedoms. This is despite 
the fact that these veto powers have no actual veto capability over constitutional change 
in terms of the mechanics of amendment-making. Their influence rests on their ability to 
exert informal institutional constraints. However, the timid scope of the 1995 
amendments cannot be solely attributed to the veto actors. As mentioned above, the 
center-left, which was the junior partner in the coalition would have preferred a 
comprehensive reform. However the ideological proximity of right wing parties with the 
1982 constitutional regime as well their own self-interest with maintaining the status quo 
need to be also taken into account. The endurance of the restrictions on the Kurdish 
language during this period, continued limitations on political parties including the power 
of the Constitutional Court to dissolve political parties and the ten percent threshold (not 
a constitutional provision) remained outside the concern of mainstream political 
parties.809  
 Although, during the constitutional reform negotiations, Turkey was in the midst 
of negotiations for a customs union with the European Community, the constitutional 
amendments adopted by the parliament were short of the necessary adjustments that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
808 For instance, in Chile presidents Aylwin and Frei, and similarly Lagos refused to make use of decree 
power provided in the constitution. 
809 Even the Turkish Republic’s first political party could not pass the threshold in the 1999 elections. 
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would satisfy the European Parliament’s criticism of Turkey’s constitutional and legal 
restrictions and human rights records (Hale 2014, 73). According to Doğanay (2007, 389), 
it is not possible to simply consider the 1995 amendments a result of EU influence. It 
would be better “described as a general undertaking shaped by the will of the Turkish 
parliament itself since we cannot talk about clearly defined and dictated standards of 
democratization of the EU before the Helsinki summit”.810 According to Usul (2011, 92) 
customs union was not the end goal for the Turkish political elite, but was seen as a 
stepping stone on the path towards EU membership. The upcoming general elections was 
a cost that the governing elite had to take into account while taking into consideration the 
European pressure, “since the EU had not given a real carrot to Turkey (candidacy), the 
EU’s impact was not regarded as sufficient to change the calculations of the governing 
elite (Usul 2011, 92). However European parliament did welcome the amendments, but 
only to the extent that Turkey showed progress in due time (Usul 2001, 95).811 
 From 1995 until 2001, the constitutional reform momentum stalled. According to 
Bilgin (2007, 142-143) the Islamist RP’s 1995 victory shifted the focus of politics from 
democratization to threat to secularism and increased tensions between the military and 
the civilians. During this period, we observe minor constitutional reforms and attempts 
that fail to succeed. The first is the 1997 unsuccessful attempt of constitutional 
amendment to limit the scope of parliamentary inviolability and provide for interrogation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
810 EU standards played a much crucial role in 2001, see Gönenç, 2004, p. 109.   
811 For the European parliament, a more pertinent demand was removing Art. 8 of the Anti-Terror Law and 
release of Kurdish (DEP) deputies based on the vague and broad grounds of offence in this article (Usul 
2001, 95). 
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and trial on such charges not covered under their nonliability on account of their votes 
and statements, without the decision of the parliament.812 The issue was not a matter of 
democratization, but rather a response to an emerging crisis in the face of increasing 
number of corruption-related charges against deputies (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 44). 
As Özbudun and Gençkaya (2009, 44) report, “If the bill had been adopted, a total of 71 
Members of Parliament would have faced charges for a total of 133 cases as of late 1997”. 
Thus, it was not necessarily surprising that the parliamentarians acted with the interest of 
self-preservation and the article was defeated. Another constitutional amendment attempt 
was with regard to altering the seven-year and non-renewable term for the president to a 
five-year term that could be renewed once. Changing the tenure of the president was 
previously voiced by President Özal who had also advocated for the direct election of the 
president. However, the reemergence of this issue was not simply an agenda set by the 
then-President Demirel. Clearly he was in favor of extending his presidential term but the 
Prime Minister Ecevit, the leader of the fragile coalition government, also supported the 
idea. The failure of the parliament to elect a new president despite hundred rounds of 
voting was one of the leading causes of the 1980 coup. Thus, supporters of this 
constitutional amendment argued that the extension of Demirel’s term would provide 
stability and feared that in the three-party coalition it would be difficult to agree on a 
compromise candidate (Gönenç 2004, 92). In order to increase the chances of 
constitutional amendment to receive the necessary quorum, another amendment that 
would have allowed the deputies to increase their salaries as they saw fit was added (Art. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
812 For more on the constitutional debates on parliamentary inviolability, see Özbudun 2005. 
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86), as well as an amendment that would rescue the Islamist Fazilet Partisi (FP) from the 
threat of closure by the Constitutional Court.813 Neither the “political bribe” nor Ecevit’s 
call to cast votes openly in violation of the parliamentary procedure worked (Özbudun 
and Gençkaya 2009, 48). It could not sway the support of necessary majorities and the 
public opinion turned against the renewal of Demirel’s term. Thus, this constitutional 
amendment initiate, yet another one that was responding to perceived crises, rather than 
motivated by democratization was defeated. 
 Two relatively minor constitutional amendments were approved in 1999. The first 
one was directed against the much-criticized State Security Courts (Devlet Güvenlik 
Mahkemeleri-DGM). These specially authorized courts were established to try cases 
related to crimes against the security of the state, its integrity and unity, the liberal 
democratic order and the Republic. Especially operationalized for terrorism related 
crimes, (with the entry of the 1991 Anti-Terrorism Law) the panel of judges included a 
military judge. Turkey, which has recently adopted the right to individual application to 
the European Commission of Human Rights in 1987 and recognized the binding effects 
of decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in 1990, was found in a number of 
cases in violation of the fair trial principles set forth in Article 6 of European Convention 
of Human Rights. The on-going trial of recently captured Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of 
the Kurdish armed terrorist group, PKK provided an additional incentive. However, 
opposition to the undemocratic character of these courts was not simply external. 
Democratic forces at home also were critical of these notorious courts among many 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
813 Refah Partisi (RP) had suffered the same fate and was dissolved by the Constitutional Court. 
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shortcomings of the rule of law in Turkey (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 46). It was 
approved by a strong majority (See Table 6.2). As a result of the amendment, the 
functions and composition of State Security Courts was reorganized and the military 
judges and prosecutors from these courts were removed.814 
 A regulative constitutional amendment in 1999 was aimed at removing the lifting 
the constitutional and legal obstacles to privatization and foreign investment.815 Again, 
the amended articles were not democracy-enhancing and were responding to immediate 
problems. Several decisions of the Constitutional Court have made privatization difficult 
for the government (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 46). Without going into further details 
of the amendments to three articles (Art. 47, 125 and 155), these reforms signaled 
Turkey’s commitment to Europeanization and market economy (Tekin and Güney 2015). 
816 The strong public support in Turkey for EU membership, was also shared by both the 
center-left and right parties forming the coalition that have come to power after the April 
1999 elections. Despite the fact that this was an unusual coalition that was “delicately 
balanced with its leaders representing irreconcilable political views that embraces 
dirigiste etatism, ultra-nationalism and right-of-center economic liberalism at one and the 
same time” (Evin 2005, 33), the Copenhagen criteria became a strong motivation that 
united different societal and political forces, either the democratization or economic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
814 Law no. 4388 June 18, 1999. 
815 Law no 4446, August 13, 1999. 
816 The amendments allowed for privatization of public services, established a constitutional basis for 
privatization, allowed for resort to international arbitration if the concession involves a foreign element, 
Turkish Council of State (Danıstay)’s mandatory and binding control over the language of private sector 
contracts relating to public utilities was reduced. For more detail, see Caliskan 2008, p. 311-313 
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liberalization goals, the latter in this instance, provided the necessary impetus for 
constitutional change to take place with large majorities. 
 The 2001 Amendments through an All-Party Accord Commission 
 The EU’s function as a significant external actor is much more evident in the 
2001 constitutional amendment than the 1995 ones. In 1999, Turkey was officially 
accepted as a candidate country with the Helsinki Summit and EU conditionality as a 
positive influence on Turkey’s democratization process was strongly felt with the 2001 
constitutional amendment and other nine “harmonization” laws (Yüksel 2007). However, 
with respect to 2001 constitutional amendments, the most comprehensive change, both 
with respect to the number of articles modified and their content, other societal forces, i.e. 
civil society organizations played an important role with lobbying the parliament 
(Kaboğlu 2002). Associations, unions, foundations and other democratic mass 
organizations during the 1991-2001 period, organized panels and talks. Academicians, 
think tanks and other platforms produced proposals of constitutional change, partial and 
total817. However these drafts and talks intended as a guiding material for the political 
elite, did not play as significant role as the influence of the Europe (Kaboğlu 2002).  
 Although, the members of the armed forces were not in favor of some of the 
proposed modifications such as the abolition of the death penalty, removing the ban on 
the use of languages other then Turkish in broadcasting, increasing the number of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
817817 These include the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association’s (TÜSİAD)’s 1992, 1997 and 
1999 reports prepared by constitutional law scholars; The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges 
of Turkey (TOBB)’s 2000 report and Turkish Union of Bar Associations (TBB)’s 2001 study. See Yazıcı. 
2011. 
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civilian members of the MGK and making the dissolution of political parties more 
difficult; matters that it perceived itself as a vested actor, the political elites showed 
commitment to find a common position among themselves and limited the scope of 
amendments. The military also recognized that its power was not restricted to 
institutional norms. For instance, with respect to the power relations between civil and 
military members in the MGK, it was not simply determined by the ratio but “the 
significantly unequal power relationship between the military and the civilian sides of the 
MGK” (Cizre 2004, 121).  
 Other non-parliamentary actors such as the members of the Constitutional Court 
and the president also participated in discussions of the Accord Commission (Gönenç 
2004, 95). Statements by the Constitutional Court and informal pressure by the military 
to an extent limited the scope of the amendments (Arato 2008, 28). For instance, the 
Constitutional Court spoke against the proposal to limit the power of the court to close 
political parties (Shambayati 2007. 117). The far-right MHP was similarly critical of 
broadcasting in languages other than Turkish, the abolition of the death penalty and 
expanding the scope of civil and political rights and freedoms, displaying an overlap with 
the “sensitivities of the General Staff” (Gönenç 2004, 95-96). The military’s criticisms 
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 Figure 6.5: Percentage of Seats by Party, 1999 Elections 
 
 The cross-party parliamentary committee, which was composed of two members 
from each parliamentary group settled on a consensus of amending 37 articles (Ganioglu 
2001).818 In order to avoid the right-wing MHP and DYP to forestall the amendments by 
taking recourse to referendum or refusing it completely, the committee did limit the scope 
of amendments and in order to gain the maximum support inserted a salary and allowance 
improvement for deputies (Gönenç 2004, 96). Some of the motions for amendments 
during plenary debates were accepted and some of the draft articles were defeated during 
the second reading of the bill (eligibility to parliament, parliamentary immunities and 
international agreements supremacy).819  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
818 Initially the committee debated 51 proposed amendments. The proposal that included 37 articles was 
submitted to the parliament on September 6, 2001 and was discussed between September 24 and October 3 
(Usul 2011, 124).  
819 See Özbudun 2005 for more on the amendment proposal on parliamentary inviolability that failed to 
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 Despite the fact that the 2001 amendments have been the result of a consensual 
effort, it was “tainted by a war of words between the Government and the President 
against a background of a growing public reaction to the salaries arrangement” (Gönenç 
2004, 97). President Necdet Sezer, the former President of the Constitutional Court 
refused to approve the amendment that would have improved the salaries and allowances 
of deputies (Article 86) and instead chose to submit to the referendum. The public 
response to this self-serving article was utterly negative and cognizant that it would 
surely be defeated, the parliament sought a resolution of this impasse by cancelling the 
referendum and reverting the article back to its original wording. The clash between the 
government and the President was the first of forthcoming other constitutional crises that 
will be analyzed in the next section.  
 As a result of these, 32 articles and the preamble were modified. The bulk of these 
amendments were on fundamental rights and freedoms (Özbudun 2004). It eliminated the 
general restrictions on rights and freedoms and introduced the principle of 
proportionality; introduced equality of men and women; improved political and civil 
rights; enlarged the scope of social and economic rights; shortened the pre-trial 
detention820; eliminated the phrase of "language prohibited by law" (directed against the 
use of Kurdish)821; restricted the death penalty to time of war and for crimes of terrorism; 
increased the quorum for political party prohibition cases, clarified the conditions of anti-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
820 Because according to European Court of Human Right’s case law, the maximum pre-trial detention is 
four days, Turkey by 2001 had lost 244 cases lodged against it for long-term pre-trial detentions. In line 
with European jurisprudence, it was reduced to four days (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 53). 
821 The constitution did not directly state that the “language prohibited by law” was Kurdish. However a 
law that banned Kurdish was in force until it was repealed in 1991.  
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constitutional activities and provided for gradual punishment system for political parties; 
altered the composition of the National Security Council (MGK) to give numerical 
majority to civilians822 and highlighted the institution’s advisory nature823 and eliminated 
the ban on Constitutional Court’s power to review the laws passed under the military 
regime (Yüksel 2007, 153-165, Gönenç 2004, 99-108, Örücü 2002 and Özbudun 2007).  
 The influence of Europe is evident in some of the changes. For instance, before 
the 2001 amendments, the preamble stated, “no protection shall be afforded to thoughts 
and opinions contrary to Turkish national interests”. The phrase “thoughts and opinions” 
was replaced with “activities,” which is in line with the approach embraced by the 
European Convention of Human Rights in Article 17 with regards to abuse of rights 
(Oder 2009). Additionally, Art. 19 was amended to reduce the period of arrest to 4 days 
in collective offenses, which was in accordance with European Court of Human Rights 
jurisprudence (Usul 2011, 125). Against the expectations of the governing elite that the 
2001 amendments would lead to a more positive report from the EU on Turkey’s 
candidacy, the report did instead focused more on the insufficiencies of Turkey’s 
progress (Usul 2011, 108).824 The Commission highlighted the endurance of restrictions 
on the exercise of fundamental freedoms and of military prerogatives in the constitution, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
822 Deputy Prime Ministers and the Minister of Justice were added to the council and through this 
amendment civilian majority was established. 
823 The requirement that the Council of Ministers should give ‘priority consideration’ to the 
recommendations of the MGK was replaced with the requirement that the Council must be “notified” of its 
recommendations. 
824 The report (2001 Regular Report and the Strategy Paper) was released on November 13, 2001 and the 
amendments had passed on October 3, 2001.  
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especially the role of the MGK in political decision-making, the rule of law with respect 
to State Security Courts and the trials of civilians in the military courts (Usul 2011, 108). 
6.2.3 Discussion  
 For both Chile and Turkey, during this period we observe reiterated amendments 
within legal continuity and within procedural and institutional constraints that are overall 
aimed at attaining consensual change. However, in many respects the two cases of 
gradual constitutional change through amendment-making display differences that go 
beyond the characteristic of open-ended reform process. In both cases, the 
disproportional electoral formula motivated coalition-making for political parties. In the 
case of Chile, this was an adaptive strategy that culminated from the 1988 plebiscite, 
which prevented the extension of Pinochet’s term and created a political cleavage 
between democratic and non-democratic forces. The constitutional amendments adopted 
during this period, were done when it acquired the support of right-wing parties as well. 
In the case of Turkey, coalition-making became necessary when the dominant party 
ANAP, failing to institutionalize, lost its stronghold over Turkish politics and the 
previously politically banned political leaders returned back, increasing the number of 
both left and right political parties in the parliament.  
 The balance of power between the political forces in the congress/parliament 
dictated, i.e. the absence of necessary quorum to singlehandedly pass constitutional 
amendments, partially explains the search for consensus. The fact that Chile during this 
period had stable and cohesive government that was clearly reform-oriented contrasts 
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significantly with unstable coalition governments that governed Turkey. However, like 
Chile during this period, the amendments introduced in Turkey were negotiated and 
consensual in form. In Turkey, this was despite the multipartism, polarization and 
fragmentation and religious and ethnic cleavages of the 1990s. The amendments were 
carried out “in a political milieu of high discord and deep cultural divides” (Kalaycıoğlu 
2011, 272). Although the Europeanization motivation must be taken into account, as we 
have observed such goal was not decisive during the 1995 amendments and may actually 
explain why its scope was limited. In the case of Chile, the external actors had no 
influence over the amendment-making initiatives. There was also no impetus from 
societal forces and pro-reforms also did not seek to mobilize the masses (Fuents 2014, 
78). Thus, it was purely a political elite project that materialized when the two blocks in 
the Congress aligned. The absence of civil society contrasts with that of Turkish case 
where “civil society has shown a great effort to raise demands for constitutional reform 
and sustain its pace” (Bilgin 2007, 146). 
 According to Arato (2014, 10) the consensual method of changing the constitution 
was the result of both the parliamentary arithmetic and the negotiated transition. In both 
cases, the sensitivity of the military command had an effect on the scope of the 
amendments. The military autonomy over the elected civilians is evident from displays of 
power whether it is army units surrounding public buildings in downtown Santiago of 
Chile or tanks moving in Sincar province of Turkey. Different than Chile, series of party 
dissolutions directed towards the Kurdish and Islamist parties, in the case of Turkey 
demonstrates the willingness of counter majoritarian institutions to constrain and 
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undermine the authority of democratic forces. However as a result of the consensual 
approach maintained in the 1995 and 2001 amendments, there was no oppositional 
parliamentary force that could take the amendments to judicial review by the 
Constitutional Court.  
 The institutional configuration of executive/assembly relation also demands 
attention. In a presidential system such as Chile, the executive branch plays an important 
role in terms of defining the legislative outcomes. In Chile, where the executive can 
dominate the legislative process, the decision of whether the executive decides to support 
constitutional reforms or not, affects the chances that it will be approved or not (Fuentes 
2014, 76-77).825 Thus, during this period, the executive branch’s refusal to push for 
constitutional reforms because it anticipated that it would not be possible to reach an 
agreement with the right-wing parties and feared that it could antagonize the military, 
limited the scope of amendments and preferred “an elite-led compromise with the right-
wing opposition” (Fuentes 2014, 78). In the parliamentary system of Turkey, where the 
amendment-making procedure provides the president a delaying power and recourse to 
referendum, the president could potentially be a veto power. During this period, we 
observe one instance during the President Sezer’s term when he decided to call for a 
referendum for an individual article in order to thwart the adoption of an amendment that 
would have improved the salaries and allowances of deputies. The parliament was able to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
825 In Chile, the executive is the agenda-setter and has constructive veto power (in case where the president 
provides objections to a constitutional reform, to override that both chambers must insist with two-thirds of 
their members in office; in case where the president totally rejects it, to override that both chambers must 
insist with two-thirds of their members in office- the president may choose to promulgate the reform or 
seek a plebiscite). Therefore, even when the Concertación did not have a majority in the Senate, Senate is 
confined to decide between the president’s proposal and the status quo (Londregan 2000, 5-6). 
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respond to his maneuver and avoid what could have been a very embarrassing defeat at 
polls. However, we see that even in a case where a constitutional amendment that would 
have changed the tenure of the president was supported by the major partner of the 
coalition, Ecevit and the president himself, it was defeated because despite the several 
incentives to other political parties in the parliament, it failed to reach the necessary 
quorum. Thus, it is not possible to simply attribute the capacity to make constitutional 
amendments to institutional configuration of executive/assembly relations.  
 Another difference we observe that in the Turkish case, several constitutional 
amendments attempts were made in response to emerging political crisis. One such 
attempt was with regards to the scope of parliamentary inviolability as a response to 
mounting corruption charges against deputies and the other attempt was with regards to 
the tenure of the president as a preemptive measure to avoid a parliamentary deadlock in 
during the presidential elections. In the case of Chile, we do not observe such 
constitutional amendments that are outside the scope of democratization reforms. 
Although the constitutional amendments that altered the Supreme Court came in the 
aftermath of corruption scandal regarding its president, there were other clear motives for 
both the left and right block to modify the Supreme Court’s composition and nomination 
and were not simply responding to emerging political crisis. It is also important to note 
that the constitutional amendments in Turkey, especially those relating to anti-democratic 
features of the constitution, did not necessarily lead to radical change in the political 
regime however they did pave the way for reforms in ordinary legislations that also 
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carried the military regime’s legacy and encompassed anti-democratic provisions (Usul 













	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
826 For the reform packages that passed immediately after the 2001 constitutional reforms and introduced 
changes (or enacted new ones) to the Turkish Penal Code, Anti-Terror Law, Criminal Procedure Code, 
Civil Code, Law on the Organization, Duties, and Powers of the Gendarmerie, Political Parties Law, Law 
on Associations, Law on Foundations, Law on Assembly and Demonstration, Law on Radio and Television 
Broadcasting, Law on the MGK among others (Usul 2011, 126-134). These are known as harmonization 
(EU adaptation) packages and between 2001 and 2004 eight harmonization packages were passed and 
implemented. 
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Chapter 7: Pathways to Constitutional Amendment: Consensual vs Confrontational 
Approach  
In this final section, we observe a great amount of variation between the Chilean 
and Turkish reform processes. Constitutional change in Chile continued on the path of 
incremental reform founded upon establishing a broad agreement among political actors. 
The political context and a more proactive executive branch facilitated the seeking of an 
agreement with the opposition on issues that had been considered controversial up until 
that point. In great contrast to Turkey, there was no economic, political or institutional 
crisis, no significant external actor and no social mobilization nor civil society 
engagement. The balance of power remained overall the same although the changing 
political context enabled the executive to advance its reformist agenda. However, in 
doing so, neither Concertación nor any political party that belonged to the coalition made 
constitutional reform part of their political platform or sought to mobilize their 
constituency around it. In fact, the 2005 reforms, which took five years to negotiate in the 
Congress, went practically uunnoticed. The Turkish constitutional change process was in 
contrast generally polarized and crisis ridden. Veto powers were not limited to opposition 
parties in the parliament. The presidency and Constitutional Court also had veto power 
over government-supported amendments as part of the constitutitonal amendment 
procedure. Other vested parties without a formal role in constitutional change, such as 
thoe of the military establishment, were also able to exercise a partial, informal veto.  
Although both countries, continued with piecemeal constitutional change 
throughout this period, it was shaped by institutional factors as well as incentives and 
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pressures caused by political and social context, and the manner in which constitutional 
reforms were enacted varied greatly. It was not only the pathway to constitutional change 
that differed but also the direction of that change. In the case of Chile, the 2005 
constitutional amendments succeeded in removing “authoritarian enclaves” and later 
amendments dealt with other pertinent issues of democratization such as decentralization 
and voluntary voting; in the case of Turkey (post-2007) constitutional change was 
unrelated to the quality of democracy and has only served to reinforce the deep cleavages 
in Turkish politics and society. 
A comparison of Chile and Turkey offers us a window from which to analyze the 
variety of factors that determine the amendment-making process. This section will first 
examine the consensual method of amendment-making through elite negotiation in the 
case of Chile, and then analyze the confrontational constitutional change experienced in 
the Turkish case which involved confrontation both inside and outside the parliament. I 
argue that underlying institutional variables such as the electoral system and the 
configuration of political parties as well as constraints and incentives for change make up 
contextual factors. 
7.1 Chile: Removing Authoritarian Enclaves through Elite Negotiation 
 By the time Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006) was elected to serve as the third president 
from Concertación, the constitution had been amended twelve times. However, his 
administration saw the negotiation and approval of the most expansive amendments Chile 
had experienced since the 1989 reforms. Lagos came to power after a very tight election, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  426	   	  
in which he defeated the right-wing candidate Joaquín Lavín (UDI) in runoff elections.  
Chile was facing its first economic recession in decades.827 Pinochet had stepped down as 
the head of the army and had taken his lifetime seat in the Senate. However, following an 
extradition request by a Spanish judge, he was arrested by Scotland Yard in October 1998, 
only to be released back to Chile to be tried for human rights abuses by the Chilean 
courts.  
 The Lagos administration carried out several other amendments before the 
adoption of the 2005 constitutional reforms. These included the creation of the status of 
"former president of the republic”,828 changing a rule in the mechanism of amendment-
making,829 eliminating cinema censorship,830 and establishing mandatory preschool and 
secondary education831 (Cea 2002, 120). Among these individual changes, the 
elimination of cinema censorship deserves further analysis for it is a clear case of a 
constitutional amendment precipitated by the influence of external actors; in this case, the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR). Prior to its amendment, Art.19 (12) of 
the constitution stated that "the law shall establish a system of censorship for the 
exhibition and advertising of cinematographic production," which referred to the Ley de 
Censura (Decree Law 679) that provided for the establishment of an organization (the 
Council of Cinematographic Evaluation- Consejo de Calificación Cinematográfica, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
827 Economic growth was in decline, comparatively better in the regions but lower than in previous years, 
while the unemployment rate was high at 9.3 percent (Agüero 2003, 318) 
828 Ley Nº 19.672- April 28, 2000. 
829 Ley Nº 19.671- April 29, 2000. 
830 Ley Nº 19.742- August 25, 2001. 
831 Ley Nº 19.876- May 22, 2003 
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CCC), equipped with broad powers to ban films from public exhibition, as well as trailers, 
film advertising and posters. It had been the CCC’s decision to revoke its ban against 
Martin Scorsese’s movie The Last Temptation of Christ in January 1997. This decision, 
which was upheld in the Appeals Court and later in the Supreme Court, was challenged at 
the international level when a group of lawyers took the case to IACtHR. Known as the 
case of “The Last Temptation of Christ”, the 2001 court decision not only found Chile in 
violation of freedom of expression (Art. 13 of the Inter-American Convention of Human 
Rights) and ordered the state to allow for the screening of the film, but it also demanded 
that Chile adapt its constitutional and legal norms to the standards of the American 
Convention.832 The constitutional amendment bill was sent to Congress by then-President 
Frei in 1997, but it foundered in the Senate (Funk 2006, 39-40). However, with the 
international dimension of the demand for constitutional change, the amendment was 
finally approved and the necessary bills to accommodate it were promulgated in 2003.  
 The constitutional amendment that established the status of a "former President of 
the Republic” was primarily motivated by a desire to persuade Pinochet to resign from 
his lifetime senator position, in exchange for another immunity granted to ex-presidents 
and continuing financial allowances. The amendment was a deal struck between the 
center and right-wing forces and was opposed by the left-wing deputies of the Congress. 
Nevertheless it was effective in persuading Pinochet to retire from his position in the 
Congress in the aftermath of his detention in London (BBC News 25 March, 2000). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
832 Chile 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 73 (Feb. 5, 2001). 
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7.1.1 Depolarization and Successful Consensus-Building: The Case of the 2005 
Reforms 
The Pinochet case was another instance when the international dimension played 
a role and affected the way President Lagos approached his reformist agenda (Funk 2006, 
40).  Under the previous administration of Aylwin and Frei, there were attempts to 
eliminate the nondemocratic provisions of the constitution. However as explored in the 
previous section, the absence of right-wing support on these issues meant that the 
government could not get the necessary quorum to see these proposals through. However, 
it became possible to adopt these constitutional changes in 2005. In order to understand 
the mechanism by which these constitutional amendments were adopted in 2005, albeit 
after a lengthy bargaining process, we must discern between institutional factors that 
foster consensus and provide incentives to change the status quo and contextual factors 
that weaken veto powers.833 
 The arrest of Pinochet, which set into motion international pressure to prosecute 
human rights cases in Chile and discredited the political legacy of Pinochet, was an event 
where Europe was a catalyst for change (Pion-Berlin 2004).834 The events surrounding 
Pinochet’s arrest gave momentum to the cause of human rights and helped change public 
opinion with regards to civil-military relations (Fuentes 2012, 250). The political right 
adapted to a changing political context partly shaped by international attention to human 
rights issues in Chile. However, the reforms were overall domestically driven (Montes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
833 See Fuentes, El Pacto 2012 for a detailed account of the 2005 reforms. 
834 Another international dimension of the Pinochet case was the decision of an Argentine judge to request 
the extradition of Pinochet for the killing of former army commander-in-chief Carlos Prats and his wife. 
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and Vial 2005, 26 and Lagos 2013, AI). As mentioned, the election of Lagos was a tight 
race, increasing the hopes of the right-wing coalition Alianza por Chile that they could 
capture the presidency in the next election, provided that they moderated their position 
along the lines of changing public opinion.835 For the right-wing parties, agreeing to 
substantial reforms could ward off accusations from the Concertación that they were 
relying on the military regime’s guarantees (Fuentes 2015, 11).  
 Several factors supplemented the right’s incentive to distance itself from the 
military establishment. The courts increasingly took an active position with regards to 
human rights violations during the dictatorship and Pinochet lost his shield of immunity 
(Ferrara, 2015, 106). The Supreme Court ruled in 1999 that kidnappings from the pre-
1978 period qualified as “ongoing crimes” and as such were not covered under the 
amnesty law (Loveman 2001, 328).836 The shift in the attitudes of the public and the 
courts forced the armed forces to reevaluate their position and to distance themselves 
from their past conduct and ideological position. General Cheyre (2002-2006) as the new 
commander in chief of the armed forces tried to distance the institution from the military 
regime (Montes and Vial 2005, 22 and Garretón 2003, 162). The Catholic Church took a 
firm attitude regarding human rights violations committed under the military regime and 
insisted on receiving information on the fate of the disappeared (Garretón 2003, 162). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
835 This was the greatest vote share for the right since the 1938 elections (Garretón 2003, 170). 
836 According to Agüero (2003, 300), the shift in the behavior of the judiciary was the result of the changes 
in its composition thanks to new appointments to the court by the government that became possible with 
the constitutional amendment of 1997. In 1990, all 17 members of the Supreme Court were appointed by 
Pinochet but in 2000, only three of them were still serving on the high court (Agüero 2003, 313). However, 
the influence of public opinion also played a role in the attitude of the members of the court.  
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These demands for justice led to several human rights initiatives, including the la Mesa 
de Diálogo, between 1999-2001- roundtable discussions with the participation of high-
ranking military officials, human rights lawyers, academicians and other civil society 
actors in which the military pledged to reveal information about the whereabouts of the 
disappeared (Ferrara 2015, 110 and Huneeus 2006, 455). A presidential commission on 
abuses committed during the military regime released a report, which also helped change 
the public perception about the regime’s legacy (Fuentes 2012, 250).837 In 2004, General 
Cheyre publicly accepted responsibility for human rights violations carried out during the 
time of the military regime.838 In addition to charges of fraud filed against Pinochet and 
others by Chile’s Internal Revenue Service, the discovery of secret bank accounts in the 
United States belonging to Pinochet and his associates tarnished his reputation further 
(Fuentes 2015, 12).839 Human rights issues, which had been the polarizing question of the 
1990s, gradually normalized, allowing constructive steps to be taken for justice and 
reestablishing the military’s subordination to civilian authority through constitutional 
reform. According to Cheyre (2013, AI), the commander in chief of the armed forces, the 
constitutional prerogatives of the military were also harmful for the institution, for these 
provisions gave the impression that the military was still a repressive instrument. 
Describing the political and social context of amendment-making in Chile, Lagos (2013, 
AI) calls it “a process of depolarization”. Lagos (2013, AI) adds that although he thought 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
837 This report is produced by the National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture is known as 
the Valech Report after Bishop Sergio Valech who headed the commission.  
838 According to Cheyre (2013, AI) this helped the recovery from trust issues between the armed forces and 
citizenry. 
839 For other symbolic changes that hinted at the normalization of civil-military relations, see Agüero 2006. 
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that he could be a polarizing figure as he had taken an adversarial approach to Pinochet 
during the military regime, he was put under no pressure by the armed forces, the 
Supreme Court or other remnants of the past regime’s envisioned institutional constraints. 
Alternatively one could argue that the 2005 reforms regarding civil-military 
relations conformed to changes that had already happened- that military autonomy had 
weakened over time and civilian oversight had increased.840 These changes did not take 
place as a result of constitutional and legal reforms, but the amendments formalized the 
new rules (Heiss and Navia 2007, 185). Lagos (2013, AI) explains that this was because 
the right wing realized that some of the institutions (of authoritarian enclaves) had 
already been overridden, stating “I dismissed a commander-in-chief” and “the military 
accepted the Valech Report” (2013, AI). This is in contrast to the Turkish case in which 
the fact that the constitutional amendments that removed some of the major prerogatives 
of the military (the 2001 and 2004 amendments), such as the composition of the MGK 
and its influence in other organs of the state, did not necessarily eliminates the military’s 
influence in politics. As Usul (2011, 156) explains “The case of democratic control of the 
military in Turkey could be given as a good example of the fact that constitutional and 
legal improvements do not necessarily lead to an automatic civilianization and 
democratization of a regime.” In Turkey the military’s informal influence over politics 
continued after constitutional change, whereas in Chile the constitutional change in civil-
military relations took place after it was already normalized. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
840 For instance, COSENA was not instrumentalized to pressure the Congress. Although it had been a 
forum for commanders to force the president to hear the military’s opinion, it also became a forum for 
civil-military dialogue (Weeks 2001) 
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 There was no political, social or economic crisis that could potentially trigger a 
demand for constitutional amendment in Chile, instead there was a gradual realignment 
of the interests of the political forces created a context that was conducive for 
constitutional change. There was no new political actor or social movement that pushed 
for change, nor was there much civil society engagement.841 Fuentes (2011, 1770) reports 
that except for indigenous organizations that were asked to provide their opinion on 
indigenous rights; only a small number of professional associations participated in the 
congressional sessions.842 Even in the media, the ongoing negotiations received very little 
attention and were restricted to expert opinions by congressional representatives and 
other constitutional experts. With respect to the rights of indigenous people, there was an 
element of international pressure to recognize these rights. However, despite the overall 
sensibility of political elites to international prestige and even though the topic was one of 
the most debated issues of the constitutional change agenda, it was ultimately not 
supported by the right-wing opposition (Fuentes 2012, AI). 
 For the Concertación, these shifting trends could potentially pose a dilemma. The 
coalition had until that point had the clear objective of reforming the constitution to 
eliminate its anti-democratic provisions. However, just as the balance of power was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
841 José Francisco García, an expert from center-right civil society organization Libertad & Desarrollo 
argues that compared to organizations supportive of the left, right-wing think tanks have taken a more 
active role in policy formation, which was also the case with the 2005 reforms. However, still the most 
important non-legislative actors remained academics, mostly constitutional law professors (García 2012, AI 
and Carmona 2012. AI). Ascensio (2012, AI) argues that even id civil society had wanted to take part in the 
negotiations, they would not have been allowed to contribute in a genuine way, and adds that if civil 
society had been an actor in the 2005 reforms, the demand for a new constitution by social actors after 2011 
would not have been as strong. 
842 Patricio Navia argues that because the 2005 constitutional reforms were not policy related, civil society 
was not involved (Navia 2012, AI). 
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shifting towards the advantage of the Concertación, it could become tempting for the 
coalition to keep these features in order to exploit them for its own benefit (Londregan 
2000, 10). For instance, with respect to appointed senators, if the institution were to be 
preserved, President Lagos would be able to appoint three senators of his choice by the 
year 2005. Similarly, with respect to lifetime senatorship for ex-presidents, Frei and 
Lagos would also take up their seats in the upper chamber.843 Neither did the designated 
senators from COSENA and the Supreme Court always vote with the right-wing coalition 
(Fuentes 2015, 14). A realization that “all the powers that Pinochet devised for himself 
are finally becoming available to the center-left coalition” led the right-wing parties to 
the conclusion that the status quo, if unaltered, was going to be to their disadvantage 
(Montes and Vial 2005, 22). Thus, they adopted a forward-looking strategy (Fuentes 
2014, 88). In sum, although the political balance of power, which had remained stable 
since the transition, does not explain the demand for constitutional change, while the 
anticipation that the future balance of power was going to favor Concertación due to non-
elected senators provides a rationale for why the right-wing political parties were willing 
to reform the military regime’s legacy (See Table 7.1). Thus it was a combination of 
political and social factors that drove the change in the attitudes of the right-wing parties 
towards constitution and to abandon their support for non-democratic provisions. 
However, if it had not been for the incentives generated by institutional rules, this 
cooperation between different political forces could not have happened.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
843 Lagos (2013, AI) states this rationale as one of the factors that influenced the decision-making of the 
right-wing political parties. 
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 Table 7.1: Balance of Power in Chile 1990-2010 (percentage of seats) 
Chamber of 
Deputies 
Concertación Alianza Independents 
1990-1994 60.0 40.0 - 
1994-1998 58.3 41.7 - 
1998-2002 58.3 41.7 - 
2002-2006 52.5 47.5 - 
2006-2010 54.2 45.8 4.2 
 
Senate Concertación Alianza Independents 
1990-1994 46.8 53.2  
1994-1998 44.7 55.3  
1998-2002 50 50  
2002-2006 50 50  
2006-2010 52.6 44.7 2.7 
       Source: Fuentes 2014, 92 Data from www.elecciones.gob.cl and www.bcn.cl 
 For Alianza, the elimination of nonelected senators (both designated and lifetime 
senators) had to be accompanied by a restructuring of the balance between the political 
forces (Fuentes 2015, 15). If the right-wing political parties were to agree to remove the 
institutional senators, they wanted to rebalance power within the state to compensate for 
the right’s capitulation of institutional guarantees. For that purpose, the right pushed for 
reforms that would increase the powers of the legislative branch to oversee the executive 
and expand their veto abilities by strengthening the Constitutional Tribunal (Fuentes 
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2015, 14)844. In that sense, the constitutional reforms of 2005 were “both an attempt to 
eliminate the authoritarian enclaves and to balance power between the executive and 
legislative branches” (Fuentes 2015, 20). 
 During the early stages of the negotiations, the uncertainty of the 2005 
presidential elections forced the two blocks to operate under a “veil of ignorance” 
(Agüero 2003, 303). However, by the time the negotiations were at an advanced stage in 
mid-2004, it appeared more likely that another Concertación leader, Michelle Bachelet 
was going to be elected as the new president, prompting the right-wing parties to seek 
constitutional changes that would strengthen their powers as the opposition (Fuentes 
2015, 15). The anticipation that the 2005 presidential election could possibly result in 
another Concertación victory made the right-wing political parties realize that the 
institutional guarantees embedded in the constitution was working against them, and so a 
rebalancing of power was in their best interests (Montes and Vial 2005, 23).  
 As it was the case with the consensus achieved with the RN and UDI with respect 
to the municipal election reforms of 1991 and the composition and nomination of 
Supreme Court judges in 1997, when the political right’s interests collided with the 
reformist agenda, it became possible to negotiate.  This process was initiated by President 
Lagos three weeks after he entered into office (Lagos 2013, AI). He intended to form a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
844 Originally, Alianza’s proposal included five issues: “allowing a political minority to request 
accountability from ministers; increasing the possibility of establishing investigative commissions in the 
Chamber of Deputies; strengthening the Constitutional Tribunal’s powers by fostering its role as a veto 
actor in the political process; allowing the Senate to intervene in the appointment of authorities (for 
example, ambassadors); and reducing the executive’s capacity to control budgets” (Fuentes 2015, 15). 
Additionally Alinaza wanted to offer an extra hurdle before the president could sign an international treaty 
that would affect national norms (Fuentes 2005, 1764). 
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broad commission out of representatives from both the upper and lower chambers and 
from all political parties (twenty people) as a constitutional commission that was 
supposed to produce a new constitution. Even though he asked the President of the 
Senate, Andrés Zaldívar to put together such an extra-congressional commission, the 
right-wing parties from the start rejected it “without even meeting in a room” (Lagos 
2013, AI). 
Lagos then held informal consultations with senators from both sides (Fuentes 
2012, 252-253). Concertación and Alianza prepared and submitted two separate 
constitutional amendment proposals in July 2000 to first be discussed in the Senate 
Commission on the Constitution, Justice and Legislature.845 This initial step, which lasted 
until November 2001, was followed closely by Interior Minister José Miguel Insulza who 
participated in all the meetings of the commission on behalf of the executive (Fuentes 
2015, 14).  
 Not all of the amendment proposals were related to the authoritarian enclaves of 
the 1980 Constitution, either. Although some of the issues outside of the scope of 
democratization, such as the empowering of the Constitutional Tribunal were approved, 
the government tried to keep the scope of the reforms to the “protected democracy” 
provisions of the constitution, unless it could offer a bargaining position to the right-wing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
845 See Fuentes 2012, Table 12.3 for similarities and differences between the proposals of Concertación and 
Alianza. The two proposals were merged into a single bill after the two coalitions established an agreement 
in November 2001 (Fuentes 2015, 14). 
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opposition.846 Reducing the number of issues was a strategy espoused by the executive to 
lessen the differences between the proposals of the two coalition blocs (Fuentes 2015, 17). 
 The differences between the proposals were negotiated in the Senate for more 
than four years until the two sides signed a “political agreement” that resolved three 
issues that were stalling the negotiations. Both sides agreed to keep the binomial electoral 
system, reestablish the presidential power to remove commanders-in-chief of the armed 
forces and the chief of police, and to grant citizenship based on the principle of jus 
sanguinis (Fuentes 2012, 253).847 Among these issues, the binomial electoral system was 
the main “stumbling block”, and had it not been for the agreement to maintain it, the talks 
would have completely broken down (Pastor 2004, 56). The final agreement reached with 
Alianza is an exemplary case of compromise. References to the binomial electoral system 
and the number of senate seats were to be removed from the constitution in order to open 
the process to future reform. And although by agreeing to move it under an organic law, 
it lowered the quorum to four-sevenths, rather than three-fifths; by codifying the number 
of deputies in the constitution, any future reform still required a constitutional 
amendment, providing that the number of deputies would have to change (Fuentes 2012, 
253). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
846 Originally Concertación’s proposal included other matters such as introducing a voluntary voting system, 
recognizing indigenous rights, providing for an easier path to attaining national citizenship and making 
probity a public duty for public servants (also included in the proposal made by Alianza) (Fuentes 2011, 
1764). 
847 According to the agreement reached in 2005, to exercise citizenship rights, one must have lived in Chile 
for over a year, meaning that citizens born abroad could not vote in the elections. Right-wing parties feared 
votes from abroad would be cast for left-wing parties given that many citizens living abroad were among 
those who had escaped because of the Pinochet regime. This provision was finally amended in the 
constitution reform of 2014.  
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 After the two sides established an initial understanding, in November 2004, the 
Chamber of Deputies debated the issue only to transfer it back to Senate after six months. 
Thus most of the debate and negotiations took place in the Senate.848 An informal 
advisory group was set up including constitutional law scholars close to Concertación and 
Alianza. Working closely with several deputies, these constitutional experts provided a 
venue to communicate and exchange drafts between members of the Congress and the 
presidency.  
 In Chile, there is no established mechanism during amendment-making, such as a 
joint commission, to resolve disputes between the two chambers of the Congress. In order 
to solve the impasse between the two chambers, the executive relied on its legislative 
powers and issued presidential vetoes. Smooth executive-legislative relations in Chile 
allowed for an informal commission to be set up in late 2005 to discuss the remaining 
discrepancies. The president’s veto power over constitutional amendments was thus 
utilized to change the content of the proposals (amendatory observations, indicaciones) 
after the informal commission that included members of both chambers had reached an 
understanding.849 The executive branch encouraged expert opinion outside of the 
Congress, which facilitated the agreement between the two sides by providing 
nonpartisan expert opinion. For instance, on reforms related to the Constitutional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
848 Fuentes (2015, 17) reports that the bill was debated in the Senate for 97 months in which 23 sessions 
were devoted to it, whereas it was debated for 8 months in the Chamber of Deputies, where only 3 sessions 
were devoted to the bill. 
849 In total, the executive branch issued 27 vetoes (Fuentes 2012, 253). 
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Tribunal, the right-wing political parties relied on the opinion of members of the high 
court (Fuentes 2012, 256 and Carmona Santender 2012, AI)850. 
 Throughout the negotiations, the executive played the most critical role. It was the 
one “setting the agenda, promoting informal agreements on divisive issues, and 
proposing alternative course of action for legislators (..) promoting specific initiatives and 
restricting the scope of issues to be discussed at the senate floor” (Fuentes 2012, 254).  
The collaborative management style espoused by the Lagos administration helped foster 
consensus. Just as the cautious approach of Aylwin and Frei had been determinant in the 
lack of substantial reform during the first two administrations of Concertación, the 









	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
850 Although the appointment structure of the Constitutional Tribunal was debated extensively on the 
congressional floor, the expansion of its power, especially vis-à-vis the Congress was not debated 
thoroughly (Fuentes 2012, AI). Because it was mostly academic views that determined the changes 
introduced to the powers of the court, it was unnoticed at the time by the members of the Congress, who 
voted for these changes (Atria 2012, AI). 
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Table 7.2: The Source of Constitutional Amendment Initiatives 
Government Source of 
Initiative 
Pinochet 1 Presidential 
Message 
Aylwin 3 Presidential 
Message, 1 
Motion 
Frei 6 Presidential 
Message, 2 
Motion 
Lagos 2 Presidential 
Message, 3 
Motion 
Bachelet 7 Presidential 
Message, 2 
Motion 
Source: Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile 
 In terms of congressional floor debate, the constitutional reform proposals were 
mostly debated by senators, deputies, members of the executive, and constitutional 
experts (Fuentes 2015, 17-18). In fact, those that did have decision-making power were 
excluded from negotiations based on the argument that “expanding the discussion, or 
even making it more transparent, would endanger the possibilities of reaching successful 
agreements” (Montes and Vial 2005, 24). 
 Representatives of civil society and professional organizations had a 
comparatively minimal role, testifying to the elite-based nature of the negotiations. As it 
was the case with other areas of policy-making in Chile, the reforms came from above 
(Huneeus 2012, AI). There was an element of fear shared by the political elite; fear of 
conflict was a factor that prevented political actors from calling on the people to exert 
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social pressure (Fuentes 2012, AI). Attesting to the strong professionalism of the Chilean 
political system, the most actively involved political actors of the constitutional reform 
were experts in constitutional issues: “sixteen of the 17 key actors were lawyers and 5 
were prestigious professors of constitutional law” (Fuentes 2015, 18).851 Both legislative 
blocs also sought technical support from constitutional lawyers. 
 The 2005 constitutional reforms, which took 61 months to debate, negotiate, draft, 
redraft and approve led to substantial reforms. The consensual nature of the constitution-
making is evidenced by the unanimous approval of the reforms, except designated 
senators, who were former members of the armed forces or who were appointed by the 
Supreme Court, and who voted against proposals that would reduce the powers of the 
armed forces (Agüero 2006, 51 and Fuentes 2015, 13 and 18).  
 The reforms finalized in 2005 after five years of negotiations can be divided into 
two categories: removing non-democratic provisions (authoritarian enclaves) and 
rebalancing power for the opposition. Thus, the reform package satisfied many, if not all 
of the demands of both legislative coalitions.  In terms of removing non-democratic 
provisions, the 2005 amendments eliminated appointed senators; introduced reforms to 
the states of exception852; reestablished the presidential power to remove commanders-in- 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
851 Carey (2002, 253) argues that the internal functions of the Congress especially with respect to the 
composition of commissions and mechanisms of appointment show strong professionalism. 
852 States of exception were reformed extensively with the 2005 amendments. These reforms introduced 
changes in the organs that could declare states of exception, replaced the COSENA’s approval with that of 
the Congress, provided further time limits, shortened the list of rights that could be suspended or reduced 
and provided for the judicial review of measures adopted during states of emergency. For the state of siege, 
freedom of expression and opinion were removed from the list of rights that could be suspended and the 
right to move persons from one point of the national territory to another was eliminated. For the state of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  442	   	  
chief of the armed forces and the Carabineros of Chile’s national police force;853 
transformed COSENA into an advisory body;854 and removed the provision which 
provided that the armed forces were the “guarantors of institutionality”.855 Most of the 
key aspects of the authoritarian constitution that constrain and undermine the authority of 
democratically elected government were removed by the 2005 reforms. However, the 
supermajority requirement for LOCs and the binominal system remained on the books.856 
 In return, other changes that primarily offered incentives for the right-wing 
political parties to reach a consensus included the reduction of the presidential term to 
four years without immediate reelection;857 the elimination of the distinction between 
“ordinary” and “extraordinary” periods of sessions in the congress; the establishment of a 
congressional mechanism to summon members of the cabinet; an increase in the powers 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
assembly freedom of information and opinion and the right of unionization were removed from the list of 
rights and freedoms that could be suspended or restricted. The duration of the state of siege and the state of 
emergency was reduced from 90 to 15 days renewable by the Congress. The state of assembly and 
catastrophe had no time limits, except that president could decide to terminate them at anytime. Most 
importantly, the 2005 amendments provided mechanisms of judicial accountability for states of exception. 
See Heiss 2011, 299-305 for a full analysis of states of exception after the 2005 reforms. 
853 Previously, COSENA’s approval was necessary. The 2005 amendments provided that the Congress 
must be informed. According to Cheyre, the commander in chief of the armed forces (2002-2006) the 
reforms relating to military prerogatives did not weaken the institution. On the contrary, it strengthened the 
armed forces, for it eliminated provisions that were damaging its institutional reputation (2013, AI).  
854 Additionally, the changes provided that COSENA could no longer convene itself, the Chamber of 
Deputies was added as a civilian member and the President could decide whether other ministers could 
attend sessions. Ruiz-Tagle (2013, AI) argues that with the 2005 reforms the powers of the President were 
in fact expanded, and that the council which could have been eliminated altogether, still maintains great 
powers. 
855 Art. 90. In addition, the reforms provided that all organs of the state shared that duty (Art. 6). 
856 Although these issues are regarded as the most significant, it is possible to add to the list other 
democratic deficiencies including maintaining the COSENA, the role of the military during the states of 
exception and during elections, the autonomy of the military in educational matters and recognition of 
indigeneous rights (Agüero 2006, 52-54). 
857 According to Ceroni (2012, AI) the reduction of presidential terms was an issue that the center-left 
coalition had to concede in exchange for the reforms that it was pursuing. 
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of congress to create investigative commissions; the provision of greater flexibility with 
the number of regions and a reform of the composition and powers of the Constitutional 
Tribunal858 (Fuentes 2011, 1756).859 In that respect, Lagos (2013, AI) criticizes the 
interest-based attitude of the right-wing parties “As I say to the right-wing … you 
produce amendments to the constitution with a computer making sure this is in favor or 
against me. And you are not thinking if this is in favor of or against the country.” 
These changes reinforced the power of the legislative to oversee the executive, 
weakened the power of the executive to interfere with legislative power, and provided the 
right-wing political parties control over appointments to the high court. The 
Constitutional Tribunal was envisioned by the right-wing opposition as an additional veto 
point to make constitutional reforms more difficult (Fuentes 2012, AI).860 The powers of 
the Constitutional Tribunal were expanded to include concrete and a posteriori judicial 
review and eliminate the justices of the Supreme Court from the Constitutional Tribunal’s 
membership (Couso 2011, 1534).861 Following these important changes, the court 
became an active and central player in the Chilean political system, which had not been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
858 In terms of the “protected-democracy” aspects, previously COSENA could appoint members. This is no 
longer the case following the 2005 amendments. 
859 Ley Nº 20.050 August 26, 2005. 
860 According to Carmona Santender, who was a member of the high court appointed in 2009 by President 
Bachelet, the court prior to the 2005 reforms was dysfunctional because of the appointment structure (i.e 
the members were appointed by COSENA) and the constitutional changes made it more pluralistic (2012, 
AI). 
861 According to Carmona Santender, the reason that the Constitutional Tribunal did not take issue with the 
amendments was because first it was asked for its opinion and second because its powers were expanded 
through the reforms (2012, AI).       
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an aspiration shared by the political elite and was not identified as a significant change at 
the time (Couso and Tohá 2009, 184 and Atria 2012, AI).862  
  Overall, the amendments fell short of what the Concertación was hoping to 
accomplish but more than what the Alianza was originally willing to concede (Fuentes 
2014, 89). It eliminated the most ominous non-democratic features of the constitution, 
but it also perpetuated the misconception that Chile had eradicated all aspects of the 
protected-democracy envisioned by the military establishment (Couso 2012, 411). 
President Lagos, who had replaced the signature of Pinochet with his after the 2005 
reforms, later came to regret that he had prematurely concluded that the amendments had 
fulfilled the preconditions for a democratic constitution (Fuentes 2010 and Saldaña 2010). 
The fact that the constitution still maintained high quorums and a binomial electoral 
system actually indicated that the constitution was not a new constitution, and demand for 
a new framework intensified after 2005 (Atria 2012, AI).  
 7.1.2 Beyond Authoritarian Enclaves: Constitutional Reform, 2005-2010 
For Concertación, incremental constitutional change had always been the 
preferred approach. After the 2005 constitutional reforms, members of the center-left 
coalition began to pursue reforms that went beyond addressing democratic deficiencies. 
These included reforms concerning issues such as early childhood education; establishing 
Easter Island as a special territory; procedural laws in regional government; a voluntary 
voting system and automatic electoral registration; relations between municipalities; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
862 The decisions of the Constitutional Tribunal on banning the morning after pill was the first instance of 
this type of a controversial decision by the court. 
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ratifying the Rome Statue and hence recognizing the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court; changing the presidential election date; a greater level of decentralization 
in regional administration and reforms regarding transparency and probity among public 
administrators and the quality of politics.863 Constitutional reform proposals submitted to 
Congress became more wide-ranging, addressing other social and political issues 
(Fuentes 2014, 92). Although Concertación still lacked the legislative majority to pass 
constitutional amendments without the consent of the opposition, Chile maintained the 
path of gradual constitutional reform, even with a rise in the number of proposals 
submitted to the Congress.  
After the election of Michele Bachelet, the reform agenda of the government 
began to shift towards issues that had so far not been addressed, such as labor, 
environmental, and sexual rights. This resulted in disenchanted Concertación deputies 
and senators leaving the coalition. Despite an increasingly fragmented political 
environment, this did not lead to the emergence of traditional cleavages within the 
coalition nor a shift in patterns of alliances and cooperation in congress across the two 
blocs (Fuentes 2014, 95). However, the emergence of bottom-up demand for change, 
spearheaded by educational reform that challenged the logic of the subsidiary state 
enshrined in the 1980 Constitution, added the dimension of proactive citizens into the 
debate on constitutional change; going beyond the congressional elitist approach 
followed thus far (Couso 2012). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
863 Ley 20.162, Ley 20.193, Ley 20.245, Ley 20.337, Ley 20.346, Ley 20.352, Ley 20.354, Ley 20.390 and 
Ley 20.414. 
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The temporary illusion that the 2005 constitutional amendments had fully 
democratized the constitution faded away almost immediately after the reforms were 
adopted. Within the center-left coalition a renewed interest in constitutional change 
appeared. However, the problem was that among the Concertación political elite there 
was no consensus regarding the best way to achieve it. Opinions varied across 
congressional consensus, presidential commission and constituent assembly (Fuentes 
2014, 94). Constitutional change began to become a central issue to the point that during 
the 2009- 2010 presidential elections, it was an integral part of the election campaigns. 
Eduardo Frei, Marco Enríquez-Ominami and Jorge Arrate had campaigned on the 
promise that once elected they would enact a new constitution. However, the only 
candidate that did not call for a new constitution, Sebastián Piñera was elected. It was 
during Piñera’s term in office that demands for replacement of the constitution became 
more pronounced and movements such as Moviemiento por la Assemblea Constituyente 
and Marcatuvoto began calling for a constituent assembly. 
7.2 Turkey: Constitutional Change with Minimum Consensus Necessary 
The ten percent electoral threshold instigated the greatest distortion in the 2002 
elections. A conservative party with Islamist roots, the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi)864 swept to power with 34 percentof the votes but gained 66 percent of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
864 The AKP was founded in 2001 by leaders of conservative right, including Recep Tayyip Erdoğan who 
had previously served as the mayor of Istanbul. He was a disciple of Islamist politician Necmettin Erbakan 
who as the leader of the Refah Partisi (RP) was pressured by the armed forces in 1997 to step down and the 
RP was subsequently dissolved by the Constitutional Court. His previous party, the Millî Selâmet Partisi 
was closed down by the military government after the 1980 coup and his party before that the, Millî Nizam 
Partisi was dissolved by the Constitutional Court in 1970. After the RP was also closed on the grounds that 
it had violated the principle of secularism enshrined in the constitution, Erbakan again formed a new party 
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seats.865 Consecutive AKP electoral victories altered the direction of Turkey’s 
constitution-making process. The old guard could not pass the threshold. The failure of 
political parties to institutionalize and their continuing “personalistic leadership style” 
was most evident in the case of ANAP (Kalaycıoğlu 2002, 59). The political parties 
making up the outgoing coalition were blamed for carrying the country into economic 
crisis being corrupt and were punished by the electorate. The parties of the previous 
decade became marginalized in electoral and parliamentary politics (Sayari 2007, 197).866 
The party system was restructured with the 2002 elections and an important new player 







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the Fazilet Partisi (FP). After that was also closed down by the high court, the Islamic movement split into 
two factions. While the supporters of Erbakan established another political party, the Saadet Partisi, 
supporters of Erdoğan who described themselves as conservative democrats with Islamic roots-but not 
necessarily Islamists-  formed the AKP.  
865 The CHP, the other party that passed the threshold and entered the parliament won one-fifth of the vote 
but acquired one-third of the seats (Sayari 2007, 200-201). 
866 According to Sayari (2007), the two-center right parties, DYP and ANAP, have steadily lost their 
electoral strength because they were seen as politically corrupt. In addition, the outgoing coalition failed to 
respond to the financial crisis of 2001, which required an IMF bailout and instead pursued populist 
economic policies 
867 Sayari (2007, 2000) highlights that electoral volatility reached its highest point in the 2002 elections 
(50.2 percent) and the fact that two newly established political parties acquired more than 40% of the vote 
attests to that. 
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  Figure 7.1: Percentage of Seats by Party, 2002 Elections 
 
The political parties that made and unmade the coalitions of the 1990s withered 
and the elections produced a two-party parliament with the AKP five seats short of the 
two-thirds majority to singlehandedly pass constitutional amendments.868 After fifteen 
years of coalition government, Turkey now had a single party government and the AKP 
emerged as the dominant force in party competition. However, the results also hinted to 
“a crisis of representation”, where 59% of the electorate, (including those who did 
abstained from voting and those who voted for parties that failed to reach the ten percent 
threshold) received no representation in the parliament (Aslan-Akman 2012a, 163). But 
finally, the multi-party of the past decade had given way to the electoral system’s 
intended effect of producing a two-party system and a strong majority government.869 
However, the AKP that was on the path to become Turkey’s dominant party was not 
necessarily the armed forces’ preference of government. Thus, post-2002 elections, we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
868 In addition to the CHP which obtained 178 seats, nine independents were elected.  
869 It is important to distinguish between the two party system, the electoral party system and the 
parliamentary party system. Because of the 10% threshold, while party fragmentation remains high in the 
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observe that the available institutional constraints come into action more often and 
amendments are passed only if they are able to survive through veto points.   
7.2.1 Consensus without Deliberation: Constitutional Reforms Under Majority Party 
2002-2004 
The AKP came to power under a caretaker prime minister, Abdullah Gül. The 
first amendment initiative was to resolve AKP’s own grievance with respect to the 
constitutional ban on candidates with past convictions. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who was 
imprisoned for reciting a poem in 1997 when he was mayor, had served four months in 
jail in 1999 on the crime of inciting religious hatred. Although he was one of the 
principal leaders that had established the AKP in 2001, he was barred from participating 
in parliamentary elections as the constitution banned those that were convicted of 
“ideological and anarchist actions”. However, the decision of the Supreme Board of 
Election to cancel the elections in one province provided an opportunity for the AKP -
with the support of the sole parliamentary opposition party, the CHP - to change the 
constitution and run Erdoğan as their candidate in the rescheduled election.  
This was self-serving constitutional change by the AKP directed at making the 
legal changes to allow for its party leader to get elected and take on the role of the prime 
minister. For that purpose, Art. 76 and 78 were amended to revoke the ban that prevented 
Erdoğan’s eligibility for parliament and allow for a by-election870. Moreover, a 
provisional article was added to Art. 67, which provided that the changes introduced to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
870 Art. 76 which previously banned those convicted of “ideological and anarchistic actions” replaced it to 
limit the ban to those convicted of “terror actions”.  
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the electoral laws do not apply within the year after the amendments technically entered 
into force. These changes made it possible for Erdoğan to run as a candidate, for by-
elections to be held 90 days to fill a vacancy and for constitutional amendments regarding 
electoral laws to be apply in scheduled elections only a few months away. The 
amendments were backed by the CHP deputies. However, President Necdet Sezer, the 
former head of the Constitutional Court and ideological opponent of the AKP 
government vetoed them on the grounds that they were tailored for a single individual.871 
However, the President’s decision to send the bill back to the parliament did not lead to a 
reconsideration and it was adopted without changes by the parliament (Özbudun and 
Gençkaya 2009, 64).   
The 2002 constitutional amendments, which were reminiscent of those of 1987, 
were steered by the government, but the government was able to persuade the opposition 
despite the fact the changes provided no incentive whatsoever to the CHP. However, the 
ideological divide between the two parties in the parliament manifested itself when the 
AKP proposed changes to three articles of the constitution. The first matter was an 
uncontroversial one, also supported by the CHP and was intended to reduce the minimum 
age for eligibility to be elected to parliament from 30 to 25 (Art. 76).872 However, the 
other two, allowing the management of state forests by private persons and the sale of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
871 For the President’s report and the Constitutional Commission’s response, see TBMM Dönem: 22 Sıra 
Yasama Yılı: 1 Sayısı: 3 dated December 12, 2002. 
872 CHP member Mehmet Ziya Yergök draws attention to a previous constitutional amendment proposal 
submitted by the CHP members to reduce the minimum age for eligbility to stand for parliament and claims 
that the reason that the CHP proposal was not supported by the AKP at the time was because the AKP was 
planning to include it in an expanded proposal (including the sale and management of forests) to persuade 
CHP members. See TBMM Dönem: 22 Cilt: 11 Yasama Yılı: 1 62nci Birleşim, April 4, 2003, p.  388. 
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public lands which technically and scientifically were no longer forests as of 31 
December 1981 (Art. 169 and 170), were vehemently opposed by the CHP, which is a 
social democrat party with a nationalist base (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 64-65).873 
The government also made a crafty move and stipulated in the proposal that in the event 
that it was submitted to a popular referendum, the proposal would be voted on as a whole, 
and not by individual articles (Gönenç, and Kontaci 2005, 111).874 Considering that the 
two matters, the age of eligibility for parliament and the sale and management of 
deforested lands, were completely unrelated to one another, the AKP government was 
attempting to utilize a remedy intended to be used in case the president vetoed part of the 
proposal. One CHP member explained that with this constitutional amendment initiative 
AKP brought tension to parliamentary relations and created a tense atmosphere among 
the public, requesting that AKP withdraw it.875 However, the AKP government argued 
that the sale of deforested lands would bring in an estimated 25 billion dollars in revenue 
(Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 65).876 President Sezer argued that the sale of deforested 
lands was against the public interest and could, as it had before, lead to the destruction of 
forestry (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 65).  Arguing that the forest lands must belong to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
873 However, during the legislative year, two deputies from CHP resigned.  
874 According to Art. 175.7 during the adoption of the constitutional amendment, the parliament had the 
power to decide which amendments would be voted together or seperate in the event of a referendum. 
875 CHP member Alp Topuz also called for expansion of the amendment proposal to include parliamentary 
inviolability. See TBMM Dönem: 22 Cilt: 11 Yasama Yılı: 1 62nci Birleşim, April 4, 2003, p.  380. 
876 Land formerly classified as forests is known as 2B.  
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the state and must be managed by the state, the President sent the bill back to parliament 
for reconsideration.877  
Although the Constitutional Committee made changes according to the 
President’s objections and the amendments were readopted with the required quorum, the 
President vetoed them once again.878 According to the amendment-making procedure, if 
the parliament was to adopt the bill without any changes, the President could submit it to 
a referendum. Considering that AKP was a young party it could not take the risk of going 
to a referendum and failing to secure the public vote. In the event that a referendum was 
called, CHP was planning to organize opposition to the proposal with the cooperation of 
civil society actors (Hürriyet Daily News, August 13, 2003). Ultimately, the amendments 
were put aside.879 
Here, the ideological affinity between the President and the CHP provided the 
opposition party with an additional veto power.  Despite the fact that the Turkish party 
system had changed significantly after the 2002 elections, “the high level of polarization 
in the interactions between the parties,” a feature of the 1990s, remained the same (Sayari 
2007, 206). The relationship between the AKP and CHP, the two parties in the parliament, 
came to be defined by the polarization between the pro-secular forces and pro-Islamist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
877 Law no. 4841, April 2003. The proposal received 366 affirmative votes, one short of the quorum that 
requires obligatory referendum. 
878 Law no. 4960, July 2003. During the interim period, two deputies from the CHP and one from the 
ANAP resigned and joined Athe KP. However, it was the support received from a DYP deputy and 
independents that gave the AKP government its two-thirds majority. 
879 The sale of deforested lands was carried out by introducing amendments to ordinary legislation. 
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forces in society and politics (Sayari 2007, 206).880 Although the AKP government’s 
program after the 2002 elections highlighted that their aim was drafting a new 
constitution, it was only after the 2007 snap elections that AKP unveiled a draft 
constitution.881  
In its initial years in the parliament, the AKP acted with caution and pragmatism, 
did not seek any radical changes, did not push ideological policies and overall tried to 
avoid confrontations with the military and the judiciary. For instance, despite the fact that 
the AKP could muster the necessary quorum, it did not seek to revoke the ban on the 
headscarves for female university students- “a politically charged and highly symbolic 
issue that has polarized Turkish politics for nearly two decades” (Sayari 2007, 206).882  
Deemed an outside actor, the traditional power holders of the Turkish state, namely the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
880 Hale and Özbudun (2009, 38-39) report the results of a 2006 survey: “while slightly over half of the 
respondents see the AKP as a party that believes in a democracy (53.7 per cent), a party that defends 
fundamental rights and freedoms more than other parties (50.8 percent), and a party that protects the rşghts 
of people with Islamic lifestyles more than other parties (53.3 per cent), a substantial proportion of them 
see it as a party that intends to impose an Islamic way of life (50.3 per cent) that seeks EU membership to 
legıitimise an Islamic political systen (45.2 per cent), that did not soften the Islamist-secularist conflict 
(44.4 per cent), tha seeks to infilrate the bureucracy with Islamic cadres (43.8 per cent),  and that intends to 
reverse advances in women’s rights (36.7 per cent)”. 
881 The program stated “We shall draft a new participatory and liberal Constitution to replace the existing 
Constitution that no longer meets our country’s needs. Our new Constitution shall represent a notion of 
democracy and the rule of law with strong popular legitimacy, high compatibility with international- most 
notably European Union norms, an emphasis on upholding individual rights and liberties and a pluralistic 
and participatory democracy at its core. We shall pay attention that the Constitution will be brief, clear, and 
comprehensible in terms of its form” (quoted in Coskun 2013, 98). Similar pledges were made after a new 
government under the prime ministry of Erdoğan was formed. See Gül Hükümeti Programı (58th 
government) available at http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukumetler/hp58.htm and I. Erdoğan Hükümeti 
Programı (59th government) available at http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukumetler/hp59.htm. 
882 AKP also did not resubmit an education bill (regarding Imam Hatip schools that provide religious 
education) that was vetoed by President Sezer on the grounds that it violated the principle of secularism. A 
statement by the military obtained after several university rectors held a meeting with a senior general, 
considered the AKP’s plans to reform the university admission system a threat to national security 
(Shambayati and Sütçü 2012, 116).  Prime Minister Erdoğan said “As a government we are not ready to 
pay the price” (Jenkins 2007, 350). 
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President’s office, the Constitutional Court, the military, the mainstream media, and the 
universities remained suspicious of the AKP, despite its claims of moderate Islam and 
promotion of a liberal market economy and European Union membership (Coşkun 2013, 
99-100).883 
The 2004 constitutional amendments still maintained the consensual approach but 
this time it was limited only to the two parties represented in parliament. Although the 
AKP’s majority control of the government provided it with a “strategic position” that did 
not require serious negotiation with the opposition parties, in the 2004 amendment-
making, the fact that CHP also supported the amendments that were motivated by a 
desire to fulfill the demands of the EU enabled a smooth process (Kalaycıoğlu 2011, 207). 
The AKP embraced full membership in the EU as one of its goals, seeing that it could 
provide the government with the necessary leverage to overcome domestic obstacles to 
constitutional change (Coşkun 2013, 101). The high public support for EU membership 
meant that the armed forces could not intervene in the political process and risk Turkey 
not receiving a date for the beginning of accession negotiations with the EU (Jenkins 
2007, 349). Thus the armed forces refrained from making any public statements about the 
reforms to avoid any damage to their own prestige.884 As such, accession to the EU was 
stated in the reasoning of the amendment proposal (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 66). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
883 However, it is important to note that several AKP policies during its first government did raise concerns 
about its self-ascribed democratic and liberal outlook. These include the attempt to criminalize adultery in 
2004 as well as its attempts to restrict the sale of alcohol, which were seen as examples of its Islamist 
agenda.  
884 However, it should be noted that during this period, even though the Chief of Staff Hilmi Özkök was not 
a hard liner, conflicts between the government and the military did take place, see Jenkins 2007. 
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It should be noted that the 2004 amendments were a continuation of the process 
that had produced the 1995 and the 2001 amendments (Kalaycıoğlu 2011, 208 and 
Gönenç and Kontaci 2005, 118). Thus the political context was shaped by the broad 
consensus between the government and opposition based on the prior experience of 
reform to enable EU compliance and scrap anti-democratic provisions. The opposition 
party CHP made one motion which reflected that the amendment proposal that 
established constitutional guarantees for gender equality was short of EU demands that 
would have preferred positive discrimination for women.885 However, the CHP’s motion 
was rejected and that remained the only discrepancy between the two parties’ 
positions.886 The reforms abolished one article and amended nine articles. The notorious 
State Security Courts were abolished altogether (Art.143).887 All references to the death 
penalty were removed from the constitution - as a result Turkey removed a constitutional 
obstacle to country’s ratification of the 13th Additional Protocol to the ECHR.888 Other 
concerns related to international norms were also addressed through this constitutional 
reform package. An amendment allowed for the extradition of Turkish citizens for 
offenses that fall under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court -thus 
removing a constitutional obstacle for Turkey to sign its convention (Art. 38). More 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
885 TBMM Dönem: 22 Cilt: 48 Yasama Yılı: 2 86ncı Birleşim, May 7, 2004, p.  280 
886 Positive discrimination was realized with the 2010 amendments. 
887 In previous amendments in 1999, its composition was purged of its military members. The SSCs were 
one of the institutitons most often criticized by the European Parliament. Also, the European Court of 
Human Rights had found Turkey in violation of the right to a fair trial and another such decision was 
expected (issued in 2005) with respect to the Öcalan (the leader of PKK) case. 
888 This meant that Art. 15, 17, 38 and 87 were amended to remove references to the death penalty. 
However, it was Art. 38 that established that a court could sentence anyone to capital pubishment. With the 
2001 amendments, the death penalty was limited to times of war and crimes of terrorism. 
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importantly, Art. 90 was amended to state that in case of a conflict between domestic 
laws and the international agreements concerning fundamental rights and liberties, 
international agreements would take precedence. This amendment was a specific demand 
put forward in a comprehensive report (2003, prepared by Arie Oostlander, Christian 
Democratic MEP) that was approved by the European Parliament (Benhabib and Isiksel 
2006, 223). The change, considered by its critics as weakening Turkey’s sovereignty, 
allowed for a more effective implementation of international human rights instruments 
and satisfied an important requirement for the EU (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 67). 
Important reforms were also introduced in terms of civil-military relations. The 
Court of Accounts was allowed to audit the expenditures of the armed forces and the 
Chief of Military Staff lost the prerogative to appoint a military member to the Board of 
Higher Education (YÖK). In terms of rights and freedoms, gender equality was 
strengthened further and the freedom of the press was reinforced by preventing the 
confiscation of vehicles that belong to printing presses or their property being seized, 
confiscated or barred from operation on the grounds of being an instrument of crime.889 
7.2.2 Polarization and Battling Veto Powers: Confrontational Constitutional Change 
2005-2010 
    From this point onward, the Turkish amendment-making process shifted away 
from constitutional changes aimed at removing non-democratic provisions from the 
constitution. Constitutional change now either meant the adoption of a minor or technical 
reform or an antagonistic modification responding to a political crisis faced by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
889 Also see Özbudun, 2007 and Gönenç and Kontaci 2005, 119-124. 
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government. The 2005 constitutional amendment on the Radio and Television Supreme 
Council (RTÜK) was a response to a Constitutional Court decision that annulled an 
amendment to the law regulating radio and television which provided that five members 
of the council would be elected by the parliament (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 67)890. 
Two petitions; one by President Sezer and the other one by opposition members of the 
parliament initiated the Constitutional Court’s case. After the court ruled in favor of the 
opposition on the government’s plans to change the election process of the members of 
the council and declared the law unconstitutional, the AKP government responded by 
introducing a constitutional amendment with a similar purpose. During the debates on the 
parliamentary floor, Minister Beşir Atalay explained that the constitutional amendment 
responded to the court’s decision of unconstitutionality by adding (Art. 133) a provision 
which stated “Parliament elects the members of RTÜK.” 891 The change was also 
motivated by a desire to resolve the deadlock at the council, which had led to no new 
members being appointed. According to the amendment, which was vetoed once by 
President Sezer only to be adopted, with a higher vote after reconsideration, the council’s 
nine members were to be selected by political parties in proportion to their seats in 
parliament.892 Following the amendments, appropriate changes were introduced to the 
law that regulating RTÜK. The institution, which in addition to being a supervisory body 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
890 The bill that regulates RTÜK was first introduced in 1994 (Law 3984) but the changes that were taken 
to the Constitutional Court entered into force in 2002 (Law 4756). Before the bill was refered to the high 
court, President Sezer had already vetoed it once. 
891 TBMM Dönem: 22 Cilt: 87 Yasama Yılı: 3 112nci Birleşim, June 15, 2005, p.  535. 
892 The amendment was adopted with 378 affirmative votes and 21 rejections. However, after it was sent 
back to the parliament by the president, the same bill was passed again with 397 deputies voting in its favor 
and 23 against it.  
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that oversees compliance with media regulations, also imposes fines for violations, 
became a focus of criticism for its partisan appointments and lack of independence 
resulting in majoritarian decisions in favor of the government or its values. 
 Two other amendment-making proposals followed. A second amendment 
adopted in 2005 changed the rules for the preparation and implementation of the 
budget.893 This rather technical amendment was necessary to respond to opposition 
criticisms regarding the budget approval process so that the next year budget could be 
decided; thus, it received the support of the opposition CHP. Another amendment that 
was minor and regulative was the 2006 amendment that lowered the age of eligibility to 
become a member of parliament from 30 to 25.894 This change had long been supported 
by the CHP and was embedded in the 2003 constitutional amendment proposal 
concerning the sale of deforested lands in order to sway opposition support. When that 
proposal failed, the eligibility age matter was also sidelined for a time, only to be adopted 
three years later almost unanimously.895 As Kalaycioğlu (2011, 273) emphasizes “these 
amendments were mostly unrelated to the EU or the quality of governance and 
democracy in the country.” 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
893 Law no. 5428 amended five articles, Art. 130, 160, 161, 162 and 163. 
894 Law no. 5551 amended Art. 76. 
895 Because changes to electoral laws do not take effect for one year after their passage, during the 2007 
general elections the minimum age to be elected was still 30. 
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The Constitutional Crisis and the 2007 Amendments: 
 Overall the AKP’s first term witnessed “a relatively smooth cohabitation between 
the elected branches of government and the military, judiciary, and civilian bureaucratic 
elites” (Bali 2013, 673).896  However, the controversy over the election of a new 
president, who would succeed President Sezer, altered these dynamics and the AKP 
“developed a predilection for unilateral action in 2007” (Kalaycioğlu 2011, 272). The 
governing AKP, holding a majority in the parliament, was in a position to elect the new 
president, who was anticipated to be a figure from outside the secular camp, who had 
traditionally held the office.897 The possibility of a president from within the AKP led to a 
harsh reaction among the secular forces of the country on the grounds that the office of 
the presidency should be occupied by someone that represented the values of the secular 
state and not be a symbol of the Islamization of state institutions (Uran 2010, 3). 
Although the post is largely ceremonial, as explained in the previous chapters, the 
president has important appointive powers and certain legislative powers such as the 
power to issue decrees with the force of law, the right to call referendums for 
constitutional amendments, to sign or send back laws and to file suits at the 
Constitutional Court for the review of the constitutionality of laws among other powers 
(Kumbaracıbası 2009, 58). President Sezer had used these powers vigorously as a check 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
896 Although President Sezer made frequent resort to the Constitutional Court, referring more cases to the 
high court than all other presidents combined after 2003, according to Shambayati and Sütçü (2012) the 
fact that he was a former judge with limited political skills and experiences and without strong ties to the 
political establishment explains why the high court was so often operationalized by the president. 
897 Özal’s election to the presidency was also problematic because since the 1960 elections, the position of 
the presidency had been held by retired generals, who perceived themselves as the guarantors of republican 
values, particularly secularism. Özal was elected only on the third round.  
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on the government (Shambayati and Sütçü 2012, 114-115 and Gönenç 2008, 513). The 
opposition parties wanted the government to hold early general elections and have a 
newly formed parliament elect the president. Chief of Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt stated his – 
and hence the armed forces’- preference for a president loyal to secularism "not just in 
words, but in essence”.898 This statement was followed by mass meetings around the 
country, organized by secular civil society organizations and attended by hundreds of 
thousands of people.899 
In order to not to provoke further reactions, the AKP did not nominate Prime 
Minister Erdoğan but instead chose the Minister of Foreign Policy, Abdullah Gül who 
was seen as a moderate, as the AKP’s candidate. However, this choice of presidential 
candidate did not quell the fears of the secularist camps, especially since his wife wore 
the headscarf, which was seen as a symbol of political Islam (Bali 2012, 286)900. A crisis 
erupted when the opposition CHP embraced an argument put forward by a retired chief 
prosecutor of the republic that the two-thirds was not only the decisional quorum but also 
the necessary quorum for the meeting of parliament. As explained in the previous chapter, 
one of the reactive aspects of the 1982 Constitution was the article on the election of the 
president. The failure to elect a new president even after more than hundred rounds of 
voting had deadlocked the parliament and became one of the rationales of the military 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
898 This statement was made on April 12, 2007; http://arsiv.ntv.com.tr/news/405388.asp 
899 The first meeting held on April 14, 2007, was held at the he mausoleum of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. 
Known as the “Republican meetings”, four others followed throughout April and May in different cities. 
900 Gül’s wife had previously applied to the European Court of Human Rights in 2002 after she was barred 
from attending university for wearing a headscarf. She withdrew her complaint after her husband became 
Turkey’s foreign minister. 
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intervention. To prevent the reoccurrence of such an impasse, the constitution set a 
maximum of four parliamentary rounds for the election of the president. According to the 
scheme provided, for the first two rounds a two-thirds majority (367 votes) and for the 
third and fourth rounds an absolute majority (276 votes) were necessary. In order to avoid 
infinite rounds of presidential election in the parliament, in the event that the parliament 
failed to elect one of the candidates, new general elections would be held. Since it did not 
have the two-thirds majority, the AKP was counting on electing its candidate in the third 
round, which is what had happened during the election of President Özal. However, once 
the opposition decided to embrace the argument that the necessary quorum for the 
meeting of the parliament was also two-thirds, they boycotted the elections and Gül 
received less than two-thirds of the votes in a session that was attended by again less than 
two-thirds of the deputies. The opposition took the case to the Constitutional Court right 
after, and on the night of the first round of elections April 27, a statement was published 
on the official website of the General Staff in which the armed forces expressed their 
concerns over the presidential election and the debate on secularism and defined 
themselves as “the staunch defenders of secularism” and threatened that “when necessary 
it will display its attitudes and actions very clearly.”901 The Constitutional Court rendered 
its decision a few days later on May 1, agreeing with the opposition’s claim that the 
required quorum was not met and annulling the ballot.902 According to its ruling, during 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
901 The event is dubbed as the “e-memorandum” because the armed forces intervened through a public 
statement made online.  
902 Özbudun and Gençkaya (2009, 98) argue that it was “an extremely controversial ruling”  because 
according to the constitution there is no special quorum rule fort he meeting of the assembly during a 
presidential elections and hence the general rule (Art. 96) should apply, which is one-third of the full 
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the first two rounds, two-thirds of the members of the parliament should be present to 
elect the president. Thus, when the assembly convened again on May 6 and as a result of 
the opposition’s renewed boycott, could not get the required quorum and could not elect a 
new president, parliament reached a deadlock. The government and the opposition agreed 
on calling new elections.903 Both sides also agreed on adding a provisional article to the 
constitution, which put a temporary block on Art. 67 for the upcoming general election. 
The article in question provided that amendments to the electoral laws shall not apply to 
elections held within one year after the amendments enter into force. The logic behind 
this amendment, albeit temporary, was to allow a change in the electoral law that would 
force independent candidates to be included in a single unified ballot with the rest of the 
political parties. The change in the electoral law had come immediately after the Kurdish 
DTP (Demokratik Toplum Partisi)904 announced that to overcome the national threshold, 
they would run as independent candidates in the 2007 elections. The requirement of the 
single unified ballot was to increase the chances that the Kurdish electorate, some 
illiterate, would have difficulty in voting for their preferred candidate and hence to 
increase the null vote in the Kurdish areas (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 98).905 The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
membership. However, the Constitutonal Court sided with the opposition CHP’s opinion that the election 
of the president was one of the exceptions cited in that article.  
903 The general election was originally set to take place in November 2007, but as a result of the impasse a 
snap election was held instead on July 22.  
904 DTP was a Kurdish political party that described itself as social democratic. It was the sucessor party to 
DEHAP. It was dissolved by the Constitutional Court in 2009 for violating Art 68 and 69 of the 
constitution and having connections with the Kurdish militant organization, PKK. Following its closure, a 
new party was formed –the BDP (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi). 
905 Previously, independent candidates could print their ballot according to the specifics provided by the 
board of election and have it available as a separate document alongside the ballot on political parties. 
However, the regulations about the single unified ballot, especially since the independent candidates would 
not have an emblem on then, making it more difficult for the independent candidates to be electors. See 
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government and the opposition, in order to exclude the Kurdish vote from the parliament 
accepted a temporary alliance and approved both the changes in the electoral law and the 
constitutional amendment that allowed them to be effective in the upcoming snap 
elections.906 
From this point onwards, the government reacted to the crisis by seeking 
constitutional change that would alter the system of government. The AKP proposed a 
constitutional amendment package that shortened the legislative period from 5 to 4 years, 
introduced the popular election of the president, reduced the president’s term of office 
from seven years to five years but allowed for a maximum of two terms and clarified the 
meeting quorum of the assembly, setting it at one-third of the members of parliament 
(Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 98-99). The AKP’s aim was to bypass deadlocks in the 
parliament, but the opposition feared that the government was attempting to capture the 
presidency and increase the office’s political weight through its election by popular vote 
(Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 99). Debates in the Constitution Commission and the 
parliament were tense and did not leave room for negotiation.907 President Sezer vetoed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“Bağımsızlar Oy Pusulasına Resmen Sıkıştırıldı”, Bianet May 18, 2007 available at 
http://bianet.org/biamag/siyaset/96210-bagimsizlar-oy-pusulasina-resmen-sikistirildi 
906 The change in the electoral law was approved with a 430 to 20 majority and the constitutional amenment 
acquired 429 approvals and 12 rejections . 
907 Kart, a CHP MP and a member of the Constitution Commission reports that his party interpreted the 
amendments as an imposition and that there was no atmosphere of negotiation (Kart 2014, AI). He 
describes the debates as fierce and chaotic to the extent that one member of the commission from the CHP 
physically attacked the president of the commission (Burhan Kuzu) from the AKP-both of whom are by 
training constitutional law professors. The President of the Constitution Commission, Kuzu confirm the 
tense atmosphere of the commission and stated that the opposition CHP submitted more than 10 thousand 
motions but he had decided not to put them into debate because he saw them as a tactic to delay the 
commission’s work. He prepared a resolution on working methods that limited each member of the 
commission to submit one motion and limit their speech to five minutes (Kuzu, 2014 AI).  
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the constitutional amendment and sent it back to parliament for reconsideration on the 
grounds that a president with a popular mandate against the prime minister would lead to 
instability and would challenge the impartial role assigned to president by the 
constitutional framework designed to provide balance against the power of the majority 
party. He also opined that such a significant change had been introduced without much 
deliberation and warned against the repercussions of both having the political parties 
decide on presidential candidates and the possibility of a second term for the president 
(Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 99 and Kumbaracibasi 2009, 60). The parliament 
readopted the bill and overrode the presidential veto with a small margin. In return, Sezer 
submitted the amendment to a referendum and the opposition CHP and Sezer applied to 
Constitutional Court on the grounds that procedural irregularites had taken place during 
the parliamentary voting.908 The court ruled against the petitioners and did not null the 
amendments over the constitutionality of the proceedings. 
The government’s attempt at shortening the period before holding the referendum 
from 120 to 45 days and hence having the popular election of the president on the same 
day as the parliamentary elections failed when President Sezer vetoed the bill and there 
was not enough time to readopt the bill.909 The elections as decided would take place on 
July 22 and the referendum for the constitutional amendment would take place on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
908 The 2007 constitional amendment package included amendments to five articles (Art. 77, 79, 96, 101 
and 102)  and the addition of two provisional articles (PA 18 and 19). During the individual voting of the 
articles, the article that provided for a shorter legislative period was adopted by less than two-thirds but the 
whole package received more than the two-thirds majority. The court rejected the claim of 
unconstitutonality. For the court’s reasoning, see Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 100. 
909 The proposed change was with regards to an ordinary law that dealt with referenda on constitutional 
amendments, Law no 3376. 
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October 21. The snap elections took place in a heated political atmosphere. AKP retained 
its majority and even increased its vote but with a lower number of seats (340 seats) 
because the nationalist MHP, which had failed to pass the threshold in the 2002 elections 
joined the parliament along with 22 independent candidates. The 2007 elections led to 
much more proportional results, and if we count the independents that later formed the 
DTP, 85 percent of the vote was represented in the parliament (Hale 2008, 238).  
Figure 7.2: Percentage of Seats by Party, 2007 Elections 
 
Following the elections, Gül re-declared his candidacy, but the government faced 
the same problem; it did not have the two-thirds majority of attendance for the first round 
of presidential elections. The Constitutional Court’s interpretation had confirmed the 
opposition’s position that at least two-thirds of the members must be present at the outset 
of the process for voting to begin, and since the constitutional amendment that would set 
the quorum of the assembly as one-third of the seats was to be decided by a referendum a 
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acquire the two-thirds majority and convene the assembly for the election of the president. 
The nationalist MHP and the social democrat DSP attended the parliamentary sessions, in 
order to avoid another presidential election stalemate.910 However, both put forward their 
own candidates and voted for them and as such Gül was elected on the third round 
(Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 101). With the election of Gül, the presidency ceased to 
be a veto actor or alternatively we can say it ceased to be a “safeguard that can force 
consensus by the other parties before making amendments” (Arato 2009, 37). 






Referendum Constitutional  
Court and its 
decision 













1988 (failed) 284 approved, 
95 rejected  
380 
participated  
No × 65% 
rejected 
 
1993 313 approved, 
50 rejected  
370 
participated  
No   
1995 360 approved, 
32 rejected  
392 
participated  
No   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
910 The Demokratik Sol Parti was the party of Ecevit. Established in 1985, the party lost its support 
gradually after 2002. In the 2007 elections, 13 DSP candidates got elected to the parliament by running as 
part of the CHP list and resigning afterwards. 
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The early general elections, the Constitutional Court’s review of the amendments, 
the parliamentary election of the new president and the concurrent referendum on the 
2007 amendments led to a discrepancy, that was resolved by another constitutional 
amendment in October 2007. These amendments were actually to undo the two 
provisional amendments that were no longer relevant because the president was already 
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elected by the parliament but they were to be voted on in the upcoming referendum.911 
However, the process was once again confrontational. The opposition CHP argued that 
Turkish citizens residing abroad had already begun casting their votes at the customs with 
the version of the referendum ballot that included the two provisional articles that were 
intended to be deleted from the text and thus that the referendum process had already 
begun (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 102). The CHP’s proposal was to withdraw the 
whole constitutional amendment package and terminate the referendum process. 
However, the other opposition party, the nationalist MHP, again in order to avoid another 
constitutional crisis gave the government its support and the amendments were adopted. 
The referendum took place on October 21 and was approved by 68.95% of the vote.  
The 2007 constitutional changes regarding the election of the president and 
parliamentary procedures were sudden reactions to political crises and were carried out 
without much consideration as to their repercussions. They were not the result of a well 
thought out constitutional step (Uran 2010, 3). The amendments were also irrelevant to 
democracy (Kalaycioğlu 2011, 274). The AKP’s legislative hegemony had provided it 
with the confidence to push through changes at the risk of exacerbating the polarized 
atmosphere. Its majoritarian attitude worsened the political conflict and triggered a 
confrontational attitude from opposition parties as well (Kalaycioğlu 2011, 273). The 
constitutional amendment that changed the system of government from a parliamentary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
911 PA 18 stated “The last paragraph of Art. 67 is not applicable for bills and amendments to electoral laws 
that are requisite for the presidential election”. PA 19 stated “The first round of the election of the 11th 
president of the Republic shall be held on the first sunday following the fortieth day from the publication of 
this law in the Official Gazette and the second round shall be held on the second sunday following the first 
round”. Both of these temporary additions to the constitituion, albeit in the form of constitutional 
amendments, have not been applicable since Gül was elected as the 11th president. 
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system to a parliamentary system with an elected presidency was the result of a “political 
conflict between the ruling political party and the constitutional court” (Uran and 
Pasquina 2015, 93). The legislative politics preferred by AKP did not allow for 
compromise and consensus-seeking between the government and the opposition parties, 
especially when accompanied by political tension and bitterness outside of the parliament 
(Kalaycioğlu 2011, 273).  
The whole process that defined the presidential election stalemate, the 
Constitutional Court’s decision, the warning by the military, the snap elections, 
constitutional amendments and the referendum- were a series of crises that followed one 
another. The constitution-making and referendum processes were the result of partisan 
politics characterized by the secularist versus pro-Islamic divide in Turkish politics 
(Atikcan and Öge 2012, 454). This polarized context intensified with further 
developments in 2008 where the AKP faced constitutional challenges on two fronts 1) on 
the constitutionally of amendments that would permit female students to wear 
headscarves on university campuses, 2) a threat of closure to the governing AKP for 
being the "focal point of anti-secular activities". Both issues were centered around the 
issue of secularism and divided around the secular-pro-Islamic fault lines.  
Constitutional Change Defined by the Religious— Secularist Divide: the 
Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments of 2008 
The AKP electoral victory following months of crisis gave the party leadership 
the self-confidence to pursue further constitutional change. Able to form a single party 
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government once again, with a new president chosen from its ranks, the AKP abandoned 
its preference for consensus with pro-Western and liberal business circles and the media 
(Eligür 2010, 261). On the one hand, it revealed plans to introduce a new constitution 
drafted by a governmental extra-party committee (Arato 2010a, 477).912 On the other 
hand, AKP placed lifting the ban on female students wearing the Islamic headscarf at 
universities on top of its agenda. A highly politicized issue, the headscarf debate has been 
the epitome of the secularist vs pro-Islamic divide (Saktanber and Çorbacioğlu 2008). 
While one segment of the society saw the ban “as a precaution for protecting the secular 
regime and gender equality,” the other portion saw it “as an infringement of their 
fundamental democratic right to freedom of religion” (Azak 2013, 92). The ban is not 
based on a provision of the constitution, nor any statutory law. Previous efforts to resolve 
the issue through ordinary legislation have failed. Two decisions of the Constitutional 
Court from l989 and 1991 had become the basis for which public bodies imposing the 
ban and prohibiting the wearing of headscarves at universities913.  
Recognizing the issue’s sensitivity for the opposition party CHP, the military and 
the judiciary, AKP government did not attempt to revoke the ban during its first term, 
arguing that there was no “institutional consensus” on the issue (Özbudun and Gençkaya 
2009, 107). However, a few months after the elections in early 2008, the issue became 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
912 The committee that prepared the draft constitution included six professors of constitutional law: Ergun 
Özbudun, Levent Köker, Yavuz Atar, Fazıl Hüsnü Erdem, Zühtü Arslan and Serap Yazıcı. They were 
asked on June 8, prepared a draft in a short period of time and presented it to the AKP leadership at the end 
of August. The draft was slightly modified after the committee held a meeting with AKP cadres in mid-
September (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 104). The committee was formed upon the request of Prime 
Minister Erdoğan. 
913 The legal and historical background of the headscarf ban is beyond the scope of this study. See Roznai 
and Yolcu 2012, 177-182 for further information. 
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front and center. Prime Minister Erdoğan revealed that the intension of AKP were to 
swiftly lift the headscarf ban (Eligür 2010, 263). Although the largest opposition party 
CHP vehemently opposed such an idea, the necessary support came from the nationalist 
MHP. Devlet Bahçeli, the chair of the MHP, a nationalist and anti-liberal political party 
whose electorate overlaps with that of the AKP, who suggested a resolution via 
constitutional amendment rather than waiting for a constitutional replacement to solve the 
issue (Eligür 2010, 263).  A constitutional amendment proposal regarding two articles 
(Art. 10 and 42) was submitted with the signatures of AKP and MHP deputies. The 
initiative, which was read as a step towards lifting the headscarf ban at all state 
institutions, created a counter-mobilization by the judiciary and the secular media, 
university faculty and civil society associations. Unlike the previous instances of military 
interference, on this occasion the armed forces refrained from involvement or making 
public statements (Eligür 2010, 264). However, statements from authorities including the 
Supreme Court of Appeals and the Council of State were communicated through the 
media, suggestiing that at least some sectors of the judiciary found headscarf freedom 
incompatible with the republic’s principle of secularism. Among secular segments of the 
society, the issue also led to mobilization. For instance, women’s associations marched to 
Atatürk’s mausoleum, a symbol of secularism and other ideals of the republic (Eligür 
2010, 265).  
However, the two parties, the AKP and MHP were able to muster the necessary 
votes and their amendments were approved by the parliament in early February with over 
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two-thirds of the votes.914 The country’s newspaper of record Hürriyet’s headline after 
the parliamentary vote read “411 hands were raised in favor of chaos,” referring to the 
number of deputies who voted for the constitutional changes. The amendments 
concerning the principle of equality (Article 10) and the right to education (Article 42) 
were subtly changed. An additional phrase “in the use of all kinds of public services” was 
inserted to Art. 10 and a new paragraph stating “No one shall be deprived of his/her right 
to higher education for any reason not explicitly specified by law. The limits on the 
exercise of this right shall be determined by law” was added to Art. 42 (Özbudun and 
Gençkaya 2009, 107). Although appearing neutral in terms of content, the amendments 
were specifically catered to AKP’s religious base. Kalaycıoğlu (2011, 274) finds it 
unlikely to categorize these amendments as part of the EU reforms as he argues that the 
government’s agenda of promoting EU membership stalled once Turkey began the actual 
accession negotiations in 2005 and instead turned inwards towards consolidating its 
power in autonomous agencies of the state, high political offices and the assertion of a 
more forceful political Islam. Nevertheless, the explanation for the 2008 amendments do 
refer to the absence of such a problem – some female students being deprived of a 
university education- in other European member states of the Council of Europe as part 
of their rationale (Roznai and Yolcu 2012, 183). 
The decision by the AKP to embark on constitutional change directed at its own 
electoral base on the one hand and to convene a committee of experts to draft a 
constitution without the participation of opposition groups on the other hand raised 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
914 Law no. 5755 adopted on February 9, 2008. 
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suspicions about the intentions of the governing party. Although it was not clear whether 
the amendments would suffice to lift the ban or if implementing legislation would be 
required,915 members of the main opposition party CHP petitioned the Constitutional 
Court916 on the grounds that the amendments were against the unamendable articles of 
the constitution: in particular, the principle of secularism.917 This period, after which the 
high court began its formal review of the legislative process and the parliament’s power 
to propose constitutional amendments also witnessed political crisis on a number of 
fronts. In mid-March, the Chief Public Prosecutor, Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya, filed a with 
the Constitutional Court demanding the closure of the AKP and a ban from politics for 71 
of its members for five years on the grounds that the party had become the "focal point of 
anti-secular activities". In addition to the constitutional amendments that would pave the 
way for headscarf freedom at the universities, unsubstantiated and circumstantial 
statements by AKP members were cited as evidence. The court accepted the prosecutor’s 
indictment against the sitting government and came within just one vote of banning the 
governing party, though it did vote to cut public funding for the party. The Chairman of 
the Constitutional Court, Haşim Kılıç, who voted against the closure, stated that the 
court’s decision was a “serious warning” (Hürriyet, July 30, 2008). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
915 With regards to the ambiguity over the repercussions of this constitutional change, see Benhabib 2009. 
916 Since the AKP came to power, the CHP has continuously challenged the constitutionality of the 
ordinary laws adopted by the AKP majority (Aslan-Akman 2005). However it was only in 2007 that the 
opposition party brought a petition on constitutional amendment to the high court. 
917 The deputies of the other center-left political party, the DSP, were also among the petititoners. The 
official petititon was drawn up on February 27, 2008, and the Court decided to examine the case on its 
merits on March 6. 
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Throughout the AKP closure case, the country was also absorbed by the 
investigation into the so-called Ergenekon organization, a clandestine ultranationalist 
group that allegedly planned to orchestrate assassinations and bomb attacks to create 
chaos and pave the way for a military coup that would ultimately overthrow the AKP 
government. The court cases that started in early 2008 gradually changed the balance of 
power between the military and civilians. However, not only military officers, retired 
generals and intelligence officers were arrested or detained in relation to Ergenekon but 
also opposition members of parliament, members of civil society associations, academics, 
politicians and journalists. Prime Minister Erdoğan stated that AKP members were the 
prosecutors in this trial while the leader of the CHP, Deniz Baykal, contended that 
seculars members of Turkish society had become targets of the government and its allies 
in the police force and the judiciary (Eligür 2010, 269). The governing AKP adopted the 
rhetoric that as the “true” representative of the people, it was battling against the 
authoritarian establishment and its representatives in the civil and military bureaucracy 
(Tombuş 2013). Members of the AKP also charged that the opposition parties were 
culprits in this conspiracy by the Ergenekon organization and that they were providing 
the suspects “moral, political and even legal support” and that the high courts were 
attempting to undermine the AKP (Kalaycığlu 2011, 4). The Ergenekon trials aggravated 
the parliamentary polarization and the tension between the government and the judiciary 
(Aydın-Düzgit 2012, 331). In this increasingy confrontational political atmosphere, the 
Constitutional Court decided to invalidate the 2008 amendments. 
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The Constitutional Court argued that the amendments were unconstitutional on 
the basis that the secular character of the republic was among the unamendable articles, 
whose modification cannot be even proposed according to Art. 4, even though the 
parliamentary majority was reached and other procedural requirements were followed.918 
Despite the explicit limits on constitutional review by Art. 148 to procedural grounds, the 
court concluded that the constitutional amendments were unconstitutional because they 
were inconsistent with the constitutional provision that mandates a secular state (Bali 
2013, Roznai and Yolcu 2012). With regards to the absence of consensus-seeking, the 
Court found it problematic that “society’s anxiety has not been resolved but, rather, a 
defiant solution had been adopted as a method that excludes democratic compromise” 
(Roznai and Yolcu 2012, 187). The court’s decision became another rallying point for the 
critics of the 1982 Constitution.919 In August 2008, AKP revealed that it had decided to 
withhold its plans to replace the constitution but had prepared 40 amendments to the 
existing constitution, dubbed a “democratization package”. Although the speaker of the 
parliament sought to establish a conciliation committee and extended invitations to the 
opposition parties in parliament, the main opposition party CHP declined to participate. 
The Turkish political elite had now entered into a full-on confrontational and the 
parliamentary politics had now become “deeply divided polarized, intensely 
confrontational, and marked by mutual hatred and distrust” (Kalaycıoğlu 2011, 4).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
918 See Roznai and Yolcu, 2012, pp. 175–20; Özbudun 2009 and Acar 2009 for further analysis of the 
court’s decision. Also Ergun Özbudun, “AYM'nin 5.6.2008 tarih, 2008/16 esas, 2008/116 karar sayılı iptal 
gerekçesi üzerine değerlendirme,” Milliyet Blog, October 22, 2008, available at 
http://blog.milliyet.com.tr/aym-nin-5-6-2008-tarih--2008-16-esas--2008-116-karar-sayili-iptal-gerekcesi-
uzerine-degerlendirme/Blog/?BlogNo=139547 
919 Özbudun, November 16 2008. 
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Bitter and Polarized: Confrontational Constitutional Change of 2010  
Judicial reform had become a priority for the AKP after its clashes with the high 
court over the election of the president, constitutional amendments and its averted closure 
case.920 From the perspective of the government, the judiciary was systematically 
challenging the government’s ability to legislate and it was operationalized as “an 
unelected veto player” by the opposition CHP and other state elites unable to block the 
AKP’s initiatives in the parliament (Bali 2013, 691). According to its critics, the court 
was not concerned with the protection of individual rights and the promotion of 
democratic values, but was governed with an institutional duty to preclude electoral 
majorities that might threaten the republic’s founding ideological commitments (Bali 
2012, 258). According to the AKP, the judicial appointments and promotions process had 
generated a biased court. Although Gül’s presidency implied that he could appoint 
justices more favorable to AKP agenda, he was still constrained by the candidate pool 
which was determined by the appellate courts (Bali 2013, 691). Kuzu, the President of 
the Constitution Commission from the AKP who worked on the drafting of his party’s 
proposal, stated that “we had no other option than [changing the constitution] to break off 
the tutelage [of the judiciary]” (Kuzu 2014, AI). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
920 Gök (2014, AI), a CHP member of Constitution Commission states that the restructuring of the judiciary 
was “goal-oriented” in the sense that AKP wanted to eliminate the judiciary’s status quo approach in order 
to have an impact on its future decisions. İyimaya (2014, AI, an AKP MP who worked on the AKP’s 
proposal and was a member of Constitution Commission describes himself as the architect of the reforms. 
According to him, not only societal demands but also the memory of past crises played a role in the AKP’s 
proposal (İyimaya 2014, AI).  
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Speculation in the media in early 2010 that the public prosecutor to the Supreme 
Court of Appeals was contemplating bringing another case to close down the AKP 
prompted the governing party to propose a constitutional change that would make it more 
difficult for parties to be closed. The original proposal was later supplemented with 
changes in the composition of the Constitutional Court921 and the High Council of Judges 
and Prosecutors (HSYK)922 and was prepared by the AKP’s legal consultants. After the 
AKP announced that it welcomed the demands of opposition parties and interest groups, 
asking them to bring forth their proposals within a few days, both the CHP and MHP 
declined ivolvement in the AKP’s proposal. Three members from the MHP drafted a 48-
article amendment proposal with the expectation that all proposals, and not just the 
government’s, would be negotiated and those amendments where all parties reached a 
consensus would be submitted to the parliament (Korkmaz 2014, AI). The CHP prepared 
its own constitutional amendment proposal including six articles, as did the BDP, which 
proposed a counter-constitutional package that emphasized the demands of its social 
democratic and ethnically Kurdish base such as the right of conscientious objection, the 
right to mother tongue education, the elimination of mandatory religious education, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
921 The constitituonal challenges faced by the AKP since 2007 were at the heart of this decision with 
respect to the Constitutional Court. Özdemir Özdemir who served as the general director of law under the 
Justice Minister between 2008 and 2011, argues that the government’s plans to introduce individual 
constitutional complaints also prompted the decision to expand the composition of the court because the 
new mechanism was expected to increase the caseload of the court (Özdemir 2014, AI). 
922 Attempts to restructure the HSYK stemmed from some other high profile cases, in which the board had 
suppressed the activism of lower courts such as during the investigation into the the Şemdinli incident, see 
Tezcür 2009 and Sağlam 2013. The European Union has repeatedly criticized the board and called for 
reform, see “Concerns remain about the independence, impartiality and efficiency of the judiciary,” Turkey 
2009 Progress Report, at 11, SEC (2009) 1334 (Oct. 14, 2009). The February 2010 arrest of a prosecutor 
(İlhan Cihaner) and the decision of HSYK to revoke the authority of another prosecutor who ordered his 
arrest created an additional crisis between the government and the judiciary. 
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use of the phrase “citizen of the Turkish Republic” rather than “Turkish citizen” and the 
provision of state funded education at all levels.923 Civil society organizations such as the 
Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (TÜRK-İŞ) similarly released their demands to 
the media (Hürriyet March 26, 2010).  
The opposition party CHP considered the constitutional amendment proposal a 
majoritarian imposition that was ill-fitted for such high tension parliamentary politics and 
was only willing to agree to lifting the amnesty for the coup makers of 1980 and to the 
proposal on parliamentary inviolability (NTV, March 1 2010). As the government 
prepared to submit the package to the parliament, the opposition CHP decided to make 
visits to civil society organizations to mobilize them against the AKP’s proposals. 
Around 200 academics and representatives of unions, women’s associations and other 
civil society organizations made a statement and sent a delegation to the parliament 
demanding that constitutional change should take place after the upcoming general 
elections once the necessary legal and constitutional modifications such as removing the 
electoral threshold, revising the laws on political parties and the electoral system, limiting 
parliamentary inviolability and providing positive discrimination for women were 
enacted (Bianet, March 22 2010). Behind closed doors, the authorities of the Supreme 
Court of Appeals and Supreme Military Council voiced their objections to changes that 
would affect their institutions, but these did not amount to any substantive pressure 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
923 For a comparison of the AKP and BDP’s proposals, see 
http://bianet.org/system/uploads/1/files/attachments/000/000/109/original/bdp_anayasa.html 
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(Özdemir, 2014 AI). Ultimately, the proposal submitted was the one that was drafted in 
AKP headquarters (Gök 2014, AI).924 
  Table 7.4: Major Constitutional Amendments in Turkey 





Subject of the amendments 
1987  4 articles Single party 
majority 
ANAP  Amendment procedure; election 
regulations and lifting the ban on 
poltical leaders. 





DYP, SHP Preamble; rights and freedoms; 
expansion of political rights and 
participation; increase in the 
number of members in the 
parliament; procedures for political 
party closures; recourse to CC in 
case of loss of membership for 
deputies. 







Preamble; expanding the scope of 
rights and freedoms and delimiting 
general restrictions on rights and 
freedoms; restricted death penalty; 
political participation; right to fair 
trial; Turkish citizenship; judicial 
review of military regime laws; 
punishment system for political 
parties; composition of the MGK 
2004 10 articles Single party 
majority 
AKP Elimination of capital punishment 
and State Security Courts, 
precedence of international treaties 
on fundamental rights and 
freedoms; gender equality 
2007 7 articles Single party 
majority 
AKP Tenure of the parliament; direct 
election of the president; meeting 
quorum of the parliament 
2010 26 articles Single party 
majority 
AKP Positive discrimination; rights and 
freedoms; collective bargaining for 
public servants; introduction of 
ombudsman; individual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
924 Although the proposal was drafted by AKP cadres, including ministers and members of the parliament, 
academics did contribute to the the drafting process and the 2007 draft constitution prepared by Özbudun 
was also taken into consideration (Üstün 2014, AI). The bureaucracy of the Justice Ministry played an 
important part in the drafting of the proposal (Kuzu 2014, AI). 
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constitutional complaint 
mechanism; recourse to judicial 
review for Supreme Military 
Council expulsion decisions; 
restricting the military courts' 
jurisdiction; removing the 
immunity for the perpetrators of 
the 1980 coup; composition and 
appointment structure of the 
Constitutional Court and Supreme 
Council of Judges and Prosecutors 
 
Despite these developments, within and outside the parliament, the government’s 
proposal was submitted on March 30 and was adopted by the Assembly on May 7 with 
almost exclusively AKP votes because the CHP and BDP had decided to boycott the vote 
and the MHP had voted against the proposal.925 The parliamentary debates between the 
government and the opposition were “were highly heated, and mutually demeaning” 
(Kalaycıoğlu 2011, 6).926  Members of the AKP did defend their proposals, but they were 
satisfied that the package would pass regardless of the opposition’s objections.927 
Resistance to constitutional change by the opposition and certain state institutions led the 
AKP to conclude that they needed to push through the amendments despite these 
objections, and as one deputy from AKP described it, they considered it “breaking the 
siege” (Ustun 2014, AI). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
925 These amendments were debated in the parliament between April 19 and May 7. 
926 See Şeref 2011 for an analysis of parliamentary debate during the 2010 amendment-making. 
927 An anonymous rapporteur for the Constituton Commission, in an interview conducted on November 26, 
2014 describe the government’s attitude throughout the 2010 amendment process as one of indifference to 
opposition. The rapporteur describes the debates held in the commission as intense sessions held for days 
and nights. Gök, a CHP member of the Constitution Commission describes the commission’s work in 
similar terms; AKP members did not even state their positions because they did not want to initiate a 
discussion to avoid wasting time with questions (2014, AI).  
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Only one article regarding party dissolution (Art 69) was dropped from the 
proposals because it fell short of three-fifth of the votes- indicating that among the AKP 
cadre there were second thoughts about the implications of leaving party closure cases to 
the consent of the parliament.928 Because the package received less than two-thirds, 
referendum became obligatory. However, even before the assembly voted on the whole 
package, AKP vice president Cemil Çiçek had revealed that the government was 
planning to hold a public referendum if the proposal failed to get the supermajority.929 
Thus it was clear that AKP had come to embrace a recourse to referendum as a 
mechanism to overcoming the resistance against constitutional change by both the 
opposition parties and the Constitutional Court. 
The 2010 amendments became another example of “the enhanced partisanship 
and elite conflict” that had absorbed Turkey since 2007 (Kalaycıoğlu 2011, 2). The 
opposition appealed to the Constitutional Court once again, but this time the court’s 
decision did not mean annulment but partial revision of the two articles on Constitutional 
Court and HSYK.930 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
928 Kuzu (2014, AI), the President of Constitution Commission, who was from the AKP claims that it was 
nationalist AKP MPs who feared that the provision would make dissolving Kurdish parties difficult, and 
voted against it. 
929 Özdemir who served as the general director of law under the Justice Minister between 2008 and 2011 
confirms that the AKP was aware beforehand that it could not get the two-thirds majority to approve these 
amendments without going to a referendum and this knowledge played into the decision to expand the 
scope of the amendments to include provisions related to freedoms etc. (Özdemir 2014, AI). An MP from 
the parliament who provides an account of his party’s position before AKP submitted the government’s 
proposal recalls that the AKP’s attitude was “take it or leave it” with the intention of submitting the 
amendments to referendum if the opposition choses not to support them (Korkmaz 2014, AI). 
930 Before it was put to referendum, the Constitutional Court following the request of the CHP and the DSP 
reviewed the articles, (Articles 8, 14, 16, 19, 22 and 26 of the package) based on Article 4’s ban on 
amendments to articles 1 through 3 and decided to partially annul two articles (Article 146 and 159 of the 
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A thorough media analysis of the 2010 referendum campaign demonstrates that 
“political actors tapped into the existing societal cleavage along the secular-pro-Islam 
axis, and turned the referendum debate into a partisan one” (Atikcan and Öge 2012, 458). 
The AKP’s unilateral approach to constitutional change led to a four-way division among 
the the political and societal forces: proponents, “not enough but yes” voters, opponents 
and boycotters. Among these, the “not enough by yes” voters deserve further clarification. 
This faction, although voting yes to the referendum, was critical of the government for 
stopping short of more comprehensively, liberal and democratic constitutional change. 
The pro-Kurdish BDP and other left voters boycotted the referendum on the grounds that 
it failed to respond to their demands.931 Analyzing the voting behavior of the 2010 
campaign, authors Atikcan and Öge (2012, 461) find that polarization about 
constitutional change overlapped with partisanship and that the referendum was 
interpreted as a vote of confidence for AKP (Atikcan and Öge 2012, 455). According to 
the polls, only around 10 percent of the participants of the referendum voted based on the 
content of the amendments package (Ergil 2010, 16). Further polarizing the campaign 
and pushing the electorate to the two extremes, Prime Minister Erdoğan appealed to the 
rhetoric of “state elites” vs. “elected politicians” because the recent electoral victories of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Constitution) that would have restricted the number of votes for candidates for the AYM and HSYK to one 
per election (Article 146, 4th paragraph- Article 16 of the package) and would have allowed the president to 
directly appoint four faculty members from economic and political science departments or senior 
executives to the HSYK (Article 159, 3rd paragraph- Article 22 of the package). However, the court refused 
to review the package as a whole on formal grounds. The Constitutional Court announced its decision on 
July 7, 2010. E. 2010/49 K. 2010/87  
931 See Yılmaz 2010 for a comparison of the political parties’ attitudes to the 2010 constitutional 
amendments. 
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the AKP demonstrated that polarization was electorally beneficial for the governing party 
(Turan 2010, 3). The amendments were adopted with 58% approval. 
The requirements of European Union were not a decisive factor for the 
government’s amendment proposal (Oder 2012). Although, the proposal made reference 
to EU or Europe with respect to several changes, it was not mentioned in the general 
reasoning.932 It is also interesting to note that the opposition also made reference to 
European standards in their criticisms of the substance of the articles as well the 
majoritarian method of drafting them (Oder 2012). However, the EU welcomed the 
changes.933 
Among the list of amendments, AKP government emphasized the elimination of 
military immunity for crimes carried out under the military regime. AKP constructed the 
debate on the referendum such that voting “yes” implied seeking justice for the coup 
plotters whereas voting “no” in the referendum meant support for the military coups. 
Coincidentally, the referendum was also held on the symbolic anniversary of the day of 
the coup September 12. Right before the referendum, in August 2010 the government and 
the military high command encountered tensions during the Supreme Military Council 
meeting (YAŞ) over the promotions of generals who were imprisoned and awaiting trial 
on charges related to the Ergenekon case (Aslan-Akman 2012b, 82). The AKP 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
932 Üstün (2014, AI) reports that during the drafting of the proposal by the AKP they took into 
consideration experiences from European states. For instance, with respect to individual constitutional 
complaints, the drafters of the reports studied the German example. The Venice Commission’s opinions 
were also taken into account.  
933 Venice Commission “Interim Opinion on the Draft Law on the High Council for Judges and Public 
Prosecutors (September 27, 2010) of Turkey,” Venice, 17-18 December 2010. 
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government interfered in appointments and was reluctant to consider the promotion of 
military officers implicated in the coup plots, which led to a temporary standoff between 
the government and the military. These factors helped frame constitutional change as a 
matter of “civilianization” when the amendment package included issues without any 
intrinsic link to it.  
The 2010 amendments included 26 amendments.934 Some of the articles are aimed 
at broadening the democratic content of the constitution. These include positive 
discrimination measures for children, women, and the disabled (Art. 10); the rights of 
children (Art. 41), access to information (Art. 74), the protection of personal data (Art. 
20); freedom to travel abroad (Art. 23); collective bargaining for public servants (Art. 
53); the removal of certain restrictions for labor unions (Art 51 and 54); repealing the loss 
of membership for deputies whose statements and actions had led to the dissolution of 
their parties (Art. 84); allowing judicial review for the disciplinary sanctions given to 
public servants (Art. 129);  the introduction of an ombudsman to investigate complaints 
against state institutions (Art. 74); constitutionalizing the Economic and Social Council 
(Art. 166);  establishing an individual constitutional complaint mechanism (Art. 148); 
increasing the quorum of the Constitutional Court in party prohibition and a review of the 
constitutionality of constitutional amendment cases; allowing judicial review of the 
Supreme Military Council's decisions (Art. 125); restricting the military courts' 
jurisdiction (Art. 145); widening the scope of Supreme Court’s jurisdiction (Art. 148) and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
934 Originally it included 27 amendments but Art 69 was dropped off during the plenary. Two of these were 
provisional articles that were intended to regulate the election and selection process of new members of the 
Constitutional Court and the HSYK. 
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removing immunity for the perpetrators of the 1980 coup (PA 15) (Yazıcı 2010, Örucu 
2011, Gönenç 2010 and Coşkun 2013). The opposition considered these to be “window-
dressing” for the rest of the amendments, which changed the appointment structure of the 
Constitutional Court and HSYK and were the truly divisive issues of the constitutional 
change (Art. 146, 147, 149 and 159) (Günalp 2010). The opposition considered the rest to 
be “sweeteners” that were embedded to obtain more votes in the referendum 
(Kalaycıoğlu 2011, 275). Although these amendments could have democratization 
potential, argued the oppositional forces, they were simply added as instrumental at 
attracting the support of domestic and international liberal opinion. Otherwise, the 
government would have allowed votes on each amendment separately, rather than forcing 
a yes or no vote on the whole package. Another criticism was that the new amendment 
package would make it more difficult to negotiate a consensual and democratic 
constitution in the future (Arato 2010b, 346).  
The most divisive amendments were the ones that altered the composition and 
appointment structure of the Constitutional Court935 and HSYK936. For both institutions, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
935 The number of members of the Constitutional Court is increased from 11 permanent and 4 alternate 
judges to 17 permanent judges with no alternates. Previously, all members were selected by the president 
from among candidates nominated by high courts and the Council of Higher Education (YÖK). According 
to the new rules, the parliament appoints three members. The president appoints four members directly 
from among senior administrative officers and lawyers, judges and prosecutors from the lower courts and 
ten members indirectly among candidates nominated by the high courts and YÖK. 
936 The number of members of HSYK was increased more dramatically. Previously, the board included the 
Minister of Justice, Undersecretary to the Minister of Justice, fıve other regular members and five substitute 
members. The number of members has now been raised to 22 with 12 subsitutes. The president appoints 
four regular members among members of the teaching staff in the field of law; seven regular and four 
substitute members are elected by civil judges and public prosecutors and three regular and two substitute 
members are elected by administrative judges and public prosecutors from among those who are first 
category judges. The rest are appointed by the High Court of Appeals, the Council of State and the Justice 
Academy. 
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the number of members was increased and the selection process was restructured. The 
intended goal of the amendments and their possible repercussions were at the center of 
the 2010 debate over constitutional change. On the one hand, opposition forces argued 
that the AKP intended to create a compliant judiciary by placing “institutional curbs on 
the power of its longtime secularist foes” (Müftüler-Baç and Keyman 2012, 85). On the 
other hand, supporters of judicial restructuring maintained that the amendments brought 
an end “to judicial guardianship” and allowed greater judicial autonomy (Bali 2012, 
306).937 Those who were against the amendments argued that although the selection 
process was more diversified, it was also more politicized and expressed concerns that 
the constitutional changes would pave the ground for civilian authoritarianism. 
Kalaycıoğlu argues that the tension results from “the long-running kulturkampf between 
the secularists and the Islamist revivalists” which has intensified since 2007 when the 
relationship between the governing AKP and the opposition parties deteriorated over the 
presidential elections. Alternatively, Bali (2012, 314-115) argues “the constitutional 
conflict of the last decade was not a confrontation between secularists and Islamists or a 
modernizing elite and a backward-looking provincial bourgeoisie. Rather, it was a 
conflict over the apportionment of access to state resources between a defensive elite 
seeking to safeguard its traditional privileges and a new class of social actors seeking to 
transform state institutions to accommodate ethnic and religious particularism”. Against 
the charges of the opposition that restructuring the Constitutional Court and HSYK was a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
937Although the HSYK has been made more representative, the fact that the Minister of Justice and 
Undersecretary to Minister of Justice are “natural members” of the board raises doubts about judicial 
independence 
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case of court-packing and an attempt by the majority party to capture the third branch of 
the government; the AKP and its supporters argued that the opposition had come to rely 
on the judiciary when it was unable to challenge the incumbents’ legislative agenda. 
Those who supported the reconstruction of the judiciary interpreted the underlying 
concern as “anxieties that demographic changes in Turkish society would yield new 
distributions of political power if state institutions that had long resisted democratic 
pressure were subjected to forms of accountability entailed by the reforms” (Bali 2012, 
298).  
7.3 Discussion 
 With great contrast to Chile’s consensual approach that advanced gradually only 
when veto players acquiesced, Turkish constitutional change happened abruptly, in most 
cases responding to an emerging crisis, without establishing a consensus and despite the 
attempts of procedural and institutional vetoes. The electoral system and the resulting 
balance of power in the congress/parliament offer a significant part of the explanation. In 
the case of Chile, the balance of power did not change in a meaningful way before or 
after the 2005 amendments, whereas in Turkey the balance of power shifted towards a 
dominant party (Müftüler-Baç and Keyman 2012).938  
The ten percent threshold led to “inconsistent effects, with highly fragmented 
parliaments elected in 1995 and 1999 but the opposite in the general elections of 2002 
and 2007” (Hale 2008, 236). The fragmented parties pre-2002 had allowed for consensual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
938 After its third consecutive win in 2011, the AKP satisfied Giovanni Sartori’s criteria for being a 
dominant party (Çarkoğlu 2011, 45). 
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constitution-making that aimed at ridding the constitution from anti-democratic 
provisions whereas under the single-party government, amendments were in general 
responding to a crisis, motivated by partisan interests or were minor and regulative 
changes. Another method was reconciliation between the major political party AKP with 
alliances or reconciliation with other opposition parties as was the case in 2002 and 2004 
when the CHP provided support and with the 2008 amendment (ultimately annulled) 
when the MHP provided support.  
As a result of the electoral system in Turkey, the AKP was able to convert 
pluralities of the popular vote into large parliamentary majorities. The AKP was able to 
transform its electoral hegemony into a greater parliamentary weight, creating 
considerably disproportionate seat distribution and rendering compromise with other 
political parties unnecessary, especially after the office of the presidency was secured by 
an AKP veteran. After 2007, Turkish constitutional change shifted to a majoritarian 
amending strategy (Arato 2009, 32) where changes were adopted “on the bases of 
primarily the votes of a single majority party, that could then use a referendum to confirm 
its will in the face of a presidential veto” (Arato 2010a, 477).  The opposition responded 
with a confrontational attitude as well, relying on the Constitutional Court to try to block 
AKP-sponsored constitutional amendments. In return, the AKP responded to judicial 
interventionism with constitutional changes that were centered on restructuring the 
judiciary, “projecting its own priorities and vision into the amended articles of the 1982 
Constitution” (Kalaycıoğlu 2011, 276).  
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In terms of actors outside of the parliament, the variety in the Turkish case again 
contrasts significantly with the Chilean elite-led constitutional change. For one thing, in 
the Turkish case external actors- i.e. the impact of European Union conditionality –
remains strongly felt even though the government’s EU agenda waned after 2005 when 
actual negotiations began. Afterwards, the AKP government approached “EU 
conditionality only selectively and strategically, to adopt the reforms that would increase 
the government’s powers vis-à-vis other state institutions, most notably the military and 
the judiciary” (Cengiz 2014, 9). 
In Chile, demand for constitutional change was clearly a political elite-led iniative 
with no public impetus. In the Turkish case, citizen engagement was much more 
prevalent. Recourse to referendum in 2007 and again in 2010 is only one way that 
constitutional change moved outside of the parliament. The high level of polarization 
over matters up for constitutional change- such as the direct election of the president, 
headscarf freedom and judicial restructuring- created a context in which constitutional 
matters came front and center, whether this was with regard to the engagement of civil 
society actors or mobilization in the streets. Compared to Chile, where the 2005 
constitutional amendments received little attention, constitutional change garnered active 
media attention and participation.939  
 Studying the way constitutional change took place in Chile and Turkey allows us 
to observe the variety of factors that come into play in the process of amendment-making. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
939 For media’s participation in the 2004 amendments, see Aldıkaçtı Marshall, 2010 and for the 2007 and 
2010 amendments, see Atikcan and Öge 2012. 
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First, we observe that the underlying legal and institutional variables provide an 
important part of the story of constitutional change. The executive played the most 
critical role in Chile, but smooth executive-legislative relations ensured that there was no 
discord once consensus was achieved between the two legislative blocs. In Turkey, the 
parliamentary process worked much more smoothly after 2007 when with the election of 
Gül, the majority party in parliament, the AKP, became also the party of the president. 
During President Sezer’s term, his resorting to presidential veto delayed the amendment-
making process, or in the case of failed 2003 amendments regarding deforested lands, 
prompted the government to abandon the change.940 Similarly, we observe a contrast in 
appeals to the Constitutional Court.941 In Chile, despite the competence of the 
Constitutional Tribunal to rule on constitutional amendments, it did not issue any 
decisions concerning the constitutionality of constitutional amendments. The Turkish 
Constitutional Court was instrumentalized as a veto power by the opposition parties and 
the president, leading in the case of the 2008 amendments to annulment and in the case of 
the 2010 amendments to partial revision. Another practice, unseen in the Chilean case is 
the recourse to a popular vote for Turkish constitutional changes. TheAKP government, 
convinced that its parliamentary majority should preclude the interference of unelected 
branches of the government and confident in its constituency, did not hesitate to carry 
constitutional amendments to referendum at the expense of reconfirming the polarization 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
940 In total, President Sezer used his veto power with respect to constitutional amendments five times and 
applied to the Constitutional Court once for a review of the constitutionality of constitutional amendments 
(Gönenç 2008, 513). 
941 For an analysis of judicial review exercised by the constitutional courts in Chile and Turkey, see Gözler 
2008. 
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of Turkish society between the secular and religious camps. However, this basic social 
cleavage was reinforced with further appeal to other bifurcations. In the sense that the 
AKP was able to exploit a constructed binary opposition in which it defined itself with 
“civilian politics/people/democracy/periphery/elected” and the opposition whether this 
entails the political parties, state institutions, or critics from media and academia with 
“military/elite/authoritarianism/center/appointed”, the polarization worked to its 
advantage (Tombuş 2013, 319). Beginning with the 2007 amendments, the AKP became 
willing to tap into societal divisions in matters of constitutional change, relying on its 
electoral hegemony. 
 Opportunities and incentives for change make up the contextual factors beyond 
legal and institutional variables.  Although the left-center coalition in Chile was 
embedded in maintaining the status quo and might have been tempted to keep certain 
nondemocratic provisions in order to exploit them for its own benefit, because it had a 
clearly reform-oriented agenda, it sough out constitutional reform that had from the very 
beginning aimed at removing authoritarian enclaves. The right-wing parties had 
incentives to distance themselves from the military establishment, eliminate appointed 
senators and rearrange the balance of power by increasing the powers of the legislative 
branch and strengthening the Constitutional Tribunal. Reform became possible when 
there was elite convergence on relevant constitutional change. Two legislative coalitions, 
which captured virtually all the seats in the Congress dominated Chilean contemporary 
politics and, by working together over a long period of time, resulted in a stable and 
professionalized Congress. In contrast, the governing AKP, which transformed itself 
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from an anti-systemic actor to the dominant party of Turkey, was not able to maintain a 
similarly cooperative relationship with other political parties.  
To the extent that EU membership was a shared aspiration, it provided incentives 
for the government and the opposition to coalesce. In one instance, the 2002 amendments, 
which removed Erdoğan’s disqualification a purely self-serving constitutional change for 
the AKP that offered no incentive for the CHP to play along, was still supported by the 
opposition party. This brief period of goodwill between the opposition forces changed 
when issue of the election of the president of the republic came to the agenda and both 
AKP and CHP entered into a confrontational stance. In this later period, amendments 
were prepared abruptly in response to crises. For instance, the duration of negotiations, in 
Chile for the 2005 reforms was 61 months and for the recognition of Rome Statue, it was 
85 months (Fuentes 2011, 1757-1758). In contrast, it was little over a month after the 
AKP submitted its proposal to Constitution Commission that the parliament adopted the 
amendments, after holding merely 14 meetings in the parliament. In the context of Chile, 
there was no immediate crisis that could explain the constitutional changes behind the 
2005 amendments and others. In contrast, the two most significant amendments in post-
2002 Turkey, namely the amendment that changed the election process of the president 
and the constitutional amendment package that among other things restructured the 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
8.1 Final Remarks: Constitutional Replacement in Chile and Turkey? 
 In the context of transition from authoritarian rule, the constitutions of Chile and 
Turkey over thirty years were amended extensively. However, the fact that constitutions 
went through reiterated process of revision, did not necessarily curtail the demand for 
constitutional replacement. In fact, both countries as this dissertation is being completed, 
are in the process of initiating the drafting of a new constitution.  
 Following the November 2015 snap elections in Turkey942, the country launched 
talks on drafting a new constitution. A parliamentary Constitution Conciliation 
Committee that includes 12 deputies, three from each of Turkey’s four parliamentary 
parties began deliberations in February 2016. Although there is consensus among the 
political parties that Turkey needs a new constitution (or at least a major constitutional 
reform), AKP stands alone in its call for a change from parliamentary system to 
presidential system (Varol 2015). A previous attempt at drafting a new constitution under 
the same framework of an ad-hoc all-party commission had failed after 18 months of 
deliberations between 2012 and 2013. In both instances, the AKP lacked the 
constitutional mandate to unilaterally draft a new constitution. The previous process led 
to consensus on 60 articles, mostly related to rights and freedoms. However the process 
has been criticized on many fronts. Although the commission received the inputs of non-
governmental organizations, universities, associations and unions etc., it did not set out 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
942 In the June 2015 general elections, AKP had lost its parliamentary majority. Unable to form a coalition 
with the other parties and other parties unable to form a coalition among them, Turkey held snap elections 
in November and AKP was able to recapture its parliamentary majority. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  495	   	  
beforehand how it would incorporate their views. The fact that the commission received 
an abundance of opinions and suggestions from civil society did not automatically 
translate into civil society involvement in the process. 
  From the beginning, the commission’s work was not embraced by all sectors of 
the society, especially by those who viewed it as a ploy to switch to presidential system 
to accommodate the growing influence of the former prime minister-now president 
Erdogan. The ad- hoc nature of the commission, with no legal basis in the constitution or 
in the rules of procedures of the parliament, gave way to claims that it lacked legal 
authority. The fact that the ordinary parliament that was elected under the rule of a ten 
percent threshold also called into question its ultimate representativeness for all social 
clusters of the Turkish society. In terms of the working of the commission, critics argued 
that the commission’s work would be restricted as a result of the undemocratic political 
climate where there are tacit and explicit obstacles to freedom of expression. Another 
criticism was directed at the unanimity decision-making rule of the commission. In an 
atmosphere of political polarization where the political parties have firmly embedded 
“red lines”, the requirement of achieving absolute consensus made the new constitution 
unattainable. However, the fact that the commission failed to agree on a full draft did not 
alter the consensus among the political elites and the society that a new constitution is 
needed. 
  In Chile too, a new constitution is one of the most crucial topics of the last few 
years. However, different from previous moments of constitutional change, the demand 
did not come from the political elite. Students’ demand for education reform since 2006, 
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much intensified especially after 2011, began to contextualize education reform within 
the broader context of constitutional change (León, 2013). Those who championed 
constitutional replacement highlight that the constitutional framework and the eighteen 
organic laws (including the one on education) were established to resist change. The 
constitutional amendments approved thus far, the critics argue, was been allowed to the 
extent that the political right has been willing to forgo its veto power. Thus, social 
pressure for constitutional replacement comes from its authoritarian origin as well as the 
existing supra-majoritarian devices that impede substantial constitutional change through 
amendments (Heiss and Yegen 2015). 
 Since the 2009-2010 presidential elections in Chile, calls for constitutional 
replacement have been a promise of candidates. However, the 2011 student protests gave 
new momentum to the debate and during the 2013-2014 presidential elections 
constitutional change was one of the most discussed issues. For months after her election, 
President Michele Bachelet was intentionally ambiguous as to the process of making a 
new constitution; a constituent assembly, a commission of experts or a congressional 
committee. Bachelet’s reformist agenda includes other areas such as education and labor. 
Another long-held point of criticism, the binomial electoral system, was also reformed in 
2015, which is expected to provide a more representative and inclusionary legislature. 
The changes include a switch to the proportional D’Hondt method, increasing the number 
of deputies and senators, providing a gender quota for nominations and redrawing the 
electoral boundaries. In mid-October, President Bachelet announced the beginning of the 
process to draft a new constitution. The initial steps include a campaign to educate the 
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public about constitutional politics, to be followed by a dialogue with citizens, the results 
of which may change the direction of the process. However it is expected that the 
proposals for a new constitution will be submitted to Congress in 2017 when a new 
congress is elected.  
 Such developments in both countries beg the question of whether it is possible to 
democratize an authoritarian constitution through amendments and quell demands for 
complete constitutional change. Recent developments suggest otherwise. While both 
countries have gone through incremental constitutional change, this dissertation has 
argued that the direction of that change as well as the process of making that change are 
insignificantly different between Chile and Turkey. The Chilean constitutional 
amendment-process, albeit reiterated, managed to eliminate most of the institutional 
mechanisms of the “protected democracy”. And in doing so, the democracy-enhancing 
constitutional amendments were approved through consensus-building processes. 
However, a criticism directed at this process has been that political right, which is the 
main inheritor of the military regime, has been able to exercise its veto power and has 
only allowed constitutional change to the extent that it suits its interests. Thus, the critics 
argue, the consensual method is actually a minority exercising its veto power that has 
been possible because of the presence of counter-majoritarian institutions embedded in 
the 1980 constitution. This critique strengthens the call for constitutional replacement in 
Chile.  In contrast, constitutional change in Turkey was not always advanced through 
democracy-enhancing amendments, nor were the amendments always a product of 
consensus. In cases where the majority held the power to impose its will, constitutional 
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amendments were approved without seeking consensus. The incomplete transition to 
democracy in Turkey has in fact gone through a reverse transition and Turkey 
increasingly shows characteristics of “competitive authoritarianism” (Özbudun 2015). 
These suggest to us that neither the Chilean “consensual path” nor the Turkish mixed 
model of “consensus when necessary” have been sufficient to abandon demands for 
constitutional replacement.  
8.2 General Summary of the Dissertation 
 As comparative study of constitutional change in Chile and Turkey, this study has 
focused on four main areas of constitution-making and amendment-making. The first area 
(Chapter 2) provided a comparative constitutional history of the two cases, analyzing the 
degree to which constitutions have been employed to solve a crisis and the degree to 
which frameworks have prompted crises. Commonalities such as the reactive relation 
between constitutional texts, lack of experience with a representative constituent 
assembly and precedents for military involvement demonstrate some early parallels 
between the two cases, albeit with a stronger constitutional tradition in Chile. This 
section demonstrated that constitutions have an “afterlife”. We observed that some of the 
features of past constitutions are carried over to the next one and others deemed 
responsible for crises or judged to have shortcomings were eliminated. By 
contextualizing the process through which the constitutions were made, unmade and 
amendments were introduced; the analysis demonstrates a two-way interaction between 
political, economic and social developments and constitutional change.  
 We observe that a constitution’s shortcomings are at the root of a crisis just as a 
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new constitution may be utilized as a legal instrument to solve a crisis. An example 
would be the 1924 constitution of Turkey, which did not provide for checks and balances 
against a majority party rule and was considered to have played a role in events that led 
to the 1960 coup. Governed by this conclusion, the drafters of the 1961 constitution 
ensured that the constitution would be guarded against such majoritarian tendencies and 
established a number of counter-majoritarian institutions that aimed to end the supremacy 
of the Parliament and oversee the elected officials. This analysis informs us how past 
constitutional experiences shape subsequent ones and it allows us to assess the historical 
weight of the country’s past constitutions in relation to authoritarian constitutions drafted 
in the aftermath of military coup in both cases.  
 We also observe that the amendment mechanism was put to use for past 
constitutions of Chile (1833 and 1825) and Turkey (1924 and 1961). However, more 
interestingly we observe that constitutions have been able to accommodate changes 
without the need to write new ones. An example is the 1833 constitution’s aptness to 
accommodate a parliamentary style government, eventhough this constitution was 
designed for a presidential system. It informs us that constitutional amendments may not 
be necessary when there is an understanding among the political elites.  
 The second part (Chapter 3) examines the breakdown of democracy in both 
countries. Derived from the insight of the previous chapter on past constitution-making in 
Chile and Turkey; namely that political, economic and social context matters to 
understand the process of constitution-making as well as the content of the constitutions, 
this chapter analyzes the factors that led to the breakdown of democracy in Chile and 
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Turkey. In both cases, the political crises that led to the military takeover and 
subsequently a new constitutional framework were the result of polarization of the 
political party system and institutional deadlock. The already tense political situation 
deteriorated as a result of social unrest and economic hardship. The polarization among 
political elites was reflected among the public as well; political violence, strikes and 
protests became routine, and contributed to the coup. In the case of Chile, institutional 
deadlock was over the UP government’s plans to create a socialized sector of the 
economy, in which the amendment-making process increased tensions between the 
president and the Congress. In the case of Turkey, the institutional deadlock was over the 
inability of the political parties to elect a new head of state.  
 We observe in both cases that the issue of constitutional amendments was at the 
center of the crises. The UP government’s push for a constitutional amendment to realize 
its transformational goals became the principal source of conflict in the Congress. The 
1971 constitutional amendments in Chile that Allende had signed before Congress 
confirmed his presidency was demanded by the opposition to safeguard the constitutional 
order against the UP government’s plans for a new institutional order. The 1971 and 1973 
constitutional amendments in Turkey, which restricted certain liberties, strengthened the 
powers of the executive and increased the autonomy of the military, had also come in the 
aftermath of a military ultimatum. Intended as legal remedies to impending political 
crises, constitutional amendments in both cases were unable to avoid the breakdown of 
the institutional order.   
 Leading up to the coup, we observe that the inability and/or unwillingness of 
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political parties to compromise or allow for accommodation of different interests further 
polarized the fragmented political system and increased tension between the different 
forces within society.  
 A detailed analysis of the factors that led to the breakdown of democracy allows 
us to discern the shortcomings of the existing constitutional structure so that it becomes 
possible to assess how the constitutions drafted under military rule responded to these 
presumed failures. In both Chile and Turkey, once the armed forces overthrew the 
government, they identified the constitutional framework as a major reason for their 
coups. Arguing that unless the constitution’s inherent shortcomings are addressed, events 
could repeat themselves; a major project of the military regime in both countries became 
drafting a new constitution. This analysis helps us understand why the authoritarian 
constitutions in Chile and Turkey were envisioned to serve both authoritarians and 
democrats, to what they were reacting and in what way they aimed to transform the 
institutional order.  
 The third area (Chapter 4) that the dissertation examines is the authoritarian 
constitutions themselves. It begins by asking, why do authoritarians adopt constitution? 
The bourgeoning literature on authoritarianism and authoritarian constitutions argues that 
authoritarian constitutions are not “sham” documents and that they serve many functions. 
The chapter argues that the 1980 Constitution of Chile and the 1982 Constitution of 
Turkey fall under a distinct category of authoritarian constitutions; i.e., antidotal 
authoritarian constitutions, and determines that in both cases, the authoritarian drafters 
had four main objectives: to rectify what they deem to be problematic aspects of the 
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previous constitution, to bring about fundamental and lasting changes in political, 
economic and social sphere, to formulate the terms of transfer of power and the timeline 
of transition and to institute institutional and legal devices that will safeguard the 
established structure. These goals ensure that the authoritarian rulers are able to transmit 
certain delimiting characteristics of the authoritarian rule to ensuing civilian regimes after 
the return to electoral democracy. The authoritarian rulers in this context are governed by 
the idea that, ultimately they would be handing down the constitutional framework to 
democrats. Therefore these constitutions have a dualistic character that is capable of 
serving both authoritarians and those elected representatives that inherit the documents 
from them. They were not simply designed to extend authoritarian rule or to offer a 
“window dressing” to authoritarian rule. Informed by the past crises, the constitutions of 
Chile and Turkey aimed to bring about permanent change, envisioned a return to 
democratic rule and contained mechanisms that were intended to veto attempts to alter 
the established structure. 
 The fourth and final core component of this dissertation (Chapter 5, 6, and 7) sets 
up an overarching framework, which deconstructs the amendment making mechanism by 
examining: 1) the shifts in the balance of power, societal forces and external actors; 
political, social and cultural context; characteristics of the constitution and constitutional 
tradition- factors affecting the demand side of constitutional change; and 2) the 
procedural and informal institutional elements, including the role of veto powers; 
informational constraints; and the content of the proposed amendments themselves- 
factors affecting which proposals result in amendments-the supply side of constitutional 
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change. The framework offers a method to systematically consider how the constitutions 
inherited from the military regime were amended over the next thirty years. Arguing that 
we need to look beyond the amendment-making mechanisms to understand to what 
extent the constitutions have been amended and whether the amendments have been a 
product of consensus or not, this part of the dissertation dwells on the amendment-
making process in Chile and Turkey. Contextualizing the process by which the 
amendments were proposed, and the political actors involved both inside and outside the 
legislature, the analysis focuses on the incentives for change and the constraints making 
change unattainable. Since both Chile and Turkey are transitions to democracy without 
constitutional replacement where the civilians came into power within a constraining 
constitutional formula, it is no surprise that amendments are pursued to gradually 
eliminate the authoritarian aspects of the constitution.  
 However, the amendment-making process in both countries shows significant 
differences. Although in both cases the disproportional electoral formula motivated 
coalition-making for political parties, in Turkey at times it had also led to the emergence 
of majoritarian governments. In moments when constitutional amendments were products 
of coalition governments in Turkey, we observe greater consensus among political elites 
and less constraining maneuvers by veto powers, whether formal or informal. However, 
when majority governments are in power, the result is confrontational processes of 
amendment-making, where both formal veto powers, (the president and the 
Constitutional Court) and informal veto powers (the military) are more prominent, and 
referenda are employed as a way to overcome these impediments. In Chile, we observe 
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that there is no shift in the balance of power. The two electoral blocks that dominate 
Chilean politics remain stable and only when there are shifts in interests do constitutional 
amendments become possible. In Chile, the center-left government has a cautious but 
nevertheless a clear reformist agenda, but only when its interests align with the right-
wing coalition does it become possible to reform. There is no social mobilization for 
constitutional change, nor do the pro-reformers attempt to mobilize the masses. In Turkey, 
the reformist agenda is not always domestically motivated. In contrast with Chile, an 
external actor, the European Union, factors into the demand for constitutional amendment. 
In addition, there is a stronger societal demand for constitutional change in Turkey. 
Actors beyond the political elites are outspoken about the necessity of constitutional 
reform and push for change. However, even in moments when Turkey had weak and 
unstable coalition governments and divisive political and religious cleavages, it was 
possible to pass constitutional amendments that were clearly motivated by a desire to 
eliminate authoritarian elements from the constitution. When single party majority 
governments take over, we observe a greater focus on interest-based amendments and a 
lesser search for consensus. This contrasts significantly with Chile. Even when certain 
features of the institutional setup of the 1980 Constitution became advantageous for the 
center-left government, the impetus to remove the authoritarian elements did not 
disappear. Thus, parliamentary arithmetic is only a partial explanation. The difference 
lies between whether political elites are pursuing interests or impartial reasons.  
 Another point of difference is the nature of the negotiated transition. In Chile, we 
observe that the experience of authoritarian rule has led to a political-learning process; 
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and hence the political elite show a greater willingness to cooperate and avoid 
polarization. In contrast, polarization is an increasing phenomenon in Turkey, especially 
during the tenure of single party government of AKP where zero-sum politics is also a 
characteristic of constitutional politics. Thus, the final section provides a summary of 
demand and supply factors that affect the amendment-making process. Across-case 
analysis between Chile and Turkey as well as within case study of both countries provide 
detailed accounts of the push and pull factor that make constitutional change possible or 
hinder it.  
8.3 Comparative Study of Chile and Turkey: Constitution and Amendment-Making 
 The early history of constitution-making in Chile and Turkey shows some 
parallels and differences. Chile has a longer and more stable tradition of constitutional 
rule. Although the country experienced a series of constitutions in the early 19th century, 
the Chilean political and constitutional stability is noted as “exceptional” within the Latin 
American context after it settled on the 1833 Constitution, which endured for almost a 
century. The Turkish constitutional history during the Ottoman Empire period started out 
as concessions by the sultan that provided limited rights to certain groups and progressed 
towards a legal framework with the 1876 Constitution. However, contrary to the Chilean 
experience, the Turkish constitutional experience was cut short when the sultan 
established his personal rule- resulting in a thirty-year gap of unconstitutional rule. The 
impact of outside influence in constitution-making is much stronger in the Turkish case. 
While Chile was influenced by constitutional developments in the United States and 
Spain and borrowed ideas from outside, it was not pressured or conditioned by external 
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actors. In contrast, early constitutional history of Turkey show many examples of 
impositions of reform from outside as well as attempts to appease the crumbling empire’s 
Western allies.  
 Once the 1833 Constitution was adopted in Chile, with the exception of two brief 
interruptions in 1924 and 1932, the country experienced constitutional stability. Even in 
these moments, the military did not intervene and rule directly. However, the 1924 crisis 
has made a precedent for military involvement in constitution-making, in which the 
armed forces pressured for constitutional change. Both the 1833 and the 1925 
Constitutions in Chile were introduced by the victors of a conflict, civil war in the former 
and military coup in the latter (Couso 2012, 400). The Turkish constitutional history has 
much more blatant examples of military involvement in constitution-making and 
amending. The restoration of the abrogated 1876 Constitution was the result of a military 
revolt that later on introduced the 1909 amendments. The 1961 Constitution was drafted 
under a military regime of radical young officers that had overthrown the government 
and sought to rectify the shortcomings of the previous text that failed to safeguard the 
constitutional order against majoritarian impulses. The 1971 and 1973 amendments were 
approved at a time when the military intervened indirectly, and behind the scenes 
controlled the policies of the “above-politics” government that it encouraged to form. 
However, both Chile and Turkey lack experience with a representative constituent 
assembly. 
  A feature of Turkish constitutional history is the reactive character of 
developments. The 1909 amendments strengthened the legislative and limited the 
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prerogatives of the sultan because the sultan had previously abused his powers. The 1921 
and the 1924 Constitutions rested on the notion that the elected assembly was the 
representative of the nation because the previous experience under ITC had demonstrated 
the tendency of the executive to abuse its powers. However, the established constitutional 
system of the 1924 document, which did not have effective checks on the legislative, also 
demonstrated that the “supremacy of parliament” without checks and balances equated to 
a hegemonic executive. Hence the drafters of the 1961 Constitution established a system 
of checks and balances, separation of powers, rights and freedoms; but also provided for 
counter-majoritarian institutions such as the National Security Council, Constitutional 
Court and State Planning Organization in order to safeguard the constitutional structure. 
However, the domestic turmoil of the 1970s led the states elites to pursue constitutional 
amendments that would limit rights and freedoms and strengthen the executive and 
autonomy of the military. Thus, we observe that throughout Turkish constitutional history, 
a reactive impulse has pushed constitutional change.  
 With respect to Chile, early constitutional history provides ample examples of 
gradual constitutional change and compromise among political elites. For instance, the 
1833 constitution came to accommodate parliamentary style of government between 
1891 and 1921 without significant constitutional changes. The political leaders’ choice of 
administration allowed for greater parliamentary politics. However, we also observe that 
constitutional amendments are accomplished even when the constitution is revered, rigid 
and there is electoral manipulation. In times when the interests of political parties 
overlapped, it became possible to overcome constraints, formal and informal.  
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 In terms of the breakdown of democracy, we observe that while underlying causes 
may be different, polarization of the political party system and institutional deadlock are 
the immediate structural problems that deadlocked the system in Chile and Turkey and 
gave the military their justification to intervene. Economic paralysis and social chaos was 
experienced in both cases. What differentiates the two cases are the effects of these 
experiences in the aftermath of transition from authoritarian rule. In the case of Chile, we 
observe that the post-coup political leaders showed great restraint against polarizing the 
system and opted for gradual consensus-building. In Turkey, there was no political 
learning derived from the experience of the breakdown of democracy and military rule. 
What explains the difference? Political culture, or level of violence endured during the 
authoritarian regime or the contextual features of the transition or the attitudes of political 
leaders? It is not clear. However, the comparison demonstrates that despite the 
similarities in terms of the characteristics of the antidotal authoritarian constitutions and 
the process of constitution-making under the military regime, as well as the decision of 
the incoming civilians to maintain the document, the ensuing amendment-making show 
great variances. 
 Longitudinal within-case analysis of Chile and Turkey reveals different demand 
and supply factors that affected the amendment-making process after the civilians 
inherited the constitutions drafted under military regime. Chile since the return of 
democracy experienced gradual constitutional change that has been the product of elite 
consensus with little or no input from the outside, except the contribution of experts 
(Contiades and Fotiadou 2013, 427). Thus for Chile the preferences of political elites 
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have been the most important factors. In the aftermath of the transition a 
democratic/antidemocratic regime cleavage replaced other religious and class-based 
divisions. The balance of power is explanatory in the Chilean case to the extent that the 
political opposition has a veto on constitutional amendments. Considering that the 
balance of power did not shift between 1990 and 2010 and no significant new political 
party emerged to discern how constitutional amendments were approved we need to look 
at the shifts in the interests (personal, group and institutional) and impartial reasons of the 
political parties. For instance, the right-wing RN was attempting to distance itself from 
the military regime and was pursuing future electoral payoffs by directly negotiating with 
Concertación during the 1989 constitutional amendments. Similarly, the 1991 
constitutional change that democratized municipal elections was the result of the right-
wing parties’ calculus that the existing centralized system was going to be in their 
disadvantage. Although these changes were ultimately democratizing, they were also 
agreed upon because they served the interests of the right coalition. The 2005 
constitutional reforms became feasible only when the right-wing political parties realized 
that the authoritarian elements in the constitution were starting to work against their 
advantage to that point so they wanted constitutional changes that would strengthen their 
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  Figure 8.1: Amendments to the 1980 Constitution of Chile 
 
 
  Figure 8.2: Amendments to the 1982 Constitution of Turkey 
 
  A with-in case analysis of the balance of power in Turkey reveals how shifts 
from a fragmented to majoritarian system changes the dynamics of constitutional 
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governments, constitutional change is confrontational. For instance, even when the 
parliamentary arithmetic did not allow for ANAP to pass constitutional amendments 
without the support of opposition parties, it sought vote-trading and to defeat the 
opposition party’s demands took the constitutional change to referendum with the 
calculation that it would be defeated. Under the AKP government, recourse to 
referendum was exercised twice as well, in each case as an alternative to seek consensus 
with the opposition.  
 Under the single party governments, examples of personal and group interests are 
ample. The most blatant example of personal interest is the 2002 constitutional 
amendment, which was tailored specifically the AKP leader, Erdogan. An example of 
group interest was the example of the 1988 constitutional attempt by ANAP that would 
allow for early elections. Many critics of the 2010 constitutional amendments that altered 
the composition of the judiciary and allowed for greater role for the parliament in the 
appointment structure argued that this was an attempt by a dominant party to capture the 
third branch of the government. It is important to highlight that both of these political 
parties ANAP and AKP emerged as new entities after the collapse of established ones, 
signifying important shifts in party competition (Negretto 2012, 756). 
 In contrast, during the period of coalition government of the 1990s, constitutional 
change is done through consensus building. Although each political party aims to 
maximize its interests, inter-party committee (1995) and all party accord commission 
(2001) accomplished their tasks through consensus building. However, an important 
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element in these instances has been the European Union conditionality, which brings 
another subcategory of demand factors. 
 In contrast to Chile, the impetus for constitutional change in Turkey had the 
advantage of having the support of societal forces and external actors. Since the 1982 
Constitution entered into forces, bottom up pressure for constitutional reform had been 
strong. Civil society organizations lobbied the parliament; associations, unions, 
foundations and other democratic mass organizations organized panels and talks: 
academicians, think tanks and other experts produced proposals of constitutional change. 
European Union especially during the 2001 and 2004 constitutional amendment was a 
significant actor pushing for change. To the extent that the detention of Pinochet raised 
the human rights issues and the decision of the IACtHR highlighted the restrictions on 
freedom of expression, there was limited influence of external actors in Chile as well. But 
mostly, it was a domestically and elite driven change.  
 In terms of political, social and cultural context, we observe great variances across 
and within cases. Between cases, we observe that the nature of the transition had set the 
tone of the contextual factors. Despite the fact that both cases are negotiated transitions, 
in Chile the act of defeating the military regime at the referendum is instrumental in 
uniting the left and center parties. In contrast, when the military left power in Turkey, ban 
on political parties was still in force and by the time the ban was lifted, the center-left and 
center-right was fractured. The left never recovered and the center-right parties withered 
gradually. If we compare the political actors who inherited power from the military 
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regime, the difference is telling. Although in both cases, the incoming civilians did not 
challenge the economic model instituted by the military regime, in the case of Chile the 
center-left coalition was clearly anti-military regime and there was a cautionary but 
nevertheless reformist political agenda. In Turkey, the first civilian government that came 
to power after the military regime was a right-wing political party whose leader had held 
office under the military government.  
 Both countries suffered from polarization at the societal level in the 1970s, which 
was one of the factors that led to the breakdown of democracy. Center-left parties in 
Chile after the transition abandoned ideological polarization and adapted an approach 
aimed at depoliticizing the state and society to the extent that of political apathy (Posner 
2008, 92-96).943  In contrast, polarization of the Turkish party system has gradually 
increased since the return of democracy, the Turkish society is fragmented across 
ideological and partisan dividing lines and questions related to constitutional change is at 
the center of the contestation. The constitutional amendments in Chile were aimed at 
removing the authoritarian elements from the constitution and enhancing the democratic 
qualities of the political system. Even the amendments related to the appointment of the 
Supreme Court, which came in the immediate aftermath of a scandal, also carried 
democratization goals beside the aim of addressing a problem. Constitutional changes 
that took place during the tenure of AKP (with the exception of 2004 amendments) are 
marked for the polarized atmosphere in which constitutional amendments were approved. 
We observe that within the parliament polarization between the pro-secular forces and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
943 As the above discussion indicated, the trend switched back and since 2011 especially through massive 
student protests and school takeovers, social mobilization have been increasing. 
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pro-Islamist forces, which mirrors polarization at the societal level. The referendums for 
the 2007 and the 2010 constitutional amendments further increased the polarization. The 
referendums did not just divide the public into two camps between the supporters of the 
constitutional change and the opposition, but also sharpened the division between the 
binary oppositions created by the government. These constitutional amendments of 2007 
and 2010 are also examples of initiatives aimed at responding to a problem or a crisis, 
rather than enhancing democratic credentials of Turkey. 
 In terms of the characteristics of the constitutions, we observe significant 
commonalities between the 1980 Constitution of Chile and the 1982 Constitution. Born 
in the same period and product of military regime, both respond to the perceived 
institutional weaknesses of the previous constitutional order, establish counter-
majoritarian institutions that insulate decision-making, provide a transition calendar and a 
legal guideline which guarantee that the constitution survive the transition. Both 
constitutions have several devices including a stringent amendment-making mechanism 
that aims to protect the regime’s legal apparatus. The constitutions in both countries are 
supplemented with other legislations also drafted and approved under the military regime. 
These include most significantly the law on electoral system and political parties. Age-
wise approximate, both constitutions are also close to one another in terms of length. The 
constitutional history in Chile and Turkey inform us that neither of these countries 
experienced frequent constitutional replacement. However, Chile is recognized for its 
legalistic culture and long constitutional tradition that go back to the 1833 Constitution 
(Montes and Vial 2005). Chile’s prior democratic history also generates viable examples 
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of consensus as opposed to non-cooperation (Alberts 2006, 165). 
 As explained above, constitutions in both countries provide for amendment-
making rules, which stipulate the procedural constraints for constitutional change. Table 
8.1 provides a summary of the constitutional amendment-making procedure in Chile and 
Turkey. Additional to these requirements, the Turkish constitution also includes three 
unamendable articles and the Chilean constitution also includes entrenched chapters, 
which require higher majorities (Table 8.2.). Chapter 6 and 7 on amendment-making 
reveal that the Turkish amendment-making process is marked by instances when the 
president and the Constitutional Court act as a veto power and recourse to referendum is 
sought to overcome presidential veto. In Chile, the Constitutional Tribunal decision 
before the 1988 plebiscite that compelled the military regime to follow the standards of 
political party formation and organizing plebiscite allowed the democratic opposition to 
defeat the military regime and force it to negotiate constitutional amendments.   
Table 8.1: Constitutional Amendment-Making Procedure in Chile and Turkey 
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 Solely looking at the amendment-making procedure does not capture the other 
constraints that may arise during the process of amendment-making where we observe 
great variance between Chile and Turkey. In Chile, the main veto power of 
constitutional change is the political right. Thus, its ability to constraint the amendment-
making process plays out in the Congress. Any amendment that does not garner the 
support of some members of the right-wing coalition would not be approved. This 
reality has also constrained the inclination of center-left government in Chile to push 
through changes because of the anticipation that political agreement could not be 
reached with the right-wing political parties.  However, the veto powers are not 
restricted to formal ones that have specific powers under the amendment-making 
procedure. We observe that in both Chile and Turkey, the military acts as a veto power. 
For instance, under the Aylwin government the decision not to pursue constitutional 
amendment that would reestablish the president’s power to remove high-ranking officers 
from the armed forces is because of the precarious nature of civil-military relations. 
However, in Chile the military ceases to act as a veto power and by the time 2005 
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constitutional amendments are negotiated and approved, the military is no longer an 
actor in the political arena. Turkish armed forces, despite the relevant constitutional 
changes that eliminated their prerogatives, continued to interfere in the political arena, 
exemplified by their direct interference during the 2007 presidential elections.  
Table 8.2: Necessary Quorums to Change the Constitution of Chile (post-1989 
Amendment) 
Chapters Quorum Chamber of 
Deputies 
Senate 
I, III, VIIII, XI, 
XII, XV 
2/3 80 25 
II, IV, V, VI, VII, 
IX, X, XIII, XIV 
3/5 72 23 
 
 To understand how authoritarian constitutions drafted under military regimes 
were amended under subsequent civilian governments, this dissertation has looked at the 
demand and supply factors that affect the desire for change and which proposals result in 
constitutional amendments. The comparative study of Chile and Turkey show that there 
are different pathways to constitutional change, and that to observe the process of 
amendment-making it is not sufficient to look at the majority requirements and veto 
powers. Although it might be the parliament/Congress that initiates and approves the 
constitutional amendments, simply looking at the quorums provides only partial 
explanation. Despite the similarities between the institutional characteristics established 
by the constitution, amendment-making followed different courses in the two countries. 
However, within the cases we also observe differences. Changing incentives for the right-
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wing parties, different approaches of the executive, and the relative strength and position 
of the armed forces explain variation within the Chilean process of amendment-making. 
In Turkey, a shifting balance of power, the emergence of new political parties and 
collapse of established ones, growing polarization and fragmentation of the society and 
political party system and waning influence of the EU explain why the consensual 
approach of the 1990s was replaced with a majoritarian amendment strategy. Across 
cases, we observe that the political learning derived from the experience of authoritarian 
rule is absent in the Turkish case. Between 1990 and 2010, Chile does not go through any 
shifts in the balance of power, but Turkey shifts between single-party to coalition 
governments and back to single-party governments. Veto powers, both formal and 
informal, increasingly become involved in the amendment-making process as 
polarization between the pro-secular forces and pro-Islamist forces increase. In Turkey, 
the EU conditionality provided an additional demand for constitutional change; however, 
when the EU project got sidelined, amendments that were aimed at removing 
authoritarian features of the constitution and enhancing democracy became secondary to 
amendments that aimed to respond to a political crisis. Despite the fact that Turkey had 
introduced wide ranging amendments that aimed at rectifying the democratic deficit of 
the 1982 Constitution, none of them addressed the prerogatives and arbitrary powers of 
the president. In contrast, the constitutional amendment that provided for direct election 
of the president further strengthened the president’s power vis-à-vis the parliament by 
creating two elected centers of power in a parliamentary system (Kalaycioglu 2005, 128). 
The fact that there was no societal push for constitutional change did not preclude the 
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political elites in Chile from pursuing constitutional amendments that would remove 
authoritarian elements from the constitution. In summary, the different outcomes in these 
two cases were shaped by variations in historical context, the balance of power, the 
number of veto players, and different incentives for reform; i.e., the reassertion of 
democratic practices in Chile and a reactive response to political and constitutional crises 
in Turkey.  
 This dissertation attempted to answer whether it is possible to transform 
authoritarian constitutions drafted under authoritarian rule into frameworks that are 
compatible for a consolidated democracy. It offers two major findings and one tentative 
finding. One, procedural constraints do not necessarily dictate the amendment-making 
process. A comprehensive analysis of the amendment-making process reveals that 
legislative majorities and the veto powers provide an incomplete explanation. Second, 
each instance of amendment-making is unique; different actors and different contextual 
factors shape the process and determine whether the process is a result of consensus or 
confrontation. A rather tentative conclusion that this dissertation makes is that 
constitutional change impetus does not wane in time and constitutional replacement may 
become a goal even though a constitution is thoroughly and gradually revised and 
amended. The saga of constitutional change in Chile and Turkey continues, but the 
direction has moved towards drafting a new constitution and not amending the existing 
one. 
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Appendix A. Author’s Interviews  
Interviews for Chile 
Alberto Robles Pantoja- Deputy from PRSD, Valparaiso Chile (22/10/2012) 
Alfonso De Urresti Longton- Deputy from PS, Valparaiso Chile (22/10/2012) 
Alfredo Joignant Randon- Professor of Political Science at Universidad Diego Portales, 
Santiago Chile (11/11/2012) 
Carlos Huneeus Madge- Professor of Political Science at Universidad de Chile, Santiago 
Chile (14/12/2012) 
Carlos Carmona Santender- Member of Tribunal Constitucional, Santiago Chile 
(14/12/2012) 
Claudia Heiss- Professor of Political Science at Universidad de Chile, Santiago Chile 
(15/11/2012) 
Claudio A. Fuentes- Professor of Political Science at Universidad Diego Portales, 
Santiago Chile (12/17/2012) 
Eduardo Dockendorff Vallejos- Minister Secretary General of the Presidency (2004-
2006), Santiago Chile (19/12/2012) 
Enrique Accorsi- Deputy from PPD, Valparaiso Chile (22/10/2012)  
Fernando Atria- Professor of Law at Universidad Adolfo Ibanez, Santiago Chile 
(07/12/2012) 
Gabriel Ascensio- Deputy from PDC, Valparaiso Chile (22/10/2012) 
Guillermo Ceroni- Deputy from PPD, Valparaiso Chile (22/10/2012) 
Héctor Mery R.- Analyst at La Fundación Jaime Guzmán, Santiago Chile (1/31/2013) 
Javier Couso- Professor of Constitutional Law, Universidad Diego Portales, Santiago 
Chile (06/12/2012) 
Joaquín Tuma Zedan- Deputy from PPD, Valparaiso Chile (22/10/2012) 
José Francisco García García- Analyst at Libertad & Desarrollo, Santiago Chile 
(26/12/2012) 
Juan Emilio Cheyre – Former Commander-in-Chief (2002-2006) Santiago Chile 
(1/29/2013) 
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Juan Pablo Luna - Professor of Political Science at Universidad Católica de Chile, 
Santigao Chile (11/11/2012) 
Marcelo Schilling Rodríguez- Deputy from PS, Valparaiso Chile (22/10/2012)  
Patricio Navia-Professor of Political Science at Universidad Diego Portales, Santiago 
Chile (23/11/2012) 
Pablo Ruiz-Tagle V.- Professor of Law at Universidad de Chile, Santiago Chile 
(1/30/2013) 
Ricardo Lagos- President of Chile (2000-2006), Providence, RI (13/10/2013) 
  
Interviews for Turkey 
Ahmet Iyimaya- Deputy from AKP, Ankara Turkey (26/11/2014) 
Atilla Kart- Deputy from CHP, Ankara Turkey (26/11/2014) 
Ayhan Sefer Üstün- Deputy from AKP, Ankara Turkey (26/11/2014) 
Burhan Kuzu- Deputy from AKP and Chairman of Constitution Commission, Ankara 
Turkey (26/11/2014) 
Isa Gök- Deputy from CHP, Ankara Turkey (26/11/2014) 
Kenan Özdemir- General Director of Law, Minister of Justice (2008-2011), Ankara 
Turkey (27/11/2014) 
Nevzat Korkmaz- Deputy from MHP, Ankara Turkey (27/11/2014) 
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Appendix B. Number of Amendments in Chile and Turkey 
Number of Amendments in Chile 1980-2010 
Law No Date Number of 
Amendments 
18.825  August 17, 1989 54 
19.055 April 1, 1991 4 
19.097 November 12, 1991 21 
19.174 November 12, 1992 1 
19.295 March 4, 1994 1 
19.448 February 20, 1996 1 
19.519 September 16, 1997 10 
19.526 November 17, 1997 5 
19.541 December 22, 1997 8 
19.597 January 14, 1999 1 
19.611 June 16, 1999 2 
19.643 November 5, 1999 4 
19.672 April 28, 2000 1 
19.671 April 29, 2000 1 
19.742 August 25, 2001 2 
19.876 May 22, 2003 1 
20.050 August 26, 2005 58 
20.162 February 16, 2007 2 
20.193 July 30, 2007 2 
20.245 January 10, 2008 1 
20.337 April 4, 2009 3 
20.346 May 14, 2009 1 
20.352 May 30, 2009 1 
20.354 June 12, 2009 4 
20.390 October 28, 2009 11 
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Law No Date Number of 
Amendments 
3361 May 17, 1987 4 
3913 July 8, 1993 1 
4121 July 23, 1995 15 
4388 June 18, 1999 1 
4446 August 13, 1999 3 
4709 October 3, 2001 33 
4720 November 21, 2001 1 
4777 December 26, 2002 3 
5170 May 7, 2004 10 
5370 May 27, 2005 1 
5428 October 29, 2005 5 
5551 October 13, 2006 1 
5659 May 10, 2007 1 
5678 May 31, 2007 7 
5697 October 16, 2007 2 
5982 May 7, 2010 26 
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